Rosario v. Santander Consumer USA

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 3, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-10565
StatusUnknown

This text of Rosario v. Santander Consumer USA (Rosario v. Santander Consumer USA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosario v. Santander Consumer USA, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CARLOS ROSARIO JR., Plaintiff, 22-CV-10565 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action against Santander Consumer USA under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667. He alleges that Defendant violated his rights in connection with a consumer loan for a vehicle, which has been repossessed. By order dated December 15, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Carlos Rosario alleges the following facts. On September 17, 2018, at Performance Toyota, he entered into a contract for consumer credit with Santander Consumer USA. (ECF 2 at 5.) He was “misled” and “not provided with full disclosure.” (Id.) On June 22, 2021, Plaintiff’s vehicle was repossessed, but he was “able to recover [his] property.” (Id.) On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff sent Santander Consumer USA two letters by certified mail: a “debt validation letter,” and a letter directing Santander Consumer USA to “cease and desist” unspecified actions, and offering it an “opportunity to cure.” (Id.) On March 28, 2022, Plaintiff sent Santander Consumer USA and Performance Toyota, by certified mail, a “notice of rescission,” which he states was an exercise of his rights established by the TILA. On June 3, 2022, Plaintiff’s vehicle was again repossessed, and he was “coerced into payment.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff asserts that Santander Consumer USA violated his rights under the FDCPA. Moreover, because Santander Consumer USA reported derogatory information to credit

reporting agencies, Plaintiff was unable to secure an apartment. (Id.) Plaintiff also lost his job when his vehicle was repossessed because he had no means of transportation. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks damages and to recover “all payments” that he made on the loan. DISCUSSION A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act The FDCPA applies to consumer debt “arising out of . . . transaction[s] . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5); Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he FDCPA is triggered when the obligation is a debt arising out of a consumer transaction”). The FDCPA prohibits those who qualify as “debt collectors” from using deceptive and misleading practices, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, or engaging in “conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person

in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. The FDCPA defines a debt collector as: (1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); See also Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) (“Everyone agrees that the term [debt collector] embraces the repo man—someone hired by a creditor to collect an outstanding debt.”). Section 1692d provides examples of the type of conduct that the FDCPA prohibits, including violence, or threats of violence, or other criminal means; use of obscene or profane language “the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader”; the publishing of a list of consumers who refuse to pay debts; or “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass” the person called. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his car was repossessed twice and that Defendant Santander Consumer USA violated the FDCPA. These allegations, on their own, are insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute. It appears that Santander Consumer USA originated the loan. “[T]hose who seek only to collect for themselves loans they originated generally do not” qualify as debt collectors. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721.

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Bluebook (online)
Rosario v. Santander Consumer USA, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosario-v-santander-consumer-usa-nysd-2023.