BELSON, Senior Judge:
Appellant Herbert Evans challenges his conviction for aggravated assault while armed (AAWA),1 arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial or, in the alternative, in declining to give a curative instruction, to deal with a comment the government made in its opening statement about evidence that was not later adduced at trial. Specifically, appellant argues that the government’s mention in its opening of a false [4]*4exculpatory statement appellant made to police induced the defense to promise the jury in its opening that it would hear a later exculpatory statement also made by the appellant. Then, when the government received an adverse evidentiary ruling, prompting it to abandon the attempt to enter the first statement, the appellant was left with no way to enter the second statement, and therefore, had effectively broken a promise to the jury because of the actions of the prosecution. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial or give the requested instruction.
I. THE TRIAL
A jury convicted appellant Herbert Evans of aggravated assault while armed (AAWA), following a trial before the Honorable Herbert Dixon of the Superior Court. Evans had been charged by indictment with AAWA, assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA),2 and carrying a dangerous weapon outside the home or business (CDW).3 The jury acquitted him of CDW and AWIKWA. He was sentenced to eighty-four months in prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release. This timely appeal followed.
The case arose out of the appellant’s stabbing of Steven Boyd several times during a fight on the corner of Olive and Quarles Streets, Northeast, on September 23, 2006. The witnesses for the government at trial included Boyd and Barbara Bowens, a witness to the fight, Boyd’s mother Lula Crenshaw, Officer Jason Newman, and Detective John Bevilacqua. Testifying for the defense were James Taylor, who witnessed the fight, and Barbara Bowens’ brother Joe Bowens, who was present at the scene but did not witness the fight. The appellant pled self-defense. He chose not to testify in his own defense.
The evidence showed that Boyd approached Evans on the street, upset with Evans for allegedly making sexual advances on a female friend of both. As appellant admits, it was “undisputed that Mr. Evans stabbed Mr. Boyd several times.” What was disputed was who started the fight and exactly what happened during it. Boyd’s testimony was that after some heated remarks, he began to walk away and Evans stabbed him in the back, continuing to stab Boyd until Boyd told him, “man, I had enough.”4 Barbara Bowens testified that she saw that the men appeared angry, and then “both of them just started fighting.” She could not tell who threw the first punch. She testified that at some point, “[Boyd] was actually getting the best of [Evans] and somehow [Evans] overpowered [Boyd] and [Boyd] went down to the ground. That’s when [Evans] started stabbing [Boyd].” Mr. Taylor testified that after he heard Boyd and Evans arguing, he saw Boyd throw the first punch. It appeared to Taylor that Boyd “was winning” the fight; Boyd “was getting in more punches, throwing more punches than the other man.” Once they were on the ground, he saw Evans stab Boyd in the back with the knife. None of the witnesses testified to seeing Boyd with a knife or other weapon at any time.
[5]*5Detective Bevilacqua, the lead detective on the case, testified that he and other officers followed a trail of blood from the scene of the assault back to appellant’s apartment. Once there, they knocked on the door, which appellant opened, bandages on a hand and a knee, and clad only in underwear. He also testified at a motion hearing the week before trial, but not at the trial, that when he asked appellant how he had sustained his injuries, appellant said he had been “jumped” on Kenilworth Avenue. At that point, the detective asked appellant if he would come down to the police station to answer some questions about an assault. Appellant agreed and, after dressing, accompanied Bevilacqua to the Sixth District police station. At the station, appellant was asked again how he had sustained his injuries and initially responded again that he had been jumped on Kenilworth Avenue. The officers at the station told appellant that a person had been stabbed at the corner of Olive and Quarles Streets, and that a trail of blood led directly from the scene to appellant’s home. They also informed him that they could not exclude the possibility that the assailant had acted in self-defense. At that point, appellant admitted to being involved in the assault and stated that he acted in self-defense.5
The appellant’s lone assignment of error relates to the manner in which the court dealt with a comment made by the government during its opening statement about a piece of evidence that the government subsequently elected not to present. During his opening statement, after summarizing the evidence of the attack the government intended to introduce, counsel for the government stated, “When the detectives asked [Evans] what happened to you, he said I was jumped by some guys over on Kenilworth Avenue. Well, you will hear that he was not jumped by some guys over on Kenilworth Avenue. You will hear that he injured himself as he was attacking Steven Boyd.” Apparently apprehending that the jury might think Evans had fabricated his self-defense claim for trial, counsel for the defense included the following in his opening statement:
Yes, he did tell [the police] at first the story about being jumped on Kenilworth Avenue. Folks, he had just stabbed a man. He didn’t know the law of self defense. But, you will hear that as soon as the police told him about what had happened with [Boyd], since the police said look, we got this man here stabbed, Mr. Evans told them what happened. He told them that [Boyd] jumped him. He told them that [Boyd] sliced his hand and he told them that he did stab [Boyd]. He admitted it. He said that I was defending myself.
Significantly, the defense counsel then went on to make numerous detailed remarks, not contained in Evans’ statements to the police, about what happened during the fight from Evans’ perspective. These statements included that Boyd was “high on Crack cocaine, drunk on alcohol and filled with rage,” that Boyd “[came] right after Mr. Evans and he [was] ranting at Mr. Evans,” that Boyd “pullfed] out a knife,” and that appellant “put[] up his hands to defend himself,” that Boyd “slash[ed] [Evans’] hand from knuckle to wrist,” that Boyd “hurl[ed Evans] to the ground,” causing appellant to “grind [his knee] into the pavement,” and that Boyd did “not stop” there; he “[came] right down on top of him swinging, punching[,] pummeling Mr. Evans,” until Evans “final[6]*6ly [took] that knife and he [swung] it.” Defense counsel also made several statements about what Evans was thinking during the fight, such as “[appellant knew] that that man [was] not going to stop,” “Mr. Evans [knew] he ha[d] to do something or this man [would] kill him,” and “he [was] shocked.”
Prior to presenting Detective Bevilac-qua’s testimony, the government requested a ruling from the court on whether it could enter into evidence Evans’ statement at his apartment without opening the door to the admission of the later statement at the police station, which included appellant’s claim of self-defense. The defense argued that the rule of completeness should allow the defense to introduce the subsequent statement if the government introduced the earlier statement. After a bench conference, the court agreed with the defense. Following this ruling, the government stated that it would elect not to introduce the earlier statement. The defense moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor’s promise to introduce the first statement had induced it to mention the “complete statement” in its opening, which “is now weighing in the minds of the jury.” The court denied the motion.
The defense again moved for a mistrial following the government’s case-in-ehief. It restated its theory of why the appellant was prejudiced:
The Government opened on that he just said he got jumped. I think that the Government will still benefit because that will be left lingering in the minds of the jury number one that he gave a false defense to the police. But, also, that we promised something and essentially took on a burden at that point ... and we have not fulfilled that.
The government argued that the defense voluntarily assumed the burden of proving the later statement: “Essentially, both parties have now made statements in opening that apparently will not be borne out by the testimony at trial. Both parties gambled. You take the risk.” The court once again denied the motion, finding no “misconduct.” At the close of evidence, the defense requested a curative instruction “along the lines of ... the [m]issing [e]vidence [instruction.” The instruction would have informed the jury that the defendant’s statement at the police station was evidence “that only the government can introduce” and that the jury could infer from the choice not to introduce it that it “would have been harmful to the [government.” The court denied this request also. The defense did not offer any written request for instruction tailored to the circumstances of the case.
No mention of the initial statement appellant made at his home or the subsequent statement he made at the police station was made during the closing argument of either party.
Before closing arguments, the court gave the standard instructions that the jury “may consider only the evidence properly admitted in this trial,” and “the statements and the arguments of the lawyers are not evidence.” Directly before the government’s closing, the court reiterated that “the statements of counsel are not evidence.” These admonitions were actually the second and third such instructions the jury received to this effect: immediately after the jury was impaneled, it was instructed that counsel would have “the option to make opening statements,” and that if counsel chose to give them, the jury should keep in mind that “Open[ing] statements are not evidence, but these are merely the statements of the parties, with respect to what they contend the evidence will be.”
[7]*7II. PROSECUTORIAL MISSTATEMENT
Appellant makes two arguments in support of his claim of error. First, appellant argues “prosecutorial misstatement,” contending that the trial court committed non-harmless error when it failed to grant a mistrial based on the government’s representing in opening statement that evidence adverse to the defense would be introduced and then choosing not to offer that evidence. The decision whether to grant a motion for a mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 283 (D.C.2007). Our review is therefore for abuse of discretion. Najafi v. United States, 886 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C.2005). We will reverse a trial court’s denial of a mistrial only where it “appears irrational, unreasonable, or so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. United States, 779 A.2d 297, 302 (D.C.2001) (internal citations omitted).
Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s statement in this case warranted a mistrial because “[t]he jury was ... made aware of the Kenilworth Avenue story without the prosecutor ever having to put on evidence, subject to cross-examination and other defense challenges, about the statement.” When the defense seeks reversal on the basis of a remark made by a prosecutor, a two-pronged inquiry is made. We must first consider whether the challenged remark was improper. Munn v. United States, 703 A.2d 1239, 1241 (D.C.1997). Even if it was, a new trial is required only when the defendant suffered “substantial prejudice” as a result. Id. (internal citations omitted). We conclude that appellant’s claim fails because he cannot show substantial prejudice from the remark.
We have stated that “an opening statement consisting of an objective summary of evidence which the prosecution reasonably expected to introduce, although at variance with the evidence actually introduced at trial, need not be cause for reversal.” Augburn v. United States, 514 A.2d 452, 454 (D.C.1986) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he law does not require that opening trial statements be completely supported by evidence introduced during the trial. Such a rule, rigidly enforced, would effectively eliminate opening remarks and deprive the jury of a very useful outline of the trial.” Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C.1985) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 361 A.2d 199, 200 (D.C.1976)). “[T]he failure to sustain all opening remarks during the trial is not automatically ground for a new trial. The decision is discretionary and is for the trial judge.” Robinson, 361 A.2d at 200 (quoting Mares v. United States, 409 F.2d 1083, 1085 (10th Cir.1968)).
In Owens, the defendants were charged with assault with intent to commit armed robbery. 497 A.2d at 1088-89. The evidence showed the defendants approached the complaining witness in an alley with pistols at their sides and said, “This is it,” and, referring to the pistol, “you know what it is.” Id. at 1089. During the prosecutor’s opening statement, he mischarac-terized the words as “You know what this is? Give it up”! Id. at 1091. He qualified his statement by saying, “words to that effect.” Id. We determined that there was no reversible error because, following standards established in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969), (1) the remark was made in opening statement and not during the trial, (2) the jury was instructed that opening statements are not evidence, (3) the instruction did not require the jurors to perform “mental gymnastics” — such as would be [8]*8required if a jury were asked to consider a confession as evidence against only one codefendant and not against the other, and (4) the remark was not touted to the jury as “critical.” Owens, 497 A.2d at 1092 (citing Frazier, 394 U.S. at 735-36, 89 5.Ct. 1420).6
In Frazier itself, the Supreme Court considered a misstatement by a prosecutor about testimony a codefendant would provide. 394 U.S. at 733, 89 S.Ct. 1420. The codefendant invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. Id. at 734, 89 S.Ct. 1420. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall observed that the prosecutor’s statement “took only a few minutes to recite and was sandwiched between a summary of petitioner’s own confession and a description of the circumstantial evidence the State would introduce.” Id. at 733, 89 S.Ct. 1420. Using the analysis we later quoted in deciding Owens, the Court rejected the appellant’s claim that the usual instruction that statements from counsel are not evidence was insufficient to guard against any prejudice the statement created. Id. at 735, 89 S.Ct. 1420.
Frazier and Owens are controlling here, where the misstatement was confined to opening, it was not touted to the jury as critical, and a general instruction that opening statements are not evidence was given — not once but three times. We may presume that the jury understood and followed the court’s instructions. Ginyard v. United States, 816 A.2d 21, 30 (D.C.2003); Hall v. United States, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 211, 171 F.2d 347, 349, (1948); see also Frazier, 394 U.S. at 736, 89 S.Ct. 1420 (“it does not seem at all remarkable to assume that the jury will ordinarily be able to limit its consideration to the evidence introduced during the trial”). This is particularly true when, as here, “there was nothing to suggest that the jury did not comprehend and respect the admonitions of the trial court.” Ginyard, 816 A.2d at 30. As in Frazier, the erroneous statement here made up a very small portion of the prosecutor’s opening remarks, and it was similarly “sandwiched” between more substantive evidence.7 Further, the statement was not touted as critical: the government did not attempt to relate this statement explicitly to the defense’s anticipated theory of self-defense, merely stating it as one of many facts the government anticipated it would produce. Based on an application of the Frazier factors, appellant cannot show the prosecutor’s statement caused him “substantial prejudice.”8 See Munn, 703 A.2d at 1241; Owens, 497 A.2d at 1092. Under these circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial.9
[9]*9III. RELIANCE ON THE PROSECUTOR’S OPENING
Appellant next argues he reasonably and detrimentally relied on the prosecutor’s comments in opening in deciding to include, in his own opening, a summary of appellant’s statement at the police station. He contends reversal is warranted under the reasoning we employed in Wilson v. United States, 606 A.2d 1017 (D.C.1992) (overruled on different grounds by Lyons v. United States, 683 A.2d 1066, 1067 (D.C.1996)). In Wilson, the prosecutor made a pre-trial representation to the court, with defense counsel present, that the defendant had no impeachable convictions. Id. at 1019. We held that this representation was an implicit promise not to impeach the defendant if he elected to testify. Id. at 1020. The prosecutor then broke this promise mid-trial by announcing his intention to impeach the defendant with his convictions. Id. at 1019. Because the promise occurred at a pre-trial stage, it affected defense decisions about whether to go to trial or enter into a plea agreement, whether the defendant should testify if the case went to trial, and what questions to pose to the jury panel during voir dire. Id. at 1025. These considerations meant the promise affected the defendant’s rights to effective assistance of counsel and to maintain his privilege against self-incrimination.
Wilson, however, is distinguishable from the present case. Unlike in Wilson, the government’s opening statement here was made at a time when appellant had already elected to go to trial instead of entering into a plea agreement, formulated a trial strategy (including arguing self-defense), and decided how to question potential jurors on voir dire. Therefore, the opening statement did not have the same impact on the decisions critical to the formulation of a defense that the pre-trial representation did in Wilson. Rather, the prosecutor’s opening remarks in the present case affected, at most, the defense decision to mention a particular statement in its opening remarks that was consistent with appellant’s self-defense theory. Tellingly, the reasoning in Wilson and the cases it relies on has not been applied to opening statements, but instead has thus far been limited to pre-trial representations. See Smith v. United States, 491 A.2d 1144 (D.C.1985); Rosser v. United States, 381 A.2d 598 (D.C.1977).
Appellant argues this court has characterized representations made during opening statements as “promises,” and that the reasoning of Wilson can therefore be applied to opening statements. It is true that we have referred to opening statements as “promises.” See, e.g., Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398, 418 (D.C.2009); Dobson v. United States, 711 A.2d 78, 85 n. 14 (D.C.1998). Analogizing to promises in other contexts, one could conclude that when evidence the prosecutor alludes to in opening fails to materialize during the trial, the prosecutor can be said [10]*10to have “broken” a promise. However, the analogy does not extend as far as appellant would have it. Our eases, as well as cases from other jurisdictions, illustrate that what is meant by the word “promise” in the context of an opening statement is that the party is making a promise to the jury, the breaking of which has the potential to prejudice that party with the jury. See Arthur, 986 A.2d at 418 (defendant’s decision not to testify prejudiced defendant because it caused him to be unable to fulfill his promise to the jury in opening that he would testify); Dobson, 711 A.2d at 83 (in considering appellant’s § 23-110 motion, trial court failed to consider prejudice from defense counsel’s promise to the jury in opening statement to produce alibi witness and inability to deliver on that promise); see also Brisbon v. United States, 957 A.2d 931, 958 (D.C.2008) (counsel permitted to remind the jury in summation that opposing counsel has failed to live up to promises made in opening); Ginyard, 816 A.2d at 28 (same); Allen v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 351, 273 F.2d 85, 86 (1959) (“[ojrdinarily, a prosecuting attorney’s failure to prove an assertion he made in his opening statement is prejudicial to the Government, not the defendant”); accord, United States v. Jones, 592 F.2d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.1979) (“the Government’s inability to produce evidence which it promised the jury would appear to harm the Government’s case rather than the defense”).
Pre-trial inquiries are “designed to promote the efficient administration of justice” and to give both sides a fair warning of what issues might be raised at trial. Wilson, 606 A.2d at 1021, 1022. “[T]he government is obligated to respond accurately and unambiguously to pretrial inquiries made by the court,” and “the defense and the court are entitled to rely on” these responses. Id. at 1020, 1023; see also Smith, 491 A.2d at 1147 (in order to comply with discovery rules, government responses to pre-trial inquiries regarding statements made by appellant must be accurate and unambiguous). Opening statements serve a different purpose altogether. They are intended simply as a roadmap, to provide “broad outlines of the case to enable the jury to comprehend it.” Brown v. United States, 934 A.2d 930, 944 (D.C.2007) (quotations omitted); Owens, 497 A.2d at 1091. Further, as we have stated, “the law does not require that opening trial statements be completely supported by evidence introduced during the trial.” Owens, 497 A.2d at 1091; Robinson, 361 A.2d at 200. Given the important distinctions between the functions served by pre-trial representations and opening statements, we decline to apply the reasoning in Wilson to the present case.
A contrary decision would not be in accord with the flexibility properly afforded attorneys in making decisions regarding opening statements. See Augburn, 514 A.2d at 454; Owens, 497 A.2d at 1091; Robinson, 361 A.2d at 200; see also Scott v. United States, 619 A.2d 917, 923 (D.C.1993) (no prejudice to defendant from counsel’s decision not to give opening statement); Fitzhugh v. United States, 415 A.2d 548, 551 n. 5 (D.C.1980) (defense may elect to reserve opening statement until after presentation of government case-in-chief); accord, United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir.1985) (timing of opening statement and decision of whether to make one are merely matters of trial tactics). Requiring pinpoint precision in opening statements would not only constitute a novel judicial approach, it would also add significantly to the already great stress facing parties and counsel beginning a criminal trial.
[11]*11Appellant argues his reliance was particularly reasonable in this case because our rule-of-completeness case law compelled that if the first statement appellant gave to police was admitted, the second statement would have to be admitted. Appellant also argues that the duty was on the government in the first instance to seek a pre-trial ruling on this issue before opening on it, since the government should have known it would be seeking a generous ruling from the court. We think the question was closer than appellant argues. Under the rule of completeness, “a party is entitled, once a part of a document or recorded statement has been introduced into evidence, to seek admission of the remainder of the statement.” Andrews v. United States, 922 A.2d 449, 458 (D.C.2007) (quoting Henderson v. United States, 682 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C.1993)). The rule’s underlying concern is fairness. Id. When a defendant makes one continuous statement, the prosecution may not seek to include only inculpatory portions of it, excluding exculpatory portions, so as to distort the meaning of the statement. Id.; Henderson, 632 A.2d at 426.10
This court has applied the rule of completeness to “continuous though interrupted” statements. Johns v. United States, 434 A.2d 463, 475 n. 19 (D.C.1981) (where government entered inculpatory statement made by defendant at police station, defendant was entitled to present evidence of later, exculpatory statement also given at station). The two statements to police in this ease, however, occurred in different locations, under different methods of interrogation, and after different facts and incentives were made known to appellant— all facts that distinguish this case from Johns. See id. The trial court, in its discretion, could have seen these two statements not as parts of one continuous thought, as in the example from Wigmore (supra note 10), but rather as two discrete thoughts, not subject to the rule of completeness. See Henderson, 632 A.2d at 425 (key inquiry is whether statements together were intended to express one “thought as a whole”).
Having said this, we recognize that Johns does lend some support to the rule-of-completeness argument the defense presented at trial, with which the trial court ultimately agreed. Given the closeness of the question, the prosecutor would have been well advised to request a pretrial ruling. However, saying the prosecutor should have sought a pretrial ruling does not mean the defense was “entitled to rely” on the contents of the government’s opening statement in promising evidence of its own. As all parties seem to agree, the only evidentiary basis for the defense’s presentation of the second statement to the jury would have been the government’s presentation of the first statement. Even assuming the defense was correct in anticipating that if the first statement were admitted, the second one would also have to be admitted, this does not mean the defense was reasonable in being confident that the first statement would ultimately be presented. As is true of government counsel and the trial court, defense counsel also is charged with knowing the law. Wilson, 606 A.2d at 1023. Counsel can also be expected to recognize that a prosecutor’s opening statement need only be “an objective summary of the evidence which the prosecutor reasonably expected to produce[,]” and that “[m]any things might [12]*12happen during the course of [a] trial which would prevent the presentation of all the evidence described in advance.”11 Frazier, 394 U.S. at 736, 89 S.Ct. 1420.
Granting a mistrial is a “severe remedy — a step to be avoided whenever possible, and one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor.” Najafi, 886 A.2d at 107 (quoting Salmon v. United States, 719 A.2d 949, 956 (D.C.1997)). This is so because ordering a mistrial “entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already taken place.” Id. (quoting Salmon, 719 A.2d at 956).
A missing evidence instruction, appellant’s other requested remedy — here an instruction that would have informed the jury that it could infer from the government’s choice not to introduce the statement that it would have been harmful to the government — is also not without costs. We have “recognized several dangers inherent in the use of a missing evidence instruction, since it represents a radical departure from the principle that the jury should decide the case by evaluating the evidence before it.” Tyer v. United States, 912 A.2d 1150, 1164 (D.C.2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The adverse inference, which in effect creates evidence from nonevi-dence, may add a fictitious weight to one side of the case....” Dent v. United States, 404 A.2d 165, 170-71 (D.C.1979). “Additionally, the inference is usually argued in summation when an evidentiary explanation for the absence of the [evidence] no longer can be presented to the jury.” Id. at 171. In recognition of these and other dangers, trial courts have “considerable discretion” in determining whether to give the instruction. Tyer, 912 A.2d at 1164. On the facts of this case, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in failing to grant one of these remedies.12
We are also satisfied that any error here would have been harmless. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946).13 [13]*13It is significant that, aside from the sta-tionhouse confession, defense counsel made numerous “promises” to the jury in opening that failed to materialize during trial. The jury never heard evidence, for instance, that Boyd was “high on Crack cocaine,” that he was “drunk on alcohol,” or that he was “filled with rage.” The evidence the jury heard instead was that Boyd was “a little upset” with appellant, that he “didn’t use any cocaine” that day— although his status as a routine user called the veracity of this statement into question — and that he had had two beers approximately four hours before the fight that he did not believe affected his perceptions. Similarly, the jury never heard evidence that Boyd was the one who “pull[ed] out a knife”; Boyd testified that he never had a knife and no witness testified to seeing Boyd with a weapon at any time. Likewise, the specifics of how the fight transpired and how appellant supposedly defended himself never materialized to anything approaching the degree the defense opening represented it would. Finally, the evidence never showed that appellant attacked only because he “[knew] he ha[d] to do something or this man [would] kill him,” nor did it reflect any of appellant’s other thoughts, as represented in the defense opening.
The failure of this evidence to materialize can be attributed, at least in large part, to the defendant’s decision not to testify. The defendant certainly had an unqualified right to make this decision, whether it ended up reflecting “wisdom or unwisdom.” Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C.1991). In any event, it was not attributable to any action of the government: defense counsel represented to the court that the only portion of its opening that was affected by the government’s opening was the addition of the statement to police at the station. As he said, “everything else about [his] opening, the self defense and Mr. Evans’ injuries and the witnesses, it all would have been exactly the same.” We agree with the government that, to the extent appellant was prejudiced by “his failure to carry a burden that he voluntarily assumed before the jury in opening statement,” the prejudice created by his failure to present the statement made at the police station was far outweighed by the prejudice — undoubtedly self-created — occasioned by his failure to present all of the other details of the attack he promised the jury they would hear. See Dobson, 711 A.2d at 83 (“[t]he appearance that the defense has overstated its evidence, and cannot be trusted to keep its promises, may have a significant effect on the jury’s evaluation of a case”).
We also doubt the severity of the impact of the omission at issue in the context of the trial as a whole. The defense evidence at issue, at the optimum, would have shown that at the station, once informed that the police had evidence that he was the man who had stabbed Boyd, and that a self-defense claim might be available, appellant changed his story to admit the stabbing and argue self-defense. This statement was at best corroborative of his trial theory and at worst showed he fabricated his self-defense claim upon learning he could no longer deny his involvement in the stabbing. It was not, by far, the only evidence on the subject of self-defense that appellant mentioned in his opening statement. Cf. Dobson, 711 A.2d at 83 (preju[14]*14dice to defendant where his counsel failed altogether to provide evidence of defendant’s alibi as promised in opening); Arthur, 986 A.2d at 418 (plain error where trial judge impermissibly dissuaded defendant from testifying, thereby completely depriving appellant of testimony “crucial to his defense,” regarding “his version of the facts” surrounding drug transaction).
Further, the evidence as a whole tended to disprove appellant’s self-defense theory. See Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763, 771.(D.C.2005) (burden on government to disprove self-defense, once claimed). The evidence showed that appellant stabbed Boyd ten times, including nine deep “penetrating wounds” — as opposed to “slashing wounds” — to his back. No witness testified that Boyd was armed, and Boyd himself gave the most detailed eyewitness account of the attack, which ran directly contrary to appellant’s theory. Finally, the jury was instructed not once but three times that it was not to consider statements of counsel as evidence, which is “usually a sufficient cure for any possible prejudice.” Bailey v. United States, 831 A.2d 973, 981-82 (D.C.2003). Appellant has not shown substantial prejudice so as to warrant reversal of his conviction.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
Affirmed.