Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Allison

11 L.R.A. 43, 12 S.E. 352, 86 Ga. 145, 1890 Ga. LEXIS 200
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedNovember 10, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 11 L.R.A. 43 (Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Allison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richmond & Danville Railroad v. Allison, 11 L.R.A. 43, 12 S.E. 352, 86 Ga. 145, 1890 Ga. LEXIS 200 (Ga. 1890).

Opinion

Simmons, Justice.

Allison sued the railroad company for damages, and obtained a verdict.- The railroad company moved for [147]*147a new trial, upon several grounds, which will be found in the official report. The view we take of the ease renders it unnecessary to discuss any of these grounds except the 5th and the 9th. The 5th is as follows:

Because the court erred in charging the j ury as follows: “ Another item of damages alleged by the plaintiff is for permanent injuries. lie says that he has been permanently injured, and by reason thereof his capacity to work and earn money by his labor throughout his future ,life has been practically destroyed. If this be true, he would be entitled to further compensation on that account. The burden is on the plaintiff to show the fact that his capacity to labor and earn money has been permanently impaired, and the extent of such impairment, or to furnish data to the jury from which they may be able to ascertain his fina?icial loss in this respect. In passing upon this question, you would ascertain from the evidence whether the plaintiff’s capacity to labor and earn money is in point of fact practically destroyed, or in part impaired, by his injuries, and if so, the extent of such impairment, and whether it will extend to the future, and through the remainder of his life; and if you so find, you will award him such a sum as you think reasonable and just in view of the evidence and the extent of such injury, and in view of all the facts and circumstances of this case as disclosed to you in the evidence. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff has not suffered any permanent injury as the result of the injuries mentioned in the evidence, you would not allow him anything in the way of damages for a permanent injury. No fixed rule exists for estimating this sort of damage. The plaintiff’s age, his habits, his strength, sex, vocation, the rate of wages earned by him in the past by his labor, his prospects of obtaining steady remunerative employment in the future, prospects of increased earnings in the future [148]*148by additional experience and skill required, if there be evidence on this point and that evidence in your opinion is definite -and tangible, these circumstances, in so far as they may be illustrated by the evidence, are all circumstances proper to be taken into account.”

The plaintiff in error objects to that portion of the charge set out which says, “No fixed rule exists for estimating this sort of damage,” and insists that a fixed rule does exist, to wit: that such a sum should be allowed the plaintiff as would make his future income the same as it would have been had he not been injured, taking into consideration the probabilities of disease, decreased capacity to labor and the duration of life. It is insisted that the charge as given puts no limit upon the-finding of the jury; that whilst it calls to their attention elements which they could consider, it does not restrict them by the fixation of a principle which should control their conclusion.

This court has considered this question upon different occasions, and in several cases has said that there is no “ Procrustean rule,” or fixed rule, in cases of this kind. See Ga. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Freeman, 88 Ga. 586; Central R. Co. v. Thompson, 76 Ga. 785; S. F. § W. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 71 Ga. 428(1), 446; Davis v. Central R. Co., 60 Ga. 329(4). The last case in which the question was considered was Georgia Pacific Rwy. Co. v. Freeman, supra, where the exact words complained of were approved by this court. Upon the request of counsel for the plaintiff in error, we allowed him to review that decision. We have carefully considered his argument, and have devoted much time to reading the text-books and reports of cases decided by other courts to ascertain if we could find any authority or decision holding that there is a fixed rule to be given to the jury which must control them in estimating the damages to a person who has been permanently injured by [149]*149the carelessness and negligence of a railroad company or natural person ; but we’ have been unable to find a decision of any court or a dictum of any text-writer holding that there is a fixed rule for measuring the damages in such cases. And in the nature of things it is impossible for a court to prescribe any fixed rule, because it is impossible to prove such exact 'data as would authorize a court to prescribe one. It is impossible for any witness to testify to the exact time that the injured person would have lived if he had not been injured; it is impossible to say whether the person would have remained in good health during his whole life, or whether he would have lost little or much time by sickness or idleness or the loss of an opportunity to labor; it is impossible to say whether he would have continued to earn the same amount of money during his whole life, whether he would have earned more and how much more, or less and how much less; whether he would have remained in the same occupation or would have abandoned that and pursued another more lucrative or less so. Unless these and other facts which might be enumerated could be shown the jury, we do not see how a fixed rule to measure the damages for a permanent injury could be prescribed to the jury. It may be said, however, that the life-tables put in evi-. dence would show a man’s expectancy of life, and that the amount he was earning at the time he was injured would be a sufficient basis upon which to prescribe such a rule; but we do not think that this would in all cases be fair either to the plaintifi or to the railroad company. If the plaintifi were a young man of character, capacity and industry, and had chosen his occupation and commenced its pursuit, his yearly income at first might be small, but in a few years he might be able to increase it very largely; yet, under the rule contended for, he would be confined during his life to the small income [150]*150he was making at the commencement. On the other hand, if the plaintiff were an aged or a middle-aged person making a large yearly income, it would be unfair to the railroad company to take that income and his expectancy of life as the sole basis to determine the amount of his recovery; because our experience shows that a man in declining years has not ordinarily the same capacity to labor and earn money as a young man. It is then that sickness, inability and indisposition to labor come upon him more and more each year as he grows older. These and like facts should then be taken into consideration by the jury in behalf of the railroad company. None of these things can be proved with such exactness as would authorize a court to prescribe a fixed rule.

As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Vicksburg, etc. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 554: “It has never been held that the rules to be derived from such tables or computations must be the absolute guides of the judgment and the conscience of the jury. On the contrary, in the important and much-considered case of Phillips v. London & Southwestern Railway, above cited, the judges strongly approved the usual practice of instructing the jury in general terms to award a fair and reasonable compensation, taking into consideration what the plaintiff’s income would probably have been, how long it would have lasted, and all the contingencies to which it was liable; and as strongly.

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Bluebook (online)
11 L.R.A. 43, 12 S.E. 352, 86 Ga. 145, 1890 Ga. LEXIS 200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richmond-danville-railroad-v-allison-ga-1890.