Securities & Exchange Commission v. Edwards

540 U.S. 389, 124 S. Ct. 892, 157 L. Ed. 2d 813, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 659
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 13, 2004
Docket02-1196
StatusPublished
Cited by106 cases

This text of 540 U.S. 389 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Edwards) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 124 S. Ct. 892, 157 L. Ed. 2d 813, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 659 (2004).

Opinion

*391 Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

“Opportunity doesn’t always knock . . . sometimes it rings.” App. 113 (ETS Payphones promotional brochure). And sometimes it hangs up. So it did for the 10,000 people who invested a total of $300 million in the payphone sale- and-leaseback arrangements touted by respondent under that slogan. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) argues that the arrangements were investment contracts, and thus were subject to regulation under the federal securities laws. In this case, we must decide whether a moneymaking scheme is excluded from the term “investment contract” simply because the scheme offered a contractual entitlement to a fixed, rather than a variable, return.

I

Respondent Charles Edwards was the chairman, chief executive officer, and sole shareholder of ETS Payphones, Inc. (ETS). ETS, acting partly through a subsidiary also controlled by respondent, sold payphones to the public via independent distributors. The payphones were offered packaged with a site lease, a 5-year leaseback and management agreement, and a buyback agreement. All but a tiny fraction of purchasers chose this package, although other management options were offered. The purchase price for the payphone packages was approximately $7,000. Under the leaseback and management agreement, purchasers received $82 per month, a 14% annual return. Purchasers were not involved in the day-to-day operation of the payphones they owned. ETS selected the site for the phone, installed the, *392 equipment, arranged for connection and long-distance service, collected coin revenues, and maintained and repaired the phones. Under the buyback agreement, ETS promised to refund the full purchase price of the package at the end of the lease or within 180 days of a purchaser’s request.

In its marketing materials and on its Web site, ETS trumpeted the “incomparable pay phone” as “an exciting business opportunity,” in which recent deregulation had “open[ed] the door for profits for individual pay phone owners and operators.” According to ETS, “[v]ery few business opportunities can offer the potential for ongoing revenue generation that is available in today’s pay telephone industry.” App. 114-115 (ETS brochure); id., at 227 (ETS Web site); see id., at 13 (Complaint ¶¶ 37-38).

The payphones did not generate enough revenue for ETS to make the payments required by the leaseback agreements, so the company depended on funds from new investors to meet its obligations. In September 2000, ETS filed for bankruptcy protection. The SEC brought this civil enforcement action the same month. It alleged that respondent and ETS had violated the registration requirements of §§ 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 68 Stat. 684, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77e(a), (c), the antifraud provisions of both § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 114 Stat. 2763A-452, 15 U. S. C. § 77q(a), and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 114 Stat. 2763A-454, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2003). The District Court concluded that the payphone sale-and-leaseback arrangement was an investment contract within the. meaning of, and therefore was subject to, the federal securities laws. SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (ND Ga. 2000). The Court of Appeals reversed. 300 F. 3d 1281 (CA11 2002) (per curiam). It held that respondent’s scheme was not an investment contract, on two grounds. First, it read this Court’s opinions to require that an investment contract offer either capital appreciation *393 or a participation in the earnings of the enterprise, and thus to exclude schemes, such as respondent’s, offering a fixed rate of return. Id., at 1284-1285. Second, it held that our opinions’ requirement that the return on the investment be “derived solely from the efforts of others” was not satisfied when the purchasers had a contractual entitlement to the réturn. Id., at 1285. We conclude that it erred on both grounds.

II

“Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U. S. 56, 61 (1990). To that end, it enacted a broad definition of “security,” sufficient “to encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.” Ibid. Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b(a)(l), and § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. §78c(a)(10), in slightly different formulations which we have treated as essentially identical in meaning, Reves, supra, at 61, n. 1, define “security” to include “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture,... investment contract,... [or any] instrument commonly known as a ‘security.’” “Investment contract” is not itself defined.

The test for whether a particular scheme is an investment contract was established in our decision in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946). We look to “whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” Id., at 301. This definition “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Id., at 299.

In reaching that result, we first observed that when Congress included “investment contract” in the definition of security, it “was using a term the meaning of which had been *394 crystallized’' by the state courts’ interpretation of their “‘blue sky’” laws. Id., at 298. (Those laws were the precursors to federal securities regulation and were so named, it seems, because they were “aimed at promoters who ‘would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple.’ ” 1 L. Loss & J. Seligman, Securities Regulation 36, 31-43 (3d ed. 1998) (quoting Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 Can. L.

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540 U.S. 389, 124 S. Ct. 892, 157 L. Ed. 2d 813, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 659, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-edwards-scotus-2004.