Tina M. Adams v. Michael A. Delong

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Docket: Pen-24-587
• Status: Published
• Author: LAWRENCE, J.

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 35 Docket: Pen-24-587 Submitted On Briefs: September 24, 2025 Decided: April 16, 2026

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and LIPEZ, JJ.

TINA M. ADAMS

v.

MICHAEL A. DELONG

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] Michael A. Delong appeals from a judgment of divorce entered by

the District Court (Bangor, Dufour, J.) on Tina M. Adams’s complaint. The court

incorporated the parties’ partial settlement agreement and then addressed the

remaining contested issues, which included the disposition of real estate in

Bucksport and an airplane acquired during the marriage, and the dissolution of

a jointly owned limited liability company (LLC). Delong contends that the court

abused its discretion in the division of the Bucksport real estate, erred when it

determined that the airplane was used for personal rather than business use,

and erred when it valued the airplane at $37,500. Delong also argues that an

LLC cannot be dissolved in a judgment for divorce. Although the court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that the airplane was used for personal and 2

not business purposes, it erred in finding the airplane was worth $37,500 and

it lacked jurisdiction to dissolve the LLC. Therefore, we vacate the distribution

of the Bucksport real estate, the valuation of the airplane, and the dissolution

of the LLC, but affirm the divorce judgment in all other respects. We do not

consider the division of the Bucksport real estate in this opinion because the

court must reconsider its division of the contested portions of the marital

estate.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and the

court’s findings of fact, which are supported by competent evidence in the

record except as indicated. See Buck v. Buck, 2015 ME 33, ¶ 5, 113 A.3d 1095.

[¶3] Adams filed a complaint for divorce on December 29, 2020. The

parties entered into a partial settlement agreement, which left the disposition

of the marital real estate, the alleged misuse of funds, and the disposition of an

airplane as the only identified contested issues. On October 28, 2024, the court

heard testimony from the parties on the contested issues. The court entered a

divorce judgment on December 11, 2024,1 and found the following facts.

1Later, upon stipulation by the parties, the court entered an amended divorce judgment on January 30, 2025, to account for any potential proceeds of Adams’s pending personal injury lawsuit. The changes are not relevant to the present appeal. 3

[¶4] The parties were married in 2006. In 2018, the parties purchased

real estate in Bucksport for $73,000. Both parties initially contributed to the

upkeep and renovations of the real estate. In 2020, the parties began operating

the real estate as a short-term rental business. The parties established an LLC

to operate the short-term rental business.2

[¶5] In June 2022, Adams obtained a protection from abuse (PFA) order,

prohibiting Delong from having contact with her or going to the Bucksport real

estate. From June 2022 onward, Adams has operated and maintained the

short-term rental business on her own, including by repairing and renovating

the real estate through substantial painting and improvements to the roof, pool,

and electrical system; interacting with guests; and cleaning the rental units

between guests. The court found that Delong could not assist with this

maintenance or operate the business because of the PFA order, the existence of

which was “of his own doing.”

[¶6] The parties decided to sell the Bucksport real estate in 2022. Adams

prepared the real estate for sale, readied it for showings, and conducted tours

of the property for potential buyers entirely on her own. As of October 2024,

2 The court did not make findings regarding the LLC and addressed the LLC only in its conclusions

of law. 4

the Bucksport real estate was under contract for $862,000. Any increase in the

value of the real estate from 2022 to the time of the judgment was attributed to

Adams for her significant contributions to the real estate’s value and her sole

efforts to maintain, improve, and sell the real estate. The court noted no

evidence was introduced regarding the value of the real estate in June 2022 or

the value of the improvements made by Adams, but nevertheless found Adams

increased the value of the real estate.

[¶7] The parties shared a joint bank account to operate the short-term

rental business. Over several months, Delong removed up to $6,000 from the

joint account for expenses not related to the business, which the court found to

be a misuse of funds.3 The court noted that Delong testified that he withdrew

$3,600 for a roofing project that was never completed. The court also noted

that Delong testified that he made withdrawals to match Adams’s expenses but

did not state that those withdrawals were used for the short-term rental

business in any manner.

[¶8] In October 2022, Adams transferred the remaining funds in the joint

account to a private account after Delong removed nearly all of the funds. The

court found Adams made a reasonable decision under the circumstances to

3 Delong disagrees with but does not challenge on appeal the finding that he misused the funds. 5

secure the funds in a separate account. Adams continued to use the transferred

funds for the short-term rental business and not for personal use.

[¶9] The court also heard testimony regarding a 2009 SeaRey airplane,

which the court found to be marital property. There was insufficient evidence

to support Delong’s claim that the airplane was used primarily for his

business—unrelated to the LLC and known as Delong’s Marine Service—which

the parties had agreed would be “set aside” to Delong and not divided by the

court. The court found the parties provided similar estimates for the value of

the airplane and decided to assign a value between the two estimates at

$37,500. Delong indicated the airplane was worth $35,000 in his financial

statement, and the court stated that Adams requested the court to assign a

value of $40,000 to the airplane. There is no evidence in the record supporting

a value of $40,000, and Adams does not address the court’s valuation of $40,000

in her brief. In her financial statement from 2021, Adams estimated the

airplane was worth $55,000.

[¶10] The court made the following conclusions of law and distributed

the real estate accordingly. The court awarded Adams 60% of the value of the 6

Bucksport real estate due to Adams’s sole efforts and expenses to maintain and

improve the buildings and the business after June 2022.4

[¶11] In conjunction with the sale of the Bucksport real estate, the court

ordered the dissolution of the LLC within two months of the sale of the real

estate. The court ordered any profit held by the LLC at that time to be

distributed to pay for the costs advanced by Adams and any remaining funds to

be divided equally between Adams and Delong.

[¶12] The court determined that the airplane was a marital asset. The

court valued the airplane at $37,500. The court awarded the airplane to Delong

and ordered Delong to either pay Adams $18,750 for her marital interest or sell

the airplane and equally divide the proceeds.

[¶13] Delong timely filed an appeal. M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶14] On appeal, Delong claims the court erred in its division of the

Bucksport real estate, its determination that the airplane was not used

primarily for business purposes, its valuation of the airplane, and its dissolution

of the LLC. As we discuss below, the court erroneously assigned the airplane a

4The Bucksport real estate has since sold for $862,000 with 10% placed in escrow pending the outcome of this appeal. Adams filed a motion for contempt against Delong for refusing to disburse these funds immediately. The court deferred ruling on the motion until the resolution of this appeal. 7

value of $37,500 and did not have jurisdiction to dissolve the LLC. Therefore,

we need not address Delong’s arguments regarding the division of the

Bucksport real estate, as the court may change the division upon

reconsideration of its treatment of the airplane and the LLC.5 See Macdonald v.

Macdonald, 532 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Me. 1987) (vacating and remanding the

remainder of a divorce judgment for the court to “reexamine and readjust as

necessary . . . the distribution of property in light of its changes” in the

reallocation of other property).

5 To be clear, we note that as originally ordered, the court’s division of the Bucksport real estate was not an abuse of discretion, as the court could find that Adams should receive a greater share based on her work to maintain, improve, finance, and sell the real estate in the wake of the PFA order and Delong’s misuse of the funds dedicated to maintaining the real estate. See Viola v. Viola, 2015 ME 6, ¶ 9, 109 A.3d 634 (holding that the distribution of property must be supported by “competent evidence in the record” and that the court must consider the relevant factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1) (2026) (quotation marks omitted)). We note that the court appeared to find that Adams paid for costs, taxes, and maintenance “on her own.” However, the court also found that she had sole control of the LLC account, except for the $6,000 removed by Delong, and was apparently using the rental income—which was a marital asset of the LLC—to pay for some if not all of the costs. The court did not appear to take into consideration the income received, just the expenses incurred during her period of sole control.

We also note that there was no evidence of the value of the property in 2022, as the trial court found. Although the trial court assumed there was an increase in the value after 2022, the only evidence in the record is that the property was listed for sale at $1.4 million in 2022, and that it sold for $862,000 in 2024. 8

A. The Airplane

1. Use of the Airplane

[¶15] Delong argues that the court erred by not distributing the airplane

to him as a business asset because the parties previously agreed that his

business, Delong’s Marine Service, would be “set aside” to him and not

distributed to Adams. Delong contends that he purchased the airplane for his

business to aid in inspecting docks and ramps to ensure the security of the

equipment for his clients and thus it should go to him as part of the business.

Adams does not agree that the airplane was part of the business. She argues

that the airplane is presumed to be marital property because it was purchased

during the marriage and we should not second-guess the court’s credibility

determination regarding Adams’s testimony about the extent of the use of the

airplane for personal rather than business purposes.

[¶16] We review the court’s division of property in a divorce action for

an abuse of discretion. Murphy v. Murphy, 2003 ME 17, ¶ 27, 816 A.2d 814.

“Property acquired during a marriage is statutorily presumed to be marital

property” under 19-A M.R.S. § 953(3) (2026). Nou v. Hout, 2025 ME 44, ¶ 23,

335 A.3d 603. We defer to the “court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility

and its resolution of conflicts in testimony.” Id. ¶ 22 (quotation marks omitted). 9

[¶17] The airplane was purchased during the marriage and is therefore

presumed to be marital property. See id. ¶ 23. The question then is whether

the airplane should have been considered a business asset and, as such, “set

aside” to Delong along with Delong’s Marine Service pursuant to the parties’

partial settlement agreement.6

[¶18] Here, the court heard testimony from Delong that the “sole use for

the airplane” was for his business regardless of any enjoyment had while using

the airplane and that the airplane significantly reduced his workload. Adams

testified that Delong “did not go checking all these moorings and everything

else that he says he does, but it was used for—for pleasure.” Even though

Adams did concede that Delong may have used the airplane for work “a few

times,” she insisted the plane was used primarily “for pleasure all the time.”

[¶19] Delong provided no further evidence beyond his testimony that

the airplane was part of his business and should be “set aside” to him as part of

Delong’s Marine Service. The court did not err as it had the authority as the fact

finder to resolve the conflicting testimonies, and Adams’s testimony supports

the court’s finding. See id. ¶ 22. Therefore, we affirm the conclusions that the

6 The court seemingly treated Delong’s Marine Service as marital property when dividing the marital estate, as it stated, under the discussion of intangible personal property, that “[t]he business known as Delong’s Marine [Service] shall be set aside to [Delong].” 10

airplane was marital property and was not a business asset of Delong’s Marine

Service.

2. Value of the Airplane

[¶20] Delong argues that the court erred in setting the value of the

airplane at $37,500 due to insufficient evidence. Delong asserts that the court

erroneously relied on an estimate of $40,000, did not consider the damaged and

disassembled condition of the airplane, and erroneously considered the 2021

value of the airplane instead of its value at the time of property distribution.

Adams argues that the court had sufficient evidence to determine that the value

of the airplane is $37,500 because Delong did not file a motion for further

findings of fact pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 52, and therefore we

should “assume that the court implicitly made all findings consistent with the

evidence” necessary to support the judgment.

[¶21] The determination of the value of marital property is reviewed for

clear error. Bernsten v. Bernsten, 2017 ME 111, ¶ 13, 163 A.3d 820. The court

was required to “determine the marital property’s value by conducting an

independent review of the evidence presented by the parties.” Bolduc v. Bolduc,

2023 ME 54, ¶ 12, 301 A.3d 771. “The court’s valuation of assets must reflect a 11

reasoned evaluation by the court of all of the evidence.” Bernsten, 2017 ME 111,

¶ 13, 163 A.3d 820 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶22] At trial, neither party testified to the estimated value of the

airplane. The court therefore had only the financial statements submitted in

March and April of 2021, in which Delong estimated the value to be $35,000

and Adams estimated the value to be $55,000, and Delong’s testimony that the

airplane was “completely disassembled” and damaged at the time of the

hearing. No evidence in the record supports the value of $40,000 relied on by

the court.7 Accordingly, the court erred in using the $40,000 amount to

determine the value of the airplane and erred in assigning a value of $37,500 to

the airplane as this did not reflect a reasoned evaluation. See Bernsten, 2017

ME 111, ¶ 13, 163 A.3d 820. Therefore, we vacate the judgment as to the value

of the airplane and remand for further findings.

B. Dissolution of the LLC

[¶23] Delong, citing Littell v. Bridges, 2023 ME 29, ¶ 12, 293 A.3d 445,

argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to order the dissolution of the jointly

7The value of $40,000 is found only in Adams’s proposed judgment filed with the court on October 28, 2024, as her requested half-share of the airplane that she valued—for the first time in the record—at $80,000. As Delong noted, nowhere in the record does Adams estimate the total value of the airplane to be $40,000. 12

owned LLC because an LLC may not be dissolved as part of a judgment of

divorce. Adams contends that the LLC falls under an exception that allows a

divorce court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a third-party business if the

business was “represented in all but name before the court” and the court acted

on the “reasonable assumption” that a spouse and the business “were

essentially the same party.” Robinson v. Robinson, 2000 ME 101, ¶ 11, 751 A.2d

457.

[¶24] We review the jurisdiction of a court de novo. Howard v. Howard,

2010 ME 83, ¶ 10, 2 A.3d 318. A court can obtain personal jurisdiction only

over the parties to a case, and a court “may not exercise personal jurisdiction

over an LLC in a divorce action” because an LLC “is an entity distinct from its

members” and therefore not a party to divorce. Littell, 2023 ME 29, ¶ 11, 293

A.3d 445.

[¶25] The exception argued by Adams does not apply to the dissolution

of an LLC and instead applies to other actions a court may take such as the

assignment of an interest or payment. See Robinson, 2000 ME 101, ¶¶ 8-11, 751

A.2d 457 (holding that the company and spouse were essentially the same

entity in a judgment regarding distribution of payments to the other spouse).

“Moreover, an LLC may not be dissolved as part of a judgment of divorce.” 13

Littell, 2023 ME 29, ¶ 12, 293 A.3d 445 (noting that 31 M.R.S. § 1595 (2026)

does not “include divorce in its exhaustive list of circumstances in which courts

can order the dissolution of an LLC”). Therefore, the court did not have

jurisdiction to dissolve the LLC, and we vacate and remand for the court to

consider how to distribute the shares of membership interests in, or ownership

of, the LLC, as opposed to its assets, as part of the marital estate.

III. CONCLUSION

[¶26] We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by finding

that the airplane was marital property subject to division. However, the court

erred in assigning the airplane a value of $37,500 because the court did not rely

on facts in evidence in doing so. The court also lacked jurisdiction to dissolve

the LLC in the judgment for divorce. Therefore, we affirm the divorce judgment

in part and vacate it in part and remand for reconsideration of the distribution

of the proceeds from the Bucksport real estate, the valuation of the airplane,

and the disposition of the property interest in the LLC.

The entry is:

Judgment vacated with respect to the distribution of the proceeds from the Bucksport real estate, the valuation of the airplane, and the dissolution of the LLC. Judgment affirmed in all other respects. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 14

C. Peter Bos, Esq., Gray & Palmer, Bangor, for appellant Michael A. Delong

Bronson Stephens, Esq., Fort Knox Law, LLC, Bucksport, for appellee Tina M. Adams

Bangor District Court docket number DIV-2020-519 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY