Scully v. United States

197 F. 327, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1424
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedApril 27, 1912
DocketNo. 1,017
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 197 F. 327 (Scully v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scully v. United States, 197 F. 327, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1424 (D. Nev. 1912).

Opinion

FARRINGTON, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The pleadings are exceedingly voluminous. The complaint contains more than 33,000 words, and the answer more than 19,000. In the complaint there is an effort to state the facts which constitute the cause of action, the evidence, the argument, and a history of the entire transaction, including several appeals and other proceedings in the Department of the Interior.

The answer admits the execution of the contract on which the action is based, and by way of denial to the allegations of the complaint sets out a 54-page letter written by the Commissioner of the General Land Office more than three years before the action was commenced. The pleadings are not so helpful as could he wished. They present no clear statement of the issues. The plaintiff was required by his contract to complete the survey of eight townships, and to prepare plats and field notes of this work. The estimated cost was $3,000. When his account amounted to more than $5,100, he had still some 30 sections to survey. He now demands compensation for the partial performance of his contract. Defendant in its answer takes the position that plaintiff is entitled to nothing because the surveys were defective and incomplete, the notes confusing, improperly arranged, unintelligible, and unfit for record, and the plats not in accordance with, the rules of the Manual. Taking the entire transaction as shown by pleadings and evidence, I have endeavored to determine the rights of the parties without strict construction of the pleadings.

The Survey.

[1] It is urged that the approval of “the field examiner is immaterial to the issues of this case. The contract did not require his approval or that of any other subordinate officer,” and “the United States is not liable for the acts of its agents unless manifestly done within the scope of their authority.”

This objection is without merit. Section 2223, Rev. St. U. S. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1362), authorizes the Surveyor General “to depute a confidential agent to make such examination,” and in the Commissioner’s circular letter of June 15, 1898, which is made a part of the contract, it is said:

“These retracements must be corroborated by the examiner before the deputy will be allowed compensation, and retracements thus made, as well as surveys, will be noted in the data furnished by Surveyors General to the examiners when starting for the field inspection, and the latter will bo required to examine each mile or portion of a mile of such retracements in order to verify the work done by the deputy for which he asks compensation.”

Thus the examiner is required to inspect each mile of retracement, and proper data therefor must be furnished by the Surveyor General. The Surveyor General and the Commissioner rejected 158(4 miles of [336]*336resurveys and- retracements after the examiner recommended “the work be accepted.”

It is alleged in the complaint, and not denied, and it is shown by the official report of Mr. Chaney, that in the discharge of his official duty with a corps of assistants he examined Mr. Scully’s surveys, and found' them properly executed. The Surveyor General himself testifies that Scully’s, surveys were reasonably well executed, and that no complaint is made except to the field notes. Furthermore, the townships which Mr. Scully contracted to súrvey were again surveyed in 1909 by two deputy surveyors employed by defendant for that purpose. Copies of their plats, approved by the Surveyor General, are in evidence. No attempt has been made to show this approval was a mere matter of form, and my attention has not been called to any difference between Scully’s rejected plats and the approved plats of Messrs. Thurtell and Kearney, save that the former exhibit a larger number of resurveyed lines, and the latter show some 30 sections in townships 17 and 18 N., range 44 E., which were not surveyed by Scully. Neither Chaney, Thurtell, nor Kearney are here to explain or contradict the very strong inference from these circumstances. I must therefore find that Mr. Scully’s surveys under said contract.No. 225 were correctly executed in the field.

Finality of Commissioner’s Decision.

[2] Defendant contends that the Commissioner’s decision in this controversy is not open to review by the courts, because:

“The contract provides that no payment shall be made until the plats and field- notes are accepted by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and that the Surveyor General shall certify that the services were made in accordance with the provisions of the contract. These requirements obviously mean that the Commissioner' is made the arbiter of the sufficiency of the plats and field notes, and whether the surveyor has complied with the obligations of the contract. Where by contract there is committed to a designated, officer, the matter of deciding questions of dispute, the decision of the officer so designated .is not open to review by the courts, except for fraud or such gross error as would imply bad faith.”

Plaintiff’s argument that the Commissioner’s approval is unnecessary is based upon that portion of section 456 of the Rev. Stats, of the U. S.(U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 258), which was repealed in 1894 (Act July 31, 1894, c. 174, 28 Stat. 207). It would be unreasonable to require payment for services like those performed by Mr. Scully before the government has had opportunity to accept or reject the performance. Authority to accept or reject must be lodged somewhere. The parties here -very properly vested this authority in the Surveyor General and the Commissioner of the Dand Office. If the Commissioner has thus been made the arbiter of the sufficiency of the work, it follows that his decision is binding, unless it is shown to be fraudulent, or the. result of mistake or negligence, so great as to be equivalent to bad faith. United States v. Gleason, 175 U. S. 588, 607, 20 Sup. Ct. 228, 44 L. Ed. 284. It is not necessary-that there should be actual fraud or intentional wrong. It is enough if there has been an arbitrary, unreasonable/ or unjust refusal to accept work which [337]*337ought to be accepted. Edwards v. Hartshorn, 72 Kan. 19, 82 Pac. 520, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1050; Highton v. Dessau. (Com. Pl.) 19 N. Y. Supp. 395. In the latter case the contractor and the arbiter disagreed as to the meaning of the contract. The court held the work required by the arbiter was not required by the contract, and permitted a recovery without the architect’s certificate. In Kistler v. The Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 88 Ind. 460, 464, it was held that where the arbiter had failed to estimate work, or by mistake had underestimated it, suit could be maintained for recovery of the correct amount.

[3] We must not lose sight of the fact that the Commissioner is the representative of the government in this transaction, having the execution of the contract and the performance of the survey thereunder so completely in his charge through his subordinates, including the Surveyor General, as to be, to all intents and purposes, one of the parties to the agreement itself. Under the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Commissioner and the Surveyor General to exercise a high degree of care and good faith. They are not above the contract. They are bound by its terms, and they have no right of arbitrary rejection.

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Bluebook (online)
197 F. 327, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1424, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scully-v-united-states-nvd-1912.