Reynolds v. Petrucci

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 29, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-03523·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BRIAN EDWARD REYNOLDS, Petitioner, 20-CV-3523 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND WARDEN PETRUCCI; THE CAPTAIN; LT. SUSNEY; LT. DEWIET; LT. SUDDLE, Respondents. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Petitioner, currently incarcerated at Otisville Correctional Facility, brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. By order dated June 4, 2020, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The Court directs Petitioner to file an amended petition within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in custody challenging the legality of his detention on the ground that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court has the authority to review the petition and “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled [to such relief].” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). BACKGROUND Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa of receiving and producing child pornography and enticing a minor to engage in sexual

activities, and he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms totaling 384 months). See United States v. Reynolds, No. 11-CR-42 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 15, 2012). In this petition, Petitioner alleges that he is being subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. According to Petitioner, he and other prisoners are suffering from illness and “allergy-type symptoms,” and are restricted to their cells for long periods of time, because of the presence of mold, “asbestos compounds,” leaks, and cold air. Also, there are no marked fire exits. After Petitioner complained, “numerous staff” retaliated against him by placing him in “wrongful segregation” and “shaking down[]” his cell and seizing his property. Petitioner asks for a hearing to present “inmate witnesses,” and he seeks “release and discharge of remainder of sentence” and damages. Petitioner asserts that he filed “sensitive BP-10s and BP-9s as part of administrative review process.” Petitioner moves for

appointment of pro bono counsel. DISCUSSION A. Petition for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Grounds and Exhaustion Petitioner seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Habeas corpus review is available for federal prisoners “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A petition challenging the execution of a prisoner’s sentence, such as “the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions,” is properly brought under § 2241. Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); Jabarah v. Garcia, No. 08–CV–3592 (DC), 2010 WL 3834663, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (“When a federal inmate is challenging the conditions of confinement, the proper vehicle for such a challenge is the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”); Ilina v. Zickefoose, 591 F. Supp.2d

145, 150 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that “the Second Circuit has repeatedly and consistently held § 2241 to be a proper vehicle for asserting conditions-of-confinement claims, without limitation”).1 Under Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, a habeas corpus petition must specify all of a petitioner’s available grounds for habeas corpus relief, set forth the facts supporting each of the specified grounds, and state the relief requested. A district court can apply these rules, which are applicable to habeas corpus petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to petitions brought under § 2241 as well. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. A petition for federal habeas corpus relief must permit the Court and the respondent to comprehend both the petitioner’s grounds for relief and the

underlying facts and legal theory supporting each ground so that the issues presented in the petition may be adjudicated. While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for a § 2241 petition, in this Circuit, exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally a prerequisite to habeas corpus relief under

1 “A writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 is available to a federal prisoner who does not challenge the legality of his sentence, but challenges instead its execution subsequent to his conviction.” Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons. 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that loss of good-time credits is properly challenged under section 2241 because it implicates a liberty interest that must be afforded at least minimal due-process protections). Courts in this Circuit have held, however, that claims based upon the loss of commissary and visitation privileges are not cognizable under § 2241. See Hernandez v. Lindsay, No. 08-CV- 1495, 2011 WL 3163078, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2011); Homen v. Hasty, 229 F. Supp. 2d 290, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Hinebaugh v. Wiley, 137 F. Supp. 2d 69, 76 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). § 2241. See Carmona, 243 F.3d at 634; United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1976). A federal prisoner seeking to challenge the conditions of his confinement must first utilize a four-step Administrative Remedy Program developed by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP).

Courts have also found that there are exceptions to the judicially created exhaustion requirement. See McPherson v. Lamont, No. 20-CV-0534 (JBA), 2020 WL 2198279, at *6 (D. Conn. May 6, 2020) (finding exhaustion requirement is “amenable to judge-made exceptions”) (quoting Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1857 (2016)).

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