Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge HALL wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge WILKINS concurred. Judge WIDENER wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge:
Sara Lee Corporation appeals the district court’s entry of judgment for Kayser-Roth Corporation in Sara Lee’s action for trademark infringement. The district court found that Kayser-Roth’s use of the mark Leg Looks® on a line of its No nonsense® hosiery products sold in food, drug, and mass merchandising outlets did not infringe on Sara Lee’s L’eggs® trademark. Because the court’s finding was clearly erroneous, we reverse its judgment and remand the case with directions to enter judgment for Sara Lee. We further instruct the district court to grant Sara Lee’s request that Kayser-Roth be permanently enjoined from using its Leg Looks® trademark in a manner that infringes on the L’eggs® mark.
I.
Sara Lee manufactures pantyhose and other hosiery products for retad sale under the Hanes® and L’eggs® trademarks. Until L’eggs® penetrated the “FDM market”1 in the early 1970s, women’s hosiery was sold only in department stores. Sara Lee’s most [459]*459popular L’eggs® product is its Sheer Energy® line of light support pantyhose, made from nylon and spandex. Sara Lee also manufactures nylon-only products, but its nylon-and-spandex brands account for the largest share of its profits from hosiery sales. Sara Lee dominates the nylon-and-spandex pantyhose market; about three of every four pairs sold are Sheer Energy® products.
Kayser-Roth is Sara Lee’s only nationwide competitor. It followed Sara Lee into the FDM market in 1973, when it introduced its No nonsense® line of pantyhose. In contrast to Sara Lee’s, Kayser-Roth’s sales of nylon-only products far exceed those of its nylon-and-spandex lines.
Over the last twenty-odd years, Kayser-Roth and Sara Lee have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in advertising their hosiery products. As a result, the companies have reaped billions in sales, and both No nonsense® and L’eggs® have become household names.
Sara Lee and Kayser-Roth are intense rivals and frequent court opponents. In early 1992, Kayser-Roth learned of Sara Lee’s plan to introduce L’eggs Everyday®, a new line of nylon-only hosiery. Kayser-Roth decided to respond by simultaneously introducing its own new line of nylon-and-spandex hosiery, designed to be priced lower than Sheer Energy®.
The new line required a name. Kayser-Roth had, during the previous summer, applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office to register the designations “Sheer Vigor” and “Sheer Invigoration.” Sara Lee learned of the applications, and it filed the instant suit for declaratory and in-junctive relief on July 22, 1992, alleging that Kayser-Roth had violated Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.2
Kayser-Roth instead marketed its new product as “Leg Looks®,” a trademark that it already owned. Undaunted, Sara Lee amended its complaint on September 9,1992, to assert that the name Leg Looks® infringed on its L’eggs® mark, and that the product’s packaging was confusingly similar to the trade dress of its Sheer Energy® line. See note 2, supra, Sara Lee also amended its prayer for relief to request money damages. Kayser-Roth counterclaimed, alleging that Sara Lee had engaged in numerous antitrust violations and in false advertising.
The case was assigned to a magistrate, who recommended that Kayser-Roth be preliminarily enjoined from continuing to sell [460]*460Leg Looks® as packaged. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation; Kayser-Roth thereafter recalled .its Leg Looks® products and changed the packaging.3 Kayser-Roth nevertheless continued to affix the Leg Looks® mark to its new nylon- and-spandex product.
On January 11, 1993, Sara Lee moved to supplement its amended complaint to reassert all of its federal and state claims as to the repackaged Leg Looks® product; in March, it once again moved for a preliminary injunction. The magistrate conducted a ten-day hearing on the motion in August 1993. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties and the district court agreed, inter alia, that (1) Sara Lee would waive all claims for money damages, (2) Sara Lee’s remaining claims for equitable relief would be bifurcated from Kayser-Roth’s counterclaims, and (3) the just-concluded hearing would be treated as a trial on the merits of Sara Lee’s equitable claims, with the matter referred to the magistrate for decision, subject to de novo review by the district court.4
On November 30, 1993, the magistrate issued a report and recommendation; he advised the district court to enter judgment for Sara Lee on all claims. The magistrate recommended that Kayser-Roth be permanently enjoined from using its Leg Looks® trademark in the FPM market.5
Kayser-Roth objected to the magistrate’s report and recommendation. The district court examined the record anew, and, on October 13, 1994, filed an opinion that adopted many of the magistrate’s underlying findings, yet disagreed with his conclusions.
The court found, as an initial matter, that Sara Lee’s federal trademark claim was foreclosed by the doctrines of laches and acquiescence; it further determined that, even if Sara Lee’s trademark claim were not equitably barred, Kayser-Roth’s use of the Leg Looks® mark did not violate the Lanham Act. The court likewise saw no merit in Sara Lee’s claim that Kayser-Roth’s marketing of Leg Looks® in the redesigned package infringed on the trade dress of Sara Lee’s Sheer Energy® products.6 Consequently, the district court entered judgment for Kayser-Roth on all of Sara Lee’s claims. Sara Lee appeals.
II.
Although trademark law is imbued with numerous idiosyncracies, the standard governing our review of the district court’s findings of fact in a trademark case is familiar. Generally speaking, we may set aside such findings only if they are clearly erroneous, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1526 (4th Cir.1984). However, we owe no deference to the district court’s findings if they are derived as a result of the court’s misapplication of the law. Pizzeria Uno at 1526:
III.
We must address at the threshold the district court’s findings that Sara Lee slept on [461]*461its rights or, alternatively, that it acquiesced to Kayser-Roth’s current use of the Leg Looks® mark.
A.
During the 1980s, Kayser-Roth used the Leg Looks® mark on a line of “fashion” nylon-only hosiery products in competition with Sara Lee’s Hanes® line; after peaking in 1985, sales of Leg Looks® dropped precipitously throughout the remainder of the decade. In their original incarnation, Leg Looks® products were available only in upscale department stores. No L’eggs® products have ever been sold in such outlets.
From the outset, the Hanes® division kept its corporate master fully apprised of Kay-ser-Roth’s marketing of Leg Looks®; nonetheless, Sara Lee has not challenged Kayser-Roth’s use of the Leg Looks® mark until now. The question before us is whether, as Kayser-Roth asserts, “now” is too late.
In a trademark case, courts may apply the doctrine of estoppel by laches to deny relief to a plaintiff who, though having knowledge of an infringement, has, to the detriment of the defendant, unreasonably delayed in seeking redress. See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 31.02 (3d ed.1995) [hereinafter McCarthy] (“Estoppel by laches [is] defined as that type of delay in filing suit which causes prejudice to defendant and when weighed with all other relevant equitable fae-tors, results in a bar to relief, either injunc-tive or monetary, or both.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).7
However, the doctrine is sparingly applied where, as here, a plaintiff seeks only equitable relief. See id. at § 31.03[3][b] (reviewing cases);8 see also Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 674 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir.) (“While the availability of laches as a defense to claims for injunctive relief may be limited ... laches will bar a claim for damages for bad faith infringement.”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969, 103 S.Ct. 298, 74 L.Ed.2d 280 (1982). Moreover, in consideration of the public interest, estoppel by lach-es may not be invoked to deny injunctive relief if it is apparent that the infringing use is likely to cause confusion. 4 McCarthy at § 31.04[1]; see University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044 (3d Cir.) (“Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is inextricably bound up with the nature and quality of the plaintiffs claim on the merits relevant to a prospective injunction.”), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 571, 74 L.Ed.2d 933 (1982).
In finding that Sara Lee was es-topped by laches from asserting its infringement claim, the district court failed to consid[462]*462er the relative unavailability of that defense to preclude injunctive relief. In addition, the court did not consider the public interest in avoiding confusion between the L’eggs® and Leg Looks® trademarks, undoubtedly because, as discussed in Section IV, infra, it miscalculated the likelihood of that confusion. Because the district court either overlooked or misapplied the law governing estoppel by laches, we are constrained to set aside its finding that the doctrine operates to bar the instant suit. See Section II, supra.
We also note that the district court considered, but failed to fully appreciate, the conundrum with which Sara Lee was presented when Kayser-Roth expanded the use of its Leg Looks® mark to the FDM market. Because L’eggs® hosiery was, then as now, sold exclusively in FDM outlets, it is doubtful that Sara Lee could have proved that its product would likely be confused with Kay-ser-Roth’s. Of course, the likelihood of confusion is the “keystone of infringement.” 3 McCarthy § 23.01; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1), note 2 supra. Indeed, to the extent that a plaintiffs prior knowledge may give rise to the defense of estoppel by laches, such knowledge must be of a pre-existing, infringing use of a mark. See note 7, supra (Brittingham analysis assumes the existence of an infringement for an extended period prior to the commencement of litigation).
The estoppel-by-laehes defense arises only where the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed its pursuit of a remedy. See Brittingham, 914 F.2d at 456, and note 7, supra. From the time that Kayser-Roth first introduced its Leg Looks® products, Sara Lee has been on the horns of a dilemma:
If [the trademark owner] waits for substantial injury and evidence of actual confusion, it may be faced with a laches defense. If it rushes immediately into litigation, it may have little or no evidence of actual confusion and real commercial damage, may appear at a psychological disadvantage as “shooting from the hip” and may even face a counterclaim for overly aggressive use of litigation.
4 McCarthy § 81.06[2][e]. We agree with Professor McCarthy that the owner “has no obligation to sue until ‘the likelihood of confusion looms large.’” Id. at § 31.06[2][a] (quoting Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F.Supp. 866, 881 (E.D.N.Y.1978)). Sara Lee, by waiting for Kayser-Roth to expand its use of the Leg Looks® mark to the FDM market, chose to delay its pursuit of a remedy until its right to protection had clearly ripened. Under the circumstances, we adjudge its actions to have been entirely reasonable; the district court clearly erred in finding otherwise.
B.
Likewise, the district court’s finding that Sara Lee acquiesced in Kayser-Roth’s use of the Leg Looks® mark in the FDM market is clearly erroneous. The basis for the court’s decision was a written agreement between the parties executed on April 30, 1991, in settlement of a dispute over Sara Lee’s application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to register “Lingerie Looks” as a trademark for pantyhose. In the document’s preface, the parties acknowledged that Kayser-Roth already owned the registered trademarks Leg Looks®, Career Looks®, Designer Looks®, and Silky-Looks®; the substance of the agreement addressed how Sara Lee’s Lingerie Looks products would be packaged and advertised to minimize any infringement on Kayser-Roth’s rights.
An infringement action may be barred by the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence where the owner of the trademark, by conveying to the defendant through affirmative word or deed, expressly or impliedly consents to the infringement. See 4 McCarthy § 31.14[1]; Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039, 1046 (4th Cir.1984). Although the doctrines of acquiescence and laches, in the context of trademark law, both connote consent by the owner to an infringing use of his mark, acquiescence implies active consent, while laches implies a merely passive consent. 4 McCar[463]*463thy at § 31.14[1]; see Sweetheart Plastics at 1046.9
Sara Lee’s entry into the 1991 settlement agreement with Kayser-Roth was, no doubt, an affirmative act. However, just as a preexisting infringement is a prerequisite to the estoppel-by-laches defense, see Section III— A, supra, estoppel by acquiescence requires that the trademark owner knowingly consent — albeit actively — to the defendant’s infringing use of the mark. As we discussed in the preceding section, it was by no means clear until 1992 that Sara Lee could adduce persuasive evidence of a likelihood of confusion between its L’eggs® trademark and Kayser-Roth’s Leg Looks® mark.
In any event, it is obvious that the 1991 agreement was intended only to govern Sara Lee’s future actions in marketing its Lingerie Looks brand; there is nothing in the agreement that can reasonably be construed to immunize Kayser-Roth from liability for all future uses — especially infringing uses— of any of its own marks. Moreover, even if Kayser-Roth’s estoppel-by-acquiescence defense were valid, public policy dictates that— like the doctrine of estoppel by laches — it not be rigidly applied in cases like this one, where the likelihood of confusion is apparent. See Section III-A, supra; 4 McCarthy § 31.14[1] (“The defense of laches is trumped by a strong showing of likely confusion of the public. Similarly, a strong showing of a likelihood of confusion can trump even a proven case of acquiescence by the senior user to the junior user’s usage_”).
Accordingly, we reject Kayser-Roth’s equitable defenses to the instant suit, and we move on to address the merits of Sara Lee’s claims.
IV.
We may grant injunctive relief to the owner of a registered trademark whose rights to the mark have been infringed on by another’s use of a copy or colorable imitation that is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527; see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir.1990) (“The ultimate question, for purposes of determining liability in trademark infringement actions, is whether there exists a likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers will be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The test is likelihood of confusion; evidence of actual confusion is unnecessary. Pizzeria Uno at 1527.
To ascertain the likelihood of confusion between two trademarks, we consider a number of factors. These factors include:
(1) the distinctiveness of the senior mark;
(2) the similarity of the two marks;
(3) the similarity of the goods or services that the marks identify;
(4) the similarity of the facilities employed by the parties to transact their business;
(5) the similarity of the advertising used by the parties;
(6) the defendant’s intent in adopting the same or similar mark; and
(7) actual confusion.
Pizzeria Uno at 1527. Certain factors may not be germane to every situation; moreover, though several factors are simultaneously present, some factors may, depending on the case, be more important than others. Id.; see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir.) (the Pizzeria Uno factors are not meant to be a rigid formula for infringement; they are “only a guide — catalog of various considerations that may be relevant in determining the ultimate statutory question of likelihood of confusion.”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872, 113 S.Ct. 206, 121 L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). Indeed, we have distilled other factors that may be considered relevant to analyzing the likelihood of confusion, such as (8) the quality of the defendant’s product, Perini at 127, and [464]*464(9) the sophistication of the consuming public. Id.; see Dayton Progress Corp. v. Lane Punch Corp., 917 F.2d 836, 839-40 (4th Cir.1990). We will consider each factor in turn.
A. The Distinctiveness of the Senior Mark
1. Legal Background
The protection accorded trademarks is directly related to the mark’s distinctiveness. “Fanciful,” “arbitrary,” and “suggestive” marks are inherently distinctive, and thus receive the greatest protection against infringement. 1 McCarthy § 11.01[1]. Fanciful marks are, in essence, made-up words expressly coined for serving as a trademark. Some examples of fanciful marks are Clorox®, Kodak®, Polaroid®, and Exxon®. Id. at § 11.03[4].
Arbitrary marks are comprised of words in common usage, but, because they do not suggest or describe any quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the goods they serve, are said to have been arbitrarily assigned. Examples include Tea Rose® flour, Camel® cigarettes, and Apple® computers. Id. at § 11.04[3]. Though tea rose, camel, and apple are — unlike Clorox® and Kodak® — words denoting “real” things, they are similar to fanciful marks in that they neither suggest any mental image of the associated product nor describe it in any way.
Suggestive marks connote, without describing, some quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the product. Coppertone®, Orange Crush®, and Playboy® are good examples of suggestive marks because they conjure images of the associated products. Id. at § 11.23. These marks are nevertheless not descriptive; although they are meant to project a favorable or idealistic image with which a prospective user might identify, a person without actual knowledge would have difficulty in ascertaining the nature of the products that the marks represent.
In contrast to fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive marks, there are marks that are not inherently distinctive. For instance, certain marks merely describe a function, use, characteristic, size, or intended purpose of the product. Examples of such “descriptive” marks include After Tan post-tanning lotion, 5 Minute glue, King Size men’s clothing, and the Yellow Pages telephone directory. Id. at § 11.08. Marks that are merely descriptive are accorded protection only if they have acquired a “secondary meaning,” that is, if “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.” Dayton Progress at 839 (quoting Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 n. 11, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982)). Coca-Cola® is probably the paradigm of a descriptive mark that has acquired a secondary meaning.
“Generic” terms are the common name of a product or service itself, and can never be trademarks. Perini at 124.10 Examples of brand names held to be generic terms are Convenient Store retail stores, Dry Ice solid carbon dioxide, Light Beer ale-type beverages, and, in a case where a once-fanciful mark had, over time, been assimilated into the language, Thermos vacuum-insulated bottles. 2 McCarthy § 12.03 (citation omitted).
2. The L’eggs® mark
The L’eggs® mark was conceived in the midst of Sara Lee’s endeavor to discover new ways to manufacture, package, and market women’s hosiery. The company’s efforts have paid off; by developing a line of nylon- and-spandex hosiery, packaging its products in the now-famous egg-shaped containers,11 [465]*465and cultivating a new market in which to sell its goods, Sara Lee has amassed handsome profits.
But what, exactly, does L’eggs® mean? The district court decided that L’eggs® was a contraction for “leg eggs.” It then focused on what it considered to be the “weaker” element of the mark (leg), which, of course, is also an intrinsic part of Kayser-Roth’s Leg Looks® mark, and almost certainly the source of any confusion between the two. Citing the rule that a term may be generic if it names a distinctive characteristic of the genus to which the product belongs, see note 10, supra, the court concluded that, because all pantyhose have legs, the word “leg” is generic insofar as it pertains to pantyhose. The court alternatively found that “leg” is generic because it is an abbreviation of “leg-wear” or “leggings,” terms that refer to the genus of apparel to which pantyhose belong. According to the district court, because the word “leg” is generic, it may legally be used as part of an otherwise non-infringing pantyhose trademark.
We disagree. The district court failed to appreciate that the mark at issue is neither “leg eggs” nor “legs,” but L’eggs,® a word that represents a singular concept asso-dated with — but very different from — pantyhose. Although the mark may not be wholly fanciful (because it is phonetically identical to a common word) or arbitrary (because it is not actually a “real” word), it is unquestionably suggestive, and therefore a strong, distinctive mark. L’eggs® conjures favorable images of attractive legs or legginess, and, by subtly reminding consumers of its famous egg packaging design, reinforces the association between the product and its source — a sure sign of a mark entitled to protection.12
B. The ‘‘Similarity’’ Factors
We now consider briefly the similarity of the two marks, of the goods the marks identify, of the facilities employed to transact the parties’ business,13 and of the advertising used by the parties.
L’eggs® and Leg Looks®, although not identical, are perceived similarly by the eye and ear. Whether being written or spoken, L’eggs® and the first syllable of Leg Looks® are quite similar. Moreover, Leg Looks’® first syllable stands alone, emphasizing its similarity to L’eggs®.
There can be little argument as to the similarity of the goods that the two marks represent (both are associated with women’s [466]*466hosiery), the facilities that'the parties employ to transact business (both L’eggs® and Leg Looks® are distributed in the FDM market, often side-by-side), or the advertising used by Sara Lee and Kayser-Roth (both employ similar media and target the same consumers). Regarding these three factors, there is no substantial difference between the parties that would serve to ameliorate any confusion of their marks.
C. The Defendant’s Intent
As we stated in Pizzeria Uno:
The intent of the defendant is sometimes a major factor in infringement cases. If there is intent to confuse the buying public, this is strong evidence establishing likelihood of confusion, since one intending to profit from another’s reputation generally attempts to make his signs, advertisements, etc., to resemble the other’s so as deliberately to induce confusion.
Id. at 1535. In other words, we presume that the person who sets out to infringe on another’s trademark has more brains than scruples, and will likely succeed. Cf. Osem Food Indus. Ltd. v. Sherwood Foods, Inc., 917 F.2d 161, 165 (4th Cir.1990):
When a newcomer to the market copies a competitor’s trade dress, its intent must be to benefit from the goodwill of the competitor’s customers by getting them to believe that the new product is either the same, or originates from the same source as the product whose trade dress was copied. Logic requires ... that from such intentional copying arises a presumption that the newcomer is successful and that there is a likelihood of confusion.
In his memorandum opinion, the magistrate concluded that Kayser-Roth intended to infringe on Sara Lee’s trademark, pointing to considerable circumstantial evidence in the record supporting a strong inference that, when Kayser-Roth resuscitated its Leg Looks® line, it expressly intended to take advantage of the mark’s similarity to L’eggs® to siphon sales of Sara Lee’s products.14 The district court, however, found that Kayser-Roth had acted in good faith — a finding that we may disturb only if it is clearly erroneous. Because we would reach the same result in this case regardless of Kayser-Roth’s intent, reviewing the district court’s disposition of this complex issue would serve no purpose; we thus decline to do so.
D. Actual Confusion
The record is replete with anecdotal evidence of consumers throughout the nation confusing the L’eggs® and Leg Looks® marks. Six women — most of whom usually bought L’eggs® pantyhose — testified that they had purchased (or, in one case, nearly purchased) a Leg Looks® product under the mistaken impression that it was instead a L’eggs® product. Sara Lee’s service merchandisers told the magistrate of many occasions where consumers had approached them in stores, uncertain of the origin of Leg Looks®.
The service merchandisers also told of massive confusion by store personnel. Included in the record are photographs of in-store advertisements and circulars promoting, variously, “L’eggs Looks,” “Legg Looks,” and “L’eggs Look” pantyhose.
The anecdotal evidence, standing alone, is nearly overwhelming; indeed, we can but wonder how often the experiences related by the trial witnesses have been repeated — but not reported — in stores across the country. Nevertheless, Sara Lee pro[467]*467duced additional evidence in the form of surveys that it had conducted, indicating that approximately thirty to forty percent of the consuming public was confused by the similarity of the L’eggs® and Leg Looks® marks. The district court discounted the survey evidence on the ground that its reliability may have been in question, but even if the true figure were only half of the survey estimate, actual confusion would, in our view, nevertheless exist to a significant degree.15
E. The Quality of the Defendant’s Product & the Sophistication of the Consuming Public
The two remaining factors, announced in Perini, probably apply with less frequency than the previous seven. Consideration of the quality of the defendant’s product is most appropriate in situations involving the production of cheap copies or knockoffs of a competitor’s trademark-protected goods. If a defendant markets a product under a mark similar to that affixed by a competitor to a commodity of like nature but superior manufacture, that the defendant’s product is markedly inferior is likely to be highly probative of its reliance on the similarity of the two marks to generate undeserved sales.
Barring an unusual case, buyer sophistication will only be a key factor when the relevant market is not the public at-large. If the typical consumer in the relevant market is sophisticated in the use of — or possesses an expertise regarding — a particular product, such sophistication or expertise may be pertinent in determining the likelihood of confusion. Perini at 127-28. The relative sophistication of the market may trump the presence or absence of any other factor. See id. at 128:
The plaintiff claims that lack of consideration of consumer sophistication does not preclude a finding of infringement when every other factor indicates a likelihood of confusion. Yet, we hold that in a market with extremely sophisticated buyers, the likelihood of consumer confusion cannot be presumed on the base the similarity in trade name alone....
We need not here concern ourselves, however, with either of the two “Perini factors.” There is no assertion in the instant proceeding that Kayser-Roth’s product is substantially inferior to Sara Lee’s, or that persons who buy pantyhose are any more sophisticated about that product than those who comprise the market for other ordinary retail goods.
F. “The Big Picture”
We have previously acknowledged that the distinctiveness of the senior user’s mark is “the first and paramount factor” in determining the likelihood of confusion. Pizzeria Uno at 1527. If the strength of the senior mark is the alpha of infringement analysis, then evidence of actual confusion is surély the omega; where the defendant in an infringement case has elected to use a mark similar to that of a competitor’s distinctive mark, and, as a result, has actually confused the public, our inquiry ends almost as soon as it begins.
Even if most of the other factors did not indicate — as they do in this case — a strong likelihood of confusion, the strength of the L’eggs® mark in conjunction with the solid evidence of actual confusion compels us to conclude that Kayser-Roth’s current use of its Leg Looks® mark is an infringing one.16 Upon reviewing the district court’s [468]*468finding to the contrary, we cannot help but be left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Pizzeria Uno at 1526. The court’s finding is clearly erroneous; we are thus constrained to overturn it.
V.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for it to enter judgment for Sara Lee. We further instruct the district court to enter an order permanently enjoining Kayser-Roth from affixing the Leg Looks® trademark to any of its products placed in the same channels of distribution as those in which Sara Lee’s L’eggs® products are currently sold.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.