Sauk County v. S. A. M.

2022 WI 46, 975 N.W.2d 162, 402 Wis. 2d 379

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Decided: June 23, 2022
• Docket: 2019AP001033
• Status: Published

Opinion

2022 WI 46

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN CASE NO.: 2019AP1033

COMPLETE TITLE: In the matter of the mental commitment of S. A. M.:

Sauk County, Petitioner-Respondent, v. S. A. M., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 523, 950 N.W.2d 690 (2020 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED: June 23, 2022 SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: ORAL ARGUMENT: February 28, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL: COURT: Circuit COUNTY: Sauk JUDGE: Patrick J. Taggart

JUSTICES: KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and DALLET, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring/dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Elizabeth G. Rich and Rich Law SC, Plymouth. There was an oral argument by Elizabeth G. Rich.

For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief filed by Douglas B. Raines and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Douglas B. Raines. An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball, assistant state public defender, with whom on the brief was Kelli S. Thompson, state public defender, for the Office of the State Public Defender. There was an oral argument by Colleen D. Ball.

2 2022 WI 46 NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing and modification. The final version will appear in the bound volume of the official reports. No. 2019AP1033 (L.C. No. 2017ME102)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the matter of the mental commitment of S. A. M.:

Sauk County, FILED Petitioner-Respondent, JUN 23, 2022 v. Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Supreme Court S. A. M.,

Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.

KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and DALLET, JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring/dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.

¶1 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J. This case involves the ability

of involuntarily committed persons to receive appellate review

of their commitment orders. Frequently, appellate courts

dismiss these appeals as moot because the underlying commitment

order expires before the court issues a decision on its merits. No. 2019AP001033

Such routine dismissals result in the validity of these liberty-

depriving orders largely evading review.

¶2 S.A.M. is among those committed citizens whose appeal

went unaddressed because the order extending his commitment

(also called "recommitment") expired before the court of appeals

could decide the merits of his appeal. He argues the court of

appeals erred in dismissing his appeal as moot because either

the order's ongoing collateral consequences render it not moot

or an exception to mootness applies. He further asks that if we

rule in his favor on the mootness issue, that we then review the

merits of his due-process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence

challenges.

¶3 Though in Portage County v. J.W.K. we concluded that

the expiration of the recommitment order rendered the appeal

moot, that holding was expressly "limited to situations

where . . . no collateral implications of the commitment order

are raised." 2019 WI 54, ¶28 n.11, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927

N.W.2d 509. Collateral consequences having been raised here, we hold that at least two such consequences render an appeal of an

expired recommitment order not moot: (1) the restriction of

one's constitutional right to bear arms; and (2) the liability

for the cost of one's care. On the merits, we hold that

S.A.M.'s due-process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges

fall short. For those reasons, we reverse the court of appeals'

dismissal of S.A.M.'s appeal and affirm S.A.M.'s recommitment

order.

2 No. 2019AP001033

I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Wisconsin's legal framework governing involuntary

mental-health commitments is important to understanding this

case. Before initially committing a person to the state or

county's care, the government must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the person is: (1) mentally ill;1 (2) a proper

subject for treatment; and (3) currently dangerous under at

least one of five standards. Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a), (13)(e)

(2019-20).2 Those five standards are:

 First Standard: there is a substantial probability of

physical harm to one's self evidenced by recent threats

of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm;

 Second Standard: there is a substantial probability of

physical harm to others evidenced by recent homicidal or

other violent behavior, or a recent overt act, attempt or

threat to do serious physical harm that placed others in

reasonable fear of serious physical harm;

 Third Standard: there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to one's self or others

evidenced by a pattern of recent acts or omissions

manifesting impaired judgment, and there is either no

reasonable provision for one's protection in the

1 The state or a county may also civilly commit a person who is drug dependent or developmentally disabled, but this opinion will focus on mental illness because that was the basis for S.A.M.'s commitment. 2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.

3 No. 2019AP001033

community or a reasonable probability that one will not

avail himself or herself of those services;

 Fourth Standard: there is a substantial probability that

death, serious physical injury, serious physical

debilitation, or serious physical disease will imminently

ensue that makes one unable to satisfy basic needs as

evidenced by recent acts or omissions, and there is

either no reasonable provision for one's treatment and

protection in the community or a reasonable probability

that one will not avail himself or herself of those

services; and

 Fifth Standard: (1) there is a substantial probability

both that one needs care or treatment to prevent further

disability or deterioration and that, if left untreated,

one will lack necessary services and suffer severe

mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in

the loss of one's ability to function independently in

the community or the loss of cognitive or volitional control over one's thoughts or actions; (2) either (a) an

incapability of expressing an understanding of the

advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or

treatment and the alternatives after such were explained,

or (b) a substantial incapability of applying such an

understanding to one's mental illness to make an informed

choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or

treatment; and (3) either no reasonable provision for one's care or treatment in the community or a reasonable

4 No. 2019AP001033

probability that one will not avail himself or herself of

those services.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.3 Upon sufficient evidence of both a treatable

mental illness and at least one of these forms of dangerousness,

the circuit court must order the person initially committed for

no more than six months. § 51.20(13)(a), (g)1. It must then

also issue a firearms ban, i.e. "order the individual not to

possess a firearm, [and] order the seizure of any firearm owned

by the individual." § 51.20(13)(cv)1.

¶5 The government may thereafter seek to extend the

initial commitment. Recommitment again requires clear and

convincing evidence of the same three elements required for the

initial commitment: mental illness, treatability, and current

dangerousness under at least one of the five standards outlined

above. Recommitment proceedings can differ from initial

commitment proceedings in one significant way. In an initial

commitment proceeding, the government may prove dangerousness

only with evidence of recent acts, omissions, or behavior. In a recommitment proceeding, though, the government may

alternatively prove dangerousness by "showing that there is a

substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual's

treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject

for commitment [under one of the five dangerousness standards]

if treatment were withdrawn." § 51.20(1)(am). If the

3 This summary of the statutory dangerousness standards omits elements not relevant to S.A.M.'s case and thus is not applicable to every civil commitment.

5 No. 2019AP001033

government presents clear and convincing evidence that the

committed person remains mentally ill, treatable, and dangerous

under one of the five standards (whether by recent conduct or

via the § 51.20(1)(am) alternative showing), then the court must

order that person recommitted for a period not to exceed one

year, along with another firearms ban. § 51.20(13)(cv)1.,

(g)1. & (g)3.

¶6 Given these orders' limited duration, timely appellate

review before their expiration proves difficult. The court of

appeals reports that between 2018 and 2020, it issued no

decision regarding an initial six-month commitment before the

order expired. Recommitment orders, which last for generally

one year, fared somewhat better; the court of appeals decided 40

percent of those appealed before their expiration. Though the

reasons for delay vary, rarely does fault lie with the person

committed——as is certainly the case for S.A.M.

¶7 S.A.M. is diagnosed with bipolar disorder with

psychotic features. In late 2017, S.A.M. was subjected to an emergency detention after his father reported that he made

statements about wanting to die. His father informed the

responding sheriff that S.A.M. had been homeless for some time.

S.A.M. displayed signs of malnourishment and suffered from

trench foot due to not changing his shoes for long periods of

time. An examining psychiatrist noted that S.A.M. had

discontinued taking previously prescribed medication and had a

long history of such noncompliance. S.A.M. admitted to acts of self-harm and substance abuse, predominantly alcohol but illicit

6 No. 2019AP001033

drugs as well. In January 2018, in statements to his sister,

S.A.M. threatened self-harm and told her he wanted to die.

Based on this behavior, Sauk County ("the County") successfully

petitioned to have S.A.M. involuntarily committed to its care

for six months of compelled treatment. This initial commitment

order included a firearms ban that would "remain in effect until

lifted by the court" and survive the commitment order's

expiration. S.A.M. did not appeal this initial commitment

¶8 Before the initial commitment order expired, the

County petitioned to extend S.A.M.'s involuntary commitment.

The petition contained two relevant representations from

psychiatrist Dr. Linda DiRaimondo: (1) S.A.M. suffers from a

"chronic mental disorder" (bipolar disorder); and (2) though

currently medication compliant, S.A.M. "has not been in the past

when not on commitment and has regressed to an acute psychotic

state and required hospitalization." On those bases,

Dr. DiRaimondo opined that there is "a substantial likelihood, based on [S.A.M.'s] treatment record, that if treatment were

withdrawn, [he] would regress and become a proper subject for

commitment." The day before the recommitment trial, S.A.M.

filed a motion asking, in part, for the circuit court4 to order

the County to "elect under which standard of dangerousness it

seeks to proceed" and preclude it "from presenting evidence as

to other forms of dangerousness."

4The Hon. Patrick J. Taggart of the Sauk County Circuit Court presided.

7 No. 2019AP001033

¶9 The circuit court addressed S.A.M.'s motion at the

start of the trial. S.A.M. argued that the petition "clearly

enunciated" only one method of proving dangerousness——the

recommitment alternative under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) that

there was a substantial likelihood S.A.M. would be a proper

subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. According

to S.A.M., that theory was contradicted by the County's proposed

order, which did not include the language of § 51.20(1)(am) but

instead broadly stated that S.A.M. was "dangerous because the

subject evidences behavior within one or more of the standards

under §§ 51.20(1) or (1m), Wis. Stats. (except for proceedings

under § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., Wis. Stats.)." S.A.M. argued these

imprecise filings violated his right to due process by providing

inadequate "notice of what he's up against." The County stood

by its petition's reliance on § 51.20(1)(am) and asserted,

"there's a substantial likelihood that [S.A.M.] would be a

proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. And

that's what the county intends to show today." The circuit court accepted the County's assertion, inviting S.A.M.'s

objection if the County began to introduce evidence supporting a

different theory of dangerousness.

¶10 The circuit court then proceeded with the trial.

Dr. DiRaimondo and S.A.M.'s social worker, Brigette Chizek, both

testified in favor of recommitment; S.A.M. testified against it.

Dr. DiRaimondo repeated her bipolar disorder diagnosis of S.A.M.

and affirmed it was treatable. As to S.A.M.'s dangerousness, she opined that S.A.M. "would not take his medication if he were

8 No. 2019AP001033

not on a court order" based on his treatment record, which

showed that when not in a supervised setting, "he has stopped

his medication" and that he "recently told his case manager"

that "he does not feel he needs . . . medication."

¶11 Chizek then testified to S.A.M.'s history of substance

abuse, medication noncompliance, and resulting mental-health

instability and self-harm ideations. She averred that S.A.M.,

after being told of the services available to him to assist his

independence, "talks about not wanting those," with the

exception of the community support program in which he was

currently participating. She stated his post-commitment plan

was to stay with his grandmother and then at a motel until he

could find a place to live. But she recounted how he had

previously disappeared from his grandmother's home, which led to

the events underlying his initial commitment discussed above.

She expressed her concern that a similar scenario would play out

if treatment were withdrawn and affirmed that he currently

needed a structured setting. She also recounted that S.A.M. had recently urinated in his pants and refused to change out of the

soiled clothing. Finally, she acknowledged that as recently as

the past month, S.A.M. told her he would continue his

medications if released from his commitment.

¶12 Taking the witness stand last, S.A.M. reaffirmed his

statement about staying medication compliant post-commitment and

agreed that the medication benefited him in managing his mental

illness. He explained that he hoped to start working as a laborer, as he has in the past. He further testified that he

9 No. 2019AP001033

would not repeat his past mistake of going off medication,

chalking his recent lapse up to the "hard times" he was

experiencing six months prior.

¶13 The circuit court, after recounting all of this

evidence, found grounds for a six-month recommitment order. The

recommitment order also provided that S.A.M. "is prohibited from

possessing any firearm. . . . This prohibition shall remain in

effect until lifted by the court. Expiration of the mental

commitment proceeding does not terminate this restriction."

¶14 S.A.M. timely filed his notice of intent to pursue

post-commitment relief. An unfortunate series of events then

delayed his appeal. First, the State Public Defender was unable

to appoint S.A.M. post-commitment counsel until more than four

months into his six-month commitment (nearly three months after

the deadline to appoint appellate counsel). Then, it took

another two months for the full record, including transcripts,

to be transmitted to appointed counsel——just as the recommitment

order was expiring. Next, S.A.M.'s attorney delayed filing his notice of appeal, albeit with good cause. Additional months

passed before the court of appeals received the record.

¶15 By this time, S.A.M.'s appeal had been expired for

over six months. Consequently, the court of appeals directed

the parties to brief whether the case was moot. The court of

appeals finally rendered its decision in September 2020——over

two years after the circuit court issued the six-month

recommitment order. See Sauk County v. S.A.M., No. 2019AP1033, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2020). The court

10 No. 2019AP001033

of appeals dismissed S.A.M.'s appeal as moot, concluding that

the order neither caused ongoing collateral consequences nor

presented an issue triggering a mootness exception. Id.

¶16 We granted S.A.M.'s petition for review on the

mootness issue as well as the merits issues he raised. We

additionally asked the parties to brief the following issue:

Whether this court has the authority, through its "superintending and administrative authority over all courts" (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1)) and/or its authority to "regulate pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts" (Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1)), to require the court of appeals to expedite the disposition of appeals under Wis. Stat. ch. 51, or in some other manner to ensure that appellants under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 receive an appeal that addresses the merits of the appellants' contentions? II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17 This case presents issues of mootness, procedural due

process, and sufficiency of the evidence. Both mootness and

procedural due process present questions of law we review de

novo. Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶16, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (mootness); Teague v. Schimel, 2017 WI 56, ¶19,

375 Wis. 2d 458, 896 N.W.2d 286 (procedural due process).

Whether the County presented clear and convincing evidence to

justify recommitment is a mixed question of fact and law.

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶24, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942

N.W.2d 277. S.A.M. challenges only the legal application of the

undisputed facts to the statutory standards, which we review de

novo. Id., ¶25.

11 No. 2019AP001033

III. ANALYSIS

¶18 Our analysis begins with the mootness question,

focusing on whether the collateral consequences of expired

recommitment orders render appeals of such orders not moot.

Because we determine that the ongoing collateral consequences of

recommitment do render these appeals not moot, we turn to the

merits of S.A.M.'s due-process and sufficiency-of-the-evidence

claims.

A. Mootness

¶19 In Wisconsin, dismissal of a case as moot is an act of

judicial restraint rather than a jurisdictional requirement.

See D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶19. A case is moot when the

resolution of an issue will have no practical effect on the

underlying controversy. See id. This means an appeal from an

order like S.A.M.'s is not moot when the direct or collateral

consequences of the order persist and vacatur of that order

would practically affect those consequences. See id., ¶23

(citing State v. Theoharopoulos, 72 Wis. 2d 327, 240 N.W.2d 635 (1976)). Here, S.A.M. posits that three collateral consequences

from his now-expired recommitment order render his appeal not

moot: (1) the firearms ban; (2) the liability for the cost of

his care while committed; and (3) the stigma associated with a

mental-health commitment.

¶20 We recently explained that whether a collateral

consequence renders an appeal not moot turns on the existence of

a "causal relationship" between a legal consequence and the challenged order. See id., ¶¶23-25 (quoting Theoharopoulos, 72

12 No. 2019AP001033

Wis. 2d at 333). We conclude such a causal relationship exists

between a recommitment order and at least two collateral

consequences: (1) the firearms ban; and (2) the liability for

the cost of care. We address each in turn.

1. Firearms ban

¶21 Two terms ago, we held that an appeal of an expired

initial commitment order is not moot because the order

collaterally subjects the committed person to a continuing

firearms ban. See id., ¶25. We recognized that this firearms

ban constitutes an ongoing impairment of the person's

constitutional right to bear arms, which we deemed to be "no

minor consequence." Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend II; Wis.

Const. art. I, § 25; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554

U.S. 570 (2008); Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017

WI 19, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233). We also explained that

prevailing in an appeal of an expired initial commitment order

voids the firearms ban. Id. Because voiding the firearms ban

is a "practical effect" that has a "causal relationship" to the successful appeal of an expired initial commitment order, we

deemed the appeal not moot. Id.

¶22 The question before us is whether that same rationale

applies to recommitment orders. The court of appeals concluded

it did not. In its view, with which the County agrees, vacating

the recommitment order and voiding its corresponding firearms

ban would have no practical effect because the separate ban

attached to S.A.M.'s unchallenged initial commitment order would still be in effect. S.A.M., No. 2019AP1033, at ¶¶8-12.

13 No. 2019AP001033

¶23 We disagree. The court of appeals is correct that the

firearms ban attached to an initial commitment will continue to

bar the committed person from possessing a firearm even if we

vacate a subsequent recommitment order. But that fact does not

mean prevailing in a recommitment appeal would have no

"practical effect" on restoring one's constitutional right.

Prevailing on appeal would vacate the recommitment order and

practically alter a committed person's "record and reputation"

for dangerousness, a factor a reviewing court must consider when

weighing a petition to cancel a firearms ban.

§ 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b. Additionally, if a committed person

succeeds in vacating an expired recommitment order, the fact

that the recommitment order no longer exists might influence the

reviewing court's weighing of whether restoring gun rights would

be consistent with the "public interest." Id. Even if

marginal, these practical effects on a committed person's

ability to restore a constitutional right remain "no minor

consequence." D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶25. Thus, the "causal relationship" between these practical effects and our vacatur of

an expired recommitment order renders an appeal of such orders

not moot.

2. Cost of care liability

¶24 Likewise, a person's mandatory liability for the cost

of the care received during a recommitment is a collateral

consequence that renders recommitment appeals not moot. Under

Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2), a committed person like S.A.M. "shall be liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services and

14 No. 2019AP001033

supplies" related to each commitment period. If the underlying

commitment order is vacated, however, the liability tied to that

particular commitment period no longer exists. See Jankowski v.

Milwaukee County, 104 Wis. 2d 431, 438-40, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981);

Ethelyn I.C. v. Waukesha County, 221 Wis. 2d 109, 120-21, 584

N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1998). For that reason, a direct causal

relationship exists between vacating an expired recommitment

order and removing the liability it creates, sufficient to

render recommitment appeals not moot.

¶25 The court of appeals' contrary position, again adopted

by the County, is that S.A.M. failed to show "actual monetary

liability" because he presented no evidence of collection

efforts against his debt by the time of the appeal. See S.A.M.,

No. 2019AP1033, at ¶14. This position misses the mark for two

related reasons. First, it is irrelevant whether collection

efforts have begun because, regardless, S.A.M. remains liable

solely by virtue of § 46.10(2)'s mandatory language ("shall be

liable"). And second, it is enough to overcome mootness when there is the "potential" for collection actions because of the

liability. See State v. McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 531, 537, 424

N.W.2d 411 (1988) (holding that a deceased defendant's appeal

was not moot because his conviction may lead to "potential

collateral consequences" for his estate); see also D.K., 390

Wis. 2d 50, ¶24 (applying to ch. 51 commitment orders the same

collateral-consequences rationale used in criminal cases). The

threat of potential collection actions to recoup the costs associated with S.A.M.'s recommitment care may follow S.A.M.

15 No. 2019AP001033

unless and until his recommitment order is vacated or the

liability is satisfied. See Jankowski, 104 Wis. 2d at 438.

¶26 We are also not persuaded by the County's argument

that a committed person's liability is contingent on a person's

ability to pay. That is simply not the law. A "liable

person['s] ability to pay" only informs to whom collection

efforts should be directed, see § 46.10(3), and what, if any,

settlement or agreement might be appropriate to satisfy the

debt, see § 46.10(7). Neither of those considerations, however,

extinguish the liability. And in fact, this liability permits

the government to continually probe S.A.M.'s financial condition

to reevaluate his ability to pay. See § 46.10(8)(c). Thus,

vacating a recommitment order will have the practical effect of

removing the order's attached liability, regardless of the

person's ability to pay.

¶27 Accordingly, we conclude an appeal of an expired

recommitment order is not moot because vacating the order would

still have practical effects on two of the order's collateral consequences——the ability to restore a constitutional right and

the liability for the cost of care received while subject to the

16 No. 2019AP001033

recommitment order.5 Because S.A.M.'s appeal is not moot, we

turn to the merits of his appeal.

B. Due Process

¶28 On the merits, S.A.M. first argues the County's

imprecise pretrial filings violate his due-process right to

adequate notice as to which specific theory of dangerousness

justified his recommitment.6 S.A.M.'s argument relies solely on

our recent D.J.W. decision. There, we required

"clarity . . . regarding the underlying basis for a

recommitment," such that "going forward circuit courts in

recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings

with reference to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2.

on which the recommitment is based." D.J.W., 391

Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶40, 42. According to S.A.M., due process demands

that recommitment petitions provide the same type of "clarity."

¶29 S.A.M.'s reliance on D.J.W. is misplaced for two

reasons. First, D.J.W. addressed a circuit court's legal

responsibility to facilitate meaningful appellate review, not a

5Given this holding, we refrain from addressing S.A.M.'s stigma argument. See Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15. And because his appeal is not moot, we need not address any exceptions to mootness. See id. For related reasons, we determine this case is not the proper vehicle in which to address our constitutional and statutory authority to expedite review of appeals from civil commitment orders. 6The government may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," which includes a procedural right to notice. See Wis. Const. amnd. XIV, § 1; Milewski v. Town of Dover, 2017 WI 79, ¶23, 377 Wis. 2d 38, 899 N.W.2d 303.

17 No. 2019AP001033

county's pretrial notice responsibilities. And second, our

April 2020 D.J.W. decision indicated relief under its holdings

would be prospective; its holding does not reach back to

S.A.M.'s 2018 recommitment trial. See id., ¶59. Because S.A.M.

relies only on the inapt D.J.W. to support his due-process

claim, we cannot say the County's notice violated his procedural

due-process rights. See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v.

Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("We do not

step out of our neutral role to develop or construct arguments

for parties." (citing State v. Pal, 2017 WI 44, ¶26, 374

Wis. 2d 759, 893 N.W.2d 848)).

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶30 S.A.M. next challenges whether the evidence

sufficiently establishes his dangerousness under any standard.7

To be sufficient, the evidence must be clear and convincing that

an individual is currently dangerous; it is not enough to show

only that a person once was dangerous. D.J.W., 391

Wis. 2d 231, ¶34 (citing J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶24). In a recommitment proceeding, the evidence may take the form of

either: (1) recent acts, omissions, or behaviors exhibiting

dangerousness; or (2) evidence that if treatment were withdrawn

the person would be substantially likely to engage in the types

of dangerous acts, omissions, or behaviors that meet one of the

five dangerousness standards. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.,

(1)(am).

S.A.M. does not challenge the circuit court's conclusions 7

that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment.

18 No. 2019AP001033

¶31 S.A.M. levels two sufficiency arguments. First, he

contends that the evidence under either evidentiary pathway is

insufficient. Second, he contends that the County's witnesses

failed to recite the statutory standards being applied with near

exactness as Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349

Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607, allegedly requires. We disagree

with both contentions.

1. Sufficient evidence

¶32 We are persuaded that the evidence sufficiently

establishes that S.A.M. is dangerous under the Third Standard by

way of the recommitment alternative. See Wis. Stat.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c., (1)(am). Under those two provisions, the

County's burden was to show a substantial likelihood, based on

S.A.M.'s treatment history, that if treatment were withdrawn he

would again face "a substantial probability of physical

impairment or injury to himself" and that there is either no

"reasonable provision for [his] protection . . . available in

the community" or that S.A.M. would not, to a "reasonable probability," "avail himself . . . of these services." Id.

¶33 The circuit court aptly summarized much of the record.

It recounted Dr. DiRaimondo's testimony about S.A.M. telling his

case manager "that he didn't need [his medication]," as well as

her own opinion that "if there's no court order, [S.A.M.] won't

take his medications." The circuit court then reiterated the

social worker's testimony that when S.A.M. is off medication and

"on his own, he is unstable, threat[ens] to harm himself, [and is] not compliant when he's in the group home." Though S.A.M.

19 No. 2019AP001033

promised he would maintain medication compliance absent a court

order, the circuit court was skeptical about S.A.M.'s

explanation that his recent noncompliance and resulting

dangerousness were solely the result of "hard times":

Certainly the Court understands hard times, but those hard times certainly may and may be likely to continue in the future. Whether one is on a court order or not, hard times happen. And the Court has a duty to make sure that if they happen, that [S.A.M.] has the proper treatment to deal with, with those hard times when he would be on his own. It is evident the circuit court found S.A.M. not credible on

this point, a finding to which we defer. See Metro. Assocs. v.

City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶61, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905

N.W.2d 784 ("When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it

is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and

of the weight to be given to each witness's testimony." (quoting

Lessor v. Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct.

App. 1998)). Instead, the circuit court expressly agreed with

the two professionals' shared "concern that this situation may

happen all over again if the Court does not grant

the . . . extension," i.e. if compelled treatment is withdrawn.

¶34 The evidence further addresses the likelihood that

S.A.M. would avail himself of community resources available for

his protection. S.A.M.'s social worker testified that "[w]hen

talking about what services are available"——including services

that would assist his living independently——"he talks about not

wanting those." Moreover, the circuit court recounted her testimony about S.A.M. disappearing from his grandmother's home—

20 No. 2019AP001033

—leading to the events underling his initial commitment——"under

somewhat of the same circumstances that he proposes now to live

with his grandmother, move to a motel and get a job." While the

circuit court acknowledged "that's a good plan," it also

recognized that "as recently as six months ago that plan didn't

work out" and failed to provide for his protection. Taken

together, we conclude that the evidence sufficiently proves

S.A.M. is dangerous under the Third Standard via the

§ 51.20(1)(am) recommitment alternative.

2. Melanie L.

¶35 S.A.M.'s reliance on Melanie L. is also unavailing.

Melanie L. involved a county expert's "failure to answer

questions using the terms in the statute." 349

Wis. 2d 148, ¶91. The expert opined that "Melanie was incapable

of applying an understanding of the medication 'to her

advantage.'" Id. By contrast, the statutory standard demanded

that she be "substantially incapable of applying an

understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his or her mental illness . . . to make an informed choice as

to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment." Wis.

Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)4.b. Because there was conflicting evidence

on this standard, we concluded that the expert's deviation from

the statutory terms cast doubt on whether the expert "was

applying the standard or changing the standard."

Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶90-91. As such, the County failed

to meet its clear-and-convincing burden. Id., ¶94.

21 No. 2019AP001033

¶36 We face a different record here than we did in

Melanie L. The record before us shows the circuit court,

parties, and witnesses all in accord regarding the statutory

standards they were applying. The County made clear at the

outset that it "intends to show today" that "there's a

substantial likelihood that the individual would be a proper

subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn," as

§ 51.20(1)(am) requires. Though no witness recited the Third

Standard with exactness, the experts' repeated references to

S.A.M. both reporting and threatening self-harm make clear to

this court that they were properly assessing the "probability of

physical impairment or injury to himself" if the commitment

ended. We therefore conclude the evidence on S.A.M.'s

dangerousness sufficiently justified his recommitment.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶37 Though S.A.M.'s recommitment order expired, the

ongoing collateral consequences causally related to it could be

practically affected by a favorable decision, rendering his appeal not moot. The merits of his appeal, however, do not

warrant vacating the recommitment order. As such, we reverse

the court of appeals' dismissal of S.A.M.'s appeal but affirm

the circuit court's recommitment order.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is

reversed.

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¶38 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. (concurring in part,

dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the

recommitment order should be affirmed. I dissent from the

majority opinion because it upends the longstanding mootness

doctrine in a recommitment appeal. To the extent the court is

disappointed with the delay in this case, so am I. However, the

volume of similar cases that will await the appellate system in

the future because of this opinion does not bode well for better

case processing. With no moot appeals in these cases, the

appellate system will be flooded.

¶39 It would be one thing had the court concluded that an

exception to the mootness doctrine was fulfilled because this

issue is capable of repetition yet is likely to evade review.

However, the court did not. Instead, the court inexplicably

chose this case to overturn the mootness doctrine. Spending

most of its analysis on doing away with the mootness doctrine in

recommitment cases, the court decides that S.A.M. faces

"collateral consequences."1 Of course there can be consequences of a commitment——direct and collateral. In and of themselves,

The term "collateral consequences" is a term of art in the 1

criminal context. See State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶¶60-61, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477 (explaining in the plea withdrawal context that a "direct consequence [of a conviction] . . . is one that has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect," while "[c]ollateral consequences are indirect and do not flow from the conviction" such as consequences that "rest[] not with the sentencing court, but instead with a different tribunal or government agency"). This meaning does not fit well within the commitment context. See Marathon Cnty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶¶23-25, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (analyzing "collateral consequences," including firearms bans, in the commitment context).

1 No. 2019AP1033.akz

the existence of potential and unproven collateral consequences

alone have never been determinative of mootness or lack thereof.

Restrictions on the ability of S.A.M. to possess a firearm

because of this recommitment and uncertain and unpursued

potential financial liability as a result of the recommitment

order are nothing more than theoretical possibilities. The

relevant order expired. We ought not presume collateral

consequences that do not exist. Here there are none. I am

concerned about the unintended consequences of the court's

error.

¶40 I agree that this case took far too long to process,

but that defect should not cause the court to dismantle the

established law on collateral consequences or the doctrine of

mootness. A theoretical and unproven collateral consequence has

never been a standalone reason to conclude that a case is not

moot. There are many potential consequences of being committed,

yet in the past we have nonetheless correctly concluded that

cases are moot. Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (concluding that a sufficiency of

the evidence challenge to a Chapter 51 recommitment was moot

when the order expired). Apparently the court sub silentio

overrules J.W.K. and every other case that deemed a commitment

or recommitment appeal to be moot. The majority fails to answer

what if any limits might apply. The majority does not and

cannot differentiate S.A.M.'s firearms ban or possible financial

liability from that of any other commitment or recommitment. The majority makes no mention of the practical effect of a

2 No. 2019AP1033.akz

firearms ban or possible liability on S.A.M. that might be

different from any other recommittee. See State ex rel. Riesch

v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, ¶11, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 N.W.2d 219

(holding that a case is moot where the litigants fail to

demonstrate that resolution of the case would have a "practical

effect" on the case and parties).

¶41 In fact, S.A.M. faces a firearms ban regardless of his

recommitment, and there is no indication the government has or

will pursue recovery in his initial commitment let alone this

recommitment. The majority fails to analyze why this case, as

opposed to any other, is an exception to the mootness doctrine.

The opinion is devoid of any explanation why these facts are

unique or what the practical effect is for S.A.M. that would not

be the exact same for any other. Because the law on the

mootness doctrine and collateral consequences has been upended

and reinvented by the majority opinion, and it needlessly opens

the floodgates to appellate review of all commitments and

recommitments, I dissent. ¶42 Appeals are sometimes moot, and this case is one

example of an appeal that is otherwise moot. Marathon Cnty. v.

D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 ("Mootness

is a doctrine of judicial restraint. An issue is moot when its

resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying

controversy. Because moot issues do not affect a live

controversy, this court generally declines to reach them. But

we may overlook mootness if the issue falls within one of five exceptions: (1) the issue is of great public importance; (2)

3 No. 2019AP1033.akz

the issue involves the constitutionality of a statute; (3) the

issue arises often and a decision from this court is essential;

(4) the issue is likely to recur and must be resolved to avoid

uncertainty; or (5) the issue is likely of repetition and evades

review." (Citations omitted.)); id., ¶22 ("We have previously

concluded that an expired initial commitment order is moot."

(citing Winnebago Cnty. v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, 366

Wis. 2d 1, ¶30, 878 N.W.2d 109).).

¶43 The majority does not decide this case because of any

of the foregoing exceptions to mootness. It does not conclude

that the issue is capable of repetition yet is likely to evade

review. See J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶¶29-30. While a firearms

ban may be considered a "collateral consequence," it is not with

regard to S.A.M.'s recommitment order. In fact, the

recommitment order has no impact on his inability to possess a

firearm. He is otherwise subject to a firearms ban in his

initial order. Nonetheless, the majority somehow concludes that

S.A.M.'s firearms ban in his recommitment order defeats any claim of mootness. In addition, the majority concludes that

theoretical, speculative, and highly unlikely financial

liability exists for this recommitment, even when there is no

indication it will be pursued and no indication it was pursued

for the initial commitment. Without any mention of

distinguishing facts of S.A.M.'s recommitment, and since these

are consequences of every commitment or recommitment, the

majority opinion leads to the inescapable conclusion that no

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commitment or recommitment appeal is ever moot. I respectfully

disagree.

¶44 S.A.M. identifies three potential collateral

consequences that he contends make his appeal not moot. He

contends the firearms ban, the monetary liability for care, and

social stigma are the collateral consequences that save his

appeal. The majority adopts two of the three, without any

supporting evidence of them being actual consequences, and

concludes that they are collateral consequences. S.A.M. does

not demonstrate that either of these are actual or even likely

consequences of his recommitment. This appeal is of his

recommitment, not his commitment.

¶45 A firearms ban has been labeled a collateral

consequence, but it has never been an automatic exception to

mootness in a recommitment hearing. Here, this is the issue to

be decided. In this case, the circuit court prohibited S.A.M.

from possessing any firearms when it ordered his initial

commitment. That prohibition was not lifted. S.A.M. did not appeal his initial commitment order. He does not argue in this

case that the initial commitment was legally improper,

unsupported by factual evidence, or otherwise subject to

revocation. Thus, it is undisputed that, no matter what the

outcome of the current appeal, S.A.M. will not be able to

possess a firearm and will not be able to do so until he seeks

review of the firearms ban contained in the original commitment

order. S.A.M. has not demonstrated that his right to possess a

5 No. 2019AP1033.akz

firearm is in any way impacted by the firearms ban from his

recommitment order.

¶46 Although S.A.M. speculates that two valid firearms

bans could, at some point in time, impact his ability to lift

the initial firearms ban, he cites no allegation or evidence

that he intends to challenge the initial firearms ban, nor does

he cite any basis for the court to conclude that such a

challenge would somehow be successful. A firearms ban can be

revoked only if the court, in its discretion, determines S.A.M.

is "not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and

[revoking the ban] would not be contrary to public interest."

Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b. Moreover, given that S.A.M. was

subject to his initial commitment and recommitment in the same

county, S.A.M. could seek revocation of both the initial

firearms ban and the firearms ban included in his recommitment

order if and when he challenges the initial recommitment order.

§ 51.20(13)(cv)1m.a. (stating that individuals may file a

petition to revoke a firearms ban either at the court that ordered the ban or "in the county where the individual resides

to cancel the order"). When considering whether to revoke the

initial firearms ban, the circuit court would need to review

"the individual's record and reputation." § 51.20(13)(cv)1m.b.

S.A.M.'s record would be the same whether the court was

reviewing the initial firearms ban or the ban included in the

recommitment order. I note that this court affirms his

6 No. 2019AP1033.akz

¶47 It would be pure speculation to predict whether and to

what extent a reversal of the recommitment order here, which has

not happened, would impact how the initial firearms ban would be

reviewed by a circuit court in future proceedings. S.A.M.'s

argument that resolution of this appeal will, at some point,

allow him to own a firearm is mere guesswork, which cannot

overcome mootness concerns. See Riesch, 278 Wis. 2d 24, ¶11

(explaining that a case is moot where resolution of the case

would not have a "practical effect" on the case and litigants);

PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶¶30, 49, 317 Wis. 2d 656766

N.W.2d 559 (holding that a case was moot where resolution of the

case would not provide the plaintiff any form of effective

relief). I recognize that a firearms ban has profound

consequences and is a collateral or perhaps direct consequence

in most circumstances, but it alone does not control whether an

appeal of a recommitment is moot. Here, S.A.M. has not

demonstrated that the firearms ban in his recommitment is an

exception to mootness. ¶48 Second, as to S.A.M.'s financial argument, Wisconsin

law states that individuals who are involuntarily committed may

be required to pay for their care to the extent they are able.

Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2). However, there has been absolutely no

showing that S.A.M. is in any way liable for his care or that

the government seeks or will seek any such reimbursement. In

fact, the County stated at oral argument that it has no

intention to seek such relief from S.A.M. Why would the government first seek costs of recommitment when there is no

7 No. 2019AP1033.akz

indication it sought costs in the initial commitment? Plus,

legal protections are in place should such recovery someday be

sought. Recovery for the cost of care would require litigation

on legal claims and issues that are not before us and, up to

this point, have not been advanced in any other court

proceedings.

¶49 For S.A.M. to be held liable for the costs of care,

the County would first have to choose to advance its claims.

There is no available evidence showing that the County will or

is likely to pursue such a claim. In addition, the County would

have to comply with numerous legal requirements before obtaining

a money judgment against S.A.M. By statute, the County must

prove the "costs of the care, maintenance, services and

supplies" provided to S.A.M. § 46.10(2). Furthermore, the

County must conduct an "investigation" and consider S.A.M.'s

"ability to pay." § 46.10(3). "[U]nder all of the

circumstances," the government may collect only from those

individuals and assets that are best able to pay and those the committee is not "dependent upon." § 46.10(2)-(3). In

addition, this court held in Jankowski v. Milwaukee County, 104

Wis. 2d 431, 435-38, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981), that the state cannot

collect costs of care for Chapter 51 commitments or detentions

that were illegal or invalid. See, e.g., Waukesha Memorial

Hosp. v. Nierenberger, No. 2013AP480, unpublished slip op.,

¶¶12-15 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2013) (considering whether an

individual could be liable for a hospital bill after a Chapter 51 emergency detention by first reviewing whether the detention

8 No. 2019AP1033.akz

was valid). To recover from S.A.M., the County must overcome

any other defenses S.A.M. may have. See, e.g., § 46.10(11)(a)

("[I]n any action to recover from a person liable under this

section, the statute of limitations may be pleaded in

defense."). Here there is absolutely no indication S.A.M.

himself could be financially responsible for his care.

¶50 To overcome mootness concerns, S.A.M. asks that we

speculate that the state, at some point in time in the future,

will seek to recoup the costs of care, that S.A.M. will have the

ability to pay, that the state fully satisfies Wis. Stat.

§ 46.10, and that S.A.M. will not have any valid defense to

assert. S.A.M.'s argument relies on a series of assumptions,

yet we have absolutely no indication in the record before us

that any of those assumptions are legitimate. The majority's

conclusions have sweeping consequences which are contrary to our

mootness doctrine. See City of Racine v. J-T Enters. of Am.,

Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 691, 701-02, 221 N.W.2d 869 (1974) (holding

that a case was moot in a zoning dispute where a municipality asked for a ruling on the legality of land use which it believed

would occur in the future, and reasoning that simply because a

legal dispute may occur "at some time in the future" could not

serve to overcome mootness); Ziemann v. Village of N. Hudson,

102 Wis. 2d 705, 708, 710-11, 307 N.W.2d 236 (1981) (concluding

that a case was moot where property owners sued to prevent the

sale of land to a municipality to use the property as a park

when the sale was completed, even though there could be a future legal dispute over the use of the property as a park); see also

9 No. 2019AP1033.akz

United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937 (2011) ("One

can never be certain that findings made in a decision concluding

one lawsuit will not someday control the outcome of another

suit. But if that were enough to avoid mootness, no case would

ever be moot" (cleaned up).).

¶51 Finally, no Wisconsin court has ever concluded that

social stigma alone is a collateral consequence of commitment

that will defeat the mootness doctrine. In fact, S.A.M. fails

to demonstrate that he has experienced any social stigma, let

alone social stigma as a result of the recommitment. I would

not invariably extend social stigma of a recommitment to the

level of being a collateral consequence. S.A.M. fails to

provide any evidence or describe what negative consequences he

himself has experienced and will continue experiencing as a

result of the recommitment order. Furthermore, S.A.M. does not

dispute that he was mentally ill nor that his initial commitment

was justified. There is simply no evidence or description

showing the extent to which any social stigma S.A.M. experiences is caused by his admittedly valid initial commitment, the

serious mental health issues he experienced in the past, and the

fact that he was recommitted for an additional six months. It

is by no means a given that those in society who stigmatize

S.A.M. for his mental health history will stigmatize him less if

his recommitment order were reversed on appeal, only after the

recommitment period has terminated. If we concluded that mere

conjecture on social stigma was sufficient to overcome mootness, we would be forced to revisit many of our prior decisions. See,

10 No. 2019AP1033.akz

e.g., Riesch, 278 Wis. 2d 24, ¶11 (holding that a parole

revocation decision on the basis of an alleged failure to

cooperate and violation of jail rules, among other offenses, was

moot where the defendant was discharged from the underlying

conviction and the revocation did not impact any of current

condition of probation). Further, if S.A.M.'s position were

adopted, the status of mootness as an effective legal doctrine

in Wisconsin would be called into serious doubt.

¶52 Even if the merits of S.A.M.'s appeal should be

addressed, as the majority accurately holds, his due process

challenge to his recommitment order fails. Majority op., ¶¶28-

29. Due process does not require that the County identify a

particular subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)

(i.e., 2.a. through 2.e.). Procedural due process requires only

"notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to

apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action" and

"an opportunity to present their objections." Memphis Light,

Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978). S.A.M. does not contend that he was deprived the "opportunity to

present . . . objections" prior to his recommitment. Id. In

fact, he was appointed an attorney at state expense, who through

motion practice and targeted cross-examination, provided S.A.M.

a substantive defense at his recommitment hearing. Further,

S.A.M. does not claim that the County failed to provide notice

of its intention to pursue recommitment, its petition to the

court, or the time, place, and manner by which recommitment would be determined. S.A.M. and his counsel were informed of

11 No. 2019AP1033.akz

the County's charge that without commitment he would regress

back to his prior "acute psychotic state and required

hospitalization," thus requiring an extended commitment. They

were also informed that the County would be proceeding under

Chapter 51, and that the County believed if treatment were

withdrawn S.A.M. would be the proper subject for commitment.

Furthermore, S.A.M. was informed via court notice of the experts

the County intended to rely on for in-court testimony, as well

as the subject matter of the experts' testimony.

¶53 The County did not violate S.A.M.'s procedural due

process rights in the civil commitment proceedings below.

Compare DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 774 n.1, 788

(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a ticket that cited to the wrong

legal provision and did not include a notice of hearing, in

conjunction with a summons mailed to the plaintiff of the time,

place, and subject matter of a hearing, satisfied due process

even though the plaintiff asserted that he never received the

mailed summons); Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2016) (notice of "the date, time, and

location" of a legal violation and the possibility of a hearing

was sufficient for procedural due process); Herrada v. City of

Detroit, 275 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a

notice satisfied due process despite the fact that it contained

false and misleading information on the legal consequences of

the proceedings because the notice nonetheless "clearly state[d]

that a hearing is available to contest the City's allegation that" the plaintiff committed a violation of law); see also

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Milewski v. Town of Dover, 2017 WI 79, ¶21, 377 Wis. 2d 38, 899

N.W.2d 303 ("Although the text of the [United States] and

Wisconsin constitutional provisions differ, they provide

identical procedural due process protections."). If there were

a legitimate concern as to what subdivision paragraph of Wis.

Stat. § 51.20(1)(a) the County was proceeding under, a motion

for more definite pleadings could be made. No such motion was

made in the case at issue. Procedural protections already exist

if there is confusion as to the basis for the recommitment. No

record exists that such confusion was present here. Thus, due

process does not require the County to more specifically

identify the statutory subdivision paragraph under which it

seeks a recommitment order.

¶54 I agree with the majority that the record demonstrates

that both the third standard for dangerousness and the

alternative recommitment standard for dangerousness were

satisfied. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. & 1(am).

Specifically, I agree with the majority that, based on the available record, S.A.M. would face "'a substantial probability

of physical impairment or injury to himself' and that there is

either no 'reasonable provision for [his]

protection . . . available in the community' or that S.A.M.

would not, to a 'reasonable probability,' 'avail

himself . . . of these services.'" Majority op., ¶¶32, 34

(quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.). Nonetheless, "if a question

becomes moot . . . it will not be determined by the reviewing court" unless there exists "exceptional or compelling

13 No. 2019AP1033.akz

circumstances." J-T Enters., 64 Wis. 2d at 701-02. This case

is moot, and no collateral consequence sufficient to overcome

mootness resulted from S.A.M.'s recommitment. Thus, the

majority's discussion of the merits, while correct, is in this

case unnecessary and ancillary to the damage done to the

mootness doctrine.

¶55 The majority opinion essentially concludes that the

mootness doctrine never applies in Chapter 51 proceedings. It

does so without even requiring proof of an exception to mootness

or any showing that there is a practical effect to S.A.M. The

majority makes no effort to explain how S.A.M.'s circumstances

are unique so to overcome mootness. The majority in fact does

not in any way explain why S.A.M. is different from any other

committee or recommittee. The majority creates a legal

presumption that collateral consequences always result from a

Chapter 51 commitment, and that the mootness doctrine is

inapplicable in Chapter 51 commitments and recommitments. I

disagree, and would conclude that the mootness doctrine, along with its exceptions, should remain a viable rubric when

considering a case.

¶56 Finally, as for expedited disposition of Chapter 51

appeals, this court could address and fully vet any such

proposal through administrative rulemaking. In such a hearing,

the court could also consider whether the text of the Wisconsin

Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1) grant the court the

authority to mandate any such expedited disposition. The court should not engage in that debate and conclude the outcome in

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this opinion. To the extent that the majority seeks to improve

efficiency in Chapter 51 appeals, its decision today will have

the polar opposite effect. The majority's decision will flood

the appellate system with otherwise moot cases because those

cases too will have a firearms ban and have the potential for

financial liability. We can expect more, not less, delay and

sometimes, justice delayed is justice denied.

¶57 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in

part and dissent in part.

¶58 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE

ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this writing.

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