Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. v. General Electric Capital Corp.

121 F. Supp. 3d 321, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101697, 2015 WL 4635630
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 4, 2015·No. No. 14 Civ. 8623(PAE)·Published·Cited by 25 cases

Opinion

OPINION. & ORDER

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge.

Between 1998 and 2001, defendant General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC”) had a lending relationship with two entities affiliated with Minnesota businessman Thomas Petters. In 2008, Ritchie Capital Management, LLC and the other five plaintiffs1 (collectively, “Ritchie”) also invested with Petters. In fall 2008, law enforcement officials- discovered that Petters was operating a Ponzi scheme. In 2009, Petters was convicted of fraud for operating a $3.65 billion Ponzi scheme, and was sentenced to, inter alia, a term of 50 years’ imprisonment.

Ritchie, which allegedly lost $157 million from its 2008 investments with Petters, now sues GECC. Ritchie principally alleges that- GECC had .discovered Petters’ Ponzi scheme in 2000, but chose not to disclose the fraud in order, to ensure that GECC would recover its investment. Ritchie brings three state-law causes of action against GECC: aiding and abetting fraud, civil conspiracy to commit fraud, and negligence.

GECC. now moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. For the reasons that follow, the Courl^grants GECC’s motion.

1. Background

A. Factual Background2

Ritchie’s allegations are set out in detail below, but it is useful first to summarize Ritchie’s core allegations, which are: (1) “By October 2000, GECC had uncovered (and could have ended) what would'turn out by September 2008 to be the third largest Ponzi scheme in U.S. business his[326] tory”; (2) instead of exposing Petters’ fraud, GECC joined it to ensure that it “would be paid and make a large profit”; (3) thereafter, GECC allowed Petters to “use GECC’s business stature, recommendations and UCC-1 filings to victimize many more lenders including Plaintiffs”; and (4) “Had GECC not conspired with Petters and aided and abetted Petters’ fraud, Petters and his companies would not have been able to defraud Plaintiffs.” Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.

1. Petters’ Scheme

Petters began his Ponzi scheme in 1998. Id. ¶ 5. The scheme was a “fraudulent purchase order financing scheme,” in which Petters solicited loans from private investors ostensibly to enable his companies to finance the purchase of brand-name consumer electronics merchandise. Id. ¶ 18. Petters represented to these lenders that their loans would be repaid when his companies sold these electronics to big-box retailers like Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”). Id. ¶ 19. To induce lenders to make the requested loans, Petters would provide a copy of a purported purchase order, pursuant to which a Costco subsidiary, National Distributors, would buy the electronics as soon as Petters Company, Inc. (“PCI”) had the goods. Id. ¶ 20. The authorities eventually discovered — in fall 2008 — that this was all a Ponzi scheme. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5

2. GECC’s Lending Relationships with Petters, and GECC’s Discoveries

On March 26, 1998, GECC entered into a credit agreement with another Petters corporation, Petters Capital, Inc. Id. ¶ 24. Specifically, GECC entered into a revolving credit facility (“the Petters Capital Line”) to fund Petters Capital’s purchases of electronics for resale to big-box retailers like Costco. Id. In exchange for providing funding, GECC received various fees, including a “success fee” ranging from 10 to 30 percent of Petters Capital’s gross profit margin on the sale of merchandise. Id. ¶ 25.

On December 17, 1999, GECC entered into a $55 million line of credit with a second Petters affiliate, Red Tag (“the Red Tag Capital Line”). Id. ¶ 29. This revolving credit facility had “the similar purpose” of funding electronics purchases. Id.

a. The Petters Capital Line

Around this time, Petters drafted and presented a generic letter of recommendation (about himself) to Richard Menczynski, a GECC executive in charge of the Petters accounts. Id. ¶¶28, 30. Petters asked that GECC issue this letter of recommendation. Id. ¶ 30. GECC complied: It issued the recommendation letter on its letterhead, dated January 4, 2000, and addressed “To Whom It May Concern” (the “January 2000 recommendation letter”). Id. ¶¶ 30-31. The letter described Petters Capital as “an excellent customer” that had “performed well” and described Petters “[o]n a personal level ... to be of high character and possessing strong moral values.” Id. ¶ 31. Ritchie alleges that “[e]ven after GECC discovered Petters’ fraudulent purchase order financing scheme, GECC never told Petters to cease his use of the January 2000 Letter nor asked with whom it had been shared.” Id. ¶ 32.

By October 2000, Petters owed GECC more than $45 million under the Petters Capital Line. Id. ¶ 38. On October 23, 2000, with payments owed to GECC past due, Paul Feehan of GECC contacted Costco to request verification of the amounts Costco owed Petters Capital. Id. ¶ 39. Costco replied that its records did not confirm the amounts set forth by GECC. Id. GECC then sent Costco copies of the National Distributors purchase orders. [327] Id. 40. In a follow-up phone call, a Costco representative informed Fedhan that those purchase orders were not valid National Distributors purchase orders. Id. Petters quickly learned that GECC had contacted Costco; he immediately called GECC’s Feehan “and complained angrily” that Feehan had contacted Costco and jeopardized Petters’ relationship with his largest customer. Id. ¶ 41. “Feehan accused Petters of fraud and threatened to destroy Petters’ business.” Id. ¶ 42.

Although Petters Capital owed GECC more than $45 million that was due October 27, 2000, Ritchie’s Complaint alleges that Feehan (on behalf of GECC) agreed to an extension “in order to give Petters time to induce third parties to make loans to PCI that would be used' to pay off GECC.” Id. ¶44. Specifically, the Complaint alleges:

These conversations, culminated in GECC’s tacit agreement to knowingly and voluntarily participate in a common scheme to fraudulently induce third parties to loan PCI the money that was needed to pay debts owed to GECC by using false transaction documents, and to conceal PCI’s fraudulent Costco purchase order financing- scheme from present and future lenders to PCI and related companies, in consideration for Feehan’s knowing and voluntary participation in this common scheme. Petters represented to Feehan: “I tell you what, I’ll make you look like a hero, I promise you, on the Petters [Capital] situation and the RedTag situation.”

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Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. v. General Electric Capital Corp., 121 F. Supp. 3d 321, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101697, 2015 WL 4635630 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

121 F. Supp. 3d 321 (Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. v. General Electric Capital Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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