Spitzel v. United States

146 Ct. Cl. 399, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 163, 1959 WL 7621
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 13, 1959
DocketNo. 205-56
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 146 Ct. Cl. 399 (Spitzel v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spitzel v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 399, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 163, 1959 WL 7621 (cc 1959).

Opinion

JoNes, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Each of the plaintiffs owns an undivided fractional interest in a tract of unimproved land containing 55.84 acres in San Luis Obispo County, California. From July 1943 until the latter part of 1946, the defendant used this tract, which is located on the seacoast, as an artillery range and bombing area in connection with amphibious training operations. This suit arises out of an alleged breach by che defendant of a contract to restore the land to the condition it was in when the defendant first took possession. The outcome of this suit depends on a determination of the date when the plaintiffs’ claims accrued.

In August 1943, Alfred Goldbach, the record owner of a two-thirds interest in the tract, executed a written permit or lease giving the defendant the right to use the land for training purposes. This two-thirds interest was later conveyed to Eva Lesem on August 27, 1946, but the deed was not recorded until May 24,1956. Eva Lesem instituted this action on May 11,1956; she died on September 11, 1956. A motion for leave to substitute Janice N. Spitzel, executrix [401]*401of Miss Lesem’s estate, as plaintiff was allowed on July 9, 1958.1

In exchange for the permit to use the land, the Government promised to pay a rental of one dollar per year and to restore the land to the same condition it was in when the permit was executed. There is no evidence that the defendant succeeded in obtaining a lease or permit from the owners of the remaining undivided one-third interest in the tract.

From July 1943 until the latter part of 1946, the Department of the Army used this tract and several adjoining tracts of land to train troops. As a part of these Army field exercises, shells from artillery, mortars, and other weapons were fired over and upon the plaintiffs’ land. During the latter part of 1946 the Department of the Army made an inspection of the land, decided it was free of unexploded ammunition, and, as of December 31, 1946, terminated the lease or permit under which it had occupied the tract.2

However, in June 1950, the Corps of Engineers was advised that members of a party engaged in surveying the land used by the Army in amphibious training exercises had found some unexploded ammunition on the beach in the area of the land in suit. A civilian dedudding expert was dispatched to dispose of the ammunition by detonation. It was reported that this expert had found that an area of approximately 640 acres, including the plaintiffs’ tract, contained impact signs created by high explosives, and it was learned from local citizens that many explosions had taken place there during a small brush fire.

Subsequently, during the period from March 3 through March 8, 1951, a bomb and shell disposal team carried on dedudding operations in the area. When this latter operation was completed the Corps of Engineers recommended that the property be restricted to surface use only and that the owners be advised that it was dangerous to use the land [402]*402for other than surface use. Goldbach, who was still the record owner of a two-thirds interest in the tract, was so advised in June, and again in August, of 1951. The Corps of Engineers also informed Eva Lesem by letter in August 1951 that steps were being taken to flag the perimeter of the contaminated area, and that warning signs would be posted on the property when the extent of that area had been determined. She was asked to withhold any action until the survey had been completed. Diligent efforts were also made to contact the owners of the remaining one-third interest in the tract and to advise them of its condition. Prior to 1951 none of the plaintiffs were aware that the tract had been used as an artillery range and bombing area.

During October 1951, further dedudding operations were undertaken, after which the commanding officer of the bomb and shell disposal team executed a document certifying that the land had been carefully searched and that all explosive materials reasonably possible to detect had been removed. He recommended, however, that an area described in his certificate be restricted to surface use and stated that warning signs had been posted on the land. Accordingly, on October 31, 1951, the Los Angeles District Engineer of the Corps off Engineers executed an affidavit , which stated in substance that certain described property, including the land in suit, had been used by the Army as an artillery range arid bombing area until December 1946; that while an attempt had been made to decontaminate the area, there might be unexploded mines, bombs, and other missiles on the land which might constitute a hazard to life and property, and that the area was therefore considered dangerous for any purposes involving subsurface use. This affidavit was recorded on December 4,1951, in the land records of San Luis Obispo County.

On November 1, 1951, the District Engineer mailed Gold-bach a copy of this affidavit and advised him that it would be recorded “in the public records of San Luis Obispo County.” Goldbach also received a map on which was outlined in red an area described by the District Engineer as “the area finally determined to be dangerous to use except for surface purposes.” (Emphasis supplied.) On November 14, 1951, [403]*403representatives of the Corps of Engineers met in San Luis Obispo with a number of the owners of contaminated property, at which time the procedure for filing claims for damages was explained and claim forms were distributed. Gold-bach was notified of the meeting, but failed to attend.

The defendant takes the position that the plaintiffs’ claims accrued when the Army terminated its permit or lease on December 31,1946. It then contends that this action, which was not instituted until May 1956, cannot be maintained, since it fails to meet a requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The provision in § 2501 relied on by the defendant states that “Every claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed * * * within six years after such claim first accrues.” Except for the claim of plaintiff Spitzel, we agree that these claims may not be maintained. But we do not agree that the claims accrued in 1946.

The defendant’s obligation to these plaintiffs arose from its promise to restore the plaintiffs’ land.3 It is not unreasonable to interpret this obligation as one which continued until the parties were aware, or should have been aware, that the land had not, in fact, been restored. And even after it became known that the land had not been restored, the defendant was entitled to a reasonable period of time within which to fulfill its obligation. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims did not accrue until the condition of the plaintiffs’ land became known, and the defendant thereafter either failed to restore the land within a reasonable period of time or expressed a relatively final judgment that the land could not be restored:

The evidence in this case shows that the dangerous condition of the plaintiffs’ land was hot fully brought to light until March 1951, after a bomb and shell disposal team had carried on dedudding operations in the area. It was shortly after this that the Corps of Engineers advised Goldbach and Lesem, and attempted to advise the remaining owners, that it was impossible to guarantee complete subsurface

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
146 Ct. Cl. 399, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 163, 1959 WL 7621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spitzel-v-united-states-cc-1959.