574 F.2d 610
187 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 24 P.U.R.4th 609
RICHMOND POWER & LIGHT OF the CITY OF RICHMOND, INDIANA, Petitioner
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent,
General Motors Corporation, Potomac Electric Power Company
and Appalachian Power Company, et al., Intervenors.
Representative Michael J. HARRINGTON, of Massachusetts, Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent,
General Motors Corporation, Potomac Electric Power Company
and Appalachian Power Company, et al., Intervenors.
Nos. 75-2143 and 75-2144.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 24, 1977.
Decided March 13, 1978.
George Spiegel, Washington, D.C., with whom Frances E. Francis and Bonnie S. Blair, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for petitioners.
Scott M. DuBoff, Atty., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., with whom Drexel D. Journey, Gen. Counsel, Robert W. Perdue, Deputy Gen. Counsel, and Allan Abbot Tuttle, Sol., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for respondent.
Louis Flax, Washington, D.C., with whom Frazier F. Hilder, Detroit, Mich., was on the brief, for intervenor General Motors Corp.
William J. Manning, New York City, of the bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Peter J. Schlesinger, New York City, was on the brief, for intervenors Appalachian Power Co., et al.
Edward A. Caine, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for intervenor Potomac Elec. Power Co.
Before TAMM, ROBINSON and ROBB, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge.
SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge:
We are presented here with disputes arising from attempts by the Federal Power Commission to encourage voluntary responses by electric utilities to problems created by the 1973 oil embargo. The issues are whether the Commission reasonably exercised its discretion in rejecting invocation of its emergency powers, in setting rates for service voluntarily furnished during the crisis, and in deferring detailed consideration of an allegation of unlawful discrimination. We hold that in each action it did.
I. INTRODUCTION
To counteract oil shortages threatened by the embargo, the Commission on November 29, 1973, implored the Nation's electric utilities to make maximum use of other fuels. Because utilities in some sectors of the country, such as New England, relied heavily on oil for their boilers, the Commission called for the transfer, when feasible, of electricity from regions with excess non-oil-fired capacity--primarily areas in which coal was heavily utilized--to those short on petroleum. The Commission also sought the help of the National Electric Reliability Council in establishing a voluntary program of emergency transmissions. Since an alternative solution was to convert East Coast plants to coal-fired boilers and then to ship coal to the East, the process of transferring electricity became known as "coal by wire." A number of utilities volunteered to participate.
Concerned by forecasts of dire oil shortfalls and apparently doubting the efficacy of the voluntary program, the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) on January 10, 1974, petitioned the Commission to order utilities east of the Mississippi River with excess capacity to supply it with energy. NEPOOL sought to convince the Commission to use to this end its emergency authority under Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act. The Commission responded immediately by ordering the eastern utilities to notify NEPOOL of any excess capacity available for coal-by-wire transactions and by convening a public conference to arrange a voluntary solution of NEPOOL's problems. Participants in this and four additional meetings discussed needs, schedules, rates, limitations and the effects of coal-by-wire service on the local obligations of supplying utilities. By the time of the final conference, the purchasing, transmitting and supplying utilities and participating state regulatory commissions had arrived at substantial agreement. The supplying and transmitting utilities subsequently filed new or amended rate schedules, which specified refunds in excess of $2 million on charges at previously higher rates, and NEPOOL moved to withdraw its petition for emergency relief.
The Commission's staff expressed its approval of the rates. Conceptualizing "fuel conservation service" as a series of transfers scheduled on a weekly or slightly longer basis, the staff recommended that the rate structure resemble those frequently employed for short-term power, including recovery of the replacement cost of fuel, incremental operating costs (variable costs) and a pro rata share of fixed costs (constant costs). The staff concluded that the rates were reasonable as measured by that standard.
Richmond (Indiana) Power & Light, an electric utility, and Representative Michael J. Harrington of Massachusetts objected to the proposed rates on various grounds, and the Commission instituted a rulemaking proceeding. Other interested utilities submitted undisputed data showing that the variable and constant costs allocated to this service equalled or exceeded the rates proposed. Richmond and the Commission's Office of Economics, however, protested the attribution of any fixed costs to the service. Richmond further complained of the Commission's failure to impose rates low enough for Adam Smith's invisible hand to dictate the use of coal by wire even after imported oil again became freely available. An aspect of this alleged error was the Commission's rejection of Richmond's requested "through" rate--a single joint rate for a transmission crossing two or more systems as opposed to individual rates for each utility or power pool involved in the transaction. Richmond also disputed the Commission's refusal to direct intervening utilities to transmit--or wheel--electricity from the supplier to the purchaser. Many of the parties responded to Richmond's attacks and disagreed with its conclusions.
By order of August 26, 1974, the Commission determined that the situation did not justify invocation of its emergency powers and granted NEPOOL's motion to withdraw its petition. The Commission further found that fixed-cost recovery was proper and that the cost data it had received fully supported the proposed rates. Lastly, the Commission refused to compel utilities to wheel power. On September 26, 1975, the Commission denied reconsideration of the points now in contention, and petitioners seek our review.
II. THE COAL-BY-WIRE PROGRAM
A. NEPOOL's Petition for Emergency Relief
We must first analyze the Commission's decision to allow NEPOOL to withdraw its petition for emergency relief. Richmond is aggrieved by the Commission's refusal to invoke Section 202(c) only if its emergency powers could have provided the sole authorization for the steps Richmond sought. Thus, unless the Commission incorrectly declined to declare an emergency, we must consider the remaining issues in light of the Commission's ordinary powers.
We encounter little difficulty in concluding that the Commission was well within its discretion. Richmond argues that NEPOOL never received all of the coal by wire it had originally requested and, although the embargo has long since ended, that the high cost and uncertain supply of imported oil continue to justify emergency measures. On the first point, the Commission pointed out that because the effects of the embargo were less severe than expected NEPOOL received greater oil allocations than originally anticipated, that the coal-by-wire equivalent of 1.3 million barrels of oil was voluntarily supplied, and that NEPOOL never had to interrupt service. The Commission insists that under these circumstances it did not abuse its discretion by settling upon a temporary-voluntary program, and we heartily agree.
Richmond's second contention, that dependence on imported oil leaves this country with a continuing emergency, compels no different result. We are fully mindful, of course, that current national policy is to discourage reliance on foreign oil, but we cannot fault the Commission for reading Section 202(c) as devoid of a solution. That section speaks of "temporary" emergencies, epitomized by wartime disturbances, and is aimed at situations in which demand for electricity exceeds supply and not at those in which supply is adequate but a means of fueling its production is in disfavor. The Commission's construction of Section 202(c) contravenes neither common sense nor any indication of legislative intent, and we are constrained to defer to the administrative interpretation.
B. The Necessity of Considering National Policy On Foreign Oil
Richmond's major complaint is that the Commission erroneously limited the scope of its inquiry. The Commission explained its position in these words:
These proceedings are not ones in which we are properly called upon to resolve broad questions of resource allocation, industry pooling structures and operating procedures, all as raised by the foregoing contentions. These fuel conservation power and energy transfers were consummated at the Commission's request to meet physical fuel shortfall conditions, not to affect economic conditions. The Commission contemplated that these transfers would be accomplished within the framework of the existing power pools and electric reliability councils.
Since displacement of foreign oil with domestic energy is a national goal, Richmond argues that the Commission must consider incentives to the substitution of domestic fuels in reaching any decision that could have that effect. Specifically, Richmond posits that "fuel conservation" rates that do not lead to decreased consumption of foreign oil are ipso facto unreasonable.
We disagree. Although the Commission must serve the public interest in approving rates, we see no abuse of discretion in limiting this proceeding to the shortrun problem of setting just and reasonable rates for the service theretofore provided in response to the 1973 oil embargo. While an administrative agency must remain faithful to public policies directly related to its regulatory authority, surely at any given moment of history it may rationally decline to affirmatively foster other policies in weighing the specific interests that it is required by statute to consider. This is especially true when the forum chosen by proponents of the other policy is not well suited to study of its implications.
The goal of minimal use of foreign oil is predicated upon fear of overdependence and the concomitant danger of economic dislocation by an actual or threatened cutoff. This very dispute demonstrates, however, that as long as substantial excess capacity remains available in an emergency--and Richmond does not propose any lasting dedication of capacity--the Commission by order or by persuasion can eliminate much of the need for oil in electrical generation. Thus the question of long-term displacement of imported petroleum could safely be left to later proceedings instigated by Richmond or the Commission itself, or indeed to resolution by Congress.
Moreover, while the Commission rebuffed a more positive march toward the goal of decreased consumption of foreign oil, it also rejected the means suggested by Richmond for achieving that end as either inefficacious or statutorily prohibited. If that action was well founded, the Commission's failure to weigh the requested objective could hardly amount to error. Thus, we turn to the specifics of Richmond's proposals.
C. Through Rates
Richmond's most imaginative demand was that the Commission modify the proposed schedules by the substitution of "through" transmission rates for coal-by-wire transactions. An understanding of this proposition requires some knowledge of the national electrical interconnection system, and thus we offer a brief explanation.
The United States is divided into a number of regions for purposes of interconnection. Many parts of the country are served by formal power pools, made up of interlinked utilities contracting to shunt electricity back and forth as needed. Each such pool has a central dispatcher in charge of interutility transfers and transmissions to other contiguous systems. Interpool transactions require a high degree of coordinated effort. NEPOOL, for example, might request electricity from the adjoining New York Power Pool (NYPP), which might fill the order and replace its surrendered energy by a transmission from the neighboring Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM). If PJM does not wish to start up oil-fired generators for that purpose, it may seek a transmission from the Allegheny Power System, located to the west. This process, which Richmond derisively labels a "daisy-chain," continues until it reaches a utility willing to employ its excess capacity to complete--or, from its perspective, to begin--the transaction. That utility is the supplier, and all intervening utilities are engaged in "wheeling" of electricity.
Such transfers normally occur at night or on weekends, when suppliers are more likely to have underused turbines and power lines. Traditionally, and under the schedules approved by the Commission, each utility or pool pays its neighbor for the service provided; a particular coal-by-wire transmission can involve four or more individual charges. If no supplier can be found or any needed intervening utility refuses to wheel, the entire transmission will fail. Quite understandably, no one lacking excess capacity is generally disposed to give power up until assured of a replacement amount from someone else.
Richmond proposed a single through rate for transmissions crossing multiple utilities or systems, with the participants later dividing the payment. This, it was argued, would allow supplier and ultimate purchaser to engage in "face-to-face" dealings and thus encourage use of coal by wire. Nonetheless, as the Commission pointed out, coordination is essential to assure balanced loading of transmission lines and consequently to avoid disruptions and blackouts. Unavoidably, then, each dispatch center must communicate directly with its neighbor in any case.
Moreover, as Richmond admits, through rates would be feasible only if the Commission could order all intervening utilities to wheel electricity; a bundle of electrons ordered by a purchaser simply cannot be put in the mail by a supplier. And such a rate would be advantageous to purchasers only if it were lower than the sum of the individual rates. Since purchasers are always free to subscribe to the services of willing utilities at the separate rates, the Commission's failure to establish through rates can be deemed arbitrary only if the individual rates were unjustly or unreasonably high and, as well, the utilities had a duty to wheel. Richmond separately contended for both of these propositions, to which we turn next.
D. Authority to Require Wheeling
No one now argues that the Commission has authority to mandate wheeling. As the Supreme Court recently held, the legislative history precludes that result: As originally conceived, Part II [of the Federal Power Act] would have included a "common carrier" provision making it "the duty of every public utility to .. transmit energy for any person upon reasonable request...." In addition, it would have empowered the Federal Power Commission to order wheeling if it found such action to be "necessary or desirable in the public interest." H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. These provisions were eliminated to preserve "the voluntary action of the utilities." S.Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 19.
It is clear, then, that Congress rejected a pervasive regulatory scheme for controlling the interstate distribution of power in favor of voluntary commercial relationships.
As we have indicated, both Richmond and Representative Harrington originally urged the Commission to directly order wheeling. As the Congressman put it, he would have " 'require[d] utilities to transmit power along their lines if capacity [was] fully available' " because "past reliance on voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities (Section 202(a)) by areas within the United States has not produced a rational power system...." Whether or not one is impressed by the possible benefits of a fully integrated national power grid, it is clear that Representative Harrington's arguments are better directed to his congressional colleagues than to the Commission, for only Congress can change what has been wrought by Section 202(a).
In this court Richmond seeks the same end through less direct means. Since the Commission may reject unreasonable rate proposals and fix acceptable rates instead, and since the utilities submitted to the Commission rates for voluntary wheeling, Richmond asserts that the Commission must have the power to condition its approval of those rates on continued, albeit involuntary, wheeling. This logic is superficially persuasive; the Commission does have authority to impose requirements and conditions "necessary or appropriate to promote the policies" of the Act. But such conditions may not contravene the Act, and the reasoning of Richmond's unstated minor premise, as we now explain, seeks to achieve exactly that.
Richmond assumes that the proffered rates were unreasonable because they did not guarantee that utilities will wheel. Yet Congress' as-yet unamended purpose was to indulge utilities that very freedom. If Congress had intended that utilities could inadvertently bootstrap themselves into common-carrier status by filing rates for voluntary service, it would not have bothered to reject mandatory wheeling in favor of a call for just such voluntary wheeling. What the Commission is prohibited from doing directly it may not achieve by indirection.
E. Recovery of Fixed Costs
On more traditional grounds, Richmond attacks the inclusion of fixed costs in the Commission's transmission rate calculations. The rationale is that fuel conservation service is in practice largely confined to nights and weekends and thus uses idle capacity, and that transmitting utilities do not dedicate capacity but rather can terminate transmissions on short notice. Thus Richmond would predicate the rates on variable costs because the service would not require the building of new facilities with accompanying fixed costs. Richmond also argues that fixed costs are fully reflected in the utilities' other rate schedules and that pro rata inclusion here would produce a windfall for them.
Richmond's contentions obviously would be doomed to failure had it succeeded in persuading the Commission to develop long-term fuel conservation measures featuring mandatory wheeling. Had that been done, and once such transfers became commonplace, utilities expectably would build new facilities to assure an adequate safeguard of excess capacity for their regular customers; fixed costs would thus become closely related to the service in question. The same response--and the same result--might be anticipated if long-term, large-scale voluntary wheeling became predictable. The Commission, however, has for now rejected coal by wire as more than a temporary expedient, and accordingly must justify the rates in light of the sporadic and transient nature of the service.
Without debating the logic behind the inclusion of fixed costs in situations of this sort, we must say that in this case the Commission has reached an informed and reasoned decision. We might observe generally that the science of utility ratemaking may not be so exact that, even if it were the rule that "reasonable" rates must be strictly cost-related, the allocation of fixed costs to short-term use of otherwise excess capacity could be considered unquestionably arbitrary. We need not reach that issue, however, because we find that it was within the Commission's discretion to conclude that Richmond's off-peak pricing theory was unacceptable on the facts of this case.
Although the utilities could cancel out on short notice, coal-by-wire service involved reservations of identifiable facilities. More importantly, transmitting systems such as PJM showed that their participation would often levy maximum loads on their facilities, thus imposing a ceiling on increased service to their standing customers, although supplying utilities might not be operating at capacity. And, as the Commission noted, even if some of the same fixed costs had already been allocated through another rate schedule, coal-by-wire transmission service should not be given a "free ride"; both federal and state regulatory agencies could always order corresponding changes in the rates for the utilities' normal consumers. This arrangement seems in accord with Congress' refusal to compel utilities to function as common carriers and its manifest intent that they meet their local obligations first.
To summarize, we find that substantial evidence supports the Commission's actions and that the rates approved fall within the statutorily-mandated zone of reasonableness. The Commission specifically left open the possibility of applying off-peak cost allocation methods when warranted, and in a separate rulemaking proceeding not here under challenge gave broader study to the theoretical principles generally applicable to rates in fuel-by-wire transactions. We think no more was required.
III. DISCRIMINATION
One last and analytically separate issue remains. Richmond has used these proceedings as a forum for its complaint of the alleged refusal of the American Electric Power System (AEP)--the Nation's largest--and its affiliate, Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. (I & M), to wheel Richmond's excess energy to coal-by-wire customers. Viewing itself, perhaps correctly, as David battling Goliath, Richmond argues that AEP and I & M are guilty of unlawful discrimination because they decline to transmit its power and instead wheel higher-priced electricity of another AEP member.
With contract negotiations ongoing between Richmond and I & M, the Commission's order of August 26, 1974, referred the dispute to the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and concluded that the parties should reconsider their positions in light of its rulings on Richmond's other contentions. The Commission also expressly held out "the opportunity to seek further Commission consideration and resolution of any remaining unresolved issue within the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction.... If there are then any outstanding unresolved issues within the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction, they will be set for hearing by a future Commission order."
Richmond's only response was to argue that
[t]he Commission has failed, and is failing, to order relief for Richmond which would assure that I & M will in fact purchase Richmond energy on a non-discriminatory basis, that I & M will provide transmission service for Richmond's available energy not purchased by I & M, and that I & M will sell to and transmit to Richmond conservation energy in the event of a coal shortage, at least on the same basis it provides such services to other utilities, and on the same basis such services are supplied among and between the AEP affiliates.
Thus Richmond spurned the opportunity to demonstrate that particular activities were unreasonably anticompetitive or discriminatory and claimed instead that the mere failure to wheel energy to and from Richmond while wheeling for any other utility was unlawful discrimination. With the issue thus narrowed, the Commission correctly ruled that since Congress made wheeling voluntary an individual decision to wheel for one customer but not for another is not automatically discriminatory. This rejection of a per se rule follows logically from the congressional refusal to impose common-carrier duties on electric utilities. Thus Richmond had an obligation, which it failed to meet, of presenting a prima facie case that I & M's actions were the result of anticompetitive intentions or, perhaps, were at least unreasonable.
Had Richmond made such a presentation, we would still be far from certain that the Commission's deferral of further consideration to a separate proceeding would have been error. Agencies have wide leeway in controlling their calendars, and Richmond was not complaining that any term of the approved schedules was itself anticompetitive. Richmond would have had to prove its allegations of undue discrimination in one arena or another, and we perceive no appreciable disadvantage to Richmond in consequence of the course that the Commission invited it to pursue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the objectives that Richmond has sought to realize in this ratemaking proceeding may have some merit, we remain convinced that on the whole the Commission dealt with them in a manner consistent with its statutory discretion. We are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the Commission. The orders reviewed herein must accordingly be affirmed.
So ordered.