Greenpond South, LLC v. General Electric Capital Corp.

886 N.W.2d 649, 2016 Minn. App. LEXIS 72, 2016 WL 6141653
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedOctober 24, 2016
DocketNo. A16-0350
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 886 N.W.2d 649 (Greenpond South, LLC v. General Electric Capital Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greenpond South, LLC v. General Electric Capital Corp., 886 N.W.2d 649, 2016 Minn. App. LEXIS 72, 2016 WL 6141653 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION

HOOTEN, Judge.

Appellant challenges the dismissal of its claims against an earlier lender for damage from a Ponzi scheme,1 claiming that the earlier lender is liable for civil conspiracy to commit fraud and aiding and abetting fraud. Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that it lacked authority to bring its claims and, alternatively, by dismissing its claims on the pleadings. Because appellant has failed to allege an injury separate and distinct from the injury suffered by the business entities that were utilized in the Ponzi scheme, and the fraud-related claims arising out of the Ponzi scheme were settled in bankruptcy court, we affirm.

[651]*651FACTS

Appellant Greenpond South, LLC, as successor in interest to Acorn Capital Group, LLC, brought claims of civil conspiracy to commit fraud and aiding and abetting fraud against respondent General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC). Greenpond argues that GECC’s actions contributed to the success of a Ponzi scheme operated by Thomas Petters through a number of business entities under his control.

Greenpond’s Factual Allegations

Greenpond alleges the following facts.in its amended complaint and the attached exhibits. As early as 1995 and continuing until September 2008, Petters solicited numerous lenders2.to provide capital to his various entities, ostensibly so that the entities could purchase electronics merchandise at liquidation prices and sell it to retailers at a profit. However, neither the electronics merchandise nor the purchase orders from retailers actually existed. Instead, the entities were engaged in a Ponzi scheme whereby earlier lenders were repaid with capital provided by later lenders.

GECC was one lender that provided capital to Petters. Before doing so, GECC ran a background cheek on Petters and discovered that he had a criminal history that included past financial crimes. Nevertheless, GECC agreed to lend money to Petters, but GECC retained certain cash controls. In March 1998, GECC established a revolving credit facility3 with Pet-ters Capital, Inc., a Petters entity, to fund Petters Capital’s purported purchases of electronics merchandise. • In December 1999, GECC also established a revolving credit facility with RedtagBiz, Inc. (Red-tag), another Petters entity, to finance accounts receivable resulting from the sale of electronics merchandise purchased over the Internet.

In’ January 2000, Richard Menczynski, at that time a GECC assistant vice president, provided a recommendation letter to Petters. The letter, which was written on GECC letterhead and addressed “To Whom It May Concern,” described Petters Capital as “an excellent customer” and stated that the transactions under the Pet-ters Capital credit facility had “performed well.” Menczynski added' that “on a personal level” he had known Petters for over two years and had “found him to be of high character and possessing strong moral values.” Menczynski knew that his statements regarding Petters’ character were false when he made them. No restrictions were imposed on Petters’ use of the letter, and GECC understood that Pet-ters intended to use the letter to raise capital from third-party lenders. In April 2000, Petters made a job offer to Menczyn-ski, and Menczynski accepted the position of Redtag’s vice president of finance in September 2000.

[652]*652In October 2000, months after the recommendation letter was written, GECC discovered Petters’ fraud. The chain of events that led to GECC’s discovery of the fraud began in the spring of 2000, when a series of accounts receivable, allegedly generated from electronics merchandise sales to Costco, became past due. After unsuccessfully trying to enforce some of its protections under the Petters Capital credit facility, GECC contacted Costco in October 2000, seeking to authenticate certain pending Costco purchase orders, representing approximately $60 million in purported sales. Costco informed GECC that Costco. had never agreed to any of the purported purchases and that there were no Costco accounts receivable. As a result, GECC learned that Petters’ operation was engaged in fraud, GECC’s purported collateral did not exist, and the payments it had received from the Petters entities came from a source other than merchandise sales. At this time, GECC had more than $50 million in outstanding loans to Petters Capital and Redtag. In an attempt to recoup full payment on the Pet-ters Capital and Redtag credit facilities, GECC decided not to expose Petters’ fraud.

By December 2000, the Petters Capital credit facility was satisfied in full, including “success fees,” and closed. The funds used to satisfy the Petters Capital credit facility were paid not by Petters Capital, but by another Petters entity, Petters Company, Inc., using funds obtained from new-lenders. GECC was told that the funds used to repay the Petters Capital credit facility were from Petters’ “investors.”

Petters requested that GECC lend additional'funds under the Redtag credit facility, telling GECC that the additional draw was to purchase inventory from other Pet-ters entities. Petters presented GECC with cancelled checks ostensibly showing amounts Costco paid for merchandise, but GECC discovered that these checks were fraudulent and declined to provide any additional draws to the Redtag credit facility. The Redtag credit facility was satisfied in full and closed in March 2001. GECC had no further lending relationship with Pet-ters or any of his entities.

At the end of 2000, before the closing of the Redtag credit facility, Redtag asked GECC to document the “nature of defaults, if any” on the Redtag credit facility, in order to provide information to" Redtag’s auditor, Ernst & Young. GECC responded on January 30, 2001. Although GECC understood that Petters’ conduct comprised multiple events of default under the Redtag credit facility, GECC indicated only that Redtag had defaulted on a net worth covenant requiring that Redtag’s net worth be at least $8.1 million. Ernst & Young issued the 2001 Redtag audit opinion without knowledge of Petters’ fraud. GECC knew that the Ernst & Young audit opinion would be used to induce later lenders to loan capital to the Petters entities.

The audit opinion stated that the financial statements included in the opinion “present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of [Redtag.]” The opinion also indicated, however, that Redtag’s “recurring losses and negative cash flows from operations raise substantial doubts about its ability to continue as a going concern.” With -regard to Redtag’s relationship with GECC, the opinion stated that in January 2001 Redtag’s borrowing capacity was reduced from $55 million to $600,000 and that Redtag “was in violation of certain covenants of the revolving credit facility [as of] December 31,2000.”

After GECC was paid in full, Petters invited Acorn to enter into a lending relationship with Redtag. On April 24, 2001, Marlon Quan, on behalf of Acorn, met with [653]*653Petters, Redtag’s CEO and majority and controlling shareholder, and Menczynski, now Redtag’s CFO. At this meeting, Pet-ters and Menczynski provided Quan with Menczynski’s January 2000 recommendation letter and Ernst &

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886 N.W.2d 649, 2016 Minn. App. LEXIS 72, 2016 WL 6141653, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/greenpond-south-llc-v-general-electric-capital-corp-minnctapp-2016.