Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York

Supreme Court

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York

336 U.S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 2d 533, 93 L. Ed. 533, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 2800

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedJanuary 31, 1949

Docket51

StatusPublished

Cited by670 cases

This text of 336 U.S. 106 (Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 2d 533, 93 L. Ed. 533, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 2800 (1949).

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Opinions

Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 124 of the Traffic Regulations of the City of New York¹ promulgated by the Police Commissioner provides:

“No person shall operate, or cause to be operated, in or upon any street an advertising vehicle; pro[108]*108vided that nothing herein contained shall prevent the putting of business notices upon business delivery-vehicles, so long as such vehicles are engaged in the usual business or regular work of the owner and not used merely or mainly for advertising.”

Appellant is engaged in a nation-wide express business. It operates about 1,900 trucks in New York City and sells the space on the exterior sides of these trucks for advertising. That advertising is for the most part unconnected with its own business.* ² It was convicted in the magistrate’s court and fined. The judgment of conviction was sustained in the Court of Special Sessions. 188 Misc. 342, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 732. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion by a divided vote. 297 N. Y. 703, 77 N. E. 2d 13. The case is here on appeal. Judicial Code § 237 (a), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a), as amended, now 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

The Court in Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, sustained the predecessor ordinance to the present regulation over the objection that it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that that was a municipal [109]*109ordinance resting on the broad base of the police power, while the present regulation stands or falls merely as a traffic regulation. But we do not believe that distinction warrants a different result in the two cases.

The Court of Special Sessions concluded that advertising on vehicles using the streets of New York City constitutes a distraction to vehicle drivers and to pedestrians alike and therefore affects the safety of the public in the use of the streets.³ We do not sit to weigh evidence on the due process issue in order to determine whether the regulation is sound or appropriate; nor is it our function to pass judgment on its wisdom. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236. We would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all municipal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New York City. It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such a relation. And nothing has been advanced which shows that to be palpably false.

The question of equal protection of the laws is pressed more strenuously on us. It is pointed out that the regulation draws the line between advertisements of products sold by the owner of the truck and general advertisements. It is argued that unequal treatment on the basis of such a distinction is not justified by the aim and purpose of the regulation. It is said, for example, that one of appellant’s trucks carrying the advertisement of a commercial house would not cause any greater distraction of pedestrians and vehicle drivers than if the [110]*110commercial house carried the same advertisement on its own truck. Yet the regulation allows the latter to do what the former is forbidden from doing. It is therefore contended that the classification which the regulation makes has no relation to the traffic problem since a violation turns not on what kind of advertisements are carried on trucks but on whose trucks they are carried.

That, however, is a superficial way of analyzing the problem, even if we assume that it is premised on the correct construction of the regulation. The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use. It would take a degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case. If that judgment is correct, the advertising displays that are exempt have less incidence on traffic than those of appellants.

We cannot say that that judgment is not an allowable one. Yet if it is, the classification has relation to the purpose for which it is made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection. It is by such practical considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be answered. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144; Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 198-199; Metropolitan Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 585-586. And the fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160.

[111]*111It is finally contended that the regulation is a burden on interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. Many of these trucks are engaged in delivering goods in interstate commerce from New Jersey to New York. Where trafile control and the use of highways are involved and where there is no conflicting federal regulation, great leeway is allowed local authorities, even though the local regulation materially interferes with interstate commerce. The case in that posture is controlled by S. C. Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 187 et seq. And see Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Rutledge

acquiesces in the Court’s opinion and judgment, dubitante on the question of equal protection of the laws.

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Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 124 of the Traffic Regulations of the City of New York¹ promulgated by the Police Commissioner provides:

“No person shall operate, or cause to be operated, in or upon any street an advertising vehicle; pro[108]*108vided that nothing herein contained shall prevent the putting of business notices upon business delivery-vehicles, so long as such vehicles are engaged in the usual business or regular work of the owner and not used merely or mainly for advertising.”

Appellant is engaged in a nation-wide express business. It operates about 1,900 trucks in New York City and sells the space on the exterior sides of these trucks for advertising. That advertising is for the most part unconnected with its own business.* ² It was convicted in the magistrate’s court and fined. The judgment of conviction was sustained in the Court of Special Sessions. 188 Misc. 342, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 732. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion by a divided vote. 297 N. Y. 703, 77 N. E. 2d 13. The case is here on appeal. Judicial Code § 237 (a), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a), as amended, now 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

The Court in Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, sustained the predecessor ordinance to the present regulation over the objection that it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that that was a municipal [109]*109ordinance resting on the broad base of the police power, while the present regulation stands or falls merely as a traffic regulation. But we do not believe that distinction warrants a different result in the two cases.

The Court of Special Sessions concluded that advertising on vehicles using the streets of New York City constitutes a distraction to vehicle drivers and to pedestrians alike and therefore affects the safety of the public in the use of the streets.³ We do not sit to weigh evidence on the due process issue in order to determine whether the regulation is sound or appropriate; nor is it our function to pass judgment on its wisdom. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236. We would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all municipal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New York City. It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such a relation. And nothing has been advanced which shows that to be palpably false.

The question of equal protection of the laws is pressed more strenuously on us. It is pointed out that the regulation draws the line between advertisements of products sold by the owner of the truck and general advertisements. It is argued that unequal treatment on the basis of such a distinction is not justified by the aim and purpose of the regulation. It is said, for example, that one of appellant’s trucks carrying the advertisement of a commercial house would not cause any greater distraction of pedestrians and vehicle drivers than if the [110]*110commercial house carried the same advertisement on its own truck. Yet the regulation allows the latter to do what the former is forbidden from doing. It is therefore contended that the classification which the regulation makes has no relation to the traffic problem since a violation turns not on what kind of advertisements are carried on trucks but on whose trucks they are carried.

That, however, is a superficial way of analyzing the problem, even if we assume that it is premised on the correct construction of the regulation. The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use. It would take a degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case. If that judgment is correct, the advertising displays that are exempt have less incidence on traffic than those of appellants.

We cannot say that that judgment is not an allowable one. Yet if it is, the classification has relation to the purpose for which it is made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection. It is by such practical considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be answered. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144; Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 198-199; Metropolitan Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 585-586. And the fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160.

[111]*111It is finally contended that the regulation is a burden on interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. Many of these trucks are engaged in delivering goods in interstate commerce from New Jersey to New York. Where trafile control and the use of highways are involved and where there is no conflicting federal regulation, great leeway is allowed local authorities, even though the local regulation materially interferes with interstate commerce. The case in that posture is controlled by S. C. Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 187 et seq. And see Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Rutledge

acquiesces in the Court’s opinion and judgment, dubitante on the question of equal protection of the laws.

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336 U.S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 2d 533, 93 L. Ed. 533, 1949 U.S. LEXIS 2800, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/railway-express-agency-inc-v-new-york-scotus-1949.

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