Opinion
NICHOLSON, J.
Members of the Sanctity of Human Life Network (plaintiffs) stood on sidewalks of freeway overpasses during rush hours and held signs, visible to motorists below on the freeways, communicating their views concerning abortion. Responding to reports of freeway congestion caused by plaintiffs’ activities, officers of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) directed plaintiffs to terminate their activities.
Plaintiffs filed this injunctive and declaratory relief action, seeking to enjoin the CHP from interfering with their display of handheld signs on freeway overpasses during rush hours on January 22, the anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113 [93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147]. After trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the CHP.
We find that the statutes, Vehicle Code sections 21465 and 21467, under which the CHP claimed the power to terminate plaintiffs’ activities, do not apply to plaintiffs’ activities. However, we also conclude the CHP, under the facts presented at trial, acted appropriately pursuant to its authority to direct traffic. (See Veh. Code, § 2410.) We further conclude that the CHP’s actions in this case did not violate plaintiffs’ free speech rights. Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to grant to plaintiffs declaratory relief only to the extent of declaring that the CHP may not interfere with plaintiffs’ activities under the authority of Vehicle Code sections 21465 and 21467 and otherwise affirm the judgment. (Hereafter, unspecified code citations are to the Vehicle Code.)
[863]*863Trial Court Proceedings
As reflected in the statement of decision, the issue litigated at trial was whether plaintiffs can display handheld signs from freeway overpasses to the traffic below during rush hours on January 22, the Roe v. Wade anniversary date. In 1997 and 1998, the CHP ordered plaintiffs to take down the signs. The CHP intends to continue to issue such orders under the authority of sections 21465 and 21467 (governing display of traffic signs and declaring every prohibited sign a public nuisance) and Penal Code section 372 (relating to failure to remove a public nuisance). While plaintiffs objected to the statement of decision on several grounds, they did not dispute these facts.
For purposes of trial, the parties stipulated that (1) plaintiffs conducted their demonstrations on sidewalks on freeway overpasses rather than in the roadway, (2) the freeway overpasses involved are enclosed with cyclone fencing so there is no danger of signs falling onto the freeway, and (3) plaintiffs do not claim a right to attach their signs to public property.
On January 22, 1997, plaintiffs held signs on four freeway overpasses between 6:30 and 8:30 in the morning. An officer of the CHP arrived at one of the locations about 7:30 a.m. After some discussion concerning plaintiffs’ right to display the signs and the arrival of other officers, the officers took plaintiffs’ signs. At other overpasses, CHP officers told plaintiffs they must leave, which they did.
In 1998, plaintiffs displayed their handheld signs on freeway overpasses during rush hour the morning of January 21 until they were told to leave by CHP officers. The CHP officers were dispatched to the freeway overpasses in response to complaints that plaintiffs’ activities were causing freeway congestion. Plaintiffs were told they had to remove the signs. On the afternoon of January 22, 1998, plaintiffs planned to gather on freeway overpasses, displaying their handheld signs, between 3:30 and 5:00 p.m. At one overpass, at approximately 4:30 p.m., officers of the Sacramento Police Department arrived, cited plaintiffs and told them they had to leave. CHP officers were present but did not interact with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs held signs and demonstrated on unspecified dates in locations other than freeway overpasses with no interference from the CHP.
Discussion
I
Vehicle Code Traffic Sign Statutes
As noted, the CHP has terminated plaintiffs’ activities on freeway overpasses under the purported authority of sections 21465 and'21467. The CHP [864]*864officers who testified at trial stated they would continue to remove prohibited signs in view of freeway motorists under this authority, although the officers were less than clear concerning what is a prohibited sign. Plaintiffs assert these Vehicle Code sign statutes do not apply to their signs. After consideration of the statutes, their context within the Vehicle Code, and their legislative history, we agree with plaintiffs that sections 21465 and 21467 do not apply to their signs.
While section 21465 prohibits certain signs, section 21467 merely provides authority for the CHP to remove such prohibited signs. We therefore focus on section 21465.
Section 21465 is found in division 11, chapter 2, article 3 of the Vehicle Code. Division 11 relates generally to rules of the road, while chapter 2 of division 11 relates to traffic signs, signals, and markings, and article 3 of that chapter designates offenses relating to traffic devices.
Section 21465 provides: “No person shall place, maintain, or display upon, or in view of, any highway any unofficial sign, signal, device, or marking, or any sign, signal, device, or marking which purports to be or is an imitation of, or resembles, an official traffic control device or which attempts to direct the movement of traffic or which hides from view any official traffic control device.” There are two categories of prohibited signs, signals, devices, and markings under the language of the statute. They are (1) unofficial signs, signals, devices, or markings and (2) signs, signals, devices, or markings which (a) purport to be or are imitations of, or resemble, an official traffic control device, (b) attempt to direct the movement of traffic, or (c) hide from view any official traffic control device. Plaintiffs’ signs did not meet the description of signs in the second category. Therefore, we must determine whether plaintiffs’ signs were prohibited because they are in the first category.
We need not consider what is a signal, device, or marking because it has been agreed throughout this litigation that what plaintiffs were displaying were signs. An “unofficial sign,” as opposed to an official sign, appears to be a traffic sign not placed by governmental entities, although nowhere in the Vehicle Code is “unofficial sign” defined. (See § 21351 [allowing governmental entities to place traffic signs, signals and other traffic control devices].)
During trial, the CHP’s expert on the Vehicle Code, Officer Scott Hall, who teaches the Vehicle Code at the Highway Patrol Academy and is authorized to speak authoritatively concerning the meaning of the Vehicle [865]*865Code for the CHP, testified concerning the CHP’s enforcement of section 21465. His testimony reveals that the CHP does not have a clear or articulable definition of the scope of section 21465. Asked to explain the presence, considering section 21465, of certain signs within view from the freeway, Officer Hall testified: “Well, first of all, we don’t enforce these signs. We enforce the official traffic control devices. We teach these are what they are. [S¥c.] [If] These signs here are enforced by another department. I don’t know if they have permits. I don’t know if they’re exempt from a permit. [^[] The fact that they’re there tells us that somebody else who regulates these signs has either given them permission or has allowed them to be there.” While he agreed billboards are unofficial signs, he simply stated that the CHP does not “enforce these signs.” He continued: “There’s two different types of signs. There’s official, and there’s permitted, ffl] An official sign regulates, warns and guides. The Department of Transportation puts up official signs. That’s what we enforce. [^] Anything else is unofficial. Unless you have a permit or you’re exempt, you can’t have it. That’s what it is.” The CHP’s view is that bus advertising and bumper stickers do not violate section 21465. When asked why that is so, the officer replied: “You got me.” Finally, Officer Hall testified that determination of what a prohibited sign is under section 21465 is purely a matter of discretion for the CHP: “[I]f this sign were a visual hazard, we would investigate it and go up to ’em, find out if they had a permit for it and what the parameters of it were for. [^[] That’s what 21467 says. If we deem it a visual hazard, we can take it down.”
In the Vehicle Code, a “highway” is “a way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. Highway includes street.” (§ 360.) This broad definition is consistent with the CHP’s understanding and enforcement efforts. Officer Hall testified that a “highway” is “pretty much any road that encompasses the main travel portion of the roadway, sidewalks, et cetera.”
Applying these definitions to the terms used in the Vehicle Code, section 21465 prohibits any unofficial sign, meaning any nongovernmental traffic sign, in view of any public place used for vehicular traffic. What is a traffic sign is the only ambiguity remaining. The plain meaning of “unofficial sign,” taken out of the context of the statutory scheme relating to traffic signs, might suggest that the statute refers to any sign, traffic related or not, that was not placed there by the government. While the plain meaning, without consideration of the context, may lead to this interpretation, other canons of statutory interpretation preclude this interpretation.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and apply the Legislature’s intent. (Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey (2000) 24 [866]*866Cal.4th 301, 309-310 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 792, 6 P.3d 713].) That intent .is typically determined from the plain meaning of the statute. If, however, application of an apparently unambiguous statute would lead to an absurd result, the court can presume the Legislature did not intend the apparent meaning. In such cases, the court must engage in further statutory construction. (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1334, fn. 7 [283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240].)
It cannot be seriously argued that the Legislature intended to prohibit any unofficial sign in view of a roadway. This would include billboards, house numbers, bus advertising, bumper stickers, and a host of other signs that are everywhere to be found in view of roadways. The prohibition in section 21465 bears no contextual relation to state statutes and local ordinances concerning private signs. Furthermore, the Legislature did not intend to prohibit unofficial signs only in view of a freeway. “Highway” has a specific meaning, including “streets,” in the Vehicle Code (§ 360), and modem freeways did not exist when the predecessor of section 21465 was enacted in 1929. (See former § 81.5 [enacted in 1957, defining “freeway”].)
We must construe statutes in the context in which the Legislature placed them. (Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 310.) Here, section 21465 is part of comprehensive legislation concerning traffic signs. It does not purport to govern any other type of sign. As noted above, chapter 2 of division 11 of the Vehicle Code relates to traffic signs, signals, and markings, and article 3 of chapter 2 provides for offenses related to those traffic devices. The context of section 21465 supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to regulate all nongovernmental signs, only those relating to traffic. For example, a private landowner cannot post a speed limit sign within view of the roadway. The same landowner, however, does not violate section 21465, interpreted in its context as a prohibition on private traffic signs, by posting a “no trespassing” sign visible from the roadway.
One might argue that the first category of prohibited signs in section 21465—unofficial signs—must be interpreted separately from the second category of prohibited signs—signs which purport to be or are an imitation of, or resemble, an official traffic control device or which attempt to direct the movement of traffic or which hide from view any official traffic control device—in order to give effect to the term “unofficial sign.” This approach to the interpretation of the statute raises as many problems as it solves. For example, if the second category of signs is interpreted without regard to the first category, even official traffic signs are prohibited because an official [867]*867traffic sign certainly purports to be an official traffic control device. Construing the two categories together to prohibit only unofficial traffic signs is the only way to avoid results obviously unintended by the Legislature.
The legislative history of section 21465 supports this contextual interpretation of that provision. The first predecessor of section 21465, former section 114 1/2, subdivision (b), enacted in 1929, provided: “It shall be unlawful for any person to place or maintain or to display upon or in view of any street or highway any unofficial sign, signal or device which purports to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic sign or signal, or which attempts to direct the movement of traffic or which hides from view any official traffic sign or signal.” (Stats. 1929, ch. 253, § 46, p. 538.) As can be seen, the class of prohibited signs is not broken down into two categories. “Unofficial sign” is joined with “which purports to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic sign . . . .”
The pattern for the 1929 provision was section 13 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Act Regulating the Operation of Vehicles, one of four separate acts comprising the Uniform Motor Vehicle Code. When codifying former section 114 1/2, subdivision (b), the Legislature adopted the language of the uniform act, as did 44 other states by 1937. (11 Uniform Laws Annotated (1938) Motor Vehicles, pp. 5, 16; Rep. of the Assem. Interim Com. on Motor Vehicle Laws (1937) p. 5 (1937 Assembly Report).)
In 1933, the Legislature requested the California Code Commission to prepare a recodification of all existing motor vehicle laws. The next year, the code commission presented to the Legislature the Proposed Vehicle Code and commented: “The California Code Commission . . . has endeavored to draft the Vehicle Code without effecting any substantive changes, except those to which attention is called in the notes following this preface.” (Proposed Veh. Code, Cal. Code Com. (1934) p. v.) The notes did not mention the section at issue here and, thus, no substantive change was intended. (Id. at pp. vii-xiii.) This recodification, “being merely a codification of then existing laws,” was enacted in 1935. (1937 Assem. Rep., p. 5.) During this recodification process, former section 473, subdivision (a), in place of former section 114 1/2, subdivision (b), was enacted. The new section contained the modem language splitting the prohibited signs into two categories. It provided: “No person shall place, maintain or display upon, or in view of, any highway any unofficial sign ... or any sign . . . which purports to be or is an imitation of, or resembles, an official traffic sign . . . .” (Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 169.) In 1959, the section number of the statute was changed to section 21465, as it currently stands. (Stats. 1959, ch. 3.)
[868]*868The change in wording of the statute, splitting the prohibited signs into two categories, was, therefore, not meant to be a substantive change to the statute. It is unclear why the Code Commission made that change. No other state has done so. For example, Colorado’s statute provides: “No person shall place, maintain, or display upon or in view of any highway any unauthorized sign, signal, marking, or device which purports to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic control device or railroad sign or signal, or which attempts to direct the movement of traffic, or which hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any official traffic control device . . . .” (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-606.) This specific language is found in most state statutes. (See, e.g., Ala. Code § 32-5A-36; Ark. Code Ann. § 27-52-109; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-310.)
Accordingly, the legislative history of section 21465 is consistent with what we have concluded is the statute’s reásonable interpretation—that is, that it applies only to traffic signs and was never intended to do more. Plaintiffs’ signs cannot be characterized as traffic signs subject to prohibition under section 21465. They did not purport to be traffic signs. They did not imitate or resemble traffic signs. The signs did not attempt to direct the movement of traffic or hide from view any traffic sign. The CHP, relying only on sections 21465 and 21467, cannot prevent plaintiffs from displaying the signs.
Plaintiffs have presented an actual controversy concerning whether the CHP may interfere with plaintiffs’ activities under the authority of sections 21465 and 21467. We conclude the CHP may not do so. Therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief on that issue. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1060 [authorizing declaratory relief when actual controversy presented].) Since sections 21465 and 21467 do not apply, we need not consider whether their application would violate plaintiffs’ free speech rights.
II
Injunctive Relief
Although the CHP purported to act pursuant to sections 21465 and 21467, which do not provide authority for the actions taken, injunctive relief is not available if it would have the effect of preventing the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (b)(4).) Under the facts of this case, an injunction could have the effect of preventing the CHP from executing its beneficial function of directing traffic pursuant to section 2410.
“Members of the California Highway Patrol are authorized to direct traffic according to law, and, in the event of a fire or other emergency, or to [869]*869expedite traffic or insure safety, may direct traffic as conditions may require notwithstanding the provisions of this code.” (§ 2410.) Traffic includes pedestrians. (§ 620.) The record shows that the CHP acted to terminate plaintiffs’ activities on freeway overpasses only when those activities were causing freeway congestion. Thus, under the authority of section 2410 allowing the CHP to “direct traffic ... to expedite traffic ... as conditions may require . . . ,” the actions taken by the CHP conformed to their statutory authority.
During the testimony of a CHP officer, the effect of section 2410 as broad authority to direct traffic was raised but not explored. Its application to this case was not considered. The statute was mentioned in a footnote in plaintiffs’ opening brief, but only to say that the CHP did not claim this section as justification for its actions. Finally, in response to the request for supplemental briefing in which this court asked whether the CHP has inherent authority to exclude communicative activities from freeway overpasses, the CHP cited its authority under section 2410. Consideration of section 2410 goes to the question of whether plaintiffs are entitled to the injunctive relief requested. We conclude that an injunction on CHP interference with plaintiffs’ activities might have the effect of preventing the execution of a public statute for public benefit. Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (b)(4).)
On appeal, plaintiffs assert that application of sections 21465 and 21467 to their signs violates their free speech rights because it has the effect of prohibiting their signs while other signs (billboards and other advertising) containing commercial speech are allowed. Our conclusion that sections 21465 and 21467 are inapplicable makes it unnecessary to reach this contention. Plaintiffs also contend, however, that the CHP has unconstitutionally broad discretion in determining whether to interfere in plaintiffs’ activities because, in plaintiffs’ words, the CHP “can offer no statute that purports to be a reasonable time, place, manner restriction that is narrowly tailored
"
Understandably, plaintiffs did not contend in the trial court that section 2410 violates their free speech rights as applied in this case. The CHP did not assert section 2410 as authority for its actions. The focus of this action has been, as noted in the statement of decision, whether the CHP’s intended enforcement of sections 21465 and 21467 will prevent plaintiffs from displaying their signs. However, the CHP’s knowledge of the scope of its authority has no bearing on that authority.
Under the narrow facts of this case, we conclude that the CHP’s actions, authorized by section 2410, did not violate plaintiffs’ free speech [870]*870rights. The government may place restrictions on free speech on streets to permit free flow of traffic, which is the main purpose of a street, even if an incidental purpose of providing a forum for free speech is served. “Regulations of the use of a public forum that ensure the safety and convenience of the people are not ‘inconsistent with civil liberties but. . . [are] one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which [civil liberties] ultimately depend.’ Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 [61 S.Ct. 762, 765, 85 L.Ed. 1049, 133 A.L.R. 1396] (1941).” (Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist. (2002) 534 U.S. 316, 323 [122 S.Ct. 775, 780, 151 L.Ed.2d 783, 791].) “[T]he exercise of First Amendment rights may be regulated where such exercise will unduly interfere with the normal use of the public property by other members of the public with an equal right of access to it.” (Food Employees v. Logan Plaza (1968) 391 U.S. 308, 320-321 [88 S.Ct. 1601, 1609, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, 613].) Time, place, and manner restrictions on free speech “ ‘must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for communication.’ Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 [112 S.Ct. 2395, 2401, 120 L.Ed.2d 101, 112 (1992); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 [104 S.Ct. 3065, 3068-3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221] (1984).” (Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., supra, 534 U.S. at p. 323, fn. 3 [122 S.Ct. at p. 780].) The state has a strong interest in ensuring the free flow of traffic on roadways. (Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, 768 [114 S.Ct. 2516, 2526, 129 L.Ed.2d 593, 601]; Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1009, 1020-1023 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 898 P.2d 402].)
Here, the CHP’s actions were not based on the content of the message, served the significant governmental interest of allowing traffic to flow freely on the freeways, and left open ample alternatives for plaintiffs to communicate their message in other forums. Although the parties differ dramatically on whether, and under what circumstances, a freeway overpass is a public forum, it is unnecessary to decide that issue in this case because, even assuming freeway overpasses are public forums, the CHP’s actions, authorized by section 2410, did not violate plaintiffs’ free speech rights. (See Faustin v. City, County of Denver, Colorado (10th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 942, 949-950 [sidewalk of highway overpass is a traditional public forum].) “A ftmdamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” (Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Assn. (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 [108 S.Ct. 1319, 1323, 99 L.Ed.2d 534, 544]; see also Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230-231 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207, 902 P.2d 225].)
[871]*871The Legislature has never spoken concerning the issue of expressive activities on freeway overpasses. If it is the terrifying problem the dissent suggests, perhaps the Legislature should deal with the issue. A specific and narrowly tailored statute would establish California’s public policy in this regard and give the courts a point of reference for application of constitutional principles.
The CHP discontinued plaintiffs’ activities on the freeway overpasses, under the facts of this case, only when the activities were causing traffic congestion on the freeways below. Therefore, section 2410, on its face, allowed the CHP to direct plaintiffs to move on “to expedite traffic . . . .”
Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary and would be premature for us to determine whether the CHP can prevent the plaintiffs from demonstrating when the activities are not causing traffic congestion. For example, we need not determine whether the CHP can prevent plaintiffs’ activities on freeway overpasses at any time to “insure safety . . .” (§ 2410) or for other reasons. While it may be argued that allowing the CHP to prevent plaintiffs’ activities on freeway overpasses based solely on safety concerns may delegate discretion to enforcing officers that is unconstitutionally broad (see Cox v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 536, 557-558 [85 S.Ct. 453, 465-466, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 486] [only limited discretion may be vested in enforcing authorities]), the question is not presented here.
Because we conclude the CHP’s actions were authorized by section 2410 and did not violate plaintiffs’ free speech rights, plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief. Accordingly, the portion of the trial court’s judgment denying injunctive relief must be affirmed.
Ill
Declaratory Relief
Beyond the declaration that the CHP may not use sections 21465 and 21467 as authority to interfere with plaintiffs’ activities, this action does not present a proper case for declaratory relief. The issue of what the CHP can and cannot do in situations not substantially similar to the facts presented here cannot be the subject of a declaration concerning plaintiffs’ rights because we can only speculate concerning what the conditions of future encounters between plaintiffs and the CHP will be.
“Any person . . . who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another . . . , may, in cases of actual controversy relating to [872]*872the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action ... for a declaration of his or her rights and duties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)
A plaintiff may bring an action for declaratory relief before an actual invasion of rights has occurred. (Burke v. City etc. of San Francisco (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 32, 34 [65 Cal.Rptr. 539].) However, the action must be based on an actual controversy with known parameters. If the parameters are as yet unknown, the controversy is not yet ripe for declaratory relief. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170-171 [188 Cal.Rptr. 104, 655 P.2d 306].)
“The ripeness requirement, a branch of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions. [Citation.] It is rooted in the fundamental concept that the proper role of the judiciary does not extend to the resolution of abstract differences of legal opinion. It is in part designed to regulate the workload of courts by preventing judicial consideration of lawsuits that seek only to obtain general guidance, rather than to resolve specific legal disputes. However, the ripeness doctrine is primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy. On the other hand, the requirement should not prevent courts from resolving concrete disputes if the consequence of a deferred decision will be lingering uncertainty in the law, especially when there is widespread public interest in the answer to a particular legal question. [Citations.]
“. . . ‘ The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. [Citation.] It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’ . . . ‘The “actual controversy” referred to in [Code of Civil Procedure section 1060] is one which admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial administration, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. The judgment must decree, not suggest, what the parties may or may not do.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘The principle that courts will not entertain an action which is not founded on an actual controversy is a tenet of common law jurisprudence, the precise content of which is difficult to define and hard to apply. . . . A controversy is “ripe” when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have [873]*873sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 170-171.)
The focus of this litigation has been the applicability of sections 21465 and 21467 and the constitutionality of the CHP’s enforcement of those statutes. The parties did not litigate the CHP’s enforcement of other statutes or the constitutionality of such enforcement. While it is necessary for us to consider, under the current facts, the applicability of section 2410 because plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and we cannot grant injunctive relief if it would have the effect of preventing enforcement of a public statute for the public’s benefit (see Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (b)(4)), we are not in a position to know the parameters of future relations between plaintiffs and the CHP. Indeed, those relations may change simply because the CHP is now on notice that sections 21465 and 21467 do not apply to plaintiffs’ activities.
The issue of whether plaintiffs may hold their signs on freeway overpasses under circumstances not presented by the facts of this case is not ripe. Many variables, such as traffic congestion, safety, and the exercise of the CHP’s statutory authority, may combine to change whether the CHP may appropriately interfere with plaintiffs’ activities in any given situation. Furthermore, CHP interference could be presented that, unlike here, would violate plaintiffs’ free speech rights. If such a situation were presented, the issue of whether the freeway overpass is a public forum would also be ripe. We cannot, however, make a declaration at this point that will be applicable under all scenarios. Since the controversy, beyond the application of the Vehicle Code sign statutes as discussed above, does not admit of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon hypothetical facts, there is no actual controversy pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, and plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief beyond the declaration of rights already discussed.
Conclusion
The judgment is modified to grant plaintiffs declaratory relief in that the CHP may not rely on Vehicle Code sections 21465 and 21467 as authority to interfere with plaintiffs’ activities while plaintiffs are standing on the sidewalks of freeway overpasses and holding nontraffic signs visible to the motorists below on the freeway. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.
Raye, J., concurred.