Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington

433 U.S. 165, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 53 L. Ed. 2d 667, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 138, 7 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20558

Opinions

Mr. Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On April 8, 1975, after more than 12 years of litigation, including two decisions by this Court,¹ the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Pierce County entered a judgment against the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. That judgment recited that the court had jurisdiction to regulate the fishing activities of the Tribe both on and off its reservation, and limited the number of steelhead trout that members of the Tribe may catch with nets in the Puyallup River each year. The Tribe was directed to file a list of members authorized to exercise treaty fishing rights, and to report to the Washington State Department of Game, and to the court, the number of steelhead caught by its treaty fishermen each week. The judgment, with a slight modification, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington, 86 Wash. 2d 664, 548 P. 2d 1058 (1976).

The Tribe, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, contends in this Court that the doctrine of sovereign immunity requires that the judgment be vacated, and that the state courts of Washington are without jurisdiction to regulate fishing activities on its reservation. The Tribe also argues that the limitation of the steelhead catch imposed by those courts is not, in any event, a necessary conservation measure. We hold that insofar as the claim of sovereign immunity is advanced on behalf of the Tribe, rather than the individual defendants, it is well founded, but we reject petitioner Tribe’s other contentions.

I

The complaint as originally filed by respondent Department of Game of the State of Washington (hereafter respondent),² named 41 individuals, including “John Doe and Jane Doe, members [of the Tribe],” ³ as defendants. It alleged that the defendants, claiming to be immune from the State’s conservation laws, were fishing extensively in the Puyallup River with set nets and drift nets in a manner which would virtually exterminate the anadromous fishery if not enjoined. Anadro-mous fish are those which spend most of their life in the open sea, but which return as adults to freshwater streams, such as the Puyallup River, to spawn. The steelhead is an anadro-mous fish. The prayer of the complaint sought a declaration that the defendants were bound to obey the State’s conservation laws and an injunction against netting the runs of anadromous fish.

The trial court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining each of the defendants from netting fish in the Puyallup River, and directing that service be made on each defendant.

In response, a “Return on Temporary Restraining Order and Answer to Complaint” was filed by “the PUYALLUP TRIBE of INDIANS, by and through the Chairman of the Tribal Council, MR. JEROME MATHESON.” App. in Puyallup I, O. T. 1967, No. 247, p. 8 (hereafter App. in Puyallup I). The return and answer used the term “tribe” in two senses, first as a collective synonym for the individual defendant-members,⁴ and also as referring to a sovereign Indian nation.⁵ It asserted an exclusive right to the fish in the Puyallup River, describing that right somewhat ambiguously as a “property right which belongs to the Tribe and is exercised by the Tribe members under the Treaty of Medicine Creek.” Ibid. Therefore, while filed in the name of the Tribe, the return and answer was also tendered on behalf of the individual defendants.⁶

Throughout this long litigation the Tribe has continued to participate in the dual capacity of a sovereign entity⁷ and as a representative of its members who were individual defendants.⁸ The Tribe has repeatedly asserted its sovereign immunity from suit, arguing that neither it nor Congress has waived that immunity.⁹

In Puyallup I, we addressed the problems of tribal immunity and state-court jurisdiction in a footnote:

“Petitioners in No. 247 argue that the Washington courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain an action against the tribe without the consent of the tribe or the United States Government (citing United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, and Turner v. United States, 248 U. S. 354), viewing the suit as one to ‘extinguish a Tribal communal fishing right guaranteed by federal Treaty.’ This case, however, is a suit to enjoin violations of state law by individual tribal members fishing off the reservation. As such, it is analogous to prosecution of individual Indians for crimes committed off reservation lands, a matter for which there has been no grant of exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.” 391 U. S. 392, 396-397, n. 11.

Thus, Puyallup I settled an important threshold question in this case — regardless of tribal sovereign immunity, individual defendant-members of the Puyallup Tribe remain amenable to the process of the Washington courts in connection with fishing activities occurring off their reservation. That conclusion was predicated on two separate propositions worthy of restatement here.

First, even though the individual defendants were members of the Tribe and therefore entitled to the benefits of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, that treaty as construed by this Court does not confer the complete individual immunity they claim. The State may qualify the Indians’ right to fish “at all usual and accustomed places.” Specifically, we held that the “manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians.” Id., at 398.

Second, whether or not the Tribe itself may be sued in a state court without its consent or that of Congress, a suit to enjoin violations of state law by individual tribal members is permissible. The doctrine of sovereign immunity which was applied in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, does not immunize the individual members of the Tribe.¹⁰

Although only the Tribe had entered an appearance in this Court in Puyallup I, because of its representation of its individual members, jurisdiction over the individuals existed. And since the state court’s jurisdiction over the individual members was settled by Puyallup I, neither in that review nor in Puyallup II was any further consideration given to the status of the Tribe itself as a sovereign. It was after our decision in Puyallup II, when the trial court was required to determine the portion of the steelhead run that could be allocated to net fishing by the members of the Tribe, that the state court first entered an order which, in terms, is directed to the Tribe rather than to the individual defendants. That order places a limit on the number of steelhead which all members of the Tribe may catch with nets, and also directs the Tribe to identify the members engaged in the steelhead fishery and to report the number of fish they catch each week. In the trial court, in the Supreme Court of Washington, and in this Court, the Tribe has attacked that order as an infringement on its sovereign immunity to which neither it nor Congress has consented.

The attack is well founded. Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe. This Court, United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra; the Washington Supreme Court, see, e. g., State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 57 Wash. 2d 181, 182-185, 356 P. 2d 985, 987-988 (1960); and the commentators, see, e. g., U. S. Dept. of Interior, Federal Indian Law 491-494 (1958), all concur. Respondent does not argue that either the Tribe or Congress has waived its claim of immunity or consented to the entry of an order against it. And certainly, the mere fact that the Tribe has appeared on behalf of its individual members does not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity for the Tribe itself.

On the other hand, the successful assertion of tribal sovereign immunity in this case does not impair the authority of the state court to adjudicate the rights of the individual defendants over whom it properly obtained personal jurisdiction. That court had jurisdiction to decide questions relating to the allocation between the hatchery fish and the natural run, the size of the catch the tribal members may take in their nets, their right to participate in hook-and-line fishing without paying state license fees and without having fish so caught diminish the size of their allowable net catch, and like questions. Only the portions of the state-court order that involve relief against the Tribe itself must be vacated in order to honor the Tribe’s valid claim of immunity.

II

The Tribe vigorously argues that the majority of its members’ netting of steelhead takes place inside its reservation,¹¹ and that, while our prior adjudications settled respondent’s right to regulate off-reservation fishing in the interest of conservation, neither respondent nor the state court has jurisdiction over on-reservation fishing. The Tribe relies on both the Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132, and federal pre-emption of on-reservation Indian affairs, see Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 147-148.

Article II of the Treaty of Medicine Creek provided that the Puyallup Reservation was to be “set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their exclusive use” and that no “white man [was to] be permitted to reside upon the same without permission of the tribe and the superintendent or agent.” It is argued that these words amount to a reservation of a right to fish free of state interference. Such an interpretation clashes with the subsequent history of the reservation and the facts of this case. Pursuant to two Acts of Congress, 27 Stat. 633, and c. 1816, 33 Stat. 565, the Puyal-lups alienated, in fee simple absolute, all but 22 acres of their 18,000 acre reservation. None of the 22 acres abuts on the Puyallup River.¹² Neither the Tribe nor its members continue to hold Puyallup River fishing grounds for their “exclusive use.” On the contrary, it is undisputed that non-Indian licensees of respondent fish in great numbers within the reservation, and under the close supervision of respondent’s wardens.¹³

Although it is conceded that the State of Washington exercises civil and criminal jurisdiction within the reservation for most purposes," petitioner contends that it may not do so with respect to fishing.¹⁴ Again with particular reference to the facts of this case, we also reject this contention.

Our construction of the Treaty of Medicine Creek in Puyallu-p I makes it perfectly clear that although the State may not deny the Indians their right to fish “at all usual and accustomed” places, the treaty right is to be exercised “in common with all citizens of the Territory.” We squarely held that “the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive one.” 391 U. S., at 398. Rather, the exercise of that right was subject to reasonable regulation by the State pursuant to its power to conserve an important natural resource.

In Puyallup II we directed the Washington State courts to devise a formula pursuant to which the steelhead catch could be “fairly apportioned” between Indian net fishing and non-Indian sport fishing. No such fair apportionment could be effective if the Indians retained the power to take an unlimited number of anadromous fish within the reservation. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas plainly stated that the power of the State is adequate to assure the survival of the steelhead:

“We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the very last steelhead in the river. Rights can be controlled by the need to conserve a species; and the time may come when the life of a steelhead is so precarious in a particular stream that all fishing should be banned until

the species regains assurance of survival. The police power of the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets.” 414 U. S., at 49.

The resource being regulated is indigenous to the Puyallup River. Virtually all adult steelhead in the river have returned after being spawned or planted by respondent upstream from the boundaries of the original Puyallup Reservation, which encompass the lowest seven miles of the river. Though it would be decidedly unwise, if Puyallup treaty fishermen were allowed untrammeled on-reservation fishing rights, they could interdict completely the migrating fish run and “pursue the last living [Puyallup River] steelhead until it enters their nets." Ibid.15 In this manner the treaty fishermen could totally frustrate both the jurisdiction of the Washington courts and the rights of the non-Indian citizens of Washington recognized in the Treaty of Medicine Creek.¹⁶ In practical effect, therefore, the petitioner is reasserting the right to exclusive control of the steelhead run that was unequivocally rejected in both Puyallup I and Puyallup II. At this stage of this protracted litigation, we are unwilling to re-examine those unanimous decisions or to render their holdings virtually meaningless. We therefore reject petitioner’s claim to an exclusive right to take steelhead while passing through its reservation.

Ill

Finally, petitioner states that the courts below have failed to apply a standard of conservation necessity in fashioning relief. We disagree. The trial court, on remand from our decision in Puyallup II, conducted a two-week trial which was dominated by expert testimony for both parties. From the testimony and accompanying exhibits the court determined the number of steelhead in the river and how many could be taken without diminishing the number in future years; the court then allocated 45% of the annual natural steelhead run available for taking to the treaty fishermen’s net fishery.¹⁷ The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, 86 Wash. 2d, at 684-687, 548 P. 2d, at 1072-1073. This is precisely what we mandated in Puyallup II, 414 U. S., at 48-49. In the absence of a focused attack on some portion of the Washington courts’ factual determinations, we find no ground for disagreeing with them.¹⁸

A practical problem is presented by our disposition. The limitation on the size of the net catch applies to all members of the Tribe. The respondent has no interest in how the catch is allocated among the Indians; its concern is with the total number of steelhead netted during each season, with obtaining information to make it possible to recommend a proper allocation in succeeding years, and with enforcement against individuals who may net fish after the allowable limit has been reached. On the other hand, the Tribe has a separate interest in affording equitable treatment to its members and in protecting those members from any mistaken enforcement efforts. For that reason, although it properly resists the authority of the state court to order it to provide information with respect to the status of enrolled members of the Tribe and the size of their catch, it may find that its members’ interests are best served by voluntarily providing such information to respondent and to the court in order to minimize the risk of an erroneous enforcement effort. The state courts must continue to accord full respect to the Tribe’s right to participate in the proceedings on behalf of its members as it has in the past without treating such participation as qualifying its right to claim immunity as a sovereign.

The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Washington for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.

It is so ordered.

Footnotes

1

In Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 391 U. S. 392 (Puyallup I), the Court held that Art. Ill of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1133, did not foreclose reasonable state regulation, in the interest of conservation, of fishing by the Indians “in common with” fishing by others; the Court remanded the case to the state court to determine whether a total ban on net fishing was justified by the interest in conservation.

In Washington Game Dept. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (Puyallup II), the Court held that a complete ban on net fishing for steelhead trout by the Indians was precluded by the treaty, and remanded for a determination of the number of catchable fish that should be apportioned to an Indian net fishery.

2

Respondent regulates steelhead fishing in the State of Washington. The Washington Department of Fisheries was a coplaintiff with respondent in the original complaint by virtue of its responsibility for salmon fishing. After this Court's decision in Puyallup I, the Department of Fisheries amended its regulation to allow members of the Tribe to use a net fishery for salmon. No issue relating to salmon fishing remains in the case.

3

Three of the named individuals were further identified as tribal officers.

4

1, e., “Answering Paragraph No. 1 these defendants being a tribe of Indians . . . App. in Puyallup I, p. 8; “the defendants have suffered numerous arrests, jailing and other indignities at the hands of the plaintiffs who knowingly and wilfully badger, abuse and degrade the defendants . . . ,” id., at 9; “[t]hat the plaintiffs are recklessly using the power of the State of Washington to deprive the defendant [sic] and each of them of their means of making a livelihood . . . ,” id., at 10.

5

1. e., “this Tribe of Indians signed a treaty with the United States of America as a sovereign nation of Indians . . “the Puyallup Tribe' of Indians own the fish in the river ....’’ Ibid.

6

The trial court so found: “Defendants answered and alleged that they were members of the Puyallup Tribe of Indians ....’’ Id., at 31, Finding of Fact I.

7

The Tribe has been described several ways in the captions which have been filed over the years. In. this Court this Term the Tribe has described itself as “Puyallup Tribe, Inc.” The Washington Supreme Court has thrice noted that there is no such entity, see 86 Wash. 2d 664, 666 n. 1, 548 P. 2d 1058, 1062 n. 1 (1975). In Puyallup I the trial court held that the Tribe had ceased to exist; this holding was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court, 70 Wash. 2d 245, 252-253, 422 P. 2d 754, 758-759 (1967). It has therefore been settled in this case that, whatever its correct name may be, the Tribe is still in existence and is clearly recognized as such by the United States.

In this Court Ramona Bennett is a copetitioner with the Tribe. She appears in her capacity as chairwoman of the Puyallup Tribal Council. Accordingly, we treat this case as though the Tribe itself is the only petitioner in this Court and hereafter use the term "petitioner” to refer to the Tribe.

8

On a few occasions individual tribal members have been represented by attorneys who filed appearances in the Superior Court for Pierce County. On at least two occasions attorneys have filed appearances in the Washington Supreme Court in this capacity. No such appearance has been filed since the decision in Puyallup II in 1973. No appearance on behalf of an individual defendant was ever filed in this Court. Nor does the record reveal any instance of an objection to the Tribe’s representation of the individual defendants. It is clear from the record that the major responsibility for the defense of the litigation has been assumed by the Tribe.

9

It has relied on Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, and United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506. Only twice in this litigation has petitioner failed to clearly raise the issue of its tribal sovereign immunity. The first time was in its first return and answer, supra, at 168— 169. The immunity issue was later presented to the trial court, however, and the court, in the course of concluding that the Puyallup Tribe had ceased to exist, held in its memorandum decision that “this argument about the tribe being a sovereign nation is without merit.” App. in Puyallup I, p. 18. As already noted, n. 7, supra, the trial court’s holding that the Tribe had ceased to exist was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court. Second, during the representation of the Tribe by the Solicitor General before this Court in Puyallup II, no mention was made of tribal sovereign immunity. Congress has not given the Solicitor General authority to waive the immunity of an Indian tribe. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, at 513; cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 466-470.

10

That case involved an action brought in a federal court by the United States on behalf of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations to recover royalties under a mineral lease; defendant was the lessee’s surety. In an earlier bankruptcy proceeding, the lessee had obtained a judgment for $9,060.90 pursuant to a cross-claim against the same tribes. In the Fidelity case the lessee’s surety pleaded the earlier judgment as a bar to recovery in the action for royalties. We held that the earlier judgment was void in the absence of congressional authorization for a suit, 309 U. S., at 512-513. There were no individual parties to the proceeding.

11

The continued existence of the Puyallup Reservation has been a matter of dispute on which we express no opinion. The Ninth Circuit, relying on our decision in Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481, held that the reservation did still exist, United States v. Washington, 496 P. 2d 620 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1032. That decision predates our consideration of DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S. 425, and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584.

12

70 Wash. 2d, at 253, 422 P. 2d, at 759 (Puyallup I). Counsel for petitioner intimated at oral argument that petitioner-might contend in the future that it retained trust status title to the bed of the Puyallup River, Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. This contention is at odds with the otherwise uncon-tradicted findings below.

13

The tribal members’ right to fish “at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations,” secured by Art. Ill of the treaty, continues to protect their right to fish on ceded lands within the confines of the reservation.

14

Washington has acquired “Pub. L. 280” jurisdiction over the Puyallup Reservation, much of which coexists with the city of Tacoma. Pub. L. No. 280, §7, 67 Stat. 590; Wash. Rev. Code §§37.12.010-37.12.070 (1974). A provision of Pub. L. 280 exempts treaty fishing rights from state jurisdiction, however; 18 U. S. C. § 1162 (b).

15

The original complaint in this case alleged that, “[a]s a result of the defendants' fishery, the anadromous fish runs of the Puyallup River will be virtually exterminated if said fishery is permitted to continue.” App. in Puyallup I, p. 6.

The ability of the on-reservation activity to completely destroy the resource in question has not been a factor in other cases which have rejected regulation, Arnett v. Five Gill Nets, 48 Cal. App. 3d 454, 463-464, 121 Cal. Rptr. 906, 912-913 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 907 (on remand from this Court, Mattz v. Arnett, supra, where the on-reservation fishing regulation question was reserved, 412 U. S., at 485); People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N. W. 2d 375 (1971); State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P. 2d 135 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 937; State v. McConville, 65 Idaho 46, 139 P. 2d 485 (1943).

16

“Article III. The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory.” 10 Stat. 1133. As to the treaty fishermen, this sentence effects a reservation of a previously exclusive right. But that language also recognizes that the right is to be shared in common with the non-Indian “citizens of the Territory.”

17

The courts below also held that the run of hatchery fish introduced into the Puyallup by respondent was not available to the treaty fishermen. The issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari, nor was it argued in petitioner’s brief. Respondent did attempt to raise the issue in its untimely cross-petition for certiorari, and by its brief arguing affirmance. Because the question has no bearing on our decision of the questions presented by petitioner, we decline to decide it.

18

But for the direction of relief against the Tribe, the order of the Superior Court is admirably narrow in scope and well suited to effect a minimum of intrusion upon the treaty fishermen’s protected rights. The treaty fishermen are free to fish up to the limit imposed by the court without any restriction as to time, place, or method of fishing.