Appellate Case: 24-2162 Document: 25 Date Filed: 04/06/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 6, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court VINAY SAINI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-2162 (D.C. No. 2:24-CV-00113-MV-GBW) HOSPITAL CARE CONSULTANTS, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before BACHARACH, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Plaintiff Vinay Saini is a physician who filed claims against his former
employer, Hospital Care Consultants (“HCC”), for discrimination, hostile work
environment, retaliation, and numerous state law causes of action. HCC moved to
dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district
court granted the motion and denied Dr. Saini’s motion to amend. Dr. Saini filed a
timely appeal. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-2162 Document: 25 Date Filed: 04/06/2026 Page: 2
I. Background
Dr. Saini, a native of India, was employed by HCC in 2018 at the Gila Regional
Medical Center in Silver City, New Mexico. Between January 2018 and May 2018,
Dr. Saini complained to HCC’s director of operations about his pay and working
conditions. He alleges that in response, the director made “multiple adverse comments,”
including referring to him as “the complaining Indian doctor” and stating that “[p]erhaps
in your culture and where you come from it is OK to act without consideration or
compassion.” R. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On October 5, 2018, HCC terminated Dr. Saini’s employment in a letter that stated
he “had materially breached his employment contract.” Id. at 9. His clinical privileges at
Gila Regional Medical Center automatically ended upon his termination from HCC.
Although New Mexico regulations required Dr. Saini to report his termination to the New
Mexico Medical Board (“NMMB”), he failed to do so. As a result, the NMMB “publicly
reprimanded” him for his failure to report his termination. Id. at 10.
In July 2019, Dr. Saini filed a complaint with the Department of Labor Wage and
Hour Division (“DOL”), contending HCC improperly withheld his final paycheck. In
May 2022, the DOL issued a decision finding HCC owed him back wages. Five months
later, the DOL disclosed its investigative files to Dr. Saini, and he discovered that on
December 3, 2019, HCC had sent the DOL a letter stating HCC terminated his
employment for reasons related to patient care.
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On July 3, 2023, Dr. Saini filed discrimination charges with the New Mexico
Human Rights Bureau (“NMHRB”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. The agencies dismissed the charges and issued a right-to-sue letter.
Dr. Saini then filed a complaint in federal district court. His complaint included
eight counts: (1) discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under the
New Mexico Human Rights Act (“NMHRA”) and Title VII; (2) discrimination, hostile
work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; (4) prima facie tort and unjust enrichment; (5) negligent
misrepresentation and common law fraud; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
(7) defamation and false light; and (8) contractual and common law indemnification.
HCC moved to dismiss the claims under Rule 12(b)(6), and the matter was
referred to a magistrate judge, who issued a recommendation that the district court grant
HCC’s motion in its entirety. Dr. Saini objected to the recommendation and moved for
leave to amend the complaint. The district court overruled his objections, adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation in full, and denied the motion to amend as futile.
This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Serna v. Denver Police Dep’t,
58 F.4th 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2023). We accept as true all well-pleaded facts in
Dr. Saini’s complaint, view them in the light most favorable to him, and draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor. See Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d
1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021). We do not, however, assume the truth of conclusory
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allegations. See id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because Dr. Saini proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his filings, but we
do not act as an advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
A. Time-Barred Claims
1. Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment
The district court dismissed the discrimination and hostile work environment
claims on the ground that Dr. Saini filed charges with the NMHRB and EEOC long after
the respective deadlines for filing charges under Title VII and § 1981. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1) (300-day deadline for filing Title VII charges); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1-10(A) (same deadline for filing of NMHRA charges); EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d
1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1984) (deadline for filing § 1981 discrimination claims is governed
by state statute of limitations for personal injury claims); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8
(three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims). HCC terminated Dr. Saini’s
employment on October 5, 2018, and he filed charges with NMHRB and EEOC nearly
five years later, on July 23, 2023. So the district court concluded his discrimination and
hostile work environment claims, under both Title VII and § 1981, were time-barred.
Dr. Saini makes four arguments to the contrary, which the district court rejected. We
discern no error in the court’s rejection of Dr. Saini’s arguments.
First, Dr. Saini argues that on the date of his termination, he had no reasonable
basis to believe he had been discriminated against because HCC’s termination letter
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gave a “facially valid reason,” Opening Br. at 18, and he only learned four years later
that the reason provided was false. The district court rejected this argument because
“a claim accrues when the disputed employment practice—the demotion, transfer,
firing, refusing to hire, or the like—is first announced to the plaintiff.” Almond v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 665 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2011). Indeed, “an
employee who discovers, or should have discovered, the injury (the adverse
employment action) need not be aware of the unlawful discriminatory intent behind
that act for the limitations clock to start ticking.” Id.; see also Hulsey v. Kmart,
43 F.3d 555, 558-59 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[N]otice or knowledge of discriminatory
motivation is not a prerequisite for a cause of action to accrue . . . . On the contrary, it is
knowledge of the adverse employment decision itself that triggers the running of the
statute of limitations.”). In this case, the adverse employment action was the
termination of Dr. Saini’s employment, 1 which occurred on October 5, 2018, and the
district court correctly determined the limitations clock started ticking on that date.
1 Dr. Saini now argues the district court misapprehended the nature of his discrimination claims. He says his claims were not based on the termination of his employment, but on “the discriminatory application of work performance criteria,” Opening Br. at 15, which he did not discover until he saw the DOL letter in October 2022. This argument is belied by his complaint and proposed amended complaint, both of which premise his discrimination claims on his termination. And even if his characterization of his claims were accurate, they would be doomed by the absence of an adverse action. See Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case for discrimination . . .by showing an employer took adverse employment action against the plaintiff . . . .”). 5 Appellate Case: 24-2162 Document: 25 Date Filed: 04/06/2026 Page: 6
Second, Dr. Saini argues that even if his discrimination and hostile work
environment claims accrued on the date of his termination, equitable tolling should
apply to save his claims. The district court held that equitable tolling did not apply,
and we agree. Only “extraordinary circumstances . . . merit[] the employment of
equitable tolling.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1471
(10th Cir. 1996). Such circumstances include when “the case rise[s] to the level of
active deception” or the plaintiff has been “actively misled.” Biester v. Midwest
Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Dr. Saini claims he was deceived because the reason HCC gave in the
termination letter—breach of the employment contract—was inconsistent with the
patient care issues HCC later identified in DOL proceedings. But as the district court
observed, patient care issues are an adequate basis for asserting a breach of the
employment contract, so HCC’s letter was neither deceptive nor misleading. In
addition, the district court observed that Dr. Saini’s own allegations establish he was
on notice of potential discrimination at the time HCC terminated his employment.
He alleged that during his employment he had been the subject of racially motivated
comments from a member of HCC management, and that in July 2019 he complained
to the DOL that HCC had discriminated and retaliated against him.
Third, Dr. Saini argues that his DOL filing should have tolled the running of
the limitations period during the pendency of the DOL proceedings. The district
court rejected this argument because “equitable tolling does not apply when the
plaintiff has separate, distinct, and independent remedies, and has simply slept on his
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rights with regard to one of them.” Turgeau v. Admin. Review Bd., 446 F.3d 1052,
1060 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dr. Saini filed his claim
with the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division, which handles claims relating to wages,
overtime, and working conditions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. We agree
with the district court that those types of claims are separate and distinct from the
remedies for discrimination and hostile work environment available under Title VII. 2
Finally, Dr. Saini argues he could not have filed a discrimination charge with
the EEOC during the DOL proceedings, because a foreign worker may pursue a
discrimination claim under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) but may not
simultaneously pursue a discrimination claim under Title VII. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324b(b)(2). But as the district court correctly noted, Dr. Saini never filed a
complaint under the INA, so nothing prevented him from pursuing a Title VII
discrimination charge. Dr. Saini argues his DOL filing counted as a claim under the
INA because, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, 3 the DOL may transfer a
2 Dr. Saini cites an out-of-circuit case, Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 2011), in support of his argument. In Granger, the plaintiffs had mistakenly filed their claims with the DOL’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs instead of the EEOC. Id. at 709. The OFCCP not only accepted the claims, but it repeatedly assured the plaintiffs it was investigating their claims, it failed to follow its own regulations requiring it to notify the employer, and its delay in transferring the complaint to the EEOC was “egregious and exceptional.” Id. at 710, 713. Under these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit held equitable tolling was appropriate. Id. at 713. Even assuming we found Granger’s reasoning persuasive, Dr. Saini’s allegations come nowhere close to the facts of Granger. 3 Memorandum of Understanding Between Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices Civil Rights Division U.S. Department of Justice and Wage & Hour Division U.S. Department of Labor 7 Appellate Case: 24-2162 Document: 25 Date Filed: 04/06/2026 Page: 8
discrimination claim involving a foreign worker to the Office of Special Counsel
(“OSC”) at the Department of Justice. But we agree with the district court that
(1) nothing in the Memorandum required the DOL to transfer the claim, and (2) in
any event, Dr. Saini filed his DOL claim well after the deadline for filing a
discrimination claim under the INA. See id. § 1324b(d)(3) (180-day deadline for
filing discrimination claims under INA).
2. Unjust Enrichment
Dr. Saini’s unjust enrichment claim is premised on HCC’s alleged withholding
of his final paycheck. The statute of limitations for unjust enrichment is four years.
See N.M. Stat. § 37-1-4. Dr. Saini would have known of HCC’s withholding soon
after his termination on October 4, 2018, yet he did not file his unjust enrichment
claim until February 5, 2024, more than five years later. Accordingly, the district
court correctly held that his unjust enrichment claim was time-barred. Dr. Saini
argues the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of the DOL
proceedings, but for the reasons discussed above, we agree with the district court that
tolling does not save his claim.
B. Retaliation
The district court dismissed Dr. Saini’s retaliation claims under Title VII and
§ 1981 because he failed to adequately allege a required element of retaliation—namely,
a showing that he suffered an action that a reasonable employee would have found to be
Regarding Information Sharing and Case Referral (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/filesWHD/legacy/files/DOJ.pdf. 8 Appellate Case: 24-2162 Document: 25 Date Filed: 04/06/2026 Page: 9
materially adverse. See Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2012)
(listing elements of retaliation); Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1211
(10th Cir. 2008) (“The test for establishing a prima facie case for retaliation is the same
under both Title VII and . . . § 1981.”). Dr. Saini alleges that HCC’s letter to the DOL,
which asserted that he was fired for issues related to patient care, constituted a materially
adverse action. He alleges the letter harmed him because it resulted in his being
reprimanded by the NMMB for failing to report his termination of employment.
We agree with the district court, however, that HCC’s letter was not material
because Dr. Saini was obligated by New Mexico law to report his termination to the
NMMB at the time of the termination. The applicable regulation requires that “[a]ll . . .
licensees . . . shall report any action adversely affecting the clinical privileges of the
licensee . . . within thirty days after the action is taken.” N.M. Admin. Code
§ 16.10.10.9(A). “Adversely affecting means reducing, restricting, suspending, revoking,
denying, or failing to renew clinical privileges, or membership in a health care entity to
include: terminating employment for cause.” Id. § 16.10.10.7(B) (emphasis omitted).
Dr. Saini’s employment was terminated for cause in October 2018, thus triggering a duty
to report to the NMMB. The NMMB’s reprimand was the result of Dr. Saini’s failure to
report his termination, not HCC’s letter to the DOL. We therefore discern no error in the
district court’s dismissal of this claim.
C. Denial of Motion to Amend
Dr. Saini does not challenge the dismissal of his remaining claims as originally
drafted, but he argues the district court erred in denying his motion to amend as to
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those claims. “We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for abuse of
discretion,” SCO Group, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 879 F.3d 1062, 1085
(10th Cir. 2018), but when the denial is based on a determination that amendment
would be futile, “our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo review of the
legal basis for the finding of futility,” Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty., 41 F.4th 1196,
1218 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Tort Claims
Dr. Saini’s claims of prima facie tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent misrepresentation, and common law fraud were based on the allegation that he
experienced harm when he was reprimanded by the NMMB for his failure to report his
termination. He argues this harm resulted from HCC’s originally telling him he had been
fired for breach of contract, only to later tell the DOL that he had been fired for issues
concerning patient care. Dr. Saini argues that if HCC had told him about patient care
issues at the time of his termination, he would have known to report the termination to
the NMMB. For the reasons discussed above, we reject the premise of Dr. Saini’s tort
claims. As the district court correctly held, Dr. Saini had an independent obligation to
report his termination to the NMMB, so HCC’s subsequent letter had no causative effect.
Because Dr. Saini cannot allege a causal connection in support of these claims,
amendment would have been futile. See Lind v. Aetna Health, Inc., 466 F.3d 1195, 1199
(10th Cir. 2006).
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2. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing
Dr. Saini asserted a state law claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing based on an alleged implied contract created by an HCC manual. He contended
the manual provides for a complaint resolution process that HCC failed to follow. The
district court dismissed the claim because, among other things, Dr. Saini failed to allege
sufficient facts to show that HCC “‘create[d] a reasonable expectation of contractual
rights.’” R. at 98-99 (quoting Wilson v. Berger Briggs Real Estate & Ins., 497 P.3d 654,
661 (N.M. Ct. App. 2021)). The district court also denied Dr. Saini’s motion to amend
because his proposed amended complaint failed to allege any representation or conduct
by HCC to demonstrate that it intended the manual to be a binding contract, and
amendment therefore would have been futile. See Lind, 466 F.3d at 1199. We discern no
error in the district court’s conclusion.
3. Defamation and False Light
Dr. Saini’s defamation and false light claims were again premised on HCC’s letter
to the DOL regarding his alleged patient care issues. The district court dismissed the
claims because (1) “[t]he statement was only alleged to have been made during the DOL
. . . proceeding and was thus protected by the litigation privilege”; (2) “[Dr. Saini] did not
allege any concrete harm arising from the statement”; and (3) “[Dr. Saini] did not allege
that the statement was false or placed him in a false light.” R. at 232.
In his proposed amended complaint, Dr. Saini alleged that HCC shared his
“patient care issues” not only with the DOL but with other individuals and entities,
including NMMB, Gila Regional Medical Center, and unspecified others. He says that as
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a result, he suffered actual injury in two ways: (1) he is compelled to explain HCC’s
statement to other individuals and entities, including future employers, and (2) he
suffered actual injury to his reputation when he was investigated by the NMMB and
forced to defend himself in the NMMB investigation. The district court held that neither
of these new allegations meets the plausibility standard, and we agree.
Aside from the DOL, Dr. Saini does not explain how, when, or to whom HCC
disclosed his alleged patient care issues. His related assertion that he must explain the
circumstances of his termination to future employers would be true even in the absence of
HCC’s assertion that he had patient care issues. And his allegation about the NMMB
investigation is implausible because it contradicts his own timeline. Dr. Saini alleges the
NMMB completed its investigation in July 2021. Yet he claims he discovered HCC’s
statement about patient care issues in October 2022. Dr. Saini could not have been
forced to defend himself against an allegation he did not know about. Because his new
allegations in his proposed amended complaint are implausible, we agree with the district
court that amendment would have been futile. 4 See Lind, 466 F.3d at 1199.
4. Common Law and Contractual Indemnification
Dr. Saini’s indemnification claims are premised on HCC’s alleged failure to tell
him that he was fired for reasons relating to patient care, causing him not to report his
4 Dr. Saini’s reliance on Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical Center, 938 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (D.N.M. 2013), is unavailing. In contrast to Dr. Saini’s vague allegations, in Osuagwu the plaintiff presented evidence the defendant had knowingly submitted a specific false statement on a specific date to a publicly available national database. Id. at 1186-87.
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termination to the NMMB. The district court dismissed these claims because, as
discussed above, Dr. Saini’s claimed injury was caused not by HCC but by his own
failure to report his for-cause termination. In addition, the district court held Dr. Saini
failed to identify a third party who was injured in tort by HCC’s alleged actions or
omissions. See New Mexico Pub. Schs. Ins. Auth. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 198 P.3d
342, 349 (N.M. 2008) (a requirement for an indemnification claim is that the indemnitor
and indemnitee are liable to an injured third party). Dr. Saini seems to identify NMMB
as an injured third party, but NMMB was not injured in tort by his failure to report his
termination. The district court observed that in reprimanding Dr. Saini, the NMMB was
merely carrying out its regulatory function. Because Dr. Saini’s proposed amended
complaint did not rectify this flaw, the district court correctly concluded that amendment
would have been futile. See Lind, 466 F.3d at 1199.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Saini’s claims.
Entered for the Court
Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge