Reinbold v. Evers

187 F.3d 348, 1999 WL 587881
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedAugust 5, 1999
DocketNos. 98-1896, 98-2780
StatusPublished
Cited by97 cases

This text of 187 F.3d 348 (Reinbold v. Evers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 1999 WL 587881 (4th Cir. 1999).

Opinion

Affirmed by published opinion, in which Judge Wilkins and Judge Jackson joined.

OPINION

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:

Thomas G. Reinbold (Reinbold)1 filed this action against the United States, the United States Department of Defense (DOD), the National Security Agency (NSA), the United States Navy (Navy),2 and four individual officials of the Navy and NSA (Commander Wayne K. Evers (Evers) (Navy ret.), Lieutenant Ronald D. Holt (Holt) (Navy ret.), Diana L. Healy (Healy) (NSA), and Dr. John M. Schmidt (Dr. Schmidt) (NSA)) alleging, inter alia, that the defendants conspired to unlawfully search and seize, and that Holt and Evers did unlawfully search and seize, him in violation of his rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (holding that an independent cause of action for monetary damages exists against federal officials, acting under color of federal law, who violate an individual’s constitutional rights). Reinbold also alleged that the defendants covered up their conspiracy by placing false psychological evaluations and incident reports in his records, possessed and maintained by the NSA. All .of Reinbold’s claims against all defendants were disposed of through pre-trial motions, and Reinbold now appeals those dispositions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

Reinbold is an employee of the NSA. In January 1992, Reinbold was assigned to the Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) at Sugar Grove, West Virginia (Sugar Grove), where he worked as a Contracting Officer Representative — Technical (COR-T). As a COR-T, Reinbold was responsible for: (1) tasking the on-site maintenance and engineering contractors; (2) evaluating the performance of contractors; and (3) assigning scores to the contractors’ evaluation results.

Pursuant to the Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA), see 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq., Reinbold, as well as each NSA employee, was required to satisfy mandatory security standards and be cleared for access to sensitive compartmented information (an SCI security clearance). See 50 U.S.C. [352]*352§§ 831-34. An SCI security clearance allows NSA employees access to information about sophisticated systems for collecting intelligence data as well as information actually collected. An SCI security clearance is only granted when “clearly consistent with national security.” 50 U.S.C. § 831. The criteria for access to SCI materials are established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). See 50 U.S.C. § 403 et seq. A document issued by the Director of the CIA on January 22, 1992, states that any individual considered for an SCI security clearance will be rigorously investigated and must be “stable, trustworthy, reliable, of excellent character, judgment and discretion, and of unquestionable loyalty to the United States.” (S.J.A. 294a).4 Any doubts regarding an applicant’s qualifications for an SCI security clearance must be resolved in favor of national security. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 831-34. Further, an NSA employee’s failure to maintain his or her SCI security clearance is grounds for removal from his or her position with the NSA. See id.

Individuals who are granted SCI security clearance are subject to briefings and debriefings to inform them of the security requirements, restrictions, and obligations that accompany their SCI security clearance. Briefings and debriefings occur: (1) when an individual is initially indoctrinated; (2) as periodic awareness enhancement is deemed necessary, timely, or appropriate; and (3) upon termination of an individual’s SCI security clearance. In addition, debriefings can occur when any situation arises “for which a special briefing/debriefing is required by the department/agency.” (J.A. 303). In addition, individuals who possess an SCI security clearance are subject to procedures, such as NSA/Central Security Service Regulation (NSA/CSS Reg.) No. 121-18, that govern access to sensitive compartmented information. NSA/CSS Reg. No. 121-18 provides, in relevant part, that:

6. Government furnished desks, safes, file cabinets, lockers, and other containers provided for the use of personnel assigned in controlled areas are for official use only. As such, they are subject to search under the following conditions:
a. During the course of an official investigation where a search of a specific container could assist the investigation;
b. During after-hours security inspections whenever a lockable container is found improperly secured; or
c. By a supervisor or designee for official purposes in the absence of the employee to which it is assigned.
16. The [Chief of the Office of Security] is responsible for:
c. The conduct of limited physical searches of persons, property, or vehicles upon entry to, while within, or upon exit from a controlled area.
(1) Searches may be performed to locate prohibited items and to preclude the inadvertent and unauthorized removal of controlled items or other unclassified government property.
(2) Searches of property will be limited to that in a person’s possession or control, and may include all paper items, boxes, briefcases, handbags, and similar containers.

(J.A. 320-324). In addition to these directives, a sign at the entrance to the Operations Site at Sugar Grove, at which Reinbold worked, stated: “WARNING RESTRICTED AREA — KEEP OUT. AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY. AUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO THIS RESTRICTED AREA CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO SEARCH OF PERSONNEL AND THE PROPERTY UNDER [353]*353THEIR CONTROL. INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950 SECTION 21 50 U.S.C. 797.” (J.A. 326).

Reinbold alleges that since he began work at Sugar Grove in January 1992, Navy managerial personnel interfered with the performance of his COR-T duties and the process of evaluating contractor performance. Reinbold further alleges that in July 1992, when Evers joined Sugar Grove as the officer in charge of the NAVSECGRU Detachment, he immediately attempted to interfere with Reinbold’s duties. In October 1992, Evers was promoted to the position of base commander at Sugar Grove and, as Reinbold contends, began to extend his influence over Rein-bold’s COR-T duties by pressuring Rein-bold to alter contractor performance evaluations. Reinbold also alleges that Evers himself altered contractor performance evaluations “by removing text in direct conflict with contracting regulations.” (J.A. 21).

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Bluebook (online)
187 F.3d 348, 1999 WL 587881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reinbold-v-evers-ca4-1999.