Rumford v. City of Berkeley

645 P.2d 124, 31 Cal. 3d 545, 183 Cal. Rptr. 73, 1982 Cal. LEXIS 185

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Decided: June 1, 1982
• Docket: S.F. 24239
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion

NEWMAN, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment that mandates the City of Berkeley to remove traffic barriers from over 40 streets. The action was filed by several individuals and Citizens for Legal Action Against the Barricades, an unincorporated association. Other individuals and Berkeleyans for Fair Traffic Management (another unincorporated association) were allowed to intervene. The City and interveners have appealed from the grant of mandate; plaintiffs have cross-appealed, inter alla, from denial of their motion for attorneys’ fees.¹

We must decide whether Berkeley had authority to divert traffic by erecting barriers. We conclude that the judgment mandating removal should be affirmed. As ¡we will explain, the state has preempted the field of vehicular traffic regulation. Berkeley’s barriers cannot be justified under either its authority to close streets (Veh. Code, § 21101) or its authority to regulate traffic (§ 21100).²

In July 1975 the city council adopted a traffic management plan (TMP) that authorized use of barriers on an experimental basis for the purpose of shifting traffic from “local” streets to those designated “arterial.” Within six months the City had installed 41 barriers. In 1976 the TMP was adopted on a permanent basis.

The barriers are various combinations of concrete bollards and redwood boards and are of three types: (1) a full barrier spans the width of a street, preventing all through traffic; (2) a diagonal barrier extends diagonally across an intersection, forcing a turn; (3) a semibarrier extends across half a street, preventing through traffic in one direction. All streets with barriers are accessible to and used by local traffic (e.g., homeowners who live there). The streets on which barriers are placed are streets of the City; none is a state highway. Berkeley has not claimed that any street is no longer needed for vehicular traffic.

The trial court ordered removal of the barriers after finding that they are “traffic control devices” (§ 440) that do not conform to the Department of Transportation uniformity standards and specifications required by sections 21400 and 21401. Appellants contend the barriers are not the type of device that is regulated by the statutes imposing uniformity. Alternatively, they urge, the barriers are authorized by the department’s regulations. Interveners make the additional argument that the barriers are permitted by section 21101, which permits a locality to “close” a street it concludes is “no longer needed for vehicular traffic.”

Plaintiffs cross-appeal and seek attorney fees pursuant to section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the merits they argue that Berkeley exceeded its section 21101 authority to close streets. As to section 21100 they point out that if the barriers are not official traffic control devices, as the City and interveners contend, the City has no authority to utilize them. Plaintiffs regard them as traffic control devices that, as the trial court held, do not conform to statutory requirements.

I. Preemption

“The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and every citizen of the state has a right to the use thereof, subject to legislative control .... The right of control over street traffic is an exercise of a part of the sovereign power of the state . . .. ” (Ex parte Daniels (1920) 183 Cal. 636, 639 [192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172].)³ ‘“The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right, of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived .. . [A\ll persons have an equal right to use them for purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of others.’” (Escobedo v. State of California (1950) 35 Cal.2d 870, 875-876 [222 P.2d l],⁴ quoting 25 Am.Jur., Highways, § 163, p. 457; italics added.)

The state’s plenary power and its preemption of the entire field of traffic control are stated in Vehicle Code section 21: “Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable and uniform throughout the state and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly authorized therein.” (Italics added.) Thus, unless “expressly provided” by the Legislature, a city has no authority over vehicular traffic control. (Pipoly v. Benson, supra, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 371; Biber Elec. Co. v. City of San Carlos (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 342, 344 [5 Cal.Rptr. 261].)

The delegated authority of local governments to regulate traffic within their jurisdictions appears in chapter 1, article 3 of the Vehicle Code, sections 21100-21116. Pertinent here are subdivision (d) of section 21100, which permits regulation “by means of semaphores or other official traffic control devices,” and subdivision (a) of section 21101, which permits the “[closing [of], any highway to vehicular traffic when in the opinion of the legislative body having jurisdiction the highway is no longer needed for vehicular traffic.”⁵

Keeping in mind that the delegation of power to prescribe traffic rules is strictly construed (People v. Moore (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 221, 228 [40 Cal.Rptr. 121]), we now examine sections 21100 and 21101.

II. Authority to Close Streets

Section 21101 provides: “Local authorities may adopt rules and regulations by ordinance or resolution on the following matters: (a) Closing any highway to vehicular traffic when in the opinion of the legislative body having jurisdiction the highway is no longer needed for vehicular traffic.. . . ”⁶

As noted above, only the interveners rely on section 21101. Though Berkeley has described its plan as one for “street closures” it never has attempted to justify its action under section 21101. It never has claimed that any street on which barriers were placed is “no longer needed for vehicular traffic.”

Preliminarily we clarify the meaning of “close” and “closure” as used in this opinion. Installing the barriers did not close any street; even those with full barriers permit some traffic. The barriers at most effect a partial closure to certain traffic at certain points. They block through-travel in particular directions but leave all portions of the affected streets open for “local” use.

The crucial question is whether section 21101, subdivision (a) provides authority for that kind of partial closure. We conclude it does not.

Subdivision (a) concerns streets no longer needed for vehicular traffic; it does not expressly permit a city to close a street to through traffic while allowing its use for neighborhood purposes. Since that authority must be “expressly (not impliedly) declared by the Legislature” (Moore, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d, at p. 228; Holman v. Viko (1958) 161 Cal. App.2d 87, 93 [326 P.2d 551]), we should not imply a grant of authority here.

That the words “closing any highway to vehicular traffic” mean exactly what they say is indicated by the first case that considered the statute (or more precisely its predecessor, § 145), Simpson v. City of Los Angeles (1935) 4 Cal.2d 60 [47 P.2d 474]. Apparently the statute in fact was enacted to cover the Simpson situation; i.e., the closing of Olvera Street in Los Angeles.

Olvera Street was one-block long, bounded at each end by thoroughfares. It was used principally for parking of commercial vehicles and by pedestrians; it was little used for movement of vehicular traffic. In 1929 Los Angeles enacted an ordinance closing it to vehicular traffic. An abutting property owner disputed the city’s right to close the street; the trial court upheld the enactment under the city’s police power. When the ordinance was passed section 145 did not confer power to close streets; while the case was pending the Legislature in 1931 amended the section to permit closure when, in the view of the) city’s legislative body, the street was no longer needed for vehicular traffic.

Addressing arguments that Los Angeles had authority to close streets that was implied in the delegation contained in the statute’s earlier version, this court noted that the legislative intent “was made manifest” when in 1931 the express authority was added to the statute. “[A] reversal of the judgment herein would avail the plaintiff nothing,” said the court, “inasmuch as the city council could immediately validly reenact the ordinance. Furthermore, it is represented in the record that the very purpose of enacting the 1931 amendment to section 145 was to preserve the validity of the ordinance in question.” (P. 67.)

The next case was Snyder v. City of South Pasadena (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1051 [126 Cal.Rptr. 320]. South Pasadena had erected a full-length barrier on a street at the boundary with Los Angeles, to prevent Los Angeles traffic from turning onto the street. The city council had resolved that the street was “no longer needed and never had been needed as a conveyor-of through traffic. ...” The trial court denied Los Angeles residents’ request for an injunction; the Court of Appeal upheld the closure, finding authority (1) in the city’s police powers, (2) in the delegated authority to “mhintain streets,” (3) in the language of the Simpson case, and (4) in a “liberal” interpretation of subdivision (a) of section 21101. In our view the Court of Appeal erred.

First, a city’s police powers do not extend to control of vehicular traffic on its streets; that field has been preempted (§ 21). Second, the delegated power to “maintain” streets refers not to traffic control but to the power (and responsibility) to repair or improve streets and to construct overpasses, tunnels, or sidewalks (Gov. Code, § 40401; Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach (1966) 65 Cal.2d 13, 22 [51 Cal.Rptr. 881, 415 P.2d 769]). Third, the Simpson decision was premised on the validation of the city’s action by the Legislature’s enactment of subdivision (a). Finally, the court in Snyder ignored the rule that delegations of power to cities regarding vehicular traffic will be strictly construed (Moore, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 221, 228; Holman, supra, 161 Cal. App.2d 87, 93), as well as the rule of construction that words normally should be read for their “plain meaning.” (People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884 [157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 98 P.2d 473]; Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658 [147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155]; Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198 [137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148].)

The only other case interpreting subdivision (a), City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 749 [154 Cal.Rptr. 374], was decided four years later. Lafayette installed a gate across the entrance to Happy Valley Road, thereby closing it to traffic except for drivers with an accepted need to use the road; they were furnished gate-opening devices.

The Court of Appeal held that subdivision (a) provided no authority for partial closure. The opinion referred to (1) state preemption (§ 21), (2) the requirement that authority be expressly conferred and delegations strictly construed, and (3) the fact that the statute authorizes only the “closing” of a street and, by its unambiguous text, permits only the complete shutting off of a street when it is “no longer needed” for traffic. The court concluded that subdivision (a) provides no authorization to limit a street to local traffic and that implying an authority to do so was “contrary to law, and to the clear language of that statute.” (91 Cal.App.3d at p. 757.)

Lafayette’s diverter, which permitted through traffic to some drivers and not others, was not precisely analogous to any of the three types of Berkeley barriers. Yet insofar as it permitted unimpeded travel to drivers on each side of the barrier the Lafayette device was comparable to all those installed in Berkeley. Whatever the subtle differences the principle is the same; the street has been partially closed or, more precisely, closed to some vehicular traffic.⁷

Most traffic laws are to some extent discriminatory. In large measure they determine which traffic may use streets under what circumstances. Nonetheless, localities have no carte blanche and, absent express authority, may not determine which traffic shall and which shall not use streets.

Interveners’ argument that the Legislature intended section 21101, subdivision (a) to provide authority not only for complete closure but also for traffic control by restricting use does not withstand scrutiny. Interpretation of subdivision (a) to permit regulation by partial closure would render superfluous section 21100 (which specifies in detail how local governments may regulate traffic) as well as many other, more explicit, traffic control statutes. (See discussion post.) We conclude that partial closing of the Berkeley streets is not authorized by section 21101, subdivision (a).⁸

III. Authority to Regulate Traffic

Berkeley contends that its barriers implement a traffic control plan and therefore are authorized as a means of controlling traffic.⁹ Apart from “closure” of streets (§ 21101, subd. (a), supra), the statutes do permit local governments to “regulate” traffic in certain ways. We conclude, however, that the barriers are not included within that power since they are “official traffic control devices” that do not conform to uniform standards and specifications of the Department of Transportation.

The principal grant of local authority over traffic control is contained in section 21100, which provides among other things that cities may “regulat[e] traffic by means of semaphores or other official traffic control devices.” (Subd. (d).)¹⁰ Section 21351 gives the right to install traffic control devices necessary to warn or guide traffic. Other statutes grant even more-explicit powers, including the right to erect stop signs (§§ 21351.5, 21354, 21355) and yield right-of-way signs (§ 21356), and to designate all or any portion of a street for one-way traffic (§ 21657). However, “[o]nly those official traffic control devices that conform to the uniform standards and specifications promulgated by the Department of Transportation shall be placed upon a street or highway.” (§ 21401.)

Section 440 defines “official traffic control device.” Prior to 1980 the definition included “any sign, signal, marking or device not inconsistent with this code, placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.” Section 21400 provides that the Department of Transportation “shall, after consultation with local agencies and public hearings, adopt rules and regulations prescribing uniform standards and specifications for all official traffic control devices placed pursuant to the provisions of this code ...” Those standards and specifications are set out in California Administrative Code, title 21, sections 1409.1-1409.9. The trial court ruled that the Berkeley barriers are traffic control devices as defined in section 440 but noted that they are not mentioned in regulations 1409.1-1409.9.* ¹¹ Hence, it concluded, they must be removed because they do not conform to standards and specifications mandated by section 21400.

The City and interveners first contend that the barriers are not devices contemplated by section 440. That section, they argue, is limited to signs, signals, and other devices that communicate by symbol. As plaintiffs point out, the contention seems self-defeating, for to conclude that barriers are not “official traffic control devices” removes the only arguable authority for installing them, namely, the delegation of authority to regulate by “official traffic control devices.” (§§ 21100, 21401.)

Further, section 21400 states that it applies to “all official traffic control devices placed pursuant to the provisions of this code, including, but not limited to, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, [and] speed restriction signs . . . . ” Finally, whatever questions may have existed as to the applicability of the requirements to all traffic devices were resolved by 1980 amendments to sections 440 and 21100. Section 440 now defines an official traffic control device as “any sign ... or device, consistent with Section 21400” that is placed for the purpose of traffic control. And subdivision (d) of section 21100 now permits regulating traffic “by means of official traffic control devices meeting the requirements of section 21400.”

The City and intervene^ suggest that if “official traffic control devices” are not limited to signs and signals they necessarily include not only barriers but other diverters such as median strips, pedestrian islands, sidewalk curbs, road shoulders, traffic circles, and the like. Those methods of traffic control, like barriers, require no uniformity, it is urged, since their meaning is direct rather than symbolic; traditionally they have been deemed Within charter cities’ power over municipal affairs.

The dilemma is more apparent than real. As we have seen, the statutes and cases distinguish between cities’ broad powers to construct and maintain streets (e.g., Gov. Code, § 40401, supra; Sts. & Hy. Code, § 5101; Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, supra, 65 Cal.2d 13, 22; City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira (1957) 47 Cal.2d 804, 812 [306 P.2d 453]) and their lack of authority to regulate traffic on streets in use, except by authorized “traffic control devices.” Relatively permanent, physical changes in the width or alignment of roadways that are effected by islands, strips, shoulders, and curbs clearly are within the construction and maintenance power (Walnut Creek, supra) though of course they may alter patterns of traffic.

The Berkeley barriers, however, make no basic structural changes. Like signs and signals they leave existing surfaces in use; their only effect is to control the circumstances of use. They are not part of the street itself; they are rather “devices .. . placed upon a street” (§ 21401; italics added) “/or the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic” (§ 440; italics added). Thus it appears that they are traffic control devices permissible only if they “conform to the uniform standards and specifications promulgated by the Department of Transportation.” (§ 21401.)

The sole issue that remains is whether the department has promulgated “uniform standards and specifications” respecting barriers used for traffic control. We can find no standards or specifications among the department’s regulations. Indeed, no one suggests that barriers are covered by regulations 1409.1 through 1409.8. Interveners, putting aside their allegation that the department has not undertaken to provide explicit standards, suggest that blanket approval is contained in regulation 1409.9. We do not agree.

Regulation 1409.9 provides: “All official traffic control devices placed or erected after November 10, 1969, which are not specifically covered by these regulations, and all official traffic control devices placed or erected prior to November 10, 1969, shall conform to the statutory requirements, if any, in effect at the time of their installation.” The precise meaning and purpose of the regulation are.not readily apparent from reading it. Interveners suggest that except as provided in regulations 1409.1 to 1409.8, the department intended to approve all devices not prohibited by statute when they were installed.

Even so the regulation does not validate the barriers. The department must “adopt rules and regulations prescribing uniform standards and specifications for all official traffic control devices” (§ 21400; italics added), and only the devices that meet those standards and specifications may be erected (§ 21401). Regulation 1409.9 does not set uniform standards and specifications for devices of the type Berkeley has placed on its streets. Nor does it incorporate standards and specifications by reference. There were no “statutory requirements” concerning barriers at the time Berkeley installed them (see reg. 1409.9), and there are none now.

Regulatory interpretation of statutes is entitled to weight but cannot contravene legislative intent. (See Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 28 [170 Cal.Rptr. 484, 620 P.2d 1032]; Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 679 [94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231].) To the extent regulation 1409.9 ¡purports to authorize traffic control devices not subject to specific standards adopted by the department, it violates sections 21400 and 21401. Therefore, it cannot empower the City to place nonconforming barriers for the purpose of regulating traffic.

Interveners foretell chaos if we rule that diverters are not lawfully placed on streets because they do not comply with the regulations. They argue that other, commonly used devices are likewise not the subject of regulations. That fact does not persuade us to hold the barriers lawful. First we stress that the legality of devices other than barriers is not before us. Second we nóte that certain devices in common use but not covered by regulations in the Administrative Code appear nonetheless to have been installed in accordance with standards and specifications set forth in the department’s traffic manual.¹²

We need not decide here the manual’s legal effect or the propriety of its use to satisfy the requirements of section 21400. For our purposes the critical fact is that the manual, like the code, contains no standards or specifications for diverters of the kind used by Berkeley.¹³

The Berkeley barriers may not be justified as an exercise of the authority to close streets (§ 21101, subd. (a)) or to install traffic control devices (§ 21100, subd. (d)). We therefore affirm the judgment that orders their removal.

IV. Attorney Fees

The question remains of attorney fees. At time of trial, the Legislature had yet to codify the private-attorney-general fee theory (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5); hence, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ fee request without the benefit of that statute.¹⁴

Since this case was pending on appeal when section 1021.5 became effective, the statute applies. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 932 [154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200].) Whether plaintiffs have met its requirements for an award of trial and appellate fees, and the reasonable amount of any award, are questions best decided by the trial court. (Id., at p. 932 et seq.; see also Sierra Club v. City of Hayward (1981) 28 Cal.3d 840, 864 [171 Cal. Rptr. 619, 623 P.2d 180]; Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 620 [156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 596 P.2d 1134]; cf. American City Bank v. Zetlen (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 65, 67 [76 Cal.Rptr. 898].) Therefore, we remand for a determination of the propriety and amount of trial and appellate fees.

The judgment is affirmed insofar as it directs removal of the Berkeley barriers. It is reversed insofar as it denies plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The trial court is authorized to award trial and appellate fees if it determines that this case has “resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest” and conferred a “significant benefit ... on the general public or a large class of persons,” and that “the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 and subds. (a), (b).) The trial court shall determine the amount of any fees to be awarded.

Mosk, J., Richardson, J., and Broussard, J., concurred.

1 The parties will be referred to as plaintiffs, Berkeley or City, and interveners.

2 A11 statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Vehicle Code.

3 The regulation of traffic on streets is not one of those “municipal affairs” over which local authorities are given power superior to that of the Legislature. (County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra (1980) 27 Cal.3d 184, 192-193 [165 Cal.Rptr. 440, 612 P.2d 24]; Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 369 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515]; Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5.)

4 Overruled on other grounds, Rios v. Cozens (1972) 7 Cal.3d 792 [103 Cal.Rptr. 299, 499 P.2d 979], vacated and cause remanded sub nom. Dept. Motor Vehicles of California v. Rios (1973) 410 U.S. 425 [35 L.Ed.2d 398, 93 S.Ct. 1019], reiterated, 9 Cal.3d 454 [107 Cal.Rptr. 784, 509 P.2d 696].

5 For our purposes, “street” and “highway" are synonymous terms in the Vehicle Code. (§§ 360, 590.)

6 Other subdivisions provide: “(b) Designating any highway as a through highway and requiring that all vehicles observe official traffic control devices before entering or crossing the same or designating any intersection as a stop intersection and requiring all vehicles to stop at one or more entrances to the intersection. [11] (c) Prohibiting the use of particular highways by certain vehicles, except as otherwise provided by the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 1031) of Chapter 5 of Part 1 of Division 1 of the Public Utilities Code. No ordinance which is adopted pursuant to this subdivision after the effective date of the amendments to this section enacted at the 1969 Regular Session shall apply to any state highway which is included in the national system of interstate and defense highways, except an ordinance which has been approved by the California Highway Commission by a four-fifths vote. [¶] (d) Closing particular streets during regular school hours for the purpose of conducting automobile driver training programs in the secondary schools and colleges of this state. [¶] (e) Temporarily closing a portion of any street for celebrations, parades, local special events, and other purposes when in the opinion of local authorities having jurisdiction such closing is necessary for the safety and protection of persons who are to use that portion of the street during the temporary closing.”

7 Interveners attempt to distinguish Lafayette as a case permitting partial closure so long as it is not discriminatory. But the opinion is clear: a contention that subdivision (a) “impliedly granted authority for partial closure of Happy Valley Road is contrary to law, and the clear language of that statute." (91 Cal.App.3d, at pp. 756-757.) Lafayette required removal of the barrier because the city had no authority partially to close the street, not because closure discriminated between residents and nonresidents.

8 insofar as Snyder v. City of South Pasadena, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 1051 conflicts with views expressed here it is disapproved.

9 Berkeley takes the extreme position that it has authority to design and place traffic control devices free from state restraint. In view of section 21 and the explicit preemption of regulating traffic and those devices, the contention seems so erroneous that we do not elaborate on it.

10 ln 1975, when Berkeley’s TMP was adopted, section 21100 provided: “Local authorities may adopt rules and regulations by ordinance or resolution regarding the following matters: [1] (a) Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways. [¶] (b) Licensing and regulating the operation of vehicles for hire and drivers of passenger vehicles for hire, [if] (c) Regulating traffic by means of traffic officers. [¶] (d) Regulating traffic by means of semaphores or other official traffic control devices. [11] (e) Regulating traffic by means of any person given temporary appointment for such duty by the local authority whenever official traffic control devices are disabled or otherwise inoperable. [¶] (f) Regulating traffic at the site of road or street construction or maintenance by persons authorized for such duty by the local authority. [¶] (g) Licensing and regulating the operation of tow car service. [11] (h) Operation of bicycles, and, as specified in Section 21114.5, electric carts by physically disabled persons, or persons 50 years of age or older, on the public sidewalks.... ”

11 Regulations 1409.1-1409.8 repeat the standards and specifications previously contained in statutes repealed on the enactment of section 21400. (Sections 21402 to 21406, repealed in 1969, related to yield signs, speed signs, warning-approach signs, and street-and-highway signs.) The effect of section 1409.9 is discussed below.

12 At trial the traffic manual was described by expert witnesses as the “bible” of traffic management. The disclaimer in the foreword, that “It is neither designed as, nor does it establish, a legal standard for these [traffic] functions,” perhaps was intended to avoid civil liability.

For discussion of the use of manuals and other “house rules” by agencies in the exercise of quasi-legislative power arid the avoidance thereby of procedures prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, § 11342 et seq.) see Armistead v. State Personnel Board (1978) 22 Cal.3d 198 [149 Cal.Rptr. 1, 583 P.2d 744], in which we invalidated a rule contained in the agency’s personnel transaction manual because it was not promulgated pursuant tq procedures required by the APA.

13 Perusal of the manual reveáis specifications for all manner of traffic devices such as traffic-light installations,, school-crossing signs, and signs warning of curves, hills, and dead-end streets. The only barricades for which standards and specifications are provided are those used to protect the public during street construction or maintenance activities; and, for those, detailed requirements are set.

14 Section 1021.5, effective January 1, 1978, provides: “Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out .of the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving public entities, this section applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be required to be filed therefor.”