Gallo v. Nationwide Insurance

791 A.2d 1193, 2002 Pa. Super. 25, 2002 Pa. Super. LEXIS 88
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 5, 2002
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 791 A.2d 1193 (Gallo v. Nationwide Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gallo v. Nationwide Insurance, 791 A.2d 1193, 2002 Pa. Super. 25, 2002 Pa. Super. LEXIS 88 (Pa. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

BROSKY, J.

¶ 1 Stephen Gallo and Heidi Gallo, husband and wife and as parents of Ryan Matthew Gallo, (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Appellants”) appeal from an Order entered on April 27, 2001 sustaining preliminary objections filed by the Nationwide Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as the “Appellee”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 The trial court summarized the procedural history and the facts of this case as follows:

Ryan Gallo, [the] minor [Appellant], sustained injuries on January 12,1997 when the snowmobile on which he was a passenger was struck by a car driven by John D. Capatch, Jr. while the snowmobile was crossing a highway. The minor suffered serious injuries that required several surgeries and an extended recovery period. At the time of the accident, the minor’s parents (Gallos) had automobile insurance through Nationwide Insurance Company (Nationwide) covering, inter alia, $100,000 in first party medpcal] benefits in accordance with the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). *1195 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1701-1799.7 (West 2000). The Gallos[, Appellants,] incurred $76,000 in medical expenses related to their son’s injuries and sought recovery from Nationwide under their policy. Nationwide has refused to pay any medical bills indicating that exclusion three in the policy excludes payment for injuries sustained while occupying a snowmobile.
The [Appellants] filed this action seeking to recover from Nationwide the medical expenses they have incurred. Nationwide filed Preliminary Objections in the form of demurer and oral argument was heard [on] April 27, 2001. At that time, Nationwide argued that section 1714 of the MVFRL barred the Gallos from recovering first party [medical] benefits under the facts of this case. By Order dated April 27, 2001, the [trial court] granted Nationwide’s Preliminary Objections and dismissed the Complaint. On May 16, 2001, the [Appellants] filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [The said motion was denied and this appeal followed.]

Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/01, at 1-2.

¶ 3 On appeal, Appellants raise the following issue:

Whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing [Appellants’] Complaint based on [Appellee’s] Preliminary Objections and in finding that [Appellants’] insurance policy and Pennsylvania Law barred [Appellants’] right to first party medical benefits when minor-[Appellant] sustained injuries as a passenger on a snowmobile and he was struck on a roadway by a car?

Appellants’ Brief at 4.

¶ 4 When reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissing a suit, our scope of review is plenary. See Donahue v. Federal Express Corp., 753 A.2d 238, 241 (Pa.Super.2000). When reviewing an order granting preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, an appellate court applies the same standard employed by the trial court: [A]ll material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom are admitted as true for the purposes of review. The question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Juban v. Schermer, 751 A.2d 1190, 1192 (Pa.Super.2000).

¶ 5 Where affirmance of the trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections would result in the dismissal of an action, we may do so only when the case “is clear and free from doubt.” Donahue, 753 A.2d at 241. “To be clear and free from doubt that dismissal is appropriate, it must appear with certainty that the law would not permit recovery by the plaintiff upon the facts averred. Any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain the objections.” Id. We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. See Ellenbogen v. P.N.C. Bank, N.A., 731 A.2d 175, 181 (Pa.Super.1999).

¶ 6 The trial court held that Appellants’ claims for first party medical benefits are excluded under both the terms and conditions of the Nationwide automobile insurance policy and the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 et seq. For the following reasons, we agree.

¶ 7 Under the Nationwide insurance policy, there are certain first party benefits coverage exclusions; specifically, Coverage Exclusion No. 3 reads, “There is no coverage for anyone while occupying a motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, motorized pedalcycle, or similar type vehicles or a recreational vehicle not intended for highway use.” See Nationwide’s Century II *1196 Auto Policy, at 12. Under Pennsylvania statutory law, a snowmobile falls in the category of “a recreational vehicle not intended for highway use.” See 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 7721. Section 7721 of the Snowmobile and All-Terrain Vehicle Law (“SATVL”) 1 clearly states that a snowmobile is a “vehicle not intended for highway use.” Section 7721 reads as follows:

§ 7721. Operation on streets and highways
(a) General rule. — Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it is unlawful to operate a snowmobile or an ATV on any street or highway which is not designated and posted as a snowmobile or an ATV road by the governmental agency having jurisdiction.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7721(a). (Emphasis added.)

Hence, under the terms of the Nationwide automobile insurance policy, Appellants are not entitled to coverage for injuries sustained by minor-Appellant while riding on a snowmobile.

¶ 8 In the statement of question involved, Appellants also put forth the argument that the trial court erred when it ruled that the Pa.MVRFL barred Appellants’ right to first party benefits under the facts of this case. Section 1714 of the Pa.MVRFL states that first party benefits are not available for injuries sustained while operating or riding on a “recreational vehicle not intended for highway use.” See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1714. This section reads as follows:

§ 1714. Ineligible claimants
An owner of a currently registered motor vehicle who does not have financial responsibility or an operator or occupant of a recreational vehicle not intended for highway use, motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, motorized pedalcycle or like type vehicle required to be registered under this title cannot recover first party benefits.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1714. (Emphasis added.)

¶ 9 As previously stated, a snowmobile falls in the category of a recreational vehicle not intended for highway use. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 7721(a).

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Bluebook (online)
791 A.2d 1193, 2002 Pa. Super. 25, 2002 Pa. Super. LEXIS 88, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gallo-v-nationwide-insurance-pasuperct-2002.