Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 13, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-04994
StatusUnknown

This text of Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ARTHUR EDWARD SMITH, Plaintiff, 22-CV-4994 (LTS) -against- ORDER J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff filed this complaint pro se. By order dated July 15, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). By order dated August 22, 2022, the Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to address deficiencies in his original pleading. (ECF 6.) On September 29, 2022, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the action. (ECF 7.) On October 3, 2022, the Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. (ECF 8.) On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a “motion for repudiation/and or striking of Voluntary Dismissal notice.” (ECF 9.) In the motion, Plaintiff asserts that he “sought jurisdiction in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.” (Id.) Plaintiff references a Second Circuit docket number, 22-2093. The documents in that case are not available, but it appears that Plaintiff may have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Second Circuit. There is no notice of appeal on this Court’s docket. It is not clear whether Plaintiff seeks to reopen this matter, or whether he seeks some other relief. If Plaintiff seeks to reopen this matter, he should file an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of this order. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will reopen this case, and the matter will be processed in accordance with the procedures of the Clerk’s Office. Otherwise, this matter will remain closed. The amended complaint must comply with the August 22, 2022 order to amend. A copy of that order and an amended complaint form are attached to this order. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. Dated: January 13, 2023 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ARTHUR EDWARD SMITH, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-4994 (LTS) J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; J.P. ORDER TO AMEND MORGAN CHASE BANK & CO d/b/a CHASE BANK (corporately), Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated July 15, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely

possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint. On January 31, 2022, Plaintiff “online deposited” his paycheck at a Chase branch, something he had previously done without incident. In the past, Plaintiff’s check would clear after two days. Instead, in this instance, a Chase employee stamped on the back of the check, “Bad Check; Fraud Alert; Do not Cash I,” and put a “10 day hold” on it. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) According to Plaintiff, this occurrence was “preponderantly based on racial discrimination,” and thus “violative of his federal civil rights.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not identify his race in his pleading. On February 1, 2022, Plaintiff “contacted Chase Bank customer service” five times. A bank representative said that because the “process of processing the check had started,” there was “nothing [she] could do.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff “let the rep have . . . [a] ‘piece of [his] mind,’” and she “abruptly hung up.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was unable to access the funds for ten days, which

rendered him unable to pay bills and “worsen[ed]” his “hardship.” (Id. at 6, 8.) Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and also asserts, under the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Johnson v. City of New York
669 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Brown v. City of Oneonta
221 F.3d 329 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Smith v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-jp-morgan-chase-bank-na-nysd-2023.