Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 22, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-04994·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ARTHUR EDWARD SMITH, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-4994 (LTS) J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; J.P. ORDER TO AMEND MORGAN CHASE BANK & CO d/b/a CHASE BANK (corporately), Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated July 15, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely

possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint. On January 31, 2022, Plaintiff “online deposited” his paycheck at a Chase branch, something he had previously done without incident. In the past, Plaintiff’s check would clear after two days. Instead, in this instance, a Chase employee stamped on the back of the check, “Bad Check; Fraud Alert; Do not Cash I,” and put a “10 day hold” on it. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) According to Plaintiff, this occurrence was “preponderantly based on racial discrimination,” and thus “violative of his federal civil rights.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not identify his race in his pleading. On February 1, 2022, Plaintiff “contacted Chase Bank customer service” five times. A bank representative said that because the “process of processing the check had started,” there was “nothing [she] could do.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff “let the rep have . . . [a] ‘piece of [his] mind,’” and she “abruptly hung up.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was unable to access the funds for ten days, which

rendered him unable to pay bills and “worsen[ed]” his “hardship.” (Id. at 6, 8.) Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and also asserts, under the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. (Id.) After Plaintiff filed his complaint, he filed a motion to add to his complaint two exhibits — a copy of the back of the canceled check and a letter from Defendant stating that Plaintiff’s check was held because it “required additional review.” (ECF 5.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and ethnicity when making and enforcing contracts. See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 533 U.S. 442,445 (2008). Claims under section 1981 can be brought against

public or private entities, so long as the parties formed a contract. See Johnson v. City of New York, 669 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). To state a claim of discrimination under section 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that: “(1) [the] plaintiff[] [is a] member[] of a racial minority; (2) [the] defendant[’s] intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) discrimination concerning one of the statute’s enumerated activities.” Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000). “[A] plaintiff must . . . plead . . . that, but for race, [the plaintiff] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.- Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). Thus, for a claim of race discrimination under Section 1981, “it is insufficient to merely plead that race was a motivating factor in the discriminatory action.” Brown v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 19-CV-11474, 2021 WL 1163797, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021) (citing Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1017-18). Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants discriminated against him because of his race. In the complaint, however, Plaintiff does not identify his race, and he does not provide any facts

suggesting that his race was a motivating factor in what occurred, much less that, “but for” his race, the events giving rise to this complaint would not have occurred. Because Plaintiff does not set forth facts in support of his claim of race discrimination, his allegations are conclusory, and he fails to state a claim of race discrimination under section 1981.

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Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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