Rubio v. Precision Aerodynamics, Inc.

232 S.W.3d 738, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 650
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedOctober 5, 2006
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 232 S.W.3d 738 (Rubio v. Precision Aerodynamics, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rubio v. Precision Aerodynamics, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 738, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., J.,

delivered the opinion of the court, in which

WILLIAM B. CAIN and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JJ., joined.

Plaintiff brought this action to authenticate and enforce a $53,000,000 default judgment awarded against Defendant by the Superior Court of Walton County, Georgia. Defendant, a Tennessee corporation, contends the Georgia judgment is void because the Georgia court never had in personam jurisdiction over Defendant. The basis of the collateral attack on the Georgia judgment is that service of process was insufficient because the summons was served on the personal secretary of Defendant’s registered agent, not Defendant’s registered agent. The Circuit Court of Sequatchie County, Tennessee ruled the service of process was valid and the judgment was enforceable. We affirm.

*740 Plaintiff James L. Rubio, a licensed master skydiver, participated in a skydive in Monroe, Georgia in November 2001. While skydiving from 13,500 feet, his primary parachute failed to open properly. The failure of the main parachute required Plaintiff to pull his reserve chute, the Raven Dash-M, manufactured by Precision Aerodynamics, Inc. The reserve chute opened from its parachute container, but the line stitchings on the reserve canopy ripped, allegedly due to a manufacturing defect. Being unable to slow himself during the descent, Plaintiff plummeted to the ground, landing near the designated landing zone in Monroe, Georgia. He suffered near fatal injuries, which have resulted in severe and permanent physical and mental injuries.

Plaintiff commenced a civil action against Precision (Defendant) in February of 2003 in the Superior Court of Walton County, Georgia seeking damages for personal injuries arising from the skydiving accident. Defendant is a Tennessee corporation with its corporate offices in Sequat-chie County, Tennessee. As required by statute, Defendant designated a registered agent for service of process by filing the designation with the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Defendant’s registered agent at all times material to this action was Thomas A. Caldwell, an attorney in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Plaintiff hired MLQ Attorney Services to procure service of process on Defendant. Dennis Bakkom, a process server for MLQ, provided a return of service indicating he served Defendant on February 7, 2003. Bakkom did not personally serve Caldwell, the Registered Agent. Instead, Bakkom placed the Summons and Complaint in the hands of Janet Daniel, Caldwell’s personal secretary. As Bakkom explains in his affidavit, upon his arrival at Caldwell’s office, he was met by Ms. Daniel who represented that she was authorized by Caldwell to accept service on behalf of Caldwell, and that she had accepted service for Caldwell on numerous occasions in the past. She also advised Bak-kom that she would deliver the Summons and Complaint to Caldwell. The facts set forth in Bakkom’s affidavit have not been refuted. 1

Defendant did not file an answer or responsive pleading to the Georgia action. After letters from Plaintiffs counsel to Defendant went unanswered, Plaintiff made application to the Georgia court for a default judgment. When Defendant failed to reply to the motion for default judgment, the Georgia court entered a judgment of default against Defendant in May of 2003. As noted in the Order on Application for Default Judgment, the Georgia court found that Defendant was properly served on February 7, 2003. The default judgment was mailed to Defendant, yet Defendant did not respond. A date certain was set for a hearing on damages and counsel for Plaintiff mailed three letters to Defendant at its corporate office in Dunlap, Tennessee reminding Defendant of the pending hearing on damages. Still no reply from Defendant.

The Georgia court conducted an eviden-tiary hearing on damages on November 7, 2003. Defendant did not participate. Following the hearing, Plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of $53,575,000. A copy of the judgment awarding damages *741 was mailed to Defendant; however, Defendant did not reply and took no action to challenge the default judgment or the award of damages.

Thereafter, in November 2003, Plaintiff initiated this action to enforce the $53,575,000 judgment by filing an authenticated and exemplified judgment from the Superior Court of Walton County, Georgia in the Circuit Court of Sequatchie County, Tennessee. This time, process was served on Thomas Caldwell, who remained the Registered Agent of Defendant. In addition thereto, a copy of the process papers was delivered to Defendant at its corporate office in Dunlap, Tennessee.

Ten months later, on September 10, 2004, Defendant made its first response to the Georgia and Tennessee proceedings by filing in the Circuit Court for Sequatchie County, Tennessee a Motion to Dismiss and/or Vacate the Judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 and/or Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, wherein it challenged for the first time the sufficiency of service of process in the Georgia action. In April 2005, the Tennessee Circuit Court denied Defendant’s motion, stating that service of process in the Georgia action was proper, reasoning that Defendant’s registered agent, Thomas Caldwell, had the authority to authorize his personal secretary to accept process.

Defendant appeals the decision of the Tennessee Circuit Court contending: (1) the attempted service of process in the Georgia action was ineffective, and therefore, the Georgia court never had in per-sonam jurisdiction over Defendant; (2) because the Georgia court lacked jurisdiction, the judgment from the Superior Court of Walton County, Georgia is void; and (3) a void judgment from another state may be collaterally attacked in a Tennessee proceeding wherein the plaintiff seeks to authenticate and enforce the foreign judgment.

Standard of Review

No genuine material factual disputes are presented. The issue hinges, in part, on the proper interpretation of Tennessee statutes and their application to the facts of this case. Issues involving the construction of statutes and their application to facts involve questions of law. Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 74 (Tenn.2002); Waller v. Bryan, 16 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). The standard of review for questions of law is the de novo standard. Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn.2000). We will review the issues de novo and reach our own independent conclusions regarding them. King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tenn.2002).

Analysis

Defendant contends the Georgia judgment is void because the Georgia court never had jurisdiction over it due to insufficient service of process.

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Bluebook (online)
232 S.W.3d 738, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 650, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rubio-v-precision-aerodynamics-inc-tennctapp-2006.