Amelia Johnson v. Michael Osseyran

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: Cum-25-55
• Status: Published
• Author: LIPEZ, J.

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 39 Docket: Cum-25-55 Submitted On Briefs: October 29, 2025 Decided: April 23, 2026

Panel: MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.

AMELIA JOHNSON

v.

MICHAEL OSSEYRAN

LIPEZ, J.

[¶1] Amelia Johnson appeals from a judgment of the District Court

(Portland, Powers, A.R.J.) in favor of Michael Osseyran on Johnson’s complaint

for a protection-from-abuse order for herself and her minor child against

Osseyran, the child’s father. Although we modify the judgment to correct a

clerical error regarding the parties’ attendance at the final hearing, we

otherwise affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Johnson filed her complaint for protection from abuse on

December 9, 2024. That same day, the court (Darvin, J.) granted Johnson and 2

the child a temporary order for protection from abuse and awarded Johnson

temporary parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child.

[¶3] The court (Powers, A.R.J.) held a final hearing on the matter on

January 17, 2025. Johnson appeared pro se and although Osseyran did not

attend the hearing, his attorney appeared on his behalf. The court heard

testimony from Johnson, an investigations caseworker from the Department of

Health and Human Services, and a friend of Osseyran’s, and admitted in

evidence screenshots of the parties’ text messages.

[¶4] Following the parties’ presentations, the court made the following

findings of fact, which are supported by competent evidence in the record.

See Doe v. Hewson, 2022 ME 60, ¶ 11, 288 A.3d 382. The parties’ child presents

substantial parenting difficulties, and the parties have different approaches to

parenting. It can be stressful to be with and to care for the child. Osseyran is

not stalking, threatening, or harassing Johnson or the child, but rather is trying

to co-parent and communicate with Johnson. Although Osseyran’s actions may

be offensive to the child, Osseyran has not attempted to cause the child bodily

injury or to hurt the child.

[¶5] Based on these findings, the court declined to enter a final order for

protection from abuse on behalf of Johnson or the child and dismissed the 3

temporary order.1 Johnson did not file a motion for further findings of fact but

did timely appeal from the judgment. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶6] Johnson raises three arguments on appeal: (1) the evidence

compelled the court to find in her favor; (2) the court misinterpreted the

applicable statute; and (3) the court committed an evidentiary error that

requires vacatur of the judgment. We address each of these contentions in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶7] The party seeking a final protection order “must prove the

allegation of abuse or conduct specified in [19-A M.R.S. § 4103 (2026)2] by a

preponderance of the evidence.” 19-A M.R.S. § 4109(1) (2026). “In making

factual findings,” a court considering a request for a protection order “is free to

accept or reject the testimony of individual witnesses in whole or in part, and

is free to reject testimony that is not contradicted if it finds that testimony

incredible.” See Klein v. Klein, 2019 ME 85, ¶ 6, 208 A.3d 802 (quotation marks

omitted). Because Johnson had “the burden of proof at trial, we will reverse a

Johnson contends that it is not clear whether the court dismissed her complaint or entered 1

judgment in favor of Osseyran. Although the court declared orally that Johnson’s “[c]omplaint is dismissed,” we construe the court’s actions as an adjudication of the merits of Johnson’s complaint.

Title 19-A M.R.S. § 4103 was amended during the pendency of this case, though not in any way 2

that affects this appeal. See P.L. 2025, ch. 158 (effective Sep. 24, 2025). 4

ruling against [her] only if the evidence compelled the court to find in [her]

favor.” Nou v. Huot, 2025 ME 44, ¶ 22, 335 A.3d 603 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶8] Here, the evidence did not compel the court to find that Johnson was

entitled to a final order for protection from abuse. Although Johnson contends

that the evidence demonstrated that Osseyran engaged in a “deliberate pattern

of harassment” against her, none of the evidence presented, including Johnson’s

testimony and the text messages between the parties, compelled the court to

find that Osseyran engaged in stalking or threatening, harassing, or tormenting

behavior that attempted to place or placed Johnson in fear of bodily injury. See

19-A M.R.S. §§ 4102(1)(B), 4103(1)(B)(1) (2026); 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A (2026).

[¶9] Nor did the evidence compel the court to find that Osseyran abused

the parties’ child. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4102(1)(A)-(B), 4103(2)(A). To be sure,

Johnson testified that she had “noticed many incidents of [Osseyran] grabbing

[the child], yanking [the child] by the arm, grabbing [the child] by the shoulders,

[and] forcing [the child] to sit in a chair while yelling at [the child].” Although

the court appears to have credited Johnson’s testimony, it found that the

conduct did not constitute abuse but rather was an attempt by the father to

“parent . . . a very difficult child.” This was a supportable conclusion in light of

the evidence and the statutory scheme. The Legislature has excluded from the 5

definition of “abuse” in 19-A M.R.S. § 4102(1)(A) a parent’s use of “a reasonable

degree of force against [a] child when . . . [the parent] reasonably believes it

necessary to prevent or punish the child’s misconduct,” 17-A M.R.S. § 106(1)

(2026). Because Johnson did not file a motion for further findings under Maine

Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), we infer that the court was relying on this

exception when it concluded that the father’s actions, while perhaps offensive

to the child, did not constitute abuse within the meaning of the statute. See Doe

v. Tierney, 2018 ME 101, ¶ 15, 189 A.3d 756. Similarly, the evidence did not

compel a finding that Osseyran attempted to place or did place the child in fear

of bodily injury through his conduct, see 19-A M.R.S. § 4102(1)(B), as Johnson

claims.

B. Application of Protection-from-abuse Statute

[¶10] Johnson next contends that the court erred in its application of the

protection-from-abuse statute because it (1) failed to account for the fact that

victims of stalking are eligible for a protection order, see 19-A M.R.S.

§ 4103(1)(B)(1); 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A, and (2) interpreted the “reasonable

degree of force” exception too broadly, thereby undermining the Legislature’s

goal of assisting victims of abuse, see 19-A M.R.S. § 4102(1)(A); 17-A M.R.S.

§ 106(1). “We review de novo a challenge to the court’s interpretation of the 6

protection from abuse statute.” L’Heureux v. Michaud, 2007 ME 149, ¶ 5, 938

A.2d 801.

[¶11] We discern no legal error in the court’s analysis, for two reasons.

First, the court found that Johnson did not meet her burden to demonstrate that

Osseyran was stalking her, not that a successful showing of stalking is

insufficient to grant a protection-from-abuse order. Second, the court did not

misinterpret the statutory definition of “abuse,” which includes an explicit

exception for a parent’s use of a “reasonable degree of force.” See 19-A M.R.S.

§ 4102(1)(A); 17-A M.R.S. § 106(1). Johnson asserts that instead of relying on

that exception, the court should have deferred to the caseworker’s testimony

that the Department made findings of abuse. The Department, however, was

operating pursuant to a different statutory definition of “abuse,” see 22 M.R.S.

§ 4002(1) (2025),3 and apparently had before it information different from

what was presented to the court. Contrary to Johnson’s argument, the court

was correct to rely on the definition of “abuse” contained within the

protection-from-abuse statute, and its determination that Johnson had not

proved abuse was not inconsistent with the intended purposes of the statute.

See 19-A M.R.S. § 4101 (2026).

3Title 22 M.R.S. § 4002(1) has since been amended. See P.L. 2025, ch. 240 (emergency, effective June 10, 2025) (codified at 22 M.R.S. § 4002(1) (2026)). 7

C. Admission of Medical Provider’s Conclusions

[¶12] Finally, Johnson argues that the court erroneously allowed

Osseyran to introduce inadmissible evidence, specifically hearsay information

from a medical report.

[¶13] At the hearing, Johnson elicited testimony from the Department

caseworker that the caseworker made “findings of moderate severity physical

abuse due to injuries [the child] sustained, as well as moderate . . . severity

emotional abuse [based on] the behavior [the child] exhibits.” On

cross-examination, Osseyran asked the caseworker about a medical evaluation

of the child that informed the caseworker’s opinion. Osseyran specifically

inquired into a portion of the report marked “assessment” and asked the

caseworker to confirm various conclusions of the medical provider who

authored the report. This culminated in the caseworker testifying that the

medical provider, who did not testify at the hearing, had concluded that there

was “no evidence of abuse, and also no evidence to say there was none.”

Osseyran emphasized this testimony in closing, arguing to the court that “the

actual physical examination of this child shows no evidence of abuse.”

[¶14] Johnson did not object to Osseyran’s cross-examination of the

caseworker or his closing argument, so “we review the issue only for obvious 8

error that affects substantial rights or results in a substantial injustice,” Childs

v. Ballou, 2016 ME 142, ¶ 9, 148 A.3d 291 (quotation marks omitted). “Any

party claiming error must demonstrate prejudice from the error.” In re Joshua

B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 10, 776 A.2d 1240.

[¶15] Although Johnson does not clearly explain why the evidence was

inadmissible,4 it is apparent that the conclusions of the medical provider were

hearsay not subject to an exception, see M.R. Evid. 801(c)-(d), 802, 803.5 The

court’s admission of this evidence was therefore erroneous. We nonetheless

conclude that the admission does not rise to the level of obvious error because

Johnson has not demonstrated prejudice arising from the court’s consideration

of the information. See In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 10, 776 A.2d 1240.

[¶16] The evidence that Johnson presented regarding Osseyran’s alleged

abuse of the child focused on Osseyran’s conduct in disciplining the child. As

noted, Johnson described incidents of “grabbing” and “yanking,” but she did not

4Johnson points out that the court did not admit a written statement from a medical provider that she offered in her case-in-chief, and she suggests that the same rule should have applied to Osseyran.

5 Osseyran contends that this information was admissible as a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. See M.R. Evid. 803(4). This argument fails because the statements in question were conclusions of the medical provider, not statements made by the child to the medical provider. See id.; see also Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 802.2 at 461-62 (6th ed. 2007). Because Osseyran maintains (erroneously) that the information was substantively admissible, and indeed, appears to have relied on the truth of the information in making his closing argument, we do not consider whether Osseyran could have properly used the information to impeach the caseworker’s credibility. See M.R. Evid. 607, 801(c)(2); Daniels v. Tew Mac Aero Servs., Inc., 675 A.2d 984, 990-91 (Me. 1996). 9

testify that Osseyran had inflicted any injuries on the child.6 The erroneously

admitted information—that the medical provider did not find physical

evidence of abuse—was therefore not inconsistent with Johnson’s testimony

and did not serve to undercut it. Put another way, the court could have credited

Johnson’s testimony, as it appears to have done, and still concluded that

Johnson failed to meet her burden because the actions she described did not

constitute abuse within the meaning of the statute. We accordingly cannot say

that the hearsay testimony ultimately affected the outcome or Johnson’s

substantial rights, see Childs, 2016 ME 142, ¶ 9, 148 A.3d 291, and we affirm the

court’s decision not to issue a protection-from-abuse order.

D. Clerical Error in the Judgment

[¶17] Although we affirm the denial of Johnson’s request for a

protection-from-abuse order, Johnson correctly points out that the court’s

written order erroneously indicates that she did not attend the final hearing

and that Osseyran did. We therefore modify the judgment to correct this

clerical error. See M.R. Civ. P. 60(a).

However, Johnson was allowed to elicit testimony from the caseworker that the medical 6

provider noted a mark on the child’s cheek that could have been a bruise. 10

The entry is:

The judgment of the District Court is modified to indicate that Johnson, the plaintiff, was present at the final hearing, and that Osseyran, the defendant, was not present, but that his attorney appeared on his behalf. As modified, judgment affirmed.

Amelia Johnson, appellant pro se

Mehron D. Buerger, Esq., Rioux, Donahue, Chmelecki & Peltier, LLC., Portland, for appellee Michael Osseyran

Portland District Court docket number PA-2024-941 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY