Robert K. Christofferson and Oleta L. Christofferson v. Halliburton Company

534 F.2d 1147, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 8075, 1976 A.M.C. 1307

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: July 12, 1976
• Docket: 74-3378
• Status: Published

Opinions

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the issue of whether the wife of an injured seaman has a cause of action for loss of consortium against the third parties allegedly responsible for her husband’s injuries under either the Jones Act, the general maritime law, or the laws of the State of Louisiana. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the claim of Oleta J. Christofferson for loss of consortium occasioned by the injuries which her husband, Robert K. Christofferson, sustained while working on a jack-up drilling barge located in federal waters off the Louisiana coast. From the final judgment dismissing her claim with prejudice, Mrs. Christofferson prosecuted this appeal. We affirm.

THE JONES ACT

Prior to the Jones Act, a seaman who was injured by his employer’s negligence had no cause of action sounding in negligence against his employer. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903). Where the injured seaman had no such claim for negligence, his wife could not and did not have a derivative claim for loss of consortium based on negligence. When Congress, in 1915, gave a seaman the right to recover for personal injury caused by his employer’s negligence under the Jones Act, it did not authorize recovery by the seaman’s wife for loss of consortium but restricted the cause of action to “any seaman.” As to nonfatal injuries, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 reads:

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply .

In Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2nd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949, 84 S.Ct. 965, 11 L.Ed.2d 969 (1964), the Second Circuit discussed the failure of the Jones Act to confer a right upon the spouse of an injured seaman to recover for loss of consortium. Concluding that such an omission could not be dismissed as an inadvertence, the court stated:

The policy of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the regime which the Jones Act made applicable to seamen, was that the new remedy for the employee was to be exclusive and that claims of relatives recognized by state law were to be abrogated; the FELA had been thus authoritatively construed before the Jones Act was passed, New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360, 37 S.Ct. 620, 61 L.Ed. 1194 (1917); . . .

Id. at 266. See also Canal Barge Co., Inc. v. Griffith, 480 F.2d 11, 31 (5th Cir. 1973), modified 513 F.2d 911 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 71, 46 L.Ed.2d 60 (1975), where in a different context this Court specifically approved the Igneri holding.

Although neither party cites a controlling case, we hold that the district court properly dismissed Mrs. Christofferson’s claim under the Jones Act for two reasons. First, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 specifically provides that an injured seaman, and not his wife, may maintain an action for damages at law. Second, courts have held that the wife of an injured employee has no claim for loss of consortium under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the statutory scheme made applicable to seamen under the Jones Act. See Kinney v. Southern Pacific Co., 232 Or. 322, 375 P.2d 418 (1962); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lunsford, 216 Ga. 289, 116 S.E.2d 232 (1960).

THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW

Although an injured seaman did not have a negligence claim against his employer prior to the passage of the Jones Act in 1915, in 1902 the Supreme Court accepted as settled this proposition of general maritime law:

That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.

The Osceola, supra, 189 U.S. at 175, 23 S.Ct. at 487. An action for injuries occasioned by the unseaworthiness of the ship, however, has traditionally been that of the seaman himself and Mrs. Christofferson has been unable to cite any case in which a court has allowed the injured seaman’s wife to recover for loss of consortium under a theory of unseaworthiness.

In Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, supra, the Second Circuit held that the wife of an injured longshoreman did not have a cause of action for loss of consortium based upon a warranty of seaworthiness. Although Mrs. Christofferson concedes that Igneri is the leading case on this question of law, on appeal she presents two reasons why the Igneri decision is outmoded today due to intervening changes in the law. First, a majority of the states, some 37 in number, now allow the wife of an injured man to recover for loss of consortium whereas only 11 states and the District of Columbia permitted such a recovery when Igneri was written. Second, the decision of the Supreme Court in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), contains certain language which, Mrs. Christofferson asserts, arguably supports a result contrary to that which the Second Circuit reached in Igneri.

Mrs. Christofferson’s argument that Igneri would now be decided differently because a majority of the states now permit the recovery which the court denied in Igneri is without merit. See generally 36 A.L.R.3d 900 (1971). The Igneri court itself referred to common law which is uniform or nearly so.

Maritime law draws on many sources; when there are no clear precedents in the law of the sea, admiralty judges often look to the law prevailing on the land. See Gilmore and Black, Admiralty (1957), § 1-16. At least this much is true. If the common law recognized a wife’s claim for loss of consortium, uniformly or nearly so, a United States admiralty court would approach the problem here by asking itself why it should not likewise do so; if the common law denied such a claim, uniformly or nearly so, the inquiry would be whether there was sufficient reason for an admiralty court’s nevertheless recognizing one. Compare The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-214, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358 (1886).

323 F.2d at 259-260.

Recognition of a wife’s claim by some 37 states, however, does not mean that the common law is uniform, or nearly so. Much of the change in the law has come about through statutory modification of the law, rather than change in the common law. One fourth of the states steadfastly continue to deny the wife of an injured man a cause of action for loss of consortium. Against this background of division among the states, we turn to consider Mrs. Christofferson’s contention that the rational of the Court in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, supra, supports her claim for loss of consortium in the case at bar.

In Gaudet, the Supreme Court held that a longshoreman’s widow has a maritime action for wrongful death even though her husband prosecuted his claim for personal injury during his lifetime. The Court stated that, under the maritime wrongful death remedy, the widow, and other dependents, may recover damages for their “loss of support, services, and society, as well as funeral expenses.” 414 U.S. at 584, 94 S.Ct. at 814. Defining the term “society” as embracing such mutual family benefits as “love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort and protection,” the Court noted that a clear majority of the states now permit recovery for loss of society in wrongful death actions. “Thus,” the Court in Gaudet continued, “our decision to permit recovery for society aligns the maritime wrongful-death remedy with a majority of state wrongful-death statutes.” 414 U.S. at 587-588, 94 S.Ct. at 816. Mrs. Christofferson asserts that the Supreme Court’s desire to align the dependents’ recovery in a maritime death action with that recovery which a majority of the states would allow dependents supports her claim for loss of consortium in the case at bar because a majority of the states would permit her to maintain such an action in state court.

The simple answer to Mrs. Christofferson’s argument is that her claim for loss of consortium does not arise from the wrongful death of her husband. In Gaudet the Supreme Court implicitly limited a claim for loss of society to a maritime wrongful death action when it explained that no double recovery was involved in permitting the widow in Gaudet to maintain an action for wrongful death even though her husband had been compensated for his injuries during his lifetime. The Court reasoned that:

Obviously, the decedent’s recovery did not include damages for the dependents’ loss of services or of society, and funeral expenses. Indeed, these losses — unique to the decedent’s dependents — could not accrue until the decedent’s death.

Id. at 414 U.S. 591-592, 94 S.Ct. at 818. Restricting loss of society to that arising after the death of an injured maritime worker indicates no intention to create an action for loss of consortium under the general maritime law where the husband was not fatally injured.

THE LAW OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

Indisputably the Court of Appeals of Louisiana has ruled that a wife does not have a cause of action in Louisiana for mental anguish, emotional distress, and loss of past and future consortium which resulted from injury to her husband. McKey v. Dow Chemical Co., 295 So.2d 516 (La.App. 1974). See also Hickman v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 314 So.2d 486 (La.App.), writ denied, 318 So.2d 59 (S.Ct.La.1975); Johnston v. Fidelity National Bank, 152 So.2d 327 (La.App.1963); Bea v. Russo, 21 So.2d 530 (La.App.1945).

In McKey v. Dow Chemical Co., supra, the court explained that the reasons for denying a wife recovery for loss of consortium when her husband suffers an injury are the same as those for denying recovery for mental pain and suffering under the same circumstances. Summarizing those reasons in a shorthand form, the Louisiana court stated,

We deem it unnecessary to repeat in detail the underlying reasons for the above stated long standing jurisprudential rule. It suffices to state it is based in part on the practicality of justice which protects a tort-feasor from the unreasonable demands of myriads of claimants who sustain no personal injury as a result of the tort. The rationale of this premise is the avoidance of opening a field of litigation which will flood the courts with actions in which practical justice cannot be meted out to both plaintiff and defendant alike. Another basic premise of the rule is that, under such circumstances, there is no breach of a legal duty toward the party claiming damages,

295 So.2d at 518.

On appeal Mrs. Christofferson’s sole argument is that, where the Supreme Court of Louisiana has not decided the precise issue at bar, this Court is not Erie -bound to apply the law as it is stated by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana. In light of the reasoning of the court in McKey v. Dow Chemical Co., supra, however, we are not persuaded that the Supreme Court of Louisiana would allow a wife a cause of action for loss of consortium where her husband is injured by a third party. Accordingly, we decline Mrs. Christofferson’s invitation to interpose a holding on the substantive law of Louisiana which is contrary to the law as delineated by the Louisiana Court of Appeals.

Persuasive as the arguments may be that the law is changing, we hold that it has not changed yet, and that the district court was correct in deciding the case on the controlling law.¹

AFFIRMED.

1 . In his dissenting opinion Judge Freeman suggests that our decision retreats from the prior Circuit precedent established in Skidmore v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1975). That case is distinguishable from the one at bar. There we simply applied Gaudet, supra, which was handed down during the pendency of the Skidmore appeal. Like Gaudet, Skidmore involved a wrongful death claim, and we held that the decedent’s spouse was entitled to recover for loss of consortium. That holding is consistent with our decision here that a claim for loss of consortium cannot be made until the seaman’s death, and therefore the wife of a nonfatally injured seaman cannot recover.