Saul Bass & Associates v. United States

505 F.2d 1386, 20 Cont. Cas. Fed. 83,194, 205 Ct. Cl. 214, 1974 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 9
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 19, 1974
DocketNo. 373-68
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 505 F.2d 1386 (Saul Bass & Associates v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Saul Bass & Associates v. United States, 505 F.2d 1386, 20 Cont. Cas. Fed. 83,194, 205 Ct. Cl. 214, 1974 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 9 (cc 1974).

Opinion

Per Curiam

: This case comes before the court on plaintiff’s exceptions to a recommended decision filed August 29, [217]*2171972, by Trial Judge David Schwartz, pursuant to Eule 134(h) and to his supplemental opinion filed September 20, 1973, pursuant to Eule 134(h) and an order of the court of March 5,1973. The court has considered the case on the briefs and oral argument of counsel. Since the court agrees with the recommended decision, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby affirms and adopts the same as the basis for its judgment in this case with the following additions:

As shown in paragraph three of the letter of intent of December 21,1962, the letter of intent was merely an agreement to begin work on the project. The parties did not intend to incorporate the proposed Design Agreement in full, but only in part, because the proposed Design Agreement was still under negotiation. Plaintiff argues that the provision for attorney’s fees in the draft Design Agreement was incorporated in the letter of intent by the broad language in paragraphs one and four of the December 21st letter and that the attorney fee clause is remedial in nature, applying to both the design and production portions of the contract. We cannot accept plaintiff’s interpretation.

While there are broad references to the proposed Design Agreement in the letter of intent, the letter of intent is not a detailed expression of the obligations of the parties, nor are the references to the draft Design Agreement intended to make the letter of intent anything more than a preliminary agreement. The letter of intent refers to paragraphs 1, 2a, and 2b of the Design Agreement. These provisions in the Design Agreement basically provide a description of the nature of the project and a description of the work to be done in the initial stages. Neither the letter of intent nor any of the surrounding circumstances give any indication that the provision for attorney’s fees was made a part of the preliminary agreement in issue. In this situation, we cannot speculate on which portions of the draft Design Agreement were incorporated into the agreement. 'Consequently, we agree with our trial judge’s construction of the letter of intent to include in the preliminary agreement only those provisions of the proposed Design Agreement which describe the work to be done and which have been referred to, at least in part, in the letter of intent.

[218]*218In a subsequent hearing, the trial judge determined that plaintiff had presented the actual “story board” involved in this case to the court and that the clerk would deliver the “story board” to the defendant at the conclusion of the case. This satisfies the condition for plaintiff’s recovery herein, and judgment is entered for plaintiff in the sum of $22,787.72. Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees is dismissed, and defendant’s counterclaims are dismissed.

OPINION OP TRIAL JUDGE

Schwartz, Trial Judge:

Plaintiff Saul Bass & Associates, a California corporation, sues for a balance due under an alleged contract with the United States Commission for the 1964 World’s Fair for the design of the Government’s exhibit at the Fair. The Government counterclaims for a sum including its advances to plaintiff on the theory that there was no contract and if there was one, plaintiff failed to perform it. It is here held that the dealings between the parties did constitute a contract and that plaintiff is entitled to judgment for a balance of $22,787.72, found to be due, upon delivery by plaintiff to defendant of a certain “story board” which under the contract became the property of defendant.'

The U.S. Commission — N.Y. World’s Fair, was established in 1962 as a constituent agency in the Department of Commerce and pursuant to statute empowered by executive order to design, construct and operate the United States Pavilion and exhibits at the Fair. 22 U.S.C. § 2452(a) (3) ; Executive Order 11014, April 17, 1962, 3 CFR 593 (1959-1963 Comp.), 27 FR 3731 (1962) ; Dept. of Commerce Order No. 180, Aug. 7, 1962 (27 FR 8334 (1962)). The approximately $17 million appropriated for the overall project was divided into three parts, one to be used for the building, another for the exhibits and the third for operation and maintenance.

On August 6, 1962, plaintiff Saul Bass & Associates (henceforth “SBA”) submitted to the Commission a proposal for the design and construction of the exhibit on the upper level of the U.S. Pavilion at the-Fair. SBA was chosen to do the job on the basis of the concept it proposed and its experience and excellent reputation in its special fields of industrial design and the production of short films.

[219]*219SBA proposed that the exhibit should be a multimedia production involving a number of motion picture and slide projections, together with sound devices. The presentation would be viewed by small groups of visitors riding in a vehicle through an exhibit area divided into a number of segments. These segments would be so insulated from each other, that there would be presented in each — in effect continuously as the vehicle moved along — a separate production of a minute or less in duration. The spectators would thus experience successive environments composed of visual and aural phenomena. The theme was to be the conditions of modem life, sociologically treated, with emphasis on the growing problems of man’s environment and possible solutions to the problems.

On the completion of design, the Commission would enter into a contract or contracts for production — that is, the shooting of the film and the procurement, fabrication and installation of the physical elements of the exhibit. Such a contract would be made either with SBA alone or with SBA as supervisor and with various other organizations.

While SBA had a number of designers and other creative persons in its employ, it was understood that the detailed planning — called design — of the exhibit would involve the coordination of the work of a number of experts as consultants, subcontractors or in some other relationship, in such fields of films, lighting, sound and the mechanical “ride.” The design proposed would involve relatively new and complicated techniques, equipment and effects, and would be costly to realize.

SBA’s work would be both creative and fiscal, that is, it would prepare a story, script and design for the exhibit, upon the basis of estimates of the cost of the various elements, within the amount expected to be available. The Commission’s representatives gave SBA to understand that an amount in excess of $3 million or about $3.5 million would be available as a budget for production.

Upon the selection of SBA, representatives of SBA and the Commission set about negotiating the details of a formal contract. Time, however, was short and SBA did not wait to begin work for a formal contract. The Executive Order [220]*220having made appropriate waivers of procurement restrictions, the parties signed a letter of intent dated December 21, 1962.

While they expected that they would soon agree upon and execute a formal contract, and they negotiated continually until their relationship ended in May of 1963, no formal contract was ever signed.

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Bluebook (online)
505 F.2d 1386, 20 Cont. Cas. Fed. 83,194, 205 Ct. Cl. 214, 1974 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 9, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/saul-bass-associates-v-united-states-cc-1974.