SCHWELB, Associate Judge:
Edward Salmon was convicted by an eleven-member jury of one misdemeanor count of threats to do bodily harm to his wife, Charlene Wilson, in violation of D.C.Code § 22-507 (1996). On appeal, Salmon contends that the trial judge abused her discretion by excusing a juror after deliberations had commenced and by permitting the trial to proceed with a jury of eleven. We affirm.
I.
THE EVIDENCE
The trial in this case began on the morning of July 1, 1996. The prosecution presented evidence showing that on the evening of September 23, 1995, the young couple1 were entertaining friends at a dinner party celebrating Ms. Wilson’s birthday. The festivities did not go smoothly. One of the guests at the party turned out to be the father of one of Ms. Wilson’s three children by men other than Salmon; the man’s presence apparently displeased the defendant. Later, Salmon handed a female guest a plate, prompting Ms. Wilson to inquire rhetorically whether he was a “fucking waiter.” The evening thus ended with the principal protagonists on less than cordial terms.
On the following morning, Cynthia Gates, a friend of Ms. Wilson, arrived at the apartment to accompany Ms. Wilson on a shopping expedition. Salmon asked his wife where she was going. Ms. Wilson responded, in effect, that Salmon should not worry about it. Ms. Wilson testified that her husband, who had caught “an attitude,” grabbed her by the collar, pushed her against some loudspeakers,- and stepped on her toes. Ms. Wilson pushed him away; Salmon claimed that she brandished an iron.
Displeased by this turn of events, Salmon left the apartment, picked up a large cinder block, and threw it at or towards the apartment door. Ms. Wilson called 911, complaining of an “unwanted guest,” but not identifying the man as her husband. Meanwhile, according to the testimony of Cynthia Gates and of Lakesha Hines, a neighbor of Ms. Wilson, Salmon, who had briefly left the area of the building but had then returned, threatened that he would shoot Ms. Wilson and yelled that he was going to “blow that motherfucker up.” Ms. Gates testified that Salmon moved his hand into his jacket, leading her to fear that he might be reaching for a pistol. Ms. Gates passed on this information to Ms. Wilson, who called 911 again and reported that the man about whom she had complained now had a gun. Shortly thereafter, officers arrested Salmon and found him to be unarmed.
Salmon’s defense was “provocation.” He testified in his own behalf. He admitted that he had threatened to kill his wife, but claimed that he had done so only in response [951]*951to her threats to kill him.2 He explained that “[e]motion speaks my head” and that “anybody [will] say anything when they [are] mad.”
At the conclusion of the prosecution case, and again after both sides had rested, Salmon moved the court for judgment of acquittal; both motions were denied. Counsel presented their closing arguments3 and, at 4:20 p.m., the judge excused the jurors, explaining that she would deliver her final instructions at 10:30 a.m. on the following day, Tuesday, July 2,1996.
On the Tuesday morning, the judge charged the jury as promised. She excused the alternates, and the jurors began their deliberations at 10:55 a.m.
II.
THE DECISION TO EXCUSE JUROR NO. 2
At 12:45 p.m., less than two hours after deliberations began, the judge received a note from one of the jurors. The note read as follows:
It is not[4] clear that we are near the end of our deliberations. I have a 5:15 flight from Dulles and need to leave here not late[r] than 3:00. What to do?
Juror No. 2
The judge immediately called in the attorneys to discuss the juror’s note. She directed counsel’s attention to the then-recent enactment of the Jury Trial Amendment Act of 1994 (JTAA), D.C. Law 10-232, which provides in pertinent part that
if, due to extraordinary circumstances, the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court, a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining eleven jurors.
D.C.Code § 16-705(c) (1997).5 During a brief preliminary discussion of the situation, the prosecutor raised the possibility that further deliberations might be deferred until Monday, July 8, if the juror would be back by then. The prosecutor acknowledged, however, that the jurors might forget some of the testimony if the court were to proceed in this manner. The judge agreed with this concern, and added that there was also the danger “that one of [the jurors] might not come back.”
The judge then called in Juror No. 2 to obtain some elaboration of his circumstances. The juror disclosed that his aunt, who had raised him when he was a child, had died in California the previous night. He explained that he would have to leave that evening (Tuesday, July 2) in order to attend the funeral, which was to be held at 11 a.m. on July 3 in a small town “a flight out of L.A.” [952]*952In response to a question from the judge, Juror No. 2 stated that he expected to return to Washington on Thursday, July 4, so that he would be available on Friday, July 5. After a further telephone inquiry with the airline to determine if he could defer his departure, the juror stated that the last flight to California that he could take that evening left Dulles Airport at 5:14 p.m.
The judge asked the attorneys if they wished to pose any questions to Juror No. 2, but both declined. After ordering the juror to return to the jury room, the judge directed counsel to state their positions as to what action she should take. Salmon’s attorney reported that he had discussed the issue with his client, and he said that the defense would “insist” that Juror No. 2 remain on the jury. Claiming that the phrase “extraordinary circumstances” in the JTAA was ambiguous, defense counsel argued:
I would think that it would mean death of the juror, illness, bad health and extreme circumstances of [the] juror — him, not some other circumstance which is related to the death of — however sympathetic — of a close relative.
(Emphasis added.) Counsel also asserted that “despite the rule change, I think that he’s entitled to have a twelve-person jury under the Constitution, and he’s entitled to [a] unanimous verdict.” He contended that this right could not be waived through a “Rule amendment.”
The prosecutor’s position was to the contrary: “I think that this juror has to be released and that we should go forward with eleven jurors.” He argued that “[t]his is the exact ease that the amendment had in mind when it was passed,” because “what’s more extraordinary than a death?” Noting that the Supreme Court had held a six-member jury to be sufficient for constitutional purposes,6 the prosecutor asked the court to invoke the JTAA and to permit the remaining jurors to proceed to verdict.
The judge agreed with the prosecutor. She found “the death of a woman who raised [Juror No. 2] to be an extraordinary circumstance,” and she concluded that it would be “appropriate” to allow the juror to be released. In conformity with the judge’s ruling, Juror No. 2 was excused and permitted to leave. Salmon’s attorney made a somewhat tentative oral motion for a mistrial “for the record.”7 The judge did not expressly rule on the motion, but implicitly denied it by proceeding with eleven jurors.8
The remaining jurors resumed their deliberations and ultimately found Salmon guilty as charged. This appeal followed.
III.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
On appeal, Salmon presents two principal arguments. First, he asserts that the judge erred in excusing Juror No. 2 because, according to Salmon, there had been no showing of “extraordinary circumstances” within the meaning of the JTAA. Second, he claims that even if extraordinary circumstances were present, the judge abused her discretion by proceeding with eleven jurors instead of declaring a mistrial. We do not agree with either contention.
A. The standard of review.
We note at the outset that in our judgment, the trial judge’s rulings as to the two defense contentions specifically presented to her by Salmon’s attorney were demonstrably correct.
Defense counsel first argued, as we have seen, that the phrase “extraordinary circumstances” applies only to the illness or other disability of the juror, and not to the death of a relative. In Duvall v. United States, 676 A.2d 448 (D.C.1996), however, we explicitly recognized that the death of a ju[953]*953ror’s spouse after deliberations had begun constituted “extraordinary circumstances” within the meaning of the JTAA. Id, at 451 n. 3. The reasoning of Duvall applies with almost equal force to the death of a de facto parent who raised the juror. Duvall was decided on May 16, 1996, some seven weeks before Juror No. 2 was excused in this case. Salmon’s first contention, as articulated in the trial court by his attorney, was thus unavailing.
Defense counsel’s second argument in the court below was that, the JTAA to the contrary notwithstanding, Salmon had a constitutional right to a trial by a jury of twelve. This contention has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court, Williams, supra note 6, 399 U.S. at 86-103, 90 S.Ct. at 1898-1907, and by this court. Duvall, supra, 676 A.2d at 450-51 (citations omitted).9
The judge having appropriately disposed of the two contentions which had been presented to her by defense counsel, this would ordinarily end the matter. “[Pjarties may not assert one theory at trial and another on appeal.” Cowan v. United States, 629 A.2d 496, 503 (D.C.1993) (quoting Hackes v. Hackes, 446 A.2d 396, 398 (D.C.1982)). “[T]he judge must be fairly apprised as to the question on which [she] is being asked to rule. ‘Points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party’s thesis will normally be spumed on appeal.’ ” Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991, 113 S.Ct. 509, 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992) (quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App. D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)).
To prevail on a ground not presented to the trial court, the defendant must demonstrate plain error, which requires a showing both that the trial court’s ruling was obviously wrong and that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Foote v. United States, 670 A.2d 366, 369 (D.C.1996). In our judgment, Salmon has not satisfied either of these elements; at best, he has an arguable point as to whether “extraordinary circumstances” existed, and a trial by eleven impartial jurors is not manifestly unjust. See, e.g., Williams, supra, 399 U.S. at 88, 90 S.Ct. at 1899.
We have recognized, however, that difficult questions may sometimes arise at trial with little warning, and that trial counsel (and, indeed, the judge) may be “understandably taken off guard by a completely unexpected denouement.” Duvall, supra, 676 A.2d at 452 n. 5 (quoting McCall v. United States, 596 A.2d 948, 960 (D.C.1991) (dissenting opinion). That is what happened here; the juror’s sudden announcement required prompt action with comparatively little time for research or reflection. Moreover, we have differentiated, in our standard of review analysis, between “claims” and “arguments,” and we have held that although claims not presented in the trial court ordinarily will not be considered on appeal, “parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.” Mills v. Cooler, 647 A.2d 1118, 1123 n. 12 (D.C.1994) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1532, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992)).
In our view, these principles permit us to consider on their merits at least some of the more refined arguments which appellate counsel for Salmon have made for the first time on appeal. As to those contentions that have been adequately preserved, the parties agree, and we hold, that the appropriate standard for our review of the trial judge’s rulings is for abuse of discretion. D.C.Code § 16-705(c); United States v. Glover, 21 F.3d 133, 135 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 948, 115 S.Ct. 360, 130 L.Ed.2d 314 (1994); cf. Leeper v. United States, 579 A.2d 695, 698-99 (D.C.1990).
B. The existence of “extraordinary circumstances.”
Salmon contends in this court that the trial judge abused her discretion by permanently excusing Juror No. 2. He acknowledges that the death of the juror’s aunt warranted his release to attend the funeral, but argues that jury deliberations should simply have been deferred until the juror’s return. Salmon asserts that the judge should have focused on “the nature and dura[954]*954tion of the [juror’s] absence” rather than on “the seriousness of the triggering event,” and that her failure to do so was error.
We have previously adverted to the discussion between court and counsel regarding the possibility of a brief adjournment of the trial.Specifically, the prosecutor suggested that deliberations might be suspended until after Juror No. 2’s return, although he expressed concern that, by then, the jurors might not recollect the evidence. The judge rejected the suggestion that deliberations be deferred, not only for the reason stated by the prosecutor, but also because she apprehended that other jurors might become unavailable.
Salmon can hardly contend that the judge’s concern was baseless. The jurors in this ease had been selected on July 1 for what was expected to be a very brief trial. The presentation of the testimony took little more than half a day. Participants had every reason to anticipate that the proceedings would be completed well in advance of the July 4th holiday, and that the trial would not affect any plans they and their families might have for the approaching four-day weekend. Significantly, Salmon’s attorney did not utter a word in support of the prosecutor’s suggestion that jury deliberations be postponed.
Moreover, if the trial judge had decided on the course which Salmon’s appellate attorneys now favor, but which his trial counsel never suggested to the court, serious additional concerns would have arisen. The judge was dealing with a bereaved juror who was compelled, upon short notice, to travel to California to attend the funeral of a close relative. He expected to return on July 4th, but unanticipated problems and delays could obviously arise in such a situation. See Johnson v. United States, 619 A.2d 1183, 1187 (D.C.1993) (discussing danger of emotional incapacitation of juror who has lost a parent during deliberations). Indeed, given the juror’s necessary departure for California and the upcoming holiday followed by a weekend, failure to excuse the juror would have raised the realistic possibility of having to suspend jury deliberations for nearly a week. See, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 832 (2d Cir.1985) (four and one-half day delay would risk dulling jury’s recollection of evidence and arguments and would pose danger that jurors would discuss case with outsiders). Because of the emergency nature of the juror’s problem, the judge had to decide on the appropriate course of action in a short time.10 In our view, she made a reasonable call.
The principal authorities on which Salmon relies are readily distinguishable. In United States v. Tobacco, 924 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1991), the jury reported that it was deadlocked after one and one half days of deliberation. The trial judge excused the jurors for the three-day Labor Day weekend. On the Tuesday after Labor Day, one of the jurors called in and stated that his wife had taken his ear keys and that he was unable to come to the courthouse. Defense counsel specifically asked the judge to reconvene the jury the following day. The trial judge nevertheless decided to proceed with eleven jurors pursuant to Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The remaining jurors returned a guilty verdict approximately two hours later. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that “just cause”11 for permanently excusing the juror had not been shown. Id. at 913-14.
Tobacco differs from the present case in decisive respects. First, the defendant’s position in the trial court was the same as his position on appeal — he asserted in both courts that the judge should have deferred [955]*955jury deliberations for a day so that the twelfth juror could resume his participation. Second, in assessing the existence of “just cause” or “extraordinary circumstances,” the unavailability of a juror’s car keys for a single day cannot reasonably be compared with the death of a de facta parent and the unexpected need to fly across the country for the funeral.12 Finally, the three-day holiday was over by the time that the judge ruled, and there was no reason to anticipate the loss of other jurors on the basis of a single day’s delay.13
In United States v. Araujo, 62 F.3d 930 (7th Cir.1995), the jury had been deliberating on a Thursday and Friday preceding the three-day weekend marking Dr. Martin Luther King’s birthday, but had not yet returned a verdict. On the following Tuesday, the temperature in Chicago was twenty degrees below zero, and one of the jurors was unable to reach the courthouse. On the Wednesday, that juror arrived in court, but another juror called in to report that he had experienced car trouble, that he was stranded on the highway, and that he was unable to come to court. The prosecutor suggested that the juror be excused, but Araujo’s attorney objected, requesting that “we wait and allow this individual some time.” Id. at 932. Over defense objection, the trial judge decided to proceed without the absent juror from the jury. The eleven-member jury returned a verdict of guilty.
The appellate court reversed Araujo’s conviction. The court held, inter alia, that “when the record is unclear as to the juror’s inability to serve, and when the facts that are known leave open the possibility that the juror might have been able to resume her service after a reasonably brief delay, just cause for dismissal most likely is lacking.” Id. at 935.
The grounds upon which we have distinguished Tabacea apply to Araujo as well; Araujo preserved his position in the trial court; Salmon did not. Being stranded with car trouble is not at all like losing a close relative and having to travel far away. Finally, as in Tobacco, the three-day holiday was over.
In light of our decision in Duvall, the trial judge would not have abused her discretion by excusing Juror No. 2 even if Salmon had presented to the trial court the claims on which he now relies. Because he did not do so, we conclude, a fortiori, that there was no error.
C. Refusal to declare a mistrial.
Salmon contends that even if Juror No. 2 was properly excused, the trial judge abused her discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial. He relies primarily on the Advisory Committee’s note to Fed.R.Crim.P. 23, in which the Committee stated:
The [1983] amendment provides that if a juror is excused after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, it is within the discretion of the court whether to declare a mistrial or to permit deliberations to continue with 11 jurors. If the trial has been brief and not much would be lost by retrial, the court might well conclude that the unusual step of allowing a jury verdict by less than 12 jurors absent stipulation should not be taken. On the other hand, if the trial has been protracted the court is much more likely to opt for continuing with the remaining 11 jurors.
(Emphasis added.) Salmon’s trial was short, and, according to him, a mistrial was therefore the appropriate remedy. We do not agree.
This issue has been preserved for appeal barely, if at all. During a discussion between court and counsel as to how and when the judge’s decision to excuse Juror No. 2 should be communicated to the remaining jurors, Salmon’s attorney stated: “Well, I guess, first of all, I move for a mistrial based on that, just for the record.” (Emphasis added.) [956]*956Counsel provided no reasons for this rather half-hearted request, and he must therefore have been relying on his earlier erroneous contentions that the JTAA does not apply to the death of a member of a juror’s family and that the Constitution requires a twelve-member jury. His position in the trial court is a far cry indeed from his position on appeal, for his principal claim in this court is that a mistrial should have been granted because the trial was short and because a retrial therefore would not be costly. But even if we assume, without deciding, that Salmon’s appellate contentions are properly before us, we are satisfied that there was no abuse of discretion.
“A mistrial is a severe remedy — a step to be avoided whenever possible, and one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor.” United States v. Clarke, 306 U.S.App. D.C. 251, 264, 24 F.3d 257, 270 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We will reverse an order denying a motion for a mistrial only “if the decision appears irrational, unreasonable, or so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Bragdon v. United States, 668 A.2d 403, 405 n. 2 (D.C.1995) (per curiam). Salmon has made no such showing.
The declaration of a mistrial, like the reversal of a conviction, requires the court and the parties to begin the trial all over again. A mistrial therefore
entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences.
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72, 106 S.Ct. 938, 942, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986); see also Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1228 n. 19 (D.C.1992) (en banc).
If the case is retried immediately, then, in a busy urban trial court, it necessarily “bumps” another trial in which the parties and counsel are ready to proceed. It is also likely to have a “domino” effect on other previously scheduled trials. Finding new dates may be difficult, for attorneys and witnesses may be unavailable. It is also important to note that defendants whose trials must be postponed because Salmon must be tried again may well be in pretrial detention, a situation that is prolonged by such a postponement. If, on the other hand, the trial of the defendant’s case is deferred until a significantly later date, then
[t]he passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses[14] may render retrial difficult, even impossible_ Thus, while reversal may, in theory, entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution, ... and thereby cost society the right to punish admitted offenders....
Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 942 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
The price of a retrial is one that society must be prepared to pay if the defendant’s initial trial was unfair and if a miscarriage of justice resulted. This case, however, does not entail an injustice. Salmon’s sole contention is that he was found guilty by eleven jurors instead of by twelve. So far as the record reveals, all eleven jurors were impartial, and Salmon makes no claim to the contrary. The JTAA expressly states that, in circumstances such as these, eleven jurors can return a “valid” verdict. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a jury of six is constitutionally sufficient, and thus compatible with the requirements of basic fairness.
There is nothing magic about the number twelve. The Supreme Court explained in Williams that history
affords little insight into the considerations that gradually led the size of that body to be generally fixed at 12. Some have suggested that the number 12 was fixed upon simply because that was the number of the presentment jury from the hundred, from which the petit jury developed. Other, less circular but more fanciful reasons for [957]*957the number 12 have been given, “but they were all brought forward after the number was fixed,” and rest on little more than mystical or superstitious insights into the significance of “12.” Lord Coke’s explanation that the “number of twelve is much respected in holy writ, as 12 apostles, 12 stones, 12 tribes, etc.,” is typical. In short, while sometime in the 14th century the size of the jury at common law came to be fixed generally at 12, that particular feature of the jury system appears to have been a historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place.
399 U.S. at 87-90, 90 S.Ct. at 1899-1900 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). Indeed, as this court recently noted, “a jury of twelve ... is not deemed to offer any advantage [to] the defendant,” and even a statute which permits trial by a jury of six instead of twelve operates “only in a limited and [in]substantial manner to the defendant’s disadvantage.” Duvall, supra, 676 A.2d at 451 (quoting State v. Maresca, 173 Conn. 450, 377 A.2d 1330, 1333 (1977)). Assuming that the judge correctly held that the death of the juror’s aunt constituted extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of the JTAA — and we have so concluded — Salmon’s loss of a twelfth juror is not “miscarriage of justice” material.15
Salmon insists, however, that the Advisory Committee note to Fed.R.Crim.P. 23 supports his position and that we should construe the JTAA accordingly. To the extent that the enactment of a District of Columbia statute can be viewed as the adoption of an advisory committee note to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, there is some support for Salmon’s position in a few federal appellate decisions. See, e.g., Araujo, supra, 62 F.3d at 936 (dictum).16 We agree, however, with the following discussion of the issue by Judge Patricia Wald, writing for the court in United States v. Harrington, 323 U.S.App. D.C. 431, 108 F.3d 1460 (1997):
Rule 23(b) explicitly and without reservation assigns the stop/go decision to the discretion of the trial court, and nothing in the accompanying Advisory Committee notes, or in any case of which we are aware, cabins this discretion in a way that would call this judge’s decision into question. Harrington’s argument that his trial was a relatively short and simple one is well taken, but the Advisory Committee notes say only that in such cases, a trial court “might well” decide that a mistrial is appropriate, while for longer and more complex trials courts would be “more likely” to decide against a mistrial. [Fed. R.Crim.P. 23] advisory committee’s note. Because Rule 23(b) expressly leaves this decision in. the trial court’s discretion, and because we find no policy statement, case, or principle of fairness that would invalidate the discretionary decision made by the trial court here, Harrington’s challenge to the eleven-member jury verdict fails.
Id. at 443, 108 F.3d at 1472; accord, United States v. Patterson, 23 F.3d 1239, 1252 n. 17 (7th Cir.1994) (“nothing in the rule requires the judge to declare a mistrial in all brief trials”) (citation omitted).17 Moreover, Du-[958]*958vail was also a brief trial — not much longer than the present one — and this court affirmed the trial judge’s denial of the defense motion for a mistrial.
The trial in this case was in fact a short one. If Salmon’s attorney had requested a mistrial on that ground, it would have been incumbent upon the trial judge to include that consideration in her calculus in determining whether to grant Salmon’s motion for a mistrial. It might then have been a permissible (but not a mandatory) exercise of her discretion to grant the defense motion, especially if the judge could reasonably be assured that all counsel and "witnesses would be available on another suitable date, and that the cost of a mistrial, in terms of the impact on other cases and fairness to other affected persons, would not be prohibitive. Unlike our dissenting colleague, we are unwilling to burden the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this area "with the duty to balance explicitly the “relative social costs,” post at 961 (italics in original), of continuing the trial versus a mistrial. Considerations such as “the length of the trial [or] the complexity of the issues,” id., while meant to be objective criteria, can easily yield impressionistic and varying answers on similar facts. Moreover, while the District’s statute reflects a “preference in favor of twelve-member juries,” id., its purpose is precisely to give the trial court a remedy short of mistrial when extraordinary circumstances have been shown to justify excusing a juror. On the record before us we are satisfied that the judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing the trial to proceed to verdict with eleven jurors.
Affirmed.