Richmond Power & Light v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

574 F.2d 610, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 399, 24 P.U.R.4th 609
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMarch 13, 1978
DocketNos. 75-2143 and 75-2144
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 574 F.2d 610 (Richmond Power & Light v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richmond Power & Light v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 574 F.2d 610, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 399, 24 P.U.R.4th 609 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge.

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:

We are presented here with disputes arising from attempts by the Federal Power Commission1 to encourage voluntary responses by electric utilities to problems cre[402]*402ated by the 1973 oil embargo. The issues are whether the Commission reasonably exercised its discretion in rejecting invocation of its emergency powers, in setting rates for service voluntarily furnished during the crisis, and in deferring detailed consideration of an allegation of unlawful discrimination. We hold that in each action it did.

I. INTRODUCTION

To counteract oil shortages threatened by the embargo, the Commission on November 29.1973, implored the Nation’s electric utilities to make maximum use of other fuels.2 Because utilities in some sectors of the country, such as New England, relied heavily on oil for their boilers, the Commission called for the transfer, when feasible, of electricity from regions with excess non-oil-fired capacity — primarily areas in which coal was heavily utilized — to those short on petroleum. The Commission also sought the help of the National Electric Reliability Council in establishing a voluntary program of emergency transmissions. Since an alternative solution was to convert East Coast plants to coal-fired boilers and then to ship coal to the East, the process of transferring electricity became known as “coal by wire.” A number of utilities volunteered to participate.

Concerned by forecasts of dire oil shortfalls and apparently doubting the efficacy of the voluntary program, the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL)3 on January 10.1974, petitioned the Commission to order utilities east of the Mississippi River with excess capacity to supply it with energy.4 NEPOOL sought to convince the Commission to use to this end its emergency authority under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act.5 The Commission responded immediately by ordering the eastern utilities to notify NEPOOL of any excess capacity available for coal-by-wire transactions and by convening a public conference to arrange a voluntary solution of NEPOOL’s problems. Participants in this and four additional meetings discussed needs, schedules, rates, limitations and the effects of coal-by-wire service on the local obligations of supplying utilities. By the time of the final conference, the purchasing, transmitting and supplying utilities and participating state regulatory commissions had arrived at substantial agreement. The supplying and transmitting utilities subsequently filed new or amended rate schedules, which specified refunds in excess of $2 million on charges at previously higher rates, and NEPOOL moved to withdraw its petition for emergency relief.

The Commission’s staff expressed its approval of the rates. Conceptualizing “fuel conservation service” as a series of transfers scheduled on a weekly or slightly longer basis, the staff recommended that the rate structure resemble those frequently employed for short-term power, including recovery of the replacement cost of fuel, incremental operating costs (variable costs) and a pro rata share of fixed costs (constant costs). The staff concluded that the rates were reasonable as measured by that standard.

Richmond (Indiana) Power & Light, an electric utility, and Representative Michael J. Harrington of Massachusetts6 objected to the proposed rates on various grounds, and the Commission instituted a rulemak[403]*403ing proceeding.7 Other interested utilities submitted undisputed data showing that the variable and constant costs allocated to this service equalled or exceeded the rates proposed. Richmond and the Commission’s Office of Economics, however, protested the attribution of any fixed costs to the service. Richmond further complained of the Commission’s failure to impose rates low enough for Adam Smith’s invisible hand to dictate the use of coal by wire even after imported oil again became freely available. An aspect of this alleged error was the Commission’s rejection of Richmond’s requested “through” rate — a single joint rate for a transmission crossing two or more systems as opposed to individual rates for each utility or power pool involved in the transaction.8 Richmond also disputed the Commission’s refusal to direct intervening utilities to transmit — or wheel9 — electricity from the supplier to the purchaser. Many of the parties responded to Richmond’s attacks and disagreed with its conclusions.

By order of August 26,1974, the Commission determined that the situation did not justify invocation of its emergency powers and granted NEPOOL’s motion to withdraw its petition.10 The Commission further found that fixed-cost recovery was proper and that the cost data it had received fully supported the proposed rates.11 Lastly, the Commission refused to compel utilities to wheel power.12 On September 26, 1975, the Commission denied reconsideration of the points now in contention,13 and petitioners seek our review.14

II. THE COAL-BY-WIRE PROGRAM

A. NEPOOL’s Petition for Emergency Relief

We must first analyze the Commission’s decision to allow NEPOOL to withdraw its petition for emergency relief. Richmond is aggrieved by the Commission’s refusal to invoke Section 202(c)15 only if its emergency powers could have provided the sole authorization for the steps Richmond sought. Thus, unless the Commission incorrectly declined to declare an emergency, we must consider the remaining issues in light of the Commission’s ordinary powers.

We encounter little difficulty in concluding that the Commission was well within its discretion. Richmond argues that NE-POOL never received all of the coal by wire it had originally requested and, although the embargo has long since ended, that the high cost and uncertain supply of imported oil continue to justify emergency measures. On the first point, the Commission pointed out that because the effects of the embargo [404]*404were less severe than expected NEPOOL received greater oil allocations than originally anticipated, that the coal-by-wire equivalent of 1.3 million barrels of oil was voluntarily supplied, and that NEPOOL never had to interrupt service.16 The Commission insists that under these circumstances it did not abuse its discretion by settling upon a temporary-voluntary program, and we heartily agree.

Richmond’s second contention, that dependence on imported oil leaves this country with a continuing emergency, compels no different result. We are fully mindful, of course, that current national policy is to discourage reliance on foreign oil, but we cannot fault the Commission for reading Section 202(c) as devoid of a solution. That section speaks of “temporary” emergencies, epitomized by wartime disturbances,17 and is aimed at situations in which demand for electricity exceeds supply and not at those in which supply is adequate but a means of fueling its production is in disfavor.18

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574 F.2d 610, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 399, 24 P.U.R.4th 609, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richmond-power-light-v-federal-energy-regulatory-commission-cadc-1978.