2 2025 MAR 19 f't-1 ~: 14 CLERK GF COURT 3
4 BY=-~--- 5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6
7 EAGLE LAND HOLDINGS, LLC, Civil Case No. CV0242-24
8 Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER 9 vs. (Motion to Dismiss) 10 SCIENCE IS FUN AND AWESOME 11 LEARNING ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, 12 Defendant. 13
14 This matter came before the Honorable Jonathan R. Quan on November 22, 2024, for a 15 hearing upon Defendant Science is Fun and Awesome Learning Academy Charter School's ("SIF A") 16
17 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Lack ofJurisdiction (Nov. 5, 2024). At the hearing,
18 Attorney Michael F. Phillips appeared on behalf of SIF A, and Attorney Jon R. Ramos appeared on
19 behalf of Plaintiff Eagle Land Holdings, LLC. 20 SIF A's Motion to Dismiss raises three grounds for dismissal: statutory immunity, insufficient 21 pre-suit notice, and improper service of process. After considering the parties' arguments and the 22 applicable law, the Court will not dismiss this case on the first two grounds. The Court finds, 23 however, that Eagle Land Holdings failed to prove that it properly served SIF A with the statutorily 24
25 required summons and therefore the Court hereby GRANTS SIFA's Motion to Dismiss.
28 Page 1 ofl3 I BACKGROUND 2 On April 25, 2024, Eagle Land Holdings filed a Verified Complaint for Unlawful Detainer,
3 Ejectment, Trespass, and Damages ("Complaint") against SIF A. Eagle Land Holdings seeks to eject 4 SIFA from its property, and to recover $1,576,133.33 in unpaid rent. Id. at 5. On July 9, 2024, SIF A 5 filed a Memorandum regarding governmental immunity. SIFA asserted that because it is a public 6 charter school, it is "within" the Government of Guam for purposes of the Government Claims Act, 7
8 and is therefore entitled to governmental immunity. See generally SIFA Mem. P. & A. (Jul. 9, 2024).
9 SIFA then argued that because Eagle Land Holdings failed to plead a waiver of governmental
10 immunity in its Complaint, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court heard oral 11 arguments on governmental immunity on July 31, 2024, and then issued a Decision and Order on 12 October 29, 2024. The Court held, among other things, that SIF A was not an "agency, department, 13 instrumentality, public corporation, or other entity of the Government of Guam," and was therefore 14 not an entity "within" the Government of Guam for purposes of the Government Claims Act. Thus, 15
16 SIFA was not entitled to claim governmental immunity from suit.
17 Following the Decision and Order, the Court scheduled an unlawful detainer hearing for
18 November 6, 2024. Late in the day on November 5, 2024, however, SIFA filed this Motion to 19 Dismiss. SIF A raised three new grounds supporting dismissal: (I) statutory immunity from suit, as 20 provided by 17 GCA § 12107(x); (2) invalid pre-trial "notice" of its arrears as required by 21 GCA 21 § 21103(b) and the holding of Archbishop ofGuam v. G.F.G. Corp., 1997 Guam 12; and (3) a failure 22 to properly serve SIFA with a summons, as required by 21 GCA § 21108. 23
24 On February 6, 2024, prior to the scheduled hearing, Eagle Land Holdings filed a request
25 asking the Court to order an expedited briefing schedule on the Motion to Dismiss. See CVR 7.1
26 Form 4 (Nov. 6, 2024); Status Report (Nov. 6, 2024). At the hearing, the Court postponed the 27 unlawful detainer proceeding and ordered an expedited briefing schedule on the Motion to Dismiss. 28 Page 2 ofl3 I Min. Entry at 3:06:31 PM (Hr'g, Nov. 6, 2024). Eagle Land Holdings timely filed its Opposition on
2 November 13, 2024, and SIFA timely filed its Reply on November 18, 2024. The Court then held a 3 hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on November 22, 2024, and thereafter took the matter under 4 advisement. 5 DISCUSSION 6 1. The Court Will Not Dismiss Based on Statutory Immunity 7
8 SIFA first argues that this case must be dismissed because SIFA has "limited statutory
9 immunity" under the Guam Academy Charter Schools Act of 2009. Mot. Dismiss at 2-3 (Nov. 5,
10 2024). This argument derives from 17 GCA § 12107(x), which provides: 11 An Academy Charter School, and its incorporators, Trustees, officers, employees, 12 and volunteers, shall be immune from civil liability. both personally and professionally, for any act or omission within the scope of their official duties 13 unless the act or omission: 14 (I) constitutes gross negligence; 15 (2) constitutes an intentional tort; or 16 (3) is criminal in nature.
17 (emphasis added). SIFA notes, correctly, that the Complaint does not allege gross negligence, 18 intentional tort, or criminal conduct. SIF A therefore argues that this case must be dismissed because 19 the Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed "without sufficiently pied allegations bringing this matter 20 outside the scope of statutory immunity[.]" Mot. Dismiss at 2. 21
22 a. The Court Resolves This Under GRCP 12(b)(6)
23 At the outset, statutory immunity is not a jurisdictional argument. See Boudreaux v.
24 Weyerhaeuser Company, 448 P.3d 121, 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019) ("An assertion of immunity is 25 not a jurisdictional argument, but ... an assertion that the plaintiff [] has failed to assert a viable 26 cause of action"); Arlington Independent School District v. Williams, 2023 WL 8643040 *7 (Tex. 27
28 Page 3 of13 1 Ct. App. 2023) ("immunity from liability does not affect a court's jurisdiction to hear a case and
2 should not be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction."). Instead, statutory immunity implicates the legal
3 sufficiency of the complaint, i.e., whether the complaint states a potentially viable claim. See 4 Boudreaux, 448 P.3d at 137. 5 This challenge is therefore properly addressed under Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 6 ("GRCP") 12(b)(6), as a "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In decidirig a 7
8 GRCP 12(b)(6) motion, "a court must accept all the well-pleaded facts as true, construe the pleading
9 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all doubts in the non-moving party's
10 favor." Cruz v. Cruz, 2023 Guam 20 ,r 10 (quoting Guam Police Dep 't v. Guam Civ. Serv. Comm 'n 11 (Charfauros), 2020 Guam 12 ,r 8). "Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only if 'it 12 appears beyond doubt that the [non-moving party] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 13 which would entitle him to relief."' Id. (quoting Taitano v. Calvo Fin. Corp., 2009 Guam 9 ,r 6). 14 b. 17 GCA § 12107(x) is Not Limited to Claims of Ordinary Negligence 15
16 Eagle Land Holdings argues that 17 GCA § 12107(x) does not apply here because the statute
17 extends immunity "only to claims of ordinary negligence," not to "causes outside of negligence,
18 such as unlawful detainer matters." See Opposition at 2-3 (Nov. 13, 2024). In support of this 19 argument, Eagle Land Holdings cites Wells v. Hense, 235 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017), a case 20 interpreting D.C. Code§ 38-l 802.04(a)(l 7), which is substantively similar to 17 GCA § 12107(x). 21 It is true that Wells, and similar cases from the District of Columbia, have held that the D.C. 22 statute creates immunity from liability regarding ordinary negligence claims. See Wells, 235 23
24 F.Supp.3d at 13 n.13; A.M v. Bridges Public Charter School, 292 F.Supp.3d 441, 444 (D.D.C.
25 2018); Perez v. KIPP DC Supporting Corp., 2024 WL 3534769 (D.D.C. Jul. 25, 2024) (slip copy).
26 None of these cases, nor any other the Court has found, holds that the D.C. statute applies exclusively 27
28 Page 4 ofl3 to ordinary negligence claim, nor is that conclusion clear to the Court from the plain text of the
2 statute. 3 Both the D.C. statute and 17 GCA § 12107(x) provide that a charter school shall be immune 4 from civil liability. "Civil liability" means "liability imposed under the civil, as opposed to the 5 criminal, law." Liability, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). In other words, civil liability 6 encompasses all forms of liability arising under civil law. Negligent tort liability is one example of 7 civil liability. Had the Legislature intended 17 GCA § 12107(x) to immunize a charter school only 8
9 against negligent tort liability, it would have made that intention clear. Instead, by providing that a
10 charter school's immunity extends to all civil liability, the Legislature created an immunity broad II enough to encompass all of the civil claims in this action. Cf People v. Tennessen, 2010 Guam 12 12 ,r 18 ("If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and 13 the plain meaning of the statue governs."). 14 c. Statutory Immunity is an Affirmative Defense 15 - 16 Because Eagle Land Holdings' claims do not sound in gross negligence, intentional tort, or
17 criminal conduct, SIF A may have a viable statutory immunity defense under 17 GCA § 12107(x).
18 Statutory immunity, however, cannot be decided at this stage of the case. Statutory immunity under 19 17 GCA § 12107(x) is not a grant of"absolute immunity" from suit. Kelly v. Richard Wright Public 20 Charter School, 317 F.Supp.3d 564,568 (D.D.C. 2018) It is, instead, an affirmative defense. See 21 id. at 567 (in context of similar D.C. statute, "the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would likely 22 hold that the statutory immunity at issue here is an affirmative defense"); Williams, 2023 WL 23
24 8643040 at *7 ("[t]he immunity that [a similar Texas statute] provides is an affirmative defense that
25 gives professional school employees immunity from liability for actions taken within the scope of
26 their employment."); see also In re Stock Exchanges Options Trading Antitrust Litigation, 317 F .3d 27 I 34, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Most immunities are affirmative defenses."). 28 Page 5 of13 Federal courts have "repeatedly held that the existence of an affirmative defense [generally]
2 will not support a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Ventrassist Ply Ltd.
3 v. Heartware, Inc., 377 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (alteration in original); see, e.g., 4 Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024 5 (I Ith Cir. 1993). As one treatise explains: 6 The rule against raising defenses by motion is based on the view that motions to 7 dismiss or to strike cannot be used to resolve disputed fact questions, and that courts 8 should avoid "little trials" on the pleadings because under federal practice the pleadings are designed merely to provide notice of the respective claims and 9 defenses of the adversaries. Since the facts necessary to establish an affirmative 10 defense generally must be shown by matter outside the complaint, the defense technically cannot be adjudicated on a motion under Rule 12. 11 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1277 ( 4th ed.). This is
13 consistent with the principle that an affirmative defense must be proven, not merely alleged, by its 14 proponent. See Ngirangesil v. Kim, 2021 Guam 28 ,i 31 ("When summary judgment is sought on an 15 affirmative defense, ... the movant must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements 16 of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor." (quoting Dewan v. M-1, L.L.C., 858 F.3d 17 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2017)). 18
19 Here, 17 GCA § 12107(x) purportedly confers immunity from civil liability deriving from
20 "acts or omissions ... within the scope of[SIFA's] official duties." 17 GCA § 12107(x); see also
21 Kelly, 317 F.Supp.3d at 567. In other words, SIF A is only immune from civil liability based on 22 SIFA's performance of its official duties. However, SIFA has not identified, much less proven, 23 which of its "official duties" gave rise to the acts complained of here, nor is it clear from the face of 24 the Complaint. That being so, the Court cannot find that it is "beyond doubt" that there is "no set of 25 facts" under which Eagle Land Holdings could prevail in this lawsuit. See Cruz, 2023 Guam 20 ,i 26
28 Page 6 ofl3 I I 0. If SIF A cannot prove that this case arises from its performance of "official duties," then SIF A
2 cannot claim immunity under 17 GCA § 12107(x). SIFA has not proven this yet. 3 The Court also disagrees with SIF A's argument that the Complaint is facially deficient for 4 not pleading the inapplicability of 12 GCA § 12107(x). See Mot. Dismiss at 2. A plaintiff is not 5 required to negate a defendant's possible affirmative defenses before they are raised. See Scott v. 6 Columbus Dept. of Pub. Utils., 949 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (plaintiffs "need not 7
8 affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage. Requiring a plaintiff
9 to affirmatively demonstrate an exception to immunity at this stage would be tantamount to requiring
10 the plaintiff to overcome a motion for summary judgment at the pleading stage."); Isaiah v. 11 JPMorgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2020) ("A complaint need not anticipate 12 and negate affirmative defenses"); Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 13 718 (7th Cir. 1993). In the present case, Eagle Land Holdings was not required to anticipate and 14 then plead an exception to 17 GCA § 12107(x) before SIFA had raised the defense. It is SIFA's 15
16 burden to prove the statute applies, not Eagle Land Holdings' burden to prove it does not.
17 Since the Complaint was not required to plead an exception to 17 GCA § 12107(x), the Court
18 will not dismiss the Complaint for not having done so. 19
20 2. The Court Will Not Dismiss for Iusufficient "Archbishop" Notice 21 SIF A next argues that the unlawful detainer action must be dismissed because SIFA was not 22 given "valid notice," as described in Archbishop v. G.F.G. Corp., 1997 Guam 12, before Eagle Land 23
24 Holdings filed its unlawful detainer action. SIFA argues that the notice 1 it was provided was not
26 1 The "notice" in question is a letter dated February 7, 2024, from Olivia E. Brioso, President of Eagle Land
27 Holdings, to Dr. Anthony Jay Sunga, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and Officer-in-Charge ofSIFA. V. Comp!. at 4; see id. Ex. C. 28 Page 7 of 13 1 "valid" because it demanded more than one year's worth of back rent. Mot. Dismiss at 3; see
2 Archbishop, 1997 Guam 12 ,r 12.
3 It true that the notice in question demanded that SIFA pay back rent dating to June 2021, see 4 V. Comp!., Ex. C, and it is true that under Archbishop, a notice is invalid if it demands more than one 5 year's rent. action for unlawful detainer." 1997 Guam 12 ,r 12 ("Because the notice must be served 6 within one year of the date when the rent becomes due, it is invalid if the notice demands more than 7 one year's rent."). However, as the Court shall explain, Archbishop does not apply here, because this 8
9 case was brought under 21 GCA § 2l 103(a), not (b). See V. Comp!. at 4 ("Defendant is using and
10 occupying the Subject Property ... in violation of2 l GCA § 21103(a)."). 11 a. This is a Subsection (a) Action 12 Title 21 GCA § 21103 is Guam's unlawful detainer statute. This statute, however, has several 13 subsections, two of which are relevant here. Title 21 GCA § 21103(b) provides that a tenant is guilty 14 of unlawful detainer: 15
16 (b) When he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, without the permission of his landlord, or the successor in estate of his landlord, if any there be, 17 after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which 18 the property is held ....
19 21 GCA § 21103(b) (emphasis added). Title 21 GCA § 2l 103(a) provides that a tenant is guilty of 20 unlawful detainer: 21 When he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property, or any 22 part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which it is let to him, without the permission of his landlord, or the successor in estate of his landlord, if any there be 23
24 21 GCA § 21103(a) (emphasis added). In short, subsection (b) governs the situation where a tenant 25 26 has defaulted in the payment ofrent during the lease term, while subsection (a) governs the situation
27 where a holdover tenant remains on the property after the lease term.
28 Page 8 of 13 I These two subsections create separate and independent types of unlawful detainer actions. A
2 tenant who holds over at the conclusion of the lease violates subsection (a), whether or not they
3 violated subsection (b) during the lease. A tenant who stops paying rent during the lease term violates 4 subsection (b), whether or not they later violate subsection (a) at the conclusion of the lease. The 5 Court emphasizes this distinction because Archbishop does not: while Archbishop purports to 6 describe "unlawful detainer actions," it in fact describes only subsection (b) actions. 7
8 Archbishop explains that "[t]o maintain a valid unlawful detainer action under Guam law, the
9 landlord must establish that the tenant has defaulted in the payment of rent, is in possession of the
10 property without the landlord's permission, and that the tenant has been served with a valid notice 11 demanding payment or surrender of possession." 1997 Guam 12 ,r 11 (emphasis added). A demand 12 notice is "valid" only if it was served at least five days prior to the filing of the action, states the 13 amount of rent which is due, and was served within one year of the date that the rent became due. Id. 14 And "[b]ecause the notice must be served within one year of the date when the rent becomes due, it 15
16 is invalid if the notice demands more than one year's rent." Id ,r 12. These requirements, however,
17 plainly correspond to 21 GCA § 21103(b) actions, and only to subsection (b) actions.
18 Archbishop requires a landlord to establish that the tenant "has defaulted in the payment of 19 rent," which is precisely what the text of21 GCA § 21103(b) requires. Nothing in the text of21 GCA 20 § 21103(a), however, speaks to a default in the payment of rent. As noted above, a subsection (a) 21 action is exclusively concerned with the eviction of holdover tenants, and a holdover tenancy has 22 nothing to do with the payment of rent during their lease term. 2 The issue in a subsection (a) action 23
24 2 In California, the jurisdiction on which Guam's unlawful detainer statute was modeled, the recovery of unpaid 25 rent is not even available in this type of action. See Hudec v. Robertson, 258 Cal.Rptr. 868, 873 (Ct. App. 1989) ("an award of rent is only allowable if the unlawful detainer is based on the nonpayment of rent."); Castle Park No. 5 v. 26 Katherine, 154 Cal.Rptr. 498, 502 (Cal. Super. App. Div. 1979) ("rents accrued and unpaid prior to the end of the tenancy may not be recovered in that unlawful detainer proceeding."); Saberi v. Bakhtiari, 215 Cal.Rptr. 359, 362 (Ct. App. 27 1985).
28 Page 9 of13 is solely whether the tenant remains on the property without permission after the lease term expires.
2 That being so, it would be illogical for a subsection (a) action to require that the landlord prove the
3 tenant had defaulted in the payment of rent, when the non-payment of rent is not the basis of the 4 action nor a necessary component of such action. 5 Likewise, Archbishop's requirements that a pre-lawsuit notice must "state the amount ofrent 6 which is due" and "be served within one year of the date when the rent becomes due" are plainly 7
8 tailored to a subsection (b) action-these requirements also derive directly from the text of subsection
9 (b) itself. Again, however, there is no similar provision to these in 21 GCA § 21103(a), nor would
10 any be expected. The tenant's nonpayment of rent during the lease-and thus the "amount of rent 11 due" and the "date when the rent becomes due"-are neither the basis, nor a necessary element, of a 12 subsection (a) action. 13 Archbishop's discussion of"valid notice" is undoubtedly precedential for cases brought under 14 21 GCA § 21103(b), but only to those cases. Since this case was brought under subsection (a), not 15
16 (b), and since subsection (a) has no notice provisions similar to those analyzed in Archbishop, the
17 notice requirements described in Archbishop do not apply here. Thus, although Eagle Land Holdings'
18 demand notice sought back rent in excess of one year, this is not relevant to-and thus not a basis for 19 dismissal-in a subsection (a) action. 20
21 3. The Court Will Dismiss for Improper Service of Process 22 Finally, SIF A argues that Eagle Land Holdings did not serve a summons on SIF A as required 23
24 by 21 GCA § 21108. Mot. Dismiss at 6. In response, Eagle Land Holding asserts that SIF A's claim
25 is factually incorrect, and that SIFA was indeed properly served on April 25, 2024. Opposition at 5; 26 see Min. Entry at 4:22:21 PM (Nov. 22, 2024). 27
28 Page 10 of13 1 Title 21 GCA § 21109 provides that"[ u]pon filing the complaint, a summons must be issued
2 thereon." A summons in an unlawful detainer action:
3 must require the defendant to appear and answer within five (5) days after the 4 service of the summons upon him, and must notify him that ifhe fails to so appear and answer, the plaintiff will apply to the court for the relief demanded in the 5 complaint. In all other respects, the summons, or any alias summons in such 6 proceedings, must be issued, served, and returned in the same manner as summons in a civil action. 7
8 Id. (emphasis added). In civil actions, the service of a summons is governed by GRCP 4. More
9 specifically, the service of a summons upon a corporation or association3 is governed by GRCP 4(h).
10 There are two ways in which such service can be effectuated. One is service "in the manner 11 prescribed by Rule 4(e)(l) for serving an individual," GRAP 4(h)(l)(A), meaning service "in any 12 manner prescribed or authorized by any law of Guam, or as prescribed by the law of the place where 13 the person is served," GRAP 4(e)(l). The other is: 14 by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a 15 managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment 16 or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of each to the 17 defendant[.] 18 Guam R. Civ. P. 4(h). Thus, Eagle Land Holdings was required to serve a summons on SIF A "in any 19
20 manner prescribed or authorized by any law of Guam," or else by delivering a copy of the summons
21 to "an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law
22 to receive service of process" of SIFA. 23 On April 25, 2024, the Clerk of Court for the Superior Court of Guam issued a summons 24 addressed to SIFA. See Summons (Apr. 25, 2024). There is, however, no declaration in the record 25
26 27 3 The Court assumes, since neither party has argued to the contrary, that a charter school is akin to a corporation or association and that GRCP 4(h) would therefore be the applicable rule. 28 Page 11 of 13 1 averring that the summons was served, or to whom. At the November 22, 2024 hearing, Eagle Land
2 Holdings asserted that it has a signed copy of the summons. Neither party, however, was able to 3 identify whose signature appears on the summons. Min. Entry at 4:26:28 PM (Nov. 22, 2024). At 4 the hearing, Eagle Land Holdings asserted it would research the signature issue and then file an 5 affidavit to inform the Court who the signatory was. Id. 6 The Court has provided Eagle Land Holdings additional time after the November 22, 2024 7
8 hearing to provide the aforementioned information. As of this writing, more than three months after
9 the hearing, Eagle Land Holdings has not filed the proffered information/ affidavit.
10 When service is challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that service was 11 valid under Rule 4. Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 4A Charles A. 12 Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ I 083 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp.2003)). The 13 only evidence that supports Eagle Land Holdings' claim of proper service is a summons containing 14 a signature that neither party can identify. That being so, the Court cannot discern whether the 15
16 signatory was an officer or agent authorized to receive service on behalf of SIFA under GRCP
17 4(h)(l )(8). Nor can the Court find that the indiscernible signature, without more, suffices as a method
18 of service "prescribed or authorized by any law of Guam" under GRCP 4(h)(l)(A). In short, Eagle 19 Land Holdings has not met its burden of proof on this issue. 20 Clearly, SIF A had actual notice of this lawsuit, since it has appeared at several hearings since 21 June 2024. However, "Guam has adopted a rule of strict compliance with statutory service 22 requirements." RSA-Tuman, LLC v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc., 2023 Guam 8 '\[ 32 n.3; see 23
24 Pineda v. Pineda, 2005 Guam l O,r 8. Under that posture, a "trial court lacks personal jurisdiction if
25 service is defective." Mariano v. Sur/a, 2010 Guam 2 '\[ 13. Thus, [w]hen a party does not receive 26 legal process, actual notice is not a cure." Kim v. Min Sun Cha, 2020 Guam 22 '\[ 37; see also 27
28 Page 12 of13 Osrecovery, Inc. v. One Group Intern., Inc., 249 F.R.D. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("actual notice alone
2 will not sustain personal jurisdiction over a defendant").
3 Because Eagle Land Holdings has not shown that they strictly complied with statutory service 4 requirements, this case must be dismissed. 5
6 CONCLUSION 7 SIF A is not entitled to dismissal based on statutory immunity or based on the notice of arrears 8 it received from Eagle Land Holdings. SIF A, however, is entitled to dismissal based on Eagle Land 9 Holdings' failure to prove proper service of process as required by statute. 10 The Court therefore GRANTS SIF A's Moton to Dismiss. 11 12 SO ORDERED this 14th day of March, 2025.
15 Magistrate Judge, Superior Court of Guam 16
26 27
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