Raytheon Company v. United States

121 Fed. Cl. 135, 2015 WL 3473683
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJune 2, 2015
Docket15-77C
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 121 Fed. Cl. 135 (Raytheon Company v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raytheon Company v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 135, 2015 WL 3473683 (uscfc 2015).

Opinion

Bid Protest; Proposed Corrective Action Based on GAO Attorney’s Statements During an Outcome Prediction Conference; Scope of the Court’s Review; Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record; Motion to Strike Document From the Administrative Record; Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Ad^ministrative Record; Noncompliance With Solicitation’s Evaluation Scheme; Misleading and Unequal Discussions

OPINION AND ORDER

SWEENEY, Judge

In this bid protest, plaintiff Raytheon Company (“Raytheon”), the-contract awar-dee, challenges both the statements made by a Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) attorney during an outcome prediction conference held in conjunction with protests lodged by defendant-intervenors Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed”) and Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation (“Northrop”), and the decision of the awarding agency to take corrective action after hearing those statements. Presently before the court are Northrop’s motion to supplement the administrative record, Raytheon’s motion to strike a document from the administrative record, and the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. As explained more fully below, the court denies Northrop’s motion to supplement the administrative record, grants Raytheon’s motion to strike, denies Raytheon’s motion for judgment on the administrative record, and grants the remaining cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Earlier Phases of the Procurement

Several years ago, the United States Air Force (“Air Force”) initiated the Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (“3DELRR”) acquisition program to replace its existing AN/TPS-75 radar system. 1 AR *139 38928-29. The first phase of the program— the Technology Development phase — included two risk reduction periods. Id. at 38929-30. During the first risk reduction period, two contractors built and demonstrated radar system prototypes. Id. For the second risk reduction period, also referred to as the pre-Engineering and Manufacturing Development (“pre-EMD”) period, the Air Force awarded contracts to Raytheon, Northrop, and Lockheed to complete preliminary design reviews of their radar systems and demonstrate their prototypes. Id. at 38929, 38931.'

During both risk reduction periods in the Technology Development phase, a team of independent subject-matter experts (“independent review team”) with expertise in-radar system design, hardware, software, testing, and signal processing performed a Technology Readiness Assessment of each radar system. Id. at .2377-79, 38930-31, 40614, 40625. The assessment began with the identification of the radar system’s critical technology elements (“CTEs”). Id. at 2377-78, 40614. The independent review team used the following definition to guide its identification of CTEs:

“A technology element is ‘critical’ if the system being acquired depends on this technology element to meet operational requirements (within acceptable cost and schedule limits) and if the technology element or its application is. either new or novel or in an area that poses major technological risk during detailed design or demonstration.”

Id. at 40625 (quoting Department of Defense, Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook (“TRA Deskbook”). 1-1 (July 2009) 2 ); see also id. at 2382 (“[T]he technologies of interest here are not routine engineering or integration risk elements. They are items that require more than the normal engineering development that would occur in design for production as opposed to technology maturity programs.” (Department of Defense, Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Guidance (“TRA Guidance”) 2-11 (Apr. 2011))). Once the CTEs were identified, the independent review team evaluated the technological maturity of each CTE and then assigned each CTE a Technology Readiness Level (“TRL”). Id. at 2378-79, 38930-31, 40614. As set forth in Interim Department of Defense Instruction (“DoDI”) 5000.02 (Nov. 26, 2013), TRLs are meant to “be used to benchmark technology risk,” but are “rough benchmarks, and not conclusive about the degree of risk mitigation needed prior to development.” Id. at 40398 (Interim DoDI 5000.02, § 5.d(4)(b)(3)). Indeed, TRLs “can serve as helpful knowledge-based standard and shorthand for evaluating technology maturity, but they must be supplemented with expert professional judgment.” Id. at 2371 (TRA Guidance 1-1); accord id. at 2377 (“TRLs will be used as a knowledge-based standard or benchmark but should not substitute for professional judgment tailored to the specific circumstances of the program.” (TRA Guidance 2-5)). With respect to the 3DELRR procurement, the contractors were required - during the Technology Development phase to produce and demonstrate a functioning radar system prototype in which all CTEs were assigned a TRL of at least six. Id. at 40626. A CTE would be considered to be TRL 6 if the “[sjystem/subsystem model or prototype” was “demonstrat[ed] in a relevant environment.” Id. at 2385 (TRA Guidance 2-13).

At the conclusion of the pre-EMD period, after the demonstrations of the radar system prototypes, the independent review team prepared a Technology Readiness Assessment report for each contractor. Id. at 40614. In its report for Raytheon, the team described Raytheon’s proposed radar system as being composed of [...] subsystems. Id. at 40617. One of those subsystems, the [...] subsystem, included the antenna assembly, which consisted of [...] Transmit/Receive Line Replaceable Units (“TRLRUs”) [...]. Id. at 40619, 40631. Each TRLRU contained [...]. Id. at 40631. And, each T/R module consisted of [¶]... ], a circulator, [...], a gallium nitride high power amplifier (“GaN *140 HPA”), [...]. 3 Id. at 40631. Some of the components of each T/R module [...], while the circulators [...]. Id. at 40631. The following figure depicts Raytheon’s TRLRU: [•••]

Id.

The independent review team identified six CTEs for Raytheon’s radar system; of relevance here is Raytheon’s CTE 1, the Gallium Nitride High Power Amplifier [...] (“GaN HPA [...]”). Id. at 40614. The team described this CTE as a “[... ].” 4 Id. at 40630-31. It provided the following rationale for identifying the GaN HPA [...] as a CTE:

Id. at 40632; see also id,, at 40632-36 (describing test results for the TRLRU, [ ... ], [...], and [...]). In other words, notwithstanding its initial description of CTE 1 as the GaN HPA [...], the independent review team considered the GaN HPA and [...] as the new and novel critical technologies that required TRL assessment. Id. at 40632.

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121 Fed. Cl. 135, 2015 WL 3473683, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raytheon-company-v-united-states-uscfc-2015.