WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals which affirmed an order granting summary judgment entered by the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Judge Laurence C. Gram, Jr., in favor of the defendant Milwaukee county.
The named plaintiff,, Michael J. Jankowski, brought this declaratory judgment action on behalf of himself and all other persons who were involuntarily detained and committed in Milwaukee county, pursuant to Chapter 51, Stats. 1973, between January 1, 1975, and September 1, 1976. The plaintiffs seek a declaration that no money is due and owing the county for the costs incurred during these commitments in Milwaukee county institutions.
In a related case, Judge John E. McCormick of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, in his memorandum decision of August 18, 1976, Case No. 441-417, in State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, declared that all of the commitments were invalid due to violations of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law and Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel and right to trial by jury. The circuit court ordered that the plaintiffs be released or that new proceedings be instituted where appropriate. The court further ordered all records of the commitments be expunged. We note that the merit of the decision in State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy was not appealed and that the parties to this action do not dispute the fact that plaintiffs’ commitments were invalid. We, therefore, have no occasion to address [433]*433the propriety of plaintiffs’ commitments. We do, however, note that the trial judge, with some justification, used vigorous language in his evaluation of the issue of due process.
Sometime after the circuit court declared the commitment procedures unconstitutional and released the plaintiffs, Milwaukee county commenced collection efforts against the class members, seeking recovery of the costs of care and services at the Mental Health Center pursuant to sec. 46.10, Stats.1 Milwaukee county sought payment from the named plaintiff, Michael J. Jankowski, in the amount of $6,314.95. Mr. Jankowski refused payment and commenced this declaratory judgment action. The circuit court, although acknowledging that plaintiffs may have some cause of action against those persons responsible for or participating in the proceedings resulting in their commitments, determined that Milwaukee county was not a party to those proceedings. The circuit court concluded that Milwaukee county merely provided care for plaintiffs pursuant to a court order and, therefore, was entitled to be paid. Accordingly, the circuit court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in a per curiam opinion, holding that Milwaukee county was not an active participant in the illegal detentions and [434]*434commitments, and hence it should not bear the costs of care. That court further found that sec. 46.10 needed no interpretation in imposing liability upon any person committed to a county mental institution.2 We conclude the court of appeals failed to place proper emphasis upon the denial of due process involved in this case, and we reverse the judgment.
We find no precedent dealing with this question in Wisconsin or elsewhere. We are called upon to determine whether an individual illegally and involuntarily committed may be held responsible for the costs of care pursuant to sec. 46.10, Stats. We have recently addressed the issue of the constitutionality of sec. 46.10 and found no difficulty upholding the statute. In Matter of Guardianship of Nelson, 98 Wis. 2d 261, 296 N.W.2d 736 (1980); In Matter of Guardianship of Klisurich, 98 Wis. 2d 274, 296 N.W.2d 742 (1980). Plaintiff does not challenge the facial constitutionality of sec. 46.10; he merely challenges its application to all persons illegally detained and committed in Milwaukee county between the time periods of January 1, 1975, and September 1, 1976.
In arguing his case before this court and the court of appeals, plaintiff has advanced three principal bases upon which he contends relief can and should be grant[435]*435ed: (1) Sec. 46.10, State., should not be construed to assess costs of care and services against individuals illegally committed; (2) any imposition of liability would result in a further denial of due process; and (3) such an assessment of costs against an illegally committed individual is violative of public policy and inequitable. Because we find, utilizing sound principles of statutory construction, that sec. 46.10 applies only to due process commitments, we need not address the additional issues as to whether other constitutional or equitable principles prohibit statutory liability.
We note at the outset that sec. 46.10, Stats.,, provides the exclusive remedy for liability and imposition of costs of care provided by a state institution.3 Thus, any unjust enrichment argument advanced by the county or accepted by the lower courts4 regarding a “benefit” — if, in fact, there was one5 in terms of the treatment received by the illegally committed individuals is not a ground for recovery.
Sec. 46.10, Stats., provides that any person committed or admitted to a state institution shall be liable for the [436]*436cost of care, maintenance, services, and supplies according to his ability to pay. Milwaukee county advances a facially simplistic reading of the statute: any person committed, regardless of the validity of the commitment, is liable for the costs of care. The county notes that this court has previously found that sec. 46.10 “is valid, unambiguous, and no confusion or inequity arises from its operation.” State Department of Public Welfare v. Sem, 8 Wis. 2d 46, 49, 98 N.W.2d 428 (1959) (holding that liability imposed upon a parent pursuant to sec. 46.10 could not be eliminated by a divorce decree). Milwaukee county notes that where a statute is unambiguous, interpretation is unnecessary. Harris v. Kelley, 70 Wis. 2d 242, 249, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975); Weather-Tite Co. v. Lepper, 25 Wis. 2d 70, 74, 130 N.W.2d 198 (1964).
Plaintiff urges that sec. 46.10, Stats., can be read in one of two ways. Either the statute clearly and unambiguously excludes persons whose commitments are later declared judicially invalid because those persons are not committed in the eyes of the law; or, if it does require interpretation using basic canons of statutory construction, it should be construed to exclude persons whose commitments were declared invalid.
Plaintiff argues that, due to fundamentally flawed fact-finding procedures, there was never any due process finding that the individuals were in need of treatment or commitment. We agree and conclude that, because the proceedings were not adequate to sustain a finding that the individuals were in need of care and treatment, regardless of the fact that they may have been in need of such care and treatment, there was no valid commitment order. Thus the plaintiffs cannot be considered “committed” for any purpose, and they do not fall under the literal reading of sec. 46.10, Stats.
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WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals which affirmed an order granting summary judgment entered by the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Judge Laurence C. Gram, Jr., in favor of the defendant Milwaukee county.
The named plaintiff,, Michael J. Jankowski, brought this declaratory judgment action on behalf of himself and all other persons who were involuntarily detained and committed in Milwaukee county, pursuant to Chapter 51, Stats. 1973, between January 1, 1975, and September 1, 1976. The plaintiffs seek a declaration that no money is due and owing the county for the costs incurred during these commitments in Milwaukee county institutions.
In a related case, Judge John E. McCormick of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, in his memorandum decision of August 18, 1976, Case No. 441-417, in State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, declared that all of the commitments were invalid due to violations of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law and Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel and right to trial by jury. The circuit court ordered that the plaintiffs be released or that new proceedings be instituted where appropriate. The court further ordered all records of the commitments be expunged. We note that the merit of the decision in State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy was not appealed and that the parties to this action do not dispute the fact that plaintiffs’ commitments were invalid. We, therefore, have no occasion to address [433]*433the propriety of plaintiffs’ commitments. We do, however, note that the trial judge, with some justification, used vigorous language in his evaluation of the issue of due process.
Sometime after the circuit court declared the commitment procedures unconstitutional and released the plaintiffs, Milwaukee county commenced collection efforts against the class members, seeking recovery of the costs of care and services at the Mental Health Center pursuant to sec. 46.10, Stats.1 Milwaukee county sought payment from the named plaintiff, Michael J. Jankowski, in the amount of $6,314.95. Mr. Jankowski refused payment and commenced this declaratory judgment action. The circuit court, although acknowledging that plaintiffs may have some cause of action against those persons responsible for or participating in the proceedings resulting in their commitments, determined that Milwaukee county was not a party to those proceedings. The circuit court concluded that Milwaukee county merely provided care for plaintiffs pursuant to a court order and, therefore, was entitled to be paid. Accordingly, the circuit court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in a per curiam opinion, holding that Milwaukee county was not an active participant in the illegal detentions and [434]*434commitments, and hence it should not bear the costs of care. That court further found that sec. 46.10 needed no interpretation in imposing liability upon any person committed to a county mental institution.2 We conclude the court of appeals failed to place proper emphasis upon the denial of due process involved in this case, and we reverse the judgment.
We find no precedent dealing with this question in Wisconsin or elsewhere. We are called upon to determine whether an individual illegally and involuntarily committed may be held responsible for the costs of care pursuant to sec. 46.10, Stats. We have recently addressed the issue of the constitutionality of sec. 46.10 and found no difficulty upholding the statute. In Matter of Guardianship of Nelson, 98 Wis. 2d 261, 296 N.W.2d 736 (1980); In Matter of Guardianship of Klisurich, 98 Wis. 2d 274, 296 N.W.2d 742 (1980). Plaintiff does not challenge the facial constitutionality of sec. 46.10; he merely challenges its application to all persons illegally detained and committed in Milwaukee county between the time periods of January 1, 1975, and September 1, 1976.
In arguing his case before this court and the court of appeals, plaintiff has advanced three principal bases upon which he contends relief can and should be grant[435]*435ed: (1) Sec. 46.10, State., should not be construed to assess costs of care and services against individuals illegally committed; (2) any imposition of liability would result in a further denial of due process; and (3) such an assessment of costs against an illegally committed individual is violative of public policy and inequitable. Because we find, utilizing sound principles of statutory construction, that sec. 46.10 applies only to due process commitments, we need not address the additional issues as to whether other constitutional or equitable principles prohibit statutory liability.
We note at the outset that sec. 46.10, Stats.,, provides the exclusive remedy for liability and imposition of costs of care provided by a state institution.3 Thus, any unjust enrichment argument advanced by the county or accepted by the lower courts4 regarding a “benefit” — if, in fact, there was one5 in terms of the treatment received by the illegally committed individuals is not a ground for recovery.
Sec. 46.10, Stats., provides that any person committed or admitted to a state institution shall be liable for the [436]*436cost of care, maintenance, services, and supplies according to his ability to pay. Milwaukee county advances a facially simplistic reading of the statute: any person committed, regardless of the validity of the commitment, is liable for the costs of care. The county notes that this court has previously found that sec. 46.10 “is valid, unambiguous, and no confusion or inequity arises from its operation.” State Department of Public Welfare v. Sem, 8 Wis. 2d 46, 49, 98 N.W.2d 428 (1959) (holding that liability imposed upon a parent pursuant to sec. 46.10 could not be eliminated by a divorce decree). Milwaukee county notes that where a statute is unambiguous, interpretation is unnecessary. Harris v. Kelley, 70 Wis. 2d 242, 249, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975); Weather-Tite Co. v. Lepper, 25 Wis. 2d 70, 74, 130 N.W.2d 198 (1964).
Plaintiff urges that sec. 46.10, Stats., can be read in one of two ways. Either the statute clearly and unambiguously excludes persons whose commitments are later declared judicially invalid because those persons are not committed in the eyes of the law; or, if it does require interpretation using basic canons of statutory construction, it should be construed to exclude persons whose commitments were declared invalid.
Plaintiff argues that, due to fundamentally flawed fact-finding procedures, there was never any due process finding that the individuals were in need of treatment or commitment. We agree and conclude that, because the proceedings were not adequate to sustain a finding that the individuals were in need of care and treatment, regardless of the fact that they may have been in need of such care and treatment, there was no valid commitment order. Thus the plaintiffs cannot be considered “committed” for any purpose, and they do not fall under the literal reading of sec. 46.10, Stats.
Plaintiff also argues that a statute cannot be construed so as to work an absurd or unreasonable result even [437]*437when that statute appears clear and unambiguous on its face. Teamsters Union Local 695 v. Waukesha County, 57 Wis. 2d 62, 69, 203 N.W.2d 707 (1973); Estate of Evans, 28 Wis. 2d 97, 101, 135 N.W.2d 832 (1965); Worachek v. Stephenson Town School District, 270 Wis. 116, 124, 70 N.W.2d 657 (1955); Pfingsten v. Pfingsten, 164 Wis. 308, 313, 159 N.W. 921 (1916). Plaintiff asserts that to construe sec. 46.10(2), Stats., to mean that persons committed whether legally or illegally are liable for the cost of their care is not only absurd, inequitable, and against public policy, but it is inconsistent with the language and implication of prior decisions of this court.
In this latter respect, plaintiff cites a number of cases concerning liability under sec. 46.10, Stats., noting that they involve legal commitments. In State Department of Public Welfare v. Sem, supra, the court ruled that a father was liable for the cost of the care of his committed minor child, but noted that the child had been duly committed. In Estate of Buxton, 246 Wis. 97, 98, 16 N.W.2d 399 (1944), the court, in holding an individual’s estate liable under sec. 46.10 for the cost of confinement, noted that the individual had been legally committed. Plaintiff argues, by negative implication (expressio unius est exclusio alterius), that had the commitments in question been illegal the court’s ruling concerning liability for the cost of confinement would have been different. See: County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 169, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980); Teamsters Union Local 695 v. Waukesha County, 57 Wis. 2d at 67. In In Matter of Guardianship of Nelson, 98 Wis. 2d at 269, a case involving a constitutional challenge to sec. 46.10 by a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and committed pursuant to sec. 971.17 (1), Stats., this court noted that individuals committed are “generally” liable for their treatment expenses. Plaintiff takes this to imply that the court may have envisaged situations where per[438]*438sons are not. See also: Treglown v. H & SS Department, 38 Wis. 2d 317, 156 N.W.2d 363 (1968) (a person committed to a mental health facility after a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect was found not liable for the cost of his subsequent confinement and care).
Although we have not previously faced the specific issue as to whether sec. 46.10, Stats., applies solely to legal or due process commitments, we have noted in our earlier opinions construing liability that the commitments were valid. While we do not have any legislative history to guide us, we do not believe that the legislature intended that individuals illegally committed should, nevertheless, be held liable for the costs of their care. See: County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d at 164 (“‘[t]he purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature’”). We concur with plaintiff that such a result would be absurd. “If a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity. The court must restrain the words.” Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892).
Milwaukee county seeks to counter this argument by stating the proposition that, where a statute is plain on its face, intentions cannot be imputed to -the legislature. See: Honeywell, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 Wis. 2d 425, 429, 190 N.W.2d 499 (1971); Cartwright v. Sharpe, 40 Wis. 2d 494, 505, 162 N.W.2d 5 (1968); Estate of Matzke, 250 Wis. 204, 208, 26 N.W.2d 659 (1947). The county places particular reliance on Mellen Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 154 Wis. 114, 142 N.W. 187 (1913) (construing a provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act).
“It is argued that a literal interpretation of a statute should not be followed where such interpretation would lead to an absurd consequence. The statute in question may be inequitable, but this does not make it absurd. It was at one time urged that the courts might mitigate the [439]*439rigor of harsh statutes by adopting a rule of equitable construction by which exceptions might be read into such statutes. It never obtained in this state, nor to any considerable extent in this country.” Id. at 119.
We would distinguish Mellen from the instant case. There the court found that, under a literal reading of the Worker’s Compensation Act, an employee who lost two fingers was entitled to the same compensation as an employee who had been so maimed that he was totally incapacitated from performing any gainful employment. While this result was clearly inequitable and burdensome to the employer, it was not absurd or violative of any constitutional rights. While we agree that there are cases where an inequitable statute would not be absurd, we are not presently dealing with such a case. Thus we do not find Mellen persuasive.
Plaintiff advances a further canon of statutory construction which we also believe is applicable to the case before us. As we have recently stated in Niagara of Wisconsin Paper Corp. v. Department of Natural Resources, 84 Wis. 2d 32, 50, 268 N.W.2d 153 (1978), “statutes should be construed so as to avoid constitutional objections.” Accord, State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976); Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc., 22 Wis. 2d 240, 125 N.W.2d 625 (1964). Plaintiffs argue that interpreting sec. 46.10, Stats., to include liability for illegal commitments would be in violation of their constitutional rights.6 Plaintiffs contend [440]*440that the illegal commitments deprived them of their liberty. To render them liable for the cost of that care would deprive them of their property.
The Wisconsin Civil Liberties Union, who filed an ami-cus curiae brief, persuasively argues that if this court allows Milwaukee County to collect from the plaintiffs, then it must hold that sec. 46.10, Stats., creates a class of people liable for commitment costs which includes those illegally and involuntarily committed with those legally committed whether voluntarily or involuntarily. We agree that principles of equal protection forbid such a statutory construction.
While the legislature could have spoken with greater clarity, both principles of common sense and sound statutory construction easily resolve this case. We take both solace and wisdom from the oft-cited words of the United States Supreme Court:
“ ‘It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. . . . This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration ... of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act. . . . [I] t appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes which comprehend all things in the letter they have expounded to extend to but some things, and those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act they have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those which include every person in the letter, they have adjudged to reach to some persons only, which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the act, sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, and sometimes by [441]*441foreign circumstances.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. at 459.
Accord, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting Holy Trinity); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 469 (1975) (quoting Holy Trinity). We hold that sec. 46.10, Stats., applies only to due process commitments, and therefore it does not reach the plaintiffs in question. For we believe, citing Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472, “[i]t is the duty of the courts, ... to say that, however broad the language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.” We conclude, therefore, that Milwaukee county’s motion for summary judgment was improperly granted, and we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Rights declared.