WIEAND, Judge:
The issue in this appeal is whether a “dirt bike”, which cannot be licensed under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code,1 is a motorcycle for purposes of applying the provision of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act2 which disallows recovery of no-fault benefits by operators of motorcycles. The trial court held that a dirt bike was a motorcycle and that, although the bike operator had been killed in a collision with a licensed motor vehicle, the admin-istratrix of the deceased operator’s estate was ineligible to recover survivor’s benefits under the No-fault law. We conclude that the dirt bike was not a motorcycle and reverse.
On August 18, 1981, John J. Pistorius, a thirteen year old youth, was operating a Yamaha MX100 dirt bike along a township road in Sugarcreek Township, Armstrong County, when he came into collision with a truck being driven by Raymond Crawford. Pistorius died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision. Neither the dirt bike nor the truck was covered by insurance. Mary Pistorius, the deceased boy’s mother and administratrix of his estate, made a claim for basic loss benefits under the Assigned Claims Plan of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. The claim was assigned to The Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers). Travelers denied liability. It contended that the decedent had been operating a motorcycle and that, therefore, his administratrix could not recover no-fault benefits under the Act. A civil action followed. [530]*530When the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers, an appeal was filed in this Court.
“Basic loss benefits,” as defined by the No-fault Act, are payable to persons who incur loss due to injuries arising out of an accident involving the “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” No-fault Act, supra, § 103, 40 P.S. § 1009.103. However, the Act specifically excludes recovery by victims whose loss has been sustained while operating or riding on a motorcycle. With respect to operators of motorcycles, the Act retains a system of tort liability for injuries which have been sustained. No-fault Act, supra, § 301(a)(6), 40 P.S. § 1009.301(a)(6). The Act does not define the term motorcycle. Our task, therefore, is to ascertain whether the legislature intended to bar drivers of dirt bikes from recovering no-fault benefits when it denied benefits to operators of motorcycles.
A statute must be read to effect its general purpose. Busy Beaver Building Centers, Inc. v. Tueche, 295 Pa.Super. 504, 512, 442 A.2d 252, 256 (1981). Words and phrases used by the legislature are to be construed according to their common meaning and accepted usage, with technical words being given their technical meaning. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 317 Pa.Super. 497, 502, 464 A.2d 431, 434 (1983). However, individual provisions in a comprehensive legislative scheme should not be read abstractly, but rather with a view to their place in the entire structure. Commonwealth v. Davis, 330 Pa.Super. 551, 558, 479 A.2d 1041, 1045 (1984), allocatur granted (February 7, 1985); Anatanovich v. Allstate Insurance Co., 320 Pa.Super. 322, 338, 467 A.2d 345, 353 (1983), aff'd, 507 Pa. 68, 488 A.2d 571 (1985).
The Supreme Court, in Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975), upheld the validity of the legislature’s decision to treat motorcycles differently than other motor vehicles for purposes of providing basic loss benefits to accident victims. The Court did not then define a “motorcycle” for purposes of excluding coverage but did observe that “[mjotorcycles are ‘motor vehicles’ for the purpose of [531]*531compulsory insurance although they are excluded under subsection 301(a)(6) of the Act. No-fault benefits are, therefore, available to third persons injured by a motorcycle.” Id., 464 Pa. at 406 n. 29, 346 A.2d at 907 n. 29 (citations omitted).
Travelers argued in the trial court, as it does on appeal, that the Yamaha MX100 dirt bike is virtually identical to a motorcycle. Photographs produced during depositions suggest a similarity. However, the dirt bike has been designed for recreational use and not for use on public highways. It has no headlights, no taillight, no horn, no turn signals, no mirror, and no speedometer. Because it lacks these features, the dirt bike cannot be licensed under the Vehicle Code. Thus, it is not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. See: 40 P.S. § 1009.103.
In Bindernagel v. Nationwide Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 335 Pa.Super. 419, 484 A.2d 773 (1984), a panel of this Court held that a trail bike was not a motor vehicle. Therefore, it held, a trail bike is not within the ambit of the No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. With this conclusion we agree. See also: Siefert v. Nationwide Insurance, 289 Pa.Super. 160, 432 A.2d 1101 (1981) (trail bike); Bills v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 317 Pa.Super. 188, 463 A.2d 1148 (1983) (dune buggy). Compare: Gallo v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co., 328 Pa.Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984) (snowmobile). Having concluded that a trail bike was not a motor vehicle, the Bindernagel court then concluded that there could be no recovery of no-fault benefits. Overlooked by the Court, apparently because it had not been argued, was the fact that Bindernagel’s trail bike had come into collision with a motor vehicle. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the trail bike was a “motorcycle.”
In the instant case, however, we cannot avoid determining this issue, i.e., whether a dirt bike is a motorcycle. Even if appellant’s decedent was not operating a motor vehicle, it is clear that he was nevertheless a victim of a [532]*532motor vehicle accident. While operating a dirt bike, he came into collision with a licensed truck, which was a motor vehicle. As a result of this collision with a motor vehicle, the decedent received injuries which caused his death. If the decedent was operating a motorcycle, his estate is not entitled to recover benefits under the No-fault Act. If his dirt bike was not a motorcycle, however, the statute does not bar a recovery of benefits. In that event the decedent occupies under the No-fault Act a status similar to that of a bicyclist or pedestrian who has been struck by a motor vehicle.
Our examination of the No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act leads us inevitably to the conclusion that to be an operator of a motorcycle, as envisioned by the exclusionary language of the statute, one must be operating a motor vehicle.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
WIEAND, Judge:
The issue in this appeal is whether a “dirt bike”, which cannot be licensed under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code,1 is a motorcycle for purposes of applying the provision of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act2 which disallows recovery of no-fault benefits by operators of motorcycles. The trial court held that a dirt bike was a motorcycle and that, although the bike operator had been killed in a collision with a licensed motor vehicle, the admin-istratrix of the deceased operator’s estate was ineligible to recover survivor’s benefits under the No-fault law. We conclude that the dirt bike was not a motorcycle and reverse.
On August 18, 1981, John J. Pistorius, a thirteen year old youth, was operating a Yamaha MX100 dirt bike along a township road in Sugarcreek Township, Armstrong County, when he came into collision with a truck being driven by Raymond Crawford. Pistorius died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision. Neither the dirt bike nor the truck was covered by insurance. Mary Pistorius, the deceased boy’s mother and administratrix of his estate, made a claim for basic loss benefits under the Assigned Claims Plan of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. The claim was assigned to The Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers). Travelers denied liability. It contended that the decedent had been operating a motorcycle and that, therefore, his administratrix could not recover no-fault benefits under the Act. A civil action followed. [530]*530When the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers, an appeal was filed in this Court.
“Basic loss benefits,” as defined by the No-fault Act, are payable to persons who incur loss due to injuries arising out of an accident involving the “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” No-fault Act, supra, § 103, 40 P.S. § 1009.103. However, the Act specifically excludes recovery by victims whose loss has been sustained while operating or riding on a motorcycle. With respect to operators of motorcycles, the Act retains a system of tort liability for injuries which have been sustained. No-fault Act, supra, § 301(a)(6), 40 P.S. § 1009.301(a)(6). The Act does not define the term motorcycle. Our task, therefore, is to ascertain whether the legislature intended to bar drivers of dirt bikes from recovering no-fault benefits when it denied benefits to operators of motorcycles.
A statute must be read to effect its general purpose. Busy Beaver Building Centers, Inc. v. Tueche, 295 Pa.Super. 504, 512, 442 A.2d 252, 256 (1981). Words and phrases used by the legislature are to be construed according to their common meaning and accepted usage, with technical words being given their technical meaning. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 317 Pa.Super. 497, 502, 464 A.2d 431, 434 (1983). However, individual provisions in a comprehensive legislative scheme should not be read abstractly, but rather with a view to their place in the entire structure. Commonwealth v. Davis, 330 Pa.Super. 551, 558, 479 A.2d 1041, 1045 (1984), allocatur granted (February 7, 1985); Anatanovich v. Allstate Insurance Co., 320 Pa.Super. 322, 338, 467 A.2d 345, 353 (1983), aff'd, 507 Pa. 68, 488 A.2d 571 (1985).
The Supreme Court, in Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975), upheld the validity of the legislature’s decision to treat motorcycles differently than other motor vehicles for purposes of providing basic loss benefits to accident victims. The Court did not then define a “motorcycle” for purposes of excluding coverage but did observe that “[mjotorcycles are ‘motor vehicles’ for the purpose of [531]*531compulsory insurance although they are excluded under subsection 301(a)(6) of the Act. No-fault benefits are, therefore, available to third persons injured by a motorcycle.” Id., 464 Pa. at 406 n. 29, 346 A.2d at 907 n. 29 (citations omitted).
Travelers argued in the trial court, as it does on appeal, that the Yamaha MX100 dirt bike is virtually identical to a motorcycle. Photographs produced during depositions suggest a similarity. However, the dirt bike has been designed for recreational use and not for use on public highways. It has no headlights, no taillight, no horn, no turn signals, no mirror, and no speedometer. Because it lacks these features, the dirt bike cannot be licensed under the Vehicle Code. Thus, it is not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. See: 40 P.S. § 1009.103.
In Bindernagel v. Nationwide Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 335 Pa.Super. 419, 484 A.2d 773 (1984), a panel of this Court held that a trail bike was not a motor vehicle. Therefore, it held, a trail bike is not within the ambit of the No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. With this conclusion we agree. See also: Siefert v. Nationwide Insurance, 289 Pa.Super. 160, 432 A.2d 1101 (1981) (trail bike); Bills v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 317 Pa.Super. 188, 463 A.2d 1148 (1983) (dune buggy). Compare: Gallo v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co., 328 Pa.Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984) (snowmobile). Having concluded that a trail bike was not a motor vehicle, the Bindernagel court then concluded that there could be no recovery of no-fault benefits. Overlooked by the Court, apparently because it had not been argued, was the fact that Bindernagel’s trail bike had come into collision with a motor vehicle. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the trail bike was a “motorcycle.”
In the instant case, however, we cannot avoid determining this issue, i.e., whether a dirt bike is a motorcycle. Even if appellant’s decedent was not operating a motor vehicle, it is clear that he was nevertheless a victim of a [532]*532motor vehicle accident. While operating a dirt bike, he came into collision with a licensed truck, which was a motor vehicle. As a result of this collision with a motor vehicle, the decedent received injuries which caused his death. If the decedent was operating a motorcycle, his estate is not entitled to recover benefits under the No-fault Act. If his dirt bike was not a motorcycle, however, the statute does not bar a recovery of benefits. In that event the decedent occupies under the No-fault Act a status similar to that of a bicyclist or pedestrian who has been struck by a motor vehicle.
Our examination of the No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act leads us inevitably to the conclusion that to be an operator of a motorcycle, as envisioned by the exclusionary language of the statute, one must be operating a motor vehicle. A recreational vehicle which is not a motor vehicle, therefore, cannot be a motorcycle. The Yamaha MX100 was a recreational vehicle; it was not sold for operation on the public highways. As such, it could be operated lawfully by the decedent even though he was not licensed to operate motor vehicles. Because the dirt bike was not a motor vehicle, the compulsory insurance provisions of the No-fault Act had no application. Thus, if one were injured solely as a result of the maintenance or use of a dirt bike, no-fault benefits would not be payable. If a dirt bike collided with a truck or other motor vehicle, however, its rider would then be entitled to receive no-fault benefits.
We hold that the dirt bike being operated by the decedent at the time it was struck by a truck was neither a motor vehicle nor a motorcycle; it was a recreational vehicle and could not be licensed. Because appellant’s decedent was killed as a result of a collision between his dirt bike and a motor vehicle, recovery of basic loss benefits under the Act is permissible. It was error, therefore, to grant summary judgment in favor of Travelers.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not retained.
[533]*533SPAETH, President Judge, joins this opinion and also the concurring opinion by BROSKY, J.
BROSKY, J., files a concurring opinion in which SPAETH, President Judge, joins.
CIRILLO, J., files a dissenting opinion in which OLSZEW-SKI and TAMILIA, JJ., join.