Seaside, City of v. Randles

180 P. 319, 92 Or. 650, 1919 Ore. LEXIS 140
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedApril 22, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 180 P. 319 (Seaside, City of v. Randles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seaside, City of v. Randles, 180 P. 319, 92 Or. 650, 1919 Ore. LEXIS 140 (Or. 1919).

Opinion

BEAN, J.

Defendants’ first contention is that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against either of the defendants. Under this division of argument, defendants also submit two assignments of error: Number XLIY. That the court erred in giving to the jury, over the objection and exception of defendants, instruction, to wit:

“If you find for the plaintiff in the particulars complained of, as I have heretofore instructed you, then it will be your duty to determine the fair and reasonable amount it will cost the plaintiff to repair the sewer in the particulars wherein defendant Bandies failed, to the end that plaintiff will have a sewer of the character contracted for, and bring in your verdict accordingly.”

And also assignment Number XLV. That the court erred in giving the instruction to the effect that:

“If you should find that the defendant Bandies failed to lay this sewer in the particulars complained of and that the plaintiff accepted the same without knowledge of such facts, in order to determine the amount, 'if any, the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this case, you have the right to take into consideration [663]*663the cost to plaintiff of the necessary excavations and work and labor and materials necessary to be employed in making such repairs, as in your judgment from the evidence in this case, shall be required in order to make the sewer correspond with the contract."

It is the main contention of counsel for defendants that the plaintiff cannot recover for the reasons;

First. Under the circumstances presented by the complaint the acceptance of and the payment for the work as completed in accordance with the contract precludes the recovery of damages for patent defects, unless such acceptance and payment were obtained by defendants’ fraud.

Second. The allegations of the complaint failed to state- any facts constituting fraud in the procuring or inducing of the acceptance of payment of the work.

Third. The complaint fails to allege that the city removed the alleged defective work and properly reconstructed the same, stating the expense thereof.

Fourth. That it appears on the face of the complaint that the surety has been released and discharged from all liability.

1. It is convenient first to state the rule of law by which the facts of the case are to be measured. An acceptance of work done under a construction contract does not constitute a waiver of latent defects of which the owner was ignorant at the time, or which may appear thereafter: 9 C. J., p. 798; Fike v. Stratton, 174 Ala. 541 (56 South. 929); Steltz v. The Armory Co., 15 Idaho, 551 (99 Pac. 98, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872); Monahan v. Fitzgerald, 164 Ill. 525 (45 N. E. 1013); Korf v. Lull, 70 Ill. 420; Holslag v. Morse, 188 Ill. App. 607; Toronto Radiator Mfg. Co. v. Alexander, 2 Ter. L. R. 120; Eaton v. Gladwell, 108 Mich. 678 (66 N. W. 598); [664]*664Dutton v. Million, 114 Ark. 330 (169 S. W. 1183); Utah Lumber Co. v. James, 25 Utah, 434 (71 Pao. 986).

In order for an acceptance to be a waiver it must be under such circumstances as to show that the party accepting knew or ought to have known that the contract was not fully performed. 6 R. C. L., p. 991, Section 359, where the rule is stated thus:

“Where work is accepted with knowledge that it has not been done according to the contract, or under such circumstances that knowledge of its imperfect performance may be imputed, the acceptance will generally be deemed a waiver of the defective performance. But this rule does not apply to latent defects. The acceptance of work which has been defectively done, the defects being unknown and not discoverable by inspection, does not amount to a waiver of the imperfect performance”: Flannery v. Rohrmayer, 46 Conn. 558 (33 Am. Rep. 36); Van Buskirk v. Murden, 22 Ill. 446 (74 Am. Dec. 163); Brent v. Head, Westervelt & Co., 138 Iowa, 146 (115 N. W. 1106, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801); Ludlow Lumber Co. v. Kuhling, 119 Ky. 251 (83 S. W. 634, 115 Am. St. Rep. 254, and note); Thompson Mfg. Co. v. Gunderson, 106 Wis. 449 (82 N. W. 299, 49 L. R. A. 859); Iaege v. Bossieux, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 83 (76 Am. Dec. 189).

The evidence introduced upon the trial tended to support the allegation of plaintiff’s complaint and to show that soon after the sewer was accepted and Randles, had received his- pay therefor, the sand at many points caved in from the top of the excavation and a large quantity of sand was discovered at the outlets ; that an island of sand was thereby formed in the Necanicum River near where the outlets were. This would cause the ground on top of the sewer to cave in and large holes in several places occurred in the street where the sewer was laid. In many instances, where [665]*665these cave-ins occurred, the city dug down to the sewer and discovered that while there, was cement in the joints on the top of the sewer-pipe, there was no cement on the part underneath for about one-fourth the diameter of the pipe; that the part of the pipe underneath was entirely open and no cement mortar had ever been placed therein. The main sewer was laid along Seventh Street, the principal street in the City of Seaside. These cave-ins became so numerous on this street that about 250 yards of the main sewer was excavated and it was discovered that in almost every joint no cement mortar had been placed on the underneath side of the bell, while on the top for about three fourths of the diameter of the pipe, which would be visible to one standing on the bank of the trench at the time the pipe was laid, the cement mortar seemed to have been well filled in. Although the mortar in practically all instances was not two parts sand to one part cement, but was filled with earth and dirt, making the joint practically worthless. The sand was so fine that it ran into the sewer-pipe and was carried down into the Necanicum Eiver and entirely stopped up the outlet of the pipe.

That there were about 3,000 feet of the main sewer laid below an elevation of seven feet, which, according to the contract, was required to be laid with a gasket of oakum dipped in hot asphaltum of the proper consistency, and the oakum gasket when thoroughly compacted with a calking iron to fill the bell to one half of its length, after which the joints should be cemented in the manner provided for in the specifications. As a matter of fact, there was no oakum gasket placed in any of the sewer joints at all. The sewer-pipe laid below the elevation of seven feet was laid in the same manner as hereinbefore indicated with an inferior [666]*666mortar, and the part underneath left entirely open; that although the contract required all openings in laterals to be closed with vitrified or cement cover, puttied in with cement mortar on the outside only, this was not done. That the openings in all the laterals were not closed at all, while a part of them had shingles placed on top of the openings, leaving space for sand to go through, whereby the sand filled the laterals and they became useless.

The evidence also tended to show that there were a number of instances where the sewer-pipe was laid in water.

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Bluebook (online)
180 P. 319, 92 Or. 650, 1919 Ore. LEXIS 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seaside-city-of-v-randles-or-1919.