Sheila M. Jackson v. Paul A. Kelly

557 F.2d 735, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12743
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedJune 24, 1977
Docket75-1937
StatusPublished
Cited by120 cases

This text of 557 F.2d 735 (Sheila M. Jackson v. Paul A. Kelly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sheila M. Jackson v. Paul A. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12743 (10th Cir. 1977).

Opinion

LEWIS, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff sought to recover damages in the district court for the District of Colorado in this diversity action for medical malpractice by defendant. At the time of the alleged malpractice, defendant was a military physician stationed at the United States Air Force Hospital in Lakenheath, England, and plaintiff was the dependent spouse of an air force captain. Plaintiff alleged that defendant, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, negligently treated her for conditions relating to her pregnancy. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s suit, holding that defendant as a federal official is immune from a suit such as this arising out of actions taken within the scope of his official employment. For purposes of this appeal we assume defendant was acting within the scope of his employment as a military physician.

In the absence of statutory immunity, the test for whether an official shall be immune from liability for money damages is not mechanical. “[T]he immunity conferred [is] not . . . the same for all officials for all purposes.” Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 319, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 2028, 36 L.Ed.2d 912. It thus requires a careful inquiry into the nature of the alleged wrongful acts and scope of the accused official’s duties. The need for a careful inquiry stems from the competing policies underlying official immunity from money damages. From the perspective of the individual citizen, some compensatory remedy must be available to vindicate injury inflicted by government officials. From the perspective of the public interest in the effective administration of policies of government, officials must be free to exercise their duties, especially discretionary duties, without having to defend their actions in court. The doctrine of immunity reflects the view that an official may be excessively hampered if he is subject to the tedious and potentially embarrassing process of litigation regardless of the ultimate outcome. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434.

The Supreme Court has only recognized a very narrow category of judicially- *737 created absolute immunity for some federal officials. 1 See Barr v. Matteo, supra at 569, 79 S.Ct. 1335. Since defendant does not come within the narrow category of federal officials entitled to absolute immunity under recent Supreme Court decisions, the mere fact defendant was acting within the outer perimeter of his authority does not immunize him from personal liability. Any intimation to the contrary in Bates v. Carlow, 10 Cir., 430 F.2d 1331, that an official operating at defendant’s level is absolutely immune from liability for acts performed within the scope of his authority is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court pronouncements and thus must be overruled.

Doe v. McMillan, supra, makes it clear we must apply the discretionary function test, i. e., whether defendant’s duties were discretionary, to determine whether defendant is immune from personal liability for acts within the scope of his authority. 2 In Doe, the immunity of the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents for Congress was at issue. Plaintiffs alleged these officials invaded their privacy by publishing certain derogatory documents for use in Congress and distribution elsewhere. The Court found the officials were acting within the scope of their duties but their duties were not discretionary. The Court held official immunity does not automatically attach to any conduct expressly or impliedly authorized by law, unless the official was exercising a discretionary function. This rule is appropriate because the effective administration of policies of government is not severely impaired if officials with ministerial duties are answerable in damages for failure to perform obligatory functions with reasonable care.

Doe further indicates that when an official acting in a nondiscretionary capacity claims immunity, the Supreme Court

has advised a discerning inquiry into whether the contributions of immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens .

412 U.S. at 320, 93 S.Ct. at 2028. Thus, the Court mandates the use of the discretionary function test, and a direct balancing of the policies underlying the immunity doctrine in the context of each fact situation. See, e. g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (qualified immunity granted to school board officials who exercise discretion); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (qualified immunity for Governor and executive officers of state exercisiAg discretionary responsibilities).

Mindful of these principles, the first step here is to decide whether defendant’s functions were discretionary. Secondly, the consideration of harm to the individual citizen must be balanced with the threat to effective government in the context of this case.

I.

No foolproof measure of discretionary duties exists. One source of guidance useful here, however, is the explanation of the discretionary-ministerial distinction developed in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80. This distinction is important under the FTCA because the Act excepts claims based on performing or failing to perform discretionary functions. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Generally speaking, a duty is discretionary if it involves judgment, planning, or policy decisions. It is not discretionary if it involves enforcement or administration of a mandatory duty at the operational level, even if professional expert *738 evaluation is required. Nelms v. Laird, 4 Cir., 442 F.2d 1163, rev’d on other grounds, 406 U.S. 797, 92 S.Ct. 1899, 32 L.Ed.2d 499; Hendry v. United States, 2 Cir., 418 F.2d 774. The key is whether the duty is mandatory or whether the act complained of involved policy-making or judgment. For example, negligence in the construction of a government facility is nondiscretionary and subjects the government to liability under the FTCA. See Seaboard Coast Line R. R. v. United States, 5 Cir., 473 F.2d 714.

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Bluebook (online)
557 F.2d 735, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12743, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sheila-m-jackson-v-paul-a-kelly-ca10-1977.