Rocky River Co. v. United States

169 Ct. Cl. 203, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 50, 1965 WL 8333
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 22, 1965
DocketCong. No. 7-60
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 169 Ct. Cl. 203 (Rocky River Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rocky River Co. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 203, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 50, 1965 WL 8333 (cc 1965).

Opinion

Laramore, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Through this congressional reference (S.R. 331, 86th Congress, 2d session) ,1 the United States Senate has asked us to pass on plaintiffs’ legal and equitable entitlement to [205]*205recover damages against the United States for an alleged diminution in value of 3,059 acres of land in Tennessee which were under lease to the United States during the Second World War, as part of the Spencer Artillery Eange. Plaintiffs’ claims are based on an alleged breach of a provision of the lease agreement which required defendant to restore the leased property to the condition it was in when defendant first took possession. Plaintiffs attribute the alleged diminution in value of their lands to the presence of unexploded shells and bombs which were left on the lands by defendant at the expiration of the leases. There is no dispute that of the original 26,000 acres which comprised the Spencer Artillery Eange, 3,059 acres were ultimately restricted in 1956 to surface use by certification of the Corps of Engineers after a series of unsuccessful attempts by defendant to clear this area of unexploded shells. That this constitutes a breach of the lease agreement is not seriously contested by defendant. However, defendant challenges plaintiffs’ legal and equitable entitlement to recover on three grounds: (1) our 6-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. §2501 bars any recovery, (2) all of plaintiff Macy Land Corporation’s claim, and part of plaintiff Eocky Eiver Company’s claim, is null and void under the Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203, (3) both plaintiff Eocky Eiver and plaintiff Macy Land Corporation’s predecessors in title signed valid releases which discharged defendant from any further liability in connection with the leased property.

Statute of Limitations

Defendant contends that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by our 6-year statute of limitations since plaintiffs’ causes of action first accrued in 1946 when the leases were terminated. The record discloses that the final certificate of clearance was sent plaintiffs on November 29, 1956, by the Corps of Engineers. Contained therein was the following statement:

This Certificate of Clearance supersedes all previous Certificates.

Thus it was not until November of 1956 that a final determination was made as to the extent to which the land could [206]*206not be restored by defendant. Under our decision in Spitzel v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 399, 403 (1959) it is at this point that plaintiffs’ causes of action accrued. The petition in the case at bar was filed on August 22, 1960 and, therefore, meets the 6-year requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2501.

Assignment of Claims Act

Plaintiff Rocky River Company is the owner of 2,516 acres of land within the areas presently restricted to surface use. Of these 2,516 acres, 425 acres were acquired in fee by the company from the government’s former lessors in 1952 and 1953, some six or seven years after the leases were terminated. The defendant contends' that any claim that Rocky River may have with respect to the 425 acres of land which it acquired from the government’s former lessors is null and void under the Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958 Ed.). The same contention is made as to plaintiff Macy Land Corporation, since the corporation did not in fact lease any lands to the United States. The record discloses that the corporation purchased 4,213.11 acres of land from Valentine E. Macy, Jr., whose predecessors in title had leased the land to the United States as part of the artillery range, and on November 19,1952, the corporation purchased 933.31 acres of land from other former lessors of the government. Of these 5,146.42 acres of land, 512 acres are located within the restricted areas. The record discloses that the leases with the former owners ran in favor of the owners, their heirs, “successors and assigns.” The claims here asserted arise out of the express provision of restoration contained in the leases. The cause of action in the case at bar did not accrue until after the property in question was acquired by the assignees. In other words, it was not until after a series-of unsuccessful attempts by the government to restore-the entire property to its prior condition in 1956 that a breach of the restoration provision occurred. It has been held that the provisions of the anti-assignment statute apply only to claims existing at the time of the transfer. Milliken [207]*207v. Barrow, 65 Fed 888 (C.C. La. 1895), affirmed 74 Fed. 612; (5th Cir. 1896), cert. denied 167 U.S. 746 (1897). Consequently, plaintiffs are not barred by the anti-assignment statute from prosecuting their claims herein. See also, United States v. Jordan, 186 F. 2d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1951),. affirmed by an equally divided court, 342 U.S. 911 (1952).

Release amd Discharge

The record discloses that plaintiff Rocky River Corporation through its president, on November 29, 1946, executed and delivered to the United States a formal release of its claim which discharged the United States from all actions,, liability and claims which it ever had, then had, or ever would have, arising out of the lease and occupation by the United States of the leased property. Plaintiff Macy Land Corporation’s predecessors in title likewise either signed formal releases or compromised their claims. Defendant contends that these executed releases and compromises discharged the United States from all claims in law and equity arising out of the contract to which the release or compromise relates. Hellander v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 550 (1959). Our commissioner has found that none of the releases-contemplated disposition .of the matter of damages, which might be due to unexploded shells remaining on any-of the tracts of land comprising the Spencer Artillery-Range. Defendant has not challenged this finding and we accept it. However, we do not think that this finding of fact can vary the legal effect of the releases. We do not think that the facts in this case come within those special and limited situations in which a claim at law may be prosecuted despite the execution of a general release. E.g., Nippon Hodo Company, Ltd. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 1 (1958) (mutual mistake of fact) ; Winn-Senter Construction Co. v. United States, 110 Ct. Cl. 34 (1948) (fraud or-duress).

We consider the present situation as a unilateral mistake of fact which cannot serve as a basis for reformations [208]*208of the general releases, but which is relevant to the question of plaintiffs’ equitable entitlement within the meaning of our congressional reference jurisdiction.

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Bluebook (online)
169 Ct. Cl. 203, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 50, 1965 WL 8333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rocky-river-co-v-united-states-cc-1965.