IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM
RSA-TUMON, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PITT COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee,
and
SHERIF ANTOUN PHILIPS, Defendant-Appellant.
Supreme Court Case No. CVA22-003 Superior Court Case No. CV0453-20
OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam Argued and submitted on March 1, 2023 Hagåtña, Guam RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 2 of 22
Appearing for Defendant-Appellant: Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee: Sherif Antoun Philips, M.D., pro se Daniel J. Berman, Esq. 1406 N. Marine Corps Dr. Berman Law Firm Tumon, GU 96913 Bank of Guam Bldg. 111 Chalan Santo Papa, Ste. 503 Hagåtña, GU 96910
Appearing for Defendant-Appellee: Anita P. Arriola, Esq. William B. Brennan, Esq. (argued) Arriola Law Firm 259 Martyr St., Ste. 201 Hagåtña, GU 96910 RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 3 of 22
BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.
TORRES, C.J.:
[1] Defendant-Appellant Sherif Antoun Philips, M.D. (“Dr. Philips”) asks us to review the
Superior Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss on various grounds. In an Order issued March 1,
2023, this court construed Dr. Philips’s notice of appeal and brief as a petition for permission to
appeal. Defendant-Appellee Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc. (“PCMH”) and Plaintiff-
Appellee RSA-Tumon, LLC (“RSA”) were given the opportunity to answer the petition. RSA
timely filed an answer, while PCMH filed a cross-petition for interlocutory review. RSA also
answered the cross-petition.
[2] We grant Dr. Philips’s petition for permission to appeal, we deny PCMH’s cross-petition,
we affirm the decision of the Superior Court, and we issue a pre-filing order to Dr. Philips.1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[3] This appeal is part of ongoing litigation between Dr. Philips and PCMH. Although the
initial dispute between Dr. Philips and PCMH originated in North Carolina, this case is an
interpleader action filed by RSA. This case was filed after PCMH levied against Dr. Philips’s
ownership interest in RSA and sold it at public auction to satisfy a judgment obtained in the North
Carolina litigation.
[4] PCMH secured a judgment against Dr. Philips for $457,335.70 in costs and attorney’s fees
plus post-judgment interest in Pitt County, North Carolina Superior Court. Dr. Philips appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court, and the court dismissed his appeal; he also filed claims
against PCMH in federal court, but the claims were dismissed with prejudice. Appellant’s
1 This Opinion supersedes the Order issued by this court on March 31, 2023. RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 4 of 22
Excerpts of Record (May 3, 2022) (“ER”) at unnumbered p. 81 (Pet. Writ Cert., Oct. 15, 2018).2
PCMH then filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Guam to domesticate the North Carolina
judgment against Dr. Philips. PCMH moved for summary judgment against Dr. Philips, and the
trial court granted the motion, giving the North Carolina judgment full faith and credit. PCMH
then sought a levy on “[a]ll and any part of the capital, equity or membership interest” of Dr.
Philips in RSA. Record on Appeal (“RA”), tab 1 at 2 (Compl. Interpleader, July 7, 2020)
(alteration in original). PCMH obtained a writ of execution against Dr. Philips’s membership
interest in RSA and noticed an execution sale, where it intended to sell the membership interest at
public auction. On the date of the auction, RSA sought to release the levy on the membership
interest, but PCMH moved forward with the public auction—where it made the winning bid on
credit.
[5] After the auction, RSA filed an interpleader complaint in the Superior Court of Guam.
RSA sought to enjoin PCMH from selling Dr. Philips’s membership interest in RSA because it
claimed that such a sale violated its Operating Agreement. Dr. Philips was named as a defendant
in the interpleader action and was served the summons and complaint at his place of business. Dr.
Philips moved to dismiss and strike the complaint, alleging the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.
[6] Dr. Philips then removed the case to the District Court of Guam. RSA moved for the case
to be remanded to the Superior Court due to a lack of diversity between the parties. Dr. Philips
filed no opposition. The District Court remanded the case to the Superior Court based on a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court noted that as a limited liability company, RSA
2 Although filed simultaneously with his opening brief, Dr. Philips erroneously referred to these documents as his “Supplemental Excerpts” of Record rather than Excerpts of Record. See Guam R. App. P. 15(g)(1). Many documents from Dr. Philips’s protracted litigation with PCMH are not included in the Record on Appeal in this case. In our discretion, and without request, we take judicial notice of this and certain other court records under Guam Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2)-(c), as they are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See San Nicolas v. Birn, 2022 Guam 8 ¶ 3 n.1. RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 5 of 22
is a citizen of every state of which its owners are citizens. As Dr. Philips owned a 5% membership
interest in RSA, the District Court concluded that RSA was a citizen of whichever state Dr. Philips
was a citizen, and that as such there could not be diversity. Dr. Philips then filed an appeal to the
Ninth Circuit.
[7] After the case was remanded to the Superior Court, Dr. Philips filed a “Rule 62 Motion to
Dismiss,” notwithstanding his previous motion to dismiss which was still under advisement. The
Ninth Circuit denied his appeal because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. That same day, the
Superior Court denied the “Rule 62” motion, finding that “[t]o the extent Dr. Philips believes that
this Court should stay these interpleader proceedings pending an appellate review of the remand
Order, the Ninth Circuit has already definitively ruled that it lacks jurisdiction to review such
Order.” RA, tab 20 at 2 (Order, Aug. 6, 2021).
[8] Just over two weeks later, Dr. Philips filed another motion to dismiss under Rule 62 of the
Guam Rules of Civil Procedure. Seemingly, Dr. Philips wished to move the Superior Court to stay
the proceedings pending disposition of his petition for panel rehearing to the Ninth Circuit. See
ER at unnumbered pp. 53-54 (Order, Sept. 30, 2021); Appellant’s Br. at 11 (May 3, 2022). The
Ninth Circuit unanimously denied rehearing. Dr. Philips petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court, but it was not docketed for five months, presumably when his filing was
brought into compliance with Court rules. See U.S. Supreme Court Docket Search, available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-
1200.html; see also Sup. Ct. R. 12.3 (“[T]he petition shall comply in all respects with Rule 14 and
shall be submitted with proof of service as required by Rule 29. The case then will be placed on
the docket.”). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 6 of 22
[9] Dr. Philips answered RSA’s complaint and counterclaimed for “Accounting-Anti Trust,
Fraud, Harassment and legal fees.” RA, tab 32 at 1 (Answer – Denial Compl. & Countercls., Jan.
12, 2022). The Superior Court issued a Decision and Order denying Dr. Philips’s second “Rule
62” motion. RA, tab 39 at 1-6 (Dec. & Order, Feb. 15, 2022). It found that Rule 62 did not apply
and that further procedurally improper Rule 62 filings would subject Dr. Philips to sanctions. Id.
at 2. The Superior Court found that it had personal jurisdiction over Dr. Philips because “the
establishment of his domicile” in Guam was “now the law of the case.” Id. at 3. The court took
judicial notice that “Dr. Philips has continuously represented that he has been living in Guam for
more than ten years and that Guam has become his primary residence.” Id. The court stated that
even if Dr. Philips’s domicile were not in Guam, exercise of jurisdiction under Guam’s long-arm
jurisdiction statute would not offend due process because “Dr. Philips’ admitted long-term
residence on Guam indicates he has had substantial and continuous contacts within this forum,
thereby conferring general jurisdiction over him.” Id. at 4. The court also stated that Dr. Philips
could not seek dismissal on the grounds of fraud or abuse of discretion. Id. at 4-5.
[10] Dr. Philips filed a Notice of Appeal. This court held oral arguments, with Dr. Philips
appearing on his own behalf. That same day, we issued an order invoking Rule 2 of the Guam
Rules of Appellate Procedure (“GRAP”) to suspend the requirements of GRAP 4.2 as they related
to Dr. Philips’s filings, and we construed his notice of appeal and brief as a petition for permission
to appeal. RSA and PCMH were given an opportunity to file an answer opposing the petition.
RSA timely answered, and PCMH filed a cross-petition for interlocutory appeal under GRAP
4.2(b)(2). RSA also answered the cross-petition.
[11] On March 31, 2023, we dismissed two other procedurally improper interlocutory appeals
that Dr. Philips had filed while this appeal was under advisement. Order (CVA22-009, Mar. 31, RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 7 of 22
2023); Order (CVA23-003, Mar. 31, 2023). We also issued a pre-filing order that imposed a
temporary injunction on Dr. Philips’s filing of interlocutory appeals until he had an opportunity to
respond. Order at 16 (Mar. 31, 2023). Dr. Philips was ordered to show cause why the pre-filing
order should not become final, to which he timely filed an answer. Show Cause (Apr. 10, 2023).
II. JURISDICTION
[12] An order denying a motion to dismiss is not specifically appealable under Guam law. See
7 GCA § 25102 (2005). The interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss is a
discretionary appeal, rather than an appeal as of right. Banes v. Superior Court, 2012 Guam 11 ¶
22. An interlocutory appeal must satisfy at least one condition of 7 GCA § 3108(b), which exists
to “ensure that such appeals are granted only when the necessity of immediate review outweighs
[the] general policy against piecemeal disposal of litigation.” Shin v. Fujita Kanko Guam, Inc.,
2007 Guam 18 ¶ 7 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Angoco, 2006 Guam 18 ¶ 14). We
can exercise our discretion to resolve a question of law that will “[m]aterially advance the
termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings therein.” 7 GCA § 3108(b)(1) (2005).
[13] The courts of Guam have the “inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants
by imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.” Andrews v. Heaton, 483
F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007); see also People v. Wai Kam Ho, 2009 Guam 18 ¶ 8. The Guam
Supreme Court also derives this power from our Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Organic
Act. See Guam R. App. P. 32. Compare 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(3) (Westlaw current through
Pub. L. 118-13) (“jurisdiction to issue all orders and writs in aid of its appellate, supervisory, and
original jurisdiction”), with Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (“The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides district courts with the
inherent power to enter pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants.”). RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 8 of 22
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[14] We may review our own jurisdiction at any time, and we will dismiss an appeal if we find
jurisdiction to be lacking. In re Estate of Maruyama, 2013 Guam 23 ¶ 15. Questions of jurisdiction
involve interpretation of the applicable statutes about such jurisdiction; “[i]ssues of statutory
construction and jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.” People v. San Nicolas, 2016 Guam 21 ¶ 9
(citation omitted). Denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cf.
Hemlani v. Hemlani, 2015 Guam 34 ¶ 10; People v. Leslie, 2011 Guam 23 ¶ 13; People v. Flores,
2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9.
[15] “Application of our Rules of Appellate Procedure . . . does not require a standard of
review.” Abalos v. Cyfred, Ltd., 2009 Guam 14 ¶ 6.
IV. ANALYSIS
[16] We give deference to the litigation efforts of a self-represented party. Allen v. Richardson,
2020 Guam 13 ¶ 8. Still, Dr. Philips’s brief discusses several grievances about the rulings of the
District Court of Guam, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the courts of North Carolina. See
Appellant’s Br. at 6-11. These topics are unrelated to this appeal regarding denial of his motion
to dismiss and are outside our subject matter jurisdiction. As the original Superior Court action to
domesticate the North Carolina judgment and this interpleader action are distinct, Dr. Philips’s
attempts to collaterally attack the North Carolina judgment are also misplaced. Deferring Dr.
Philips’s litigation efforts as a self-represented party, we limit our review to jurisdiction and
whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
A. We Grant Dr. Philips’s Petition for Interlocutory Appeal Because It Satisfies 7 GCA § 3108(b)(1)
[17] RSA argues that we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. Appellee RSA’s Br.
at 6-9 (July 8, 2022). To address these concerns, we allowed RSA and PCMH to answer the merits RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 9 of 22
of Dr. Philips’s petition. We may hear an appeal of an interlocutory order if it satisfies one of the
criteria in 7 GCA § 3108(b). We may exercise our discretion to resolve a question of law that will
“[m]aterially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings therein.” 7
GCA § 3108(b)(1).
[18] A threshold question is whether the issue on appeal presents a question of law. See 7 GCA
§ 3108(b). The issues presented do not call for a fact-intensive inquiry. See In re Guardianship
of Moylan, 2018 Guam 15 ¶ 6 (“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction is a question of law ” (quoting
Blake v. Cnty. of Kaua’i Plan. Comm’n, 315 P.3d 749, 757 (Haw. 2013))); Guam Police Dep’t v.
Guam Civ. Serv. Comm’n (Charfauros), 2020 Guam 12 ¶ 8 (stating that when deciding a motion
to dismiss, “a court must accept all the well-pleaded facts as true, ‘construe the pleading in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all doubts in the non-moving party’s
favor’” (quoting First Hawaiian Bank v. Manley, 2007 Guam 2 ¶ 9)).
[19] This court has held that 7 GCA § 3108(b)(1) “address[es] concerns of judicial efficiency
in permitting interlocutory appeals in specific circumstances.” People v. Quenga, 1997 Guam 6 ¶
12. Granting interlocutory review will not result in piecemeal disposition. Rather, it will promote
judicial efficiency by resolving arguments that Dr. Philips continues to raise but which have not
been addressed because his appeals are dismissed on procedural grounds. Deciding this appeal on
the merits will clarify further proceedings because it will clarify that Dr. Philips’s arguments have
been heard and ruled on—he may not raise them again verbatim as he has done before. The dispute
is primarily between RSA and PCMH about the propriety of the levy and sale of the ownership
interest in the LLC. By reaching the merits of Dr. Philips’s arguments at the early stages, we
narrow the scope of the litigation and avoid future unnecessary appeals. RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 10 of 22
[20] The provisions of GRAP 4.2 are not jurisdictional, and interlocutory review may be granted
without a petition that complies with the rule if one of the criteria in 7 GCA § 3108(b) is met. See
People v. Lujan, 1998 Guam 28 ¶ 8 (“We have consistently held that this court’s appellate
jurisdiction is limited to those matters which the legislature permits us to review.” (emphasis
added)); cf. Sky Enter. v. Kobayashi, 2002 Guam 24 ¶ 13 (“Because the time limit for filing an
appeal is jurisdictional, it must be complied with, notwithstanding any order from this court
agreeing to hear a discretionary appeal.”); State v. Jenne, 591 A.2d 85, 88 (Vt. 1991). Therefore,
we grant Dr. Philips’s petition for permission to appeal.
B. We Deny PCMH’s Cross-Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
[21] PCMH “submits its Cross-Petition for Interlocutory Appeal under 7 GCA § 3108(b)(l), (2)
or (3),” but makes no further mention of the jurisdictional requirements of section 3108(b). Cross-
Pet. at 1 (Mar. 13, 2023); see Sky Enter., 2002 Guam 24 ¶ 23 (stating the requirements of 7 GCA
§ 3108(b) are jurisdictional). The cross-petition provides no analysis about how the interlocutory
appeal presents a question of law that would: “(1) Materially advance the termination of the
litigation or clarify further proceedings therein; (2) Protect a party from substantial and irreparable
injury; or (3) Clarify issues of general importance in the administration of justice.” 7 GCA §
3108(b). When a party represented by counsel fails to argue the case meets the requirements of
section 3108(b), they fail to meet their burden of showing those factors apply. See In re Estate of
Maruyama, 2013 Guam 23 ¶ 28. “In both [trial] and appellate courts, the development of an
argument is a party’s responsibility, not a judicial duty.” Salt Lake City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4, ¶ 35,
435 P.3d 248; see also Gaspard & Co. v. Tommy Tanaka Realty, Inc., No. CV-81-0053A, 1982
WL 30773, at *2 (D. Guam App. Div. July 2, 1982) (“Where an appellant fails to show that the RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 11 of 22
trial court was wrong, it is not incumbent on a reviewing court to engage in a dissertation on the
law for the purposes of demonstrating that the trial court was right.”).
[22] As PCMH has failed to meet its burden of showing at least one of the factors in section
3108(b) is met, we deny its cross-petition.
C. We affirm the decision of the Superior Court
[23] PCMH argues the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
dismiss and characterizes Dr. Philips’s appeal as “frivolous.” Appellee PCMH’s Br. at 1 (May 27,
2022). It contends that Dr. Philips has “failed to show a reversible abuse of discretion or any
related error in the trial court’s denial of relief to Defendant on his Rule 62 Motion to Dismiss.”
Id. at 4. PCMH also states that neither it nor this court is “able to proceed on a focused legal
review of the chaotic Opening Brief.” Id. at 5. PCMH requests that we dismiss the appeal based
on Dr. Philips’s violations of the GRAP or based on the “incoherence and frivolousness of the
Opening Brief.” Id. RSA also argues the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion to dismiss, apart from its argument that this court lacks jurisdiction over this
interlocutory appeal. Appellee RSA’s Br. at 6-7.
1. The Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction because it took no substantive action until Dr. Philips exhausted federal appellate review
[24] Although not clearly articulated, Dr. Philips’s arguments are enough to merit review of the
Superior Court’s jurisdiction. Dr. Philips’s repeated invocation of Rule 62 seems to be a misguided
attempt to invoke this court’s “divestiture rule.” Compare Guam R. Civ. P. 62(d), with San
Nicolas, 2016 Guam 21 ¶ 13 (“[O]nce a notice of appeal has been filed, the trial court loses the
power to take any substantive action with respect to the order or judgment on appeal.” (quoting
Bell v. United States, 676 A.2d 37, 40-41 (D.C. 1996))); see also Dumaliang v. Silan, 2000 Guam
24 ¶ 14 (explaining that the divestiture rule is a “judge-made rule designed to avoid confusion or RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 12 of 22
waste of time from having two courts considering the same issues at the same time”). He seems
to argue that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction while his appeal of the District Court’s order
of remand was pending. See Appellant’s Br. at 11.
[25] Although raising the divestiture rule presents an issue capable of our review, it does not
apply in this case. Dr. Philips removed this action to federal court and then presented no basis for
jurisdiction to the District Court. Appellee RSA’s Suppl. Excerpts of Record (“SER”) at 63-65
(Mot. Transfer, July 13, 2020); Appellee RSA’s SER at 66-68 (Order Granting Mot. Remand, Mar.
30, 2021). The District Court remanded the case to the Superior Court. Appellee RSA’s SER at
67-71 (Order Granting Mot. Remand). Dr. Philips then tried to appeal that order of remand to the
Ninth Circuit, despite black letter law that an order of remand is not reviewable. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1447(d) (“An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise ”); see also Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S.
124, 127 (1995); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 230 (2007). Even
in the face of such a futile appeal, the Superior Court took no action until after the Ninth Circuit
summarily rejected Dr. Philips’s appeal. RA, tab 20 at 2 (Order, Aug. 6, 2021). The Superior
Court then properly denied Dr. Philips’s first “Rule 62” motion to dismiss because his appeal had
been rejected. Id. (“To the extent Dr. Philips believes that this Court should stay these interpleader
proceedings pending an appellate review of the remand Order, the Ninth Circuit has already
definitively ruled that it lacks jurisdiction to review such Order.”).
[26] Although it is unclear from Dr. Philips’s brief or excerpts of record, in giving deference to
his litigation efforts, we infer that he filed his second “Rule 62” motion to dismiss after he
petitioned the Ninth Circuit for rehearing. Dr. Philips’s petition for rehearing was denied by the
Ninth Circuit on September 30, 2021. The record shows the Superior Court took no substantive RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 13 of 22
action on the second “Rule 62” motion until February 15, 2022. See Certified Docket Sheet at 2-
3 (Mar. 30, 2022). Even if the Superior Court lost the power to take any substantive action while
the futile appeal of the remand order was pending, it had the power to deny the “Rule 62” motion
when it did because “the mere act of filing a petition for certiorari does not deprive the [lower]
court of jurisdiction over the case.” United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc.,
842 F.3d 103, 106 n.1 (1st Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Sears, 411 F.3d 1240, 1241-
42 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he mere filing of a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court neither stops the mandate from issuing nor stops the case from proceeding in the district
court. A litigant desiring such cessation must seek and obtain a stay.”). The rule articulated by
the Second Circuit is persuasive on this issue:
Whatever the superficial attractiveness of a per se rule that filing of a notice of appeal automatically divests the district court of jurisdiction as to matters covered by the notice, such a rule is subject to abuse, and our application of the divestiture rule must be faithful to the principle of judicial economy from which it springs. We fail to see any efficiency in allowing a party to halt district court proceedings arbitrarily by filing a plainly unauthorized notice of appeal which confers on this court the power to do nothing but dismiss the appeal.
United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Likewise, there
is no efficiency in allowing Dr. Philips to halt Superior Court proceedings arbitrarily by filing an
unauthorized notice of appeal which conferred on the Ninth Circuit only the power to dismiss the
appeal. The Superior Court had jurisdiction because it did not violate the divestiture rule.
2. The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
[27] We generally will not grant permission to appeal denial of a motion to dismiss. But we
exercise our discretion in this unique factual and procedural instance to settle with finality the trial
court’s personal jurisdiction over Dr. Philips. RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 14 of 22
[28] The Superior Court found that Dr. Philips’s status as a resident of Guam was the law of the
case, and as such the court had jurisdiction over him. RA, tab 39 at 3 (Dec. & Order, Feb. 15,
2022). It also took judicial notice of Dr. Philips’s answer in the related case No. CV0478-18,
where he represented that he has been living in Guam for more than ten years and that Guam has
become his primary residence. Id. The court continued its analysis by stating that even if Dr.
Philips were not a Guam resident, the court could still exercise general jurisdiction over him under
Guam’s long-arm statute. Id. at 2-4.
[29] Whether the District Court’s determination that Dr. Philips was domiciled in Guam was
the “law of the case” is perhaps debatable, but the Superior Court’s personal jurisdiction over Dr.
Philips is not. The Superior Court is not bound by findings of the District Court in an order of
remand, but it may adopt them if they are not clearly erroneous. Cf. Ping Chiang Lei v. Glob.
Eng’g & Maint. SVC. Corp., No. CV 96-00007A, 1996 WL 875782, at *4 (D. Guam Oct. 4, 1996)
(“Following a bench trial, the judge’s findings of fact should not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.”). It was not an abuse of discretion to incorporate the District Court’s findings into the
determination that Dr. Philips is a resident of Guam and subject to the jurisdiction of the Superior
Court.
[30] The Superior Court taking judicial notice of Dr. Philips’s answer in a related case was also
proper. A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, such as pleadings filed in
other actions. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that
a judge could properly take judicial notice of determinations made by district court in other actions
because they were matters of public record). This court has also stated that judicial notice is not
limited to only the trial court record of the proceeding before the court. People v. Diaz, 2007
Guam 3 ¶ 66. “A judicial admission [i]s defined as ‘a formal act done in the course of judicial RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 15 of 22
proceedings which . . . bars the party himself from disputing it.’” Sinlao v. Sinlao, 2005 Guam 24
¶ 16 (first alteration in original) (quoting Goldsmith v. Allied Bldg. Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d
378, 380 (Ky. 1992)). “Such admissions ‘may occur at any point during the litigation process,’
including during ‘. . . pleadings . . . .’” Id. (quoting Kohne v. Yost, 818 P.2d 360, 362 (Mont.
1991)). The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it took judicial notice of Dr. Philips’s
admissions in a related case he was subject to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.
[31] “To establish personal jurisdiction, [a] plaintiff must first identify a statute asserting
personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and then, the plaintiff must show that exercising
jurisdiction over the defendant fulfills the constitutional principles of due process.” Banes, 2012
Guam 11 ¶ 27.
[32] The first statute RSA relies on is 7 GCA § 14108, which states, “From the time of the
service of the summons and of a copy of the complaint in a civil action . . . the court is deemed to
have acquired jurisdiction of the parties . . . .” Appellee RSA’s Br. at 18; 7 GCA § 14108 (2005).
PCMH and RSA both emphasize Dr. Philips was served in Guam, and that he has participated in
this case beyond contesting the personal jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Appellee PCMH’s Br.
at 6; Appellee RSA’s Br. at 7. The record shows that although service of the summons and
complaint did not strictly follow the governing rules and statutes,3 Dr. Philips has waived any
defect by making a general appearance and failing to object to any defects in service of process.
3 Guam has adopted a rule of strict compliance with statutory service requirements. Pineda v. Pineda, 2005 Guam 10 ¶ 18. “[J]urisdiction depends on the proper service of process or the waiver of any defect.” Id. ¶ 10 (quoting M & K Welding, Inc. v. Leasing Partners, LLC, 386 F.3d 361, 364 (1st Cir. 2004)). The record reflects that the summons and complaint were delivered to Dr. Philips’s place of business and left with an employee. As Dr. Philips is being sued in a personal capacity, serving an employee—who does not seem to have been appointed an agent for receiving process—may not have strictly complied with the statutory service requirements. But we emphasize that Dr. Philips has waived any potential defect by his participation in this case and caution him that going forward, making such arguments will result in appropriate sanctions. RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 16 of 22
See Kim v. Min Sun Cha, 2020 Guam 22 ¶ 45; Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan v. Superior Court,
2003 Guam 10 ¶ 43; RA, tab 32 at 1-5 (Answer – Denial Compl. & Countercls.).
[33] The second statute which RSA advocates grants jurisdiction is 7 GCA § 14109. Appellee
RSA’s Br. at 18. Section 14109 serves as Guam’s long-arm statute and lets Guam courts exercise
jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Organic Act or the Constitution of the United
States.” 7 GCA § 14109 (2005). “[A] court analyzing personal jurisdiction under Guam’s long-
arm statute[] simultaneously analyzes the issue of constitutional due process.” Banes, 2012 Guam
11 ¶ 27. If Dr. Philips’s argument about being a nonresident defendant is made in good faith,
principles of Fourteenth Amendment due process require he have minimum contacts with Guam
“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” PCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. GST Pacwest Telecom Haw., Inc., 1999 Guam 17 ¶
17 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Only if minimum contacts
exist will a nonresident defendant be subject to general (i.e., unlimited) or specific (i.e., limited)
jurisdiction. See id. ¶ 18. RSA correctly argues the Superior Court could properly exercise either
general or specific jurisdiction over Dr. Philips. Appellee RSA’s Br. at 15-21.
[34] We have adopted the rule that, “[i]f the nonresident defendant’s activities within a state are
‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic,’ there is a sufficient relationship between the
defendant and the state to support [general] jurisdiction even if the cause of action is unrelated to
the defendant’s forum activities.” PCI Commc’ns, 1999 Guam 17 ¶ 19 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977)).
Thus, even if Dr. Philips is correct in arguing he is not a resident of Guam and his activities relating
to the judgment were not “local matter activit[ies],” see Appellant’s Br. at 1, the Superior Court
had personal jurisdiction over him. That Dr. Philips has been living and practicing medicine in RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 17 of 22
Guam for nearly a decade gives rise to general jurisdiction because Dr. Philips’s activities within
Guam are substantial, continuous, and systematic. See RA, tab 39 at 3 (Dec. & Order, Feb. 15,
2022). The Superior Court correctly found it had general jurisdiction over Dr. Philips, and such a
conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.
[35] Even if Dr. Philips’s activities had not been substantial, continuous and systematic,4
specific jurisdiction also lies because “a court may alternatively exercise ‘limited,’ or
‘specific’ jurisdiction, where the defendant’s contacts with the forum, though limited, are
sufficiently related to the cause of action.” PCI Commc’ns, 1999 Guam 17 ¶ 18 (quoting Abuan
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1479, 1482 (D. Guam 1990)). Guam has adopted the Ninth
Circuit’s three-prong test to determine whether limited jurisdiction is appropriate:
1. The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.
2. The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related activities.
3. Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Id. ¶ 23 (quoting Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287).
[36] Dr. Philips has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of practicing medicine in
Guam, so the first prong is easily met. The cause of action is an interpleader brought by an LLC
doing business in Guam and of which Dr. Philips might still be a member.5 Thus, the second prong
is also satisfied because it arises out of Dr. Philips’s Guam-related activities. Finally, there has
4 At oral argument, Dr. Philips advocated for this court to adopt an unfairness exception to general personal jurisdiction for individuals who do not wish to reside in Guam but are brought here by a series of unfortunate events. We decline to create such an exception. 5 The question of who owns Dr. Philips’s stake in RSA after PCMH purported to win it at public auction is the crux of the dispute in this interpleader action. See RA, tab 1 at 1-3 (Compl. Interpleader, July 7, 2020). RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 18 of 22
been no showing that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. We observe that Dr. Philips
has appeared and represented his interests across multiple actions in the federal and local courts in
Guam. The Superior Court did not invoke specific jurisdiction because it concluded it had general
jurisdiction over Dr. Philips, but we find specific jurisdiction provides another basis for affirming
the decision of the Superior Court.
[37] The Superior Court has personal jurisdiction over Dr. Philips, and it did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motion to dismiss.
3. This court echoes the Superior Court’s warnings about future invocation of meritless arguments
[38] The Superior Court warned Dr. Philips that further filings found to be procedurally
improper would subject him to sanctions. See RA, tab 39 at 2 (Dec. & Order, Feb. 15, 2022). We
reject as meritless all other arguments raised by Dr. Philips in his brief. We echo the warning of
the Superior Court and add that we will not look kindly upon future “copy-and-paste” appeals. See
Conboy v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 992 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 2021).
D. We Issue a Pre-filing Order Limiting Dr. Philips’s Future Interlocutory Appeals
[39] Dr. Philips has received increasingly stern warnings from this court and the Superior Court.
We have considered Dr. Philips’s self-represented status in our repeated warnings—spanning
several cases—regarding his noncompliance with court rules and orders. We note the concern that
our suspension of GRAP 4.2 to let us reach the merits of Dr. Philip’s jurisdictional arguments may
set a poor precedent moving forward. Our dismissal of Dr. Philips’s two subsequent interlocutory
appeals signals we normally do not accept procedurally deficient interlocutory appeals. But we
recognize the delay that has been wrought in the past by Dr. Philips’s many procedurally deficient
and meritless appeals. RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 19 of 22
[40] The courts of Guam have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants
by “imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.”6 Andrews, 483 F.3d at
1077; see also Wai Kam Ho, 2009 Guam 18 ¶ 8. We find persuasive, and adopt, the Tenth Circuit’s
test for imposing pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants: specifically, injunctions restricting
further filings are appropriate “where the litigant’s lengthy and abusive history is set forth; the
court provides guidelines as to what the litigant may do to obtain its permission to file an action;
and the litigant receives notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is
implemented.” Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1077. We emphasize that a vexatious-litigant order “must
be narrowly tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d
1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990).
[41] Dr. Philips has filed at least three interlocutory appeals that have been procedurally
deficient. He has copied and pasted his moving papers and briefs from one appeal to the next. He
has taken appeals barred by black letter law. His history of abusing the interlocutory appeals
process is lengthy. Our past orders emphasize the vexatious nature of Dr. Philips’s previous
interlocutory appeals. See Order at 4 (CVA20-016, Aug. 27, 2021) (“[W]e will entertain no further
motions in CVA20-002 or CVA20-016. Should Dr. Philips file any further frivolous pleadings or
motions, we will designate him a vexatious litigant and will order the clerk’s office to reject his
future filings.”); Order at 2 (CVA22-003, Nov. 10, 2022) (“This order shall serve as notice to Dr.
Philips that any other flagrant disregard of the rules of practice before this court will not be treated
with the same leniency that the court has extended to him in the past, and will instead be
appropriately sanctioned.”); Order to Show Cause at 4 (CVA22-009, Nov. 28, 2022) (“[B]ecause
Dr. Philips has been afforded more than ample leniency and has been given fair warning by this
6 Although we limit our pre-filing order in this case to future interlocutory appeals, on remand the Superior Court may exercise its inherent power to regulate Dr. Philips’s abusive activities in the trial court. RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 20 of 22
court, the court finds it necessary and appropriate to sanction Dr. Philips monetarily for his
repeated violations of the rules and orders of this court and for his continued abuse of process. See
GRAP 21.1, 32.”).
[42] In deciding whether to restrict a litigant’s access to the courts, “[u]ltimately, the question
the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to
continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties.” Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d
19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). We find it likely that this history will continue, and we issue a pre-
filing review order. See United States v. Howe, No. 21-35682, 2021 WL 7161078, at *1 (9th Cir.
Dec. 8, 2021) (contemplating a pre-filing review order to limit “further frivolous interlocutory
appeals”). Thus, we will issue a separate administrative order detailing what Dr. Philips must do
to bring future interlocutory appeals:
1. Dr. Philips must obtain in writing that a Superior Court judge finds the interlocutory order involves a controlling question of law on which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. If he obtains such a writing, the Supreme Court, in its discretion, may permit an appeal to be taken from this order, if application is made to the Supreme Court within ten days after the entry of the order: provided, however, that application for an appeal shall not stay proceedings in the Superior Court unless the Superior Court judge or the Supreme Court shall so order. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b).
2. If a Superior Court judge will not certify the interlocutory appeal in writing, Dr. Philips must move for leave to file a petition for permission to appeal in the Superior Court. Dr. Philips must submit a copy of the pre-filing order and a copy of the proposed petition with every motion for leave. This will let a reviewing judge assess whether the proposed filing is made in good faith, and the motion shall be granted only if the petition meets the requirements of GRAP 4.2. No appeal from the denial of a motion for leave will be entertained by this court. See Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
[43] Pre-filing orders are an extreme remedy that should rarely be used. De Long, 912 F.2d at
1147. “A court should enter a pre-filing order constraining a litigant’s scope of actions in future RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 21 of 22
cases only after a cautious review of the pertinent circumstances.” Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500
F.3d at 1057. Still, “[f]lagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables
one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the
meritorious claims of other litigants.” De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148; see also O’Loughlin v. Doe,
920 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1990). We are convinced that a pre-filing order is justified and
necessary to prevent Dr. Philips from filing any further vexatious interlocutory appeals.
[44] We note that a litigant must be given an opportunity to oppose a court’s pre-filing order
before it is effective. Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1077. Our rules also require “notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond.” Guam R. App. P. 21.1(c). The injunction limiting Dr. Philips’s filing of
interlocutory appeals was initially made temporary until he had an opportunity to respond. See
Fink v. Shemtov, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 519 (Ct. App. 2010) (“[A] prefiling order constitutes an
injunction . . . .”). His written response does not adequately explain why we should not enter the
pre-filing order. Entry of the pre-filing order is justified and necessary to prevent Dr. Philips from
filing any further vexatious interlocutory appeals. On our own initiative, this pre-filing order shall
issue, and the injunction limiting Dr. Philips’s filing of interlocutory appeals is now permanent.
[45] We emphasize that any future appeals by Dr. Philips will not stay enforcement of the
judgment against him, unless he posts a supersedeas bond or obtains a stay of judgment without
bond.
V. CONCLUSION
[46] Dr. Philips’s petition for permission to appeal is granted because it will materially advance
the termination of litigation and clarify further proceedings by addressing concerns of judicial
efficiency. PCMH’s cross-petition for permission to appeal is denied because it fails to show any
of the factors in 7 GCA § 3108(b) are met. The decision of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED on RSA-Tumon, LLC v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 2023 Guam 8, Opinion Page 22 of 22
the merits7 because the court correctly found it had subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction over Dr. Philips. Finally, a pre-filing order shall issue to Dr. Philips because it is
justified and necessary to prevent him from filing any further vexatious interlocutory appeals. The
matter is REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
/s/ /s/ F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO KATHERINE A. MARAMAN Associate Justice Associate Justice
/s/ ROBERT J. TORRES Chief Justice
7 Despite the contention that we “dismiss[ed] . . . all petitioner[’s] appeals never on [the m]erit[s] but on administration issues,” Show Cause at unnumbered p. 26 (Apr. 10, 2023), we call to Dr. Philips’s attention that the resolution of this appeal is on the merits. Future attempts to relitigate jurisdiction in this case will result in appropriate sanctions.