Deborah A. Chatfield v. Estate of Frederick H. Chatfield Jr.

2025 ME 69

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: July 29, 2025
• Docket: Kno-24-327
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 69 Docket: Kno-24-327 Submitted On Briefs: March 18, 2025 Decided: July 29, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, and LAWRENCE, JJ.

DEBORAH A. CHATFIELD

v.

ESTATE OF FREDERICK H. CHATFIELD JR.

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] The Estate of Frederick H. Chatfield Jr. appeals from the denial of

Frederick H. Chatfield Jr.’s motion for relief from the divorce judgment granting

a divorce to Frederick1 and Deborah A. Chatfield. See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). The

Estate argues that the District Court (Rockland, E. Walker, D.C.J.) erred when it

denied Frederick’s motion for relief from judgment for three reasons: (1) the

court erred in determining that the property at issue was marital; (2) the court

did not have jurisdiction over the property because it should have been

classified as nonmarital; and (3) the court erred when it concluded that

Deborah’s belief that the disputed property was marital in nature, if shown to

1 Because the parties to the underlying divorce action share a last name, this opinion will refer to

the parties using their first names. 2

be wrong, would not be the type of mistake that could form the basis for an

award of relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

[¶2] Frederick and Deborah were married on June 28, 2002. Deborah

filed for divorce on July 14, 2021. Frederick was initially represented by

counsel but the attorney-client relationship broke down and his counsel

withdrew in December 2021, after which Frederick represented himself. The

court held a final hearing on August 23, 2024, at which only Deborah testified

because Frederick failed to appear. Two days later, the court entered a divorce

judgment in which it found, inter alia, that certain real estate in Rockport was

the parties’ marital property. The judgment ordered the sale of the property.

Frederick did not file a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of

law and did not appeal from the divorce judgment.

[¶3] Upon learning that Deborah had listed the Rockport real estate for

sale, Frederick retained counsel, who timely moved for relief from judgment

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b).2 Specifically, Frederick alleged that he was

M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides that the “motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for 2

reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 3

entitled to relief from the operation of the judgment based on reasons

(1), which permits relief where there is a “mistake”; (3), which permits relief in

the event of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4), which permits relief where a lack of jurisdiction rendered the judgment

void; or (6), the “catch-all provision,” which allows relief for any other reason

that justifies the relief. After a hearing, the court denied the motion on July 8,

2024.

[¶4] Frederick timely appealed from the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.

See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). While his appeal was pending, Frederick died; his

counsel filed a suggestion of death and moved to substitute the personal

representative of Frederick’s estate for Frederick. We granted the motion to

substitute parties. Because Frederick died after the parties submitted briefing,

we requested, and the parties provided, supplemental authorities on whether

the appeal of the denial of a party’s M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion from a divorce

judgment is moot when a party dies during the pendency of the appeal.

or taken.” Frederick’s motion relied upon reasons (1), (3), (4), and (6). Frederick’s Rule 60(b) motion was filed on April 29, 2024, eight months and five days after the entry of the divorce judgment. 4

B. Factual Background

[¶5] The following facts, which are drawn from the court’s judgment

denying Frederick’s motion for relief, are supported by competent evidence in

the record. See In re Children of Jessica J., 2020 ME 32, ¶ 15, 277 A.3d 573. The

divorce court found that the Rockport real estate was marital based on a

warranty deed dated May 22, 2006, transferring the property from the

collective ownership of Frederick and three of his siblings to the sole ownership

of Frederick, as well as Deborah’s testimony that the home was marital

property because it was acquired during the marriage. In the divorce judgment,

Deborah was given sole authority over the sale of the home. Frederick did not

rebut or challenge Deborah’s testimony because he was not present at the

divorce hearing, and Frederick did not file a motion for further findings of fact

after the divorce judgment was entered. Moreover, at the hearing on

Frederick’s motion for relief from judgment, the court did not find credible his

testimony that he never received notice of the final divorce hearing.3

[¶6] In denying Frederick’s Rule 60(b) motion, the court found as a

preliminary matter that Frederick “did not take the necessary steps to protect

The court did find credible one portion of Frederick’s testimony on the issue of notice and that 3

was his assertion that, since 1997, he had consistently received his mail at his post office box in 5

his interest in the original proceedings and has provided no justification for his

failure to participate.” The court then determined that Frederick was not

entitled to relief from judgment for any of the asserted reasons (mistake; fraud,

misrepresentation, or misconduct; lack of jurisdiction; or any other reason).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶7] “We review the denial of a M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for abuse of

discretion. Review for an abuse of discretion involves resolution of three

questions: (1) are factual findings, if any, supported by the record according to

the clear error standard; (2) did the court understand the law applicable to its

exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate

law, was the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the

bounds of reasonableness. A party who moves for relief from a judgment bears

the burden of producing competent evidence to support his motion, and we will

vacate factual findings that are adverse to the party with the burden of proof

only if the record compels a contrary conclusion.” Haskell v. Haskell, 2017 ME

91, ¶ 12, 160 A.3d 1176 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Rockport. The court specifically noted that during the divorce action, court notices had been sent to Frederick via his post office box in Rockport. 6

[¶8] Before proceeding further in our discussion of this case, we must

put it in perspective in two respects. First, Frederick appeals from the denial of

his motion for relief from judgment—not from the underlying judgment of

divorce. Next, our recent decision in Weinle v. Estate of Tower, 2025 ME 62, ---

A.3d ---, overruled our holding in Panter v. Panter, 499 A.2d 1233, 1233

(Me. 1985), in which we dismissed the appeal from a divorce action because the

rule was that the death of a party during the pendency of an appeal mooted the

divorce judgment and abated the underlying divorce action. Weinle means that

a party’s death during the pendency of an appeal from a divorce judgment does

not abate the judgment in regard to the parties’ property rights.

[¶9] Frederick’s appeal from the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion survives

his death during the pendency of the appeal, just as it would were it an appeal

from the divorce judgment itself. Because Frederick challenged only the

division of property in the divorce, were we to vacate the court’s denial of

Frederick’s Rule 60(b) motion and remand the matter for further action, that

would affect only the award of property rights and not the entire divorce

judgment. In other words, the only issues to be addressed on remand here

would be those concerning property interests, and Weinle therefore would 7

apply tangentially to maintain the justiciability of Frederick’s motion for relief

from the judgment.4

[¶10] We therefore proceed to consider the merits of the Estate’s appeal.

Our Rule 60(b) jurisprudence “presupposes that a party has performed his duty

to take legal steps to protect his own interests in the original litigation. . . . We

have repeatedly stated that a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) is not a

substitute for a direct appeal . . . . The principles of res judicata bar relief under

Rule 60(b) when, as here, the aggrieved party has failed to challenge the validity

of the underlying judgment on direct appeal.” McKeen & Assocs. v. Dep’t of

Transp., 1997 ME 73, ¶ 4, 692 A.2d 924 (alterations, citations, and quotation

marks omitted); see also Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 29, 955 A.2d 202

(“Dilatory conduct in failing to promptly appeal adverse judgments does not

justify Rule 60(b) relief.” (quotation marks omitted)).

4 In Deborah’s supplemental briefing, she contends that Panter v. Panter, 499 A.2d 1233, 1233 (Me. 1985), requires the dismissal of this appeal because “[r]elief from this judgment, if granted, cannot restore the former marital status of these parties for a new trial . . . and divorce is no longer possible.”

Contrary to Deborah’s contention, this matter is distinguishable from Panter because it is an appeal of a post-judgment motion rather than an appeal of a divorce judgment that has been stayed pending appeal. At the time of Frederick’s death, the appeal period for the divorce judgment had expired without an appeal being filed, rendering the parties’ divorce judgment final.

In light of Weinle v. Estate of Tower, 2025 ME 62, --- A.3d ---, Panter would be inapplicable in any case. See supra ¶ 9. 8

[¶11] Here, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Frederick’s motion for relief from judgment for any of the asserted reasons.

The motion court’s factual findings were supported by Deborah’s testimony

and corroborative documentary evidence. See Haskell, 2017 ME 91, ¶ 12, 160

A.3d 1176; Nou v. Huot, 2025 ME 44, ¶ 22, 335 A.3d 603 (“We defer to the trial

court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility and its resolution of conflicts in

testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). The motion court found that Frederick

did not meet his burden to produce competent evidence to overcome the

divorce court’s findings as to the marital nature of the property. See Haskell,

2017 ME 91, ¶ 12, 160 A.3d 1176. The court understood the law applicable to

its exercise of discretion.5 See id.; Copp v. Liberty, 2003 ME 43, ¶ 8, 818 A.2d

5To the extent that the court misunderstood the law applicable to “mistake” as a basis for relief under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), we conclude that any error was harmless. Rule 60(b)(1) “[r]elief is obtainable whether the neglect or inadvertence or mistake is that of the moving party, of the court, or of a third party.” 3 Harvey & Merritt, Maine Civil Practice § 60:6 (3d. ed.), Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2024).

Although the court stated that Frederick’s assertion that he was entitled to relief based on Deborah’s purported mistake about the Rockport real estate being marital property was “an inaccurate representation of Rule 60(b)(1), as the relief from judgment under the rule based on mistake is to be used where the mistake was on the part of the moving party,” the court added, “[e]ven if a claim of mistake was appropriate, [Frederick] showed no justification for failing to avoid the mistake.”

To be clear, a mistake by Deborah about the Rockport real estate being marital property could theoretically be a basis for relief under Rule 60(b); however, on the facts here there was no mistake on Deborah’s part. Moreover, the court’s misunderstanding does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion because the court also found that Frederick without question failed to carry his burden. See Laurel Bank & Tr. Co. v. Burns, 398 A.2d 41, 44 (Me. 1979). 9

1050 (“[I]f a party seeks relief from judgment under subsection (b)(3), then

facts must be claimed that would suggest fraud, misrepresentation, or

misconduct has taken place that invalidates the original judgment.”);

Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 2008 ME 11, ¶ 9, 940 A.2d 1082 (“Fraud requires

clear and convincing proof that an advantage has been gained in the obtaining

of a judgment by an act of bad faith whereby the court has been made an

instrument of injustice.” (quotation marks omitted)); 19-A M.R.S. § 953 (2025)

(providing that the divorce court has jurisdiction to determine whether

property is marital and to distribute accordingly);6 Ezell, 2008 ME 139,

¶¶ 28-30, 955 A.2d 202 (explaining what the court must consider when

evaluating whether to grant relief under reason (b)(6)). Finally, the court’s

weighing of the applicable facts and choices was within the bounds of

reasonableness. See Haskell, 2017 ME 91, ¶ 12, 160 A.3d 1176. The court

found, with support in the record, that Frederick did not protect his own

interests when he failed to (1) appear for his divorce hearing despite receiving

notice, (2) file a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law after

6 Notwithstanding Frederick’s assertion under Rule 60(b)(4), the motion court, based on the evidence before it, correctly found that the divorce court had jurisdiction over the Rockport property, as a part of the marital estate, and properly distributed that real estate as marital property rather than set it aside to Frederick as nonmarital property. See 19-A M.R.S. § 953(3) (2025). 10

entry of the divorce judgment, or (3) appeal from the divorce judgment.7 For

the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no merit to Frederick’s claims

under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (4), or (6).

[¶12] As we have previously stated, Rule 60(b) “was not intended as an

alternative method of appellate review, nor as a procedural means by which

legal errors readily correctible on appeal may be challenged in a second round

of litigation. Laudable as is the goal of providing relief from injustices which

Rule 60(b) contemplates, courts must strike a balance between that goal and

the salutary policy of finality in litigation.” Reville v. Reville, 370 A.2d 249, 254

(Me. 1977).

III. CONCLUSION

[¶13] We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion or clearly

err when it found that Frederick was not entitled to relief from judgment.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Moreover, as of the time of the hearing on the Rule 60(b) motion, Frederick had established a 7

pattern of nonattendance at court proceedings and noncompliance with court orders. He appeared for some court conferences and hearings but not for others. He openly defied court orders for payment of interim spousal support and the award of counsel fees. He even went to the extreme of not paying these obligations, being found in contempt, being jailed several times for his contempt, and having to pay more than $18,000 to purge his contempt and be released from jail. As this Court has observed, “a party who violates court rules or orders is not entitled to relief [pursuant to Rule 60(b)].” Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 29, 955 A.2d 202 (alteration omitted). 11

Joseph W. Baiungo, Esq., Belfast, for appellant Frederick Chatfield Jr. and the Estate of Frederick Chatfield Jr.

Joe Lewis, Esq., Port City Legal, Portland, and Gerald F. Petruccelli, Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow LLP, Portland, for appellee Deborah A. Chatfield

Rockland District Court docket number FM-2021-123 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY