Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc.

997 F. Supp. 635, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1333, 1998 WL 97855
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 11, 1998
DocketCIV.A. 96-5732
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 997 F. Supp. 635 (Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 635, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1333, 1998 WL 97855 (E.D. Pa. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

LUDWIG, District Judge.

This is an adjudication following a Markman hearing. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). The patent claims at issue involve biocidal chemicals used in pesticides. In 1994, plaintiff Rohm and Haas Company was issued U.S. Patent No. 5,312,827 (’827 patent). In this action, Rohm and Haas contends that pesticides developed by defendant Sunkyong Industries, Ltd. and marketed by defendant Lonza, Inc. constitute literal infringements of the ’827 patent. Jurisdiction is federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994), which is exclusive in patent actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).

Plaintiff is proceeding on claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 of the ’827 patent, all of which describe chemical compositions. Prior to the patent, biocidal chemicals called 3-isothiazo-lone compounds were known to be effective pesticides. However, because these compounds, in solution, tended to decompose and become unstabilized, a metal nitrate salt was added. As an untoward result, potentially carcinogenic compounds — nitrosamines—also were produced. The ’827 patent consisted of 12 compositions and processes intended to reduce or eliminate nitrosamines and impurity by-products that can become nitrosamine precursors.

In a literal infringement action, there are two steps. First, the claims in question must be construed for scope and meaning. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 371, 116 S.Ct. at 1387. Second, there is the question whether the claims, as construed, cover the accused device or process. See Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1997). Here, only the Markman phase is under consideration.

I. Markman Analysis

The objective of claims construction analysis is to ascertain the meaning that a person of ordinary skill in the art would give to the claims in dispute. See Wiener v. NEC Electronics, Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed.Cir.1996); Haynes Int'l Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1578 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.1993). The operative time is the date of the application for the patent. See Wiener, 102 F.3d at 539. In this case, the original application, Serial No. 383,858, was filed with the Patent and Trademark Office on June 1, 1982. See ’827 patent, at 1. In construing an asserted claim, the first and paramount precept is to look to the intrinsic evidence of record, ie., the patent itself, which includes the claims and the specification, together with the prosecution history before the Patent and Trademark Office. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995). Intrinsic evidence is “the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Id.

To delineate the scope of coverage, the wording of the claims, asserted and non-asserted, should be examined in their entirety. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed.Cir.1995). While the claim’s *638 words and phrases should be given their ordinary and customary meaning, “a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.

For these reasons, an evaluation of the specification is essential; the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (citing Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 181 Ct.Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (1967)). As articulated by the Federal Circuit:

The specification contains a written description of the invention which must be clear and complete enough to enable those of ordinary skill in the art to make and use it. Thus the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.

Prosecution history should also be' considered as intrinsic evidence, including the record of proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office. See id. (Prosecution history, is “often of critical significance in determining the meaning of the claims”). Those proceedings may incorporate the patentee’s representations as to claim scope, together with a review of the prior art. See id. at 1583.

“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.” Id. (citing Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211,1216 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Accordingly, it ordinarily would be improper to resort to extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony, dictionaries or learned treatises. See id. 1 However, in the unusual case, the patent record may be insufficient or an otherwise unsatisfactory basis to enable the claims to be rationally construed. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. In that narrow instance, extrinsic evidence is permissible on the issue of how someone skilled in the art would understand the claims. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. Nevertheless, such extrinsic evidence may not contradict the manifest meaning of the claims as set forth, even by implication, in the specification and prosecution history. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584-85.

Here, having reviewed the intrinsic evidence, it appears to be unnecessary — and insupportable — to go beyond the proffered record. 2 Plaintiff has shown that the intrinsic evidence is a legally sufficient matrix for claims construction in this case.

II. Disputed Elements

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Senju Pharmaceutical Co. v. Lupin Ltd.
162 F. Supp. 3d 405 (D. New Jersey, 2015)
Dow Chemical Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc.
47 F. Supp. 2d 294 (N.D. New York, 1999)
Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc.
42 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
997 F. Supp. 635, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1333, 1998 WL 97855, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rohm-and-haas-co-v-lonza-inc-paed-1998.