McDEYITT, Justice.
Elwyn Petry was employed by Spaulding Drywall for several years as a drywall hanger. This occupation required Petry to lift heavy panels of sheetrock onto framed walls and ceilings.
On August 29, 1985, Petry was lifting a piece of sheetrock when he slipped, and immediately felt a pain in his right shoulder. After resting for a few minutes the pain subsided, and he continued to work for the rest of the day. Petry notified his employer, Mr. Spaulding, of the accident, but declined the employer’s suggestion that he see a doctor, as he felt the pain would go away eventually.
Petry continued to work for Spaulding Drywall until October, 1986. During that time he continued to experience pain in his shoulder, and would sometimes be given lighter work to accommodate his discomfort.
In November of 1986, Petry again felt severe pain in his shoulder while moving a propane tank at his home. This incident convinced him that he should seek medical attention. In January 1987, Dr. Ingram examined Petry’s shoulder and recommended surgery for an impingement syndrome due to a rotator cuff tear.
Petry filed a Notice of Injury and Claim for Benefits form with the employer’s insurance company on February 19, 1987, and the employer concurrently filed a Form-1. The claim was denied because it had not been filed within one year after the accident. Spaulding Drywall had never had any employees injured on the job before, and had never filed a Worker’s Compensation claim.
The Industrial Commission found in favor of the employer and its surety because the claim was not timely filed.
The issue in this case is whether Mr. Petry, having given oral notice to his employer of his injury at the time it occurred, may still recover Worker’s Compensation benefits even though he did not file a Notice of Injury and Claim for Benefits with the Industrial Commission within the time limit prescribed by statute.
Petry’s claim for Worker’s Compensation benefits is barred by his failure to comply with I.C. § 72-701, which provides in part that “[n]o proceedings under this law shall be maintained unless ... a claim for compensation with respect thereto shall have been made within one (1) year after the date of the accident____” The one year statute of limitations is measured from the date of the accident, and not from the date that the injury is discovered or its severity understood. Moody v. State Highway Dep’t. 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1108 (1935); Smith v. IML Freight, Inc., 101 Idaho 600, 619 P.2d 118 (1980).
In this case, a Notice of Injury and Claim for Benefits was not filed until February of 1987, approximately 18 months after the accident. Petry argues that it is unjust to require an injured worker to file a claim within the statutory time limit where the extent of the injury is not discovered until after the time has expired; especially, as in this case, where the employer had actual notice of the injury at the time it occurred and is not prejudiced by the delay.
This argument is compelling to the conscience, but this Court is constrained by the clear words of the statute. Aristotle said that, “equity is that idea of justice which contravenes the written law.” This Court is not free to impart equity where, as in the case of Worker’s Compensation, the law in question derives its existence solely from the printed words of the statutes.
In Moody v. State Highway Dep’t. supra, this Court noted that in 1927 the legislature amended I.C. § 43-1202, the predecessor to I.C. § 72-701, by changing a single word instead of measuring the one year timé limit from the date of the “injury,” [384]*384the amended statute measured the time limit from the date of the “accident.”
We have no doubt that when the legislature substituted the word “accident” for the word “injury,” it intended to change the date from which the time for making claim should commence to run, and to change that date from the first manifestation of a compensable injury to the date of the accident. The statute ... needs no interpretation, because it is not ambiguous. Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, this Court is powerless to intervene and grant relief.
Moody 56 Idaho at 26, 48 P.2d 1108 (citations omitted).
Although the result is harsh and arbitrary, it is for the legislature to re-examine its policies, and not for this Court to fabricate new laws where explicit statutory directives already exist.
Petry also argues that I.C. § 72-704, which preserves Worker’s Compensation claims despite untimely notice of the accident to the employer where the employer has actual notice, shows a legislative intent that statutory time limits should not be fatal to claims where the employer has actual notice and is not prejudiced by delay. However, that statute governs the consequences where the claimant does not notify the employer of the injury. The difficulty in this case, by contrast, is that although the employer had notice, the claimant failed to file a claim with the Industrial Commission. The policy reason behind I.C. § 72-704 is to notify the employer of potential claims but at the same time preserve claims despite lack of notice where the employer had actual knowledge or is not prejudiced by lack of notice. That policy is inapplicable to the requirement at issue in this case, that a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within a certain time after the accident.
The one year statute of limitations in I.C. § 72-701 would not bar Petry’s delayed claim for benefits under the terms of I.C. § 72-604 if the employer had knowledge of the injury and willfully failed to file a report as required by I.C. § 72-602(1). Idaho Code § .72-601(1) in turn, requires the employer to file a report to the Industrial Commission of any injury which requires treatment by a physician or which results in absence from work of one day or more. Petry argues that since the employer failed to file such a report in this case, the one year statute of limitations should be excused, and Petry’s claim for benefits should be allowed. We disagree.
The requirement that the employer file a report under I.C. § 72-602(1) is triggered by an injury requiring treatment by a physician or the employee’s absence from work for one day or more. In the present case, Petry did not miss any work as a result of the accident, and did not consult a physician until more than a year had passed. We cannot say that the statute intended to require an employer to file a report whenever a work-related injury requires medical attention, no matter how far removed in time the medical attention is from the date of the accident. Thus, we hold that in this case the employer was not required to file a report with the Industrial Commission, as Petry did not seek medical attention and did not miss any time off of work due to his injury.
Moreover, even if a report was required to be filed by the employer in this case, the omission must have been willful in order to excuse Petry’s delay in filing a claim.
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McDEYITT, Justice.
Elwyn Petry was employed by Spaulding Drywall for several years as a drywall hanger. This occupation required Petry to lift heavy panels of sheetrock onto framed walls and ceilings.
On August 29, 1985, Petry was lifting a piece of sheetrock when he slipped, and immediately felt a pain in his right shoulder. After resting for a few minutes the pain subsided, and he continued to work for the rest of the day. Petry notified his employer, Mr. Spaulding, of the accident, but declined the employer’s suggestion that he see a doctor, as he felt the pain would go away eventually.
Petry continued to work for Spaulding Drywall until October, 1986. During that time he continued to experience pain in his shoulder, and would sometimes be given lighter work to accommodate his discomfort.
In November of 1986, Petry again felt severe pain in his shoulder while moving a propane tank at his home. This incident convinced him that he should seek medical attention. In January 1987, Dr. Ingram examined Petry’s shoulder and recommended surgery for an impingement syndrome due to a rotator cuff tear.
Petry filed a Notice of Injury and Claim for Benefits form with the employer’s insurance company on February 19, 1987, and the employer concurrently filed a Form-1. The claim was denied because it had not been filed within one year after the accident. Spaulding Drywall had never had any employees injured on the job before, and had never filed a Worker’s Compensation claim.
The Industrial Commission found in favor of the employer and its surety because the claim was not timely filed.
The issue in this case is whether Mr. Petry, having given oral notice to his employer of his injury at the time it occurred, may still recover Worker’s Compensation benefits even though he did not file a Notice of Injury and Claim for Benefits with the Industrial Commission within the time limit prescribed by statute.
Petry’s claim for Worker’s Compensation benefits is barred by his failure to comply with I.C. § 72-701, which provides in part that “[n]o proceedings under this law shall be maintained unless ... a claim for compensation with respect thereto shall have been made within one (1) year after the date of the accident____” The one year statute of limitations is measured from the date of the accident, and not from the date that the injury is discovered or its severity understood. Moody v. State Highway Dep’t. 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1108 (1935); Smith v. IML Freight, Inc., 101 Idaho 600, 619 P.2d 118 (1980).
In this case, a Notice of Injury and Claim for Benefits was not filed until February of 1987, approximately 18 months after the accident. Petry argues that it is unjust to require an injured worker to file a claim within the statutory time limit where the extent of the injury is not discovered until after the time has expired; especially, as in this case, where the employer had actual notice of the injury at the time it occurred and is not prejudiced by the delay.
This argument is compelling to the conscience, but this Court is constrained by the clear words of the statute. Aristotle said that, “equity is that idea of justice which contravenes the written law.” This Court is not free to impart equity where, as in the case of Worker’s Compensation, the law in question derives its existence solely from the printed words of the statutes.
In Moody v. State Highway Dep’t. supra, this Court noted that in 1927 the legislature amended I.C. § 43-1202, the predecessor to I.C. § 72-701, by changing a single word instead of measuring the one year timé limit from the date of the “injury,” [384]*384the amended statute measured the time limit from the date of the “accident.”
We have no doubt that when the legislature substituted the word “accident” for the word “injury,” it intended to change the date from which the time for making claim should commence to run, and to change that date from the first manifestation of a compensable injury to the date of the accident. The statute ... needs no interpretation, because it is not ambiguous. Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, this Court is powerless to intervene and grant relief.
Moody 56 Idaho at 26, 48 P.2d 1108 (citations omitted).
Although the result is harsh and arbitrary, it is for the legislature to re-examine its policies, and not for this Court to fabricate new laws where explicit statutory directives already exist.
Petry also argues that I.C. § 72-704, which preserves Worker’s Compensation claims despite untimely notice of the accident to the employer where the employer has actual notice, shows a legislative intent that statutory time limits should not be fatal to claims where the employer has actual notice and is not prejudiced by delay. However, that statute governs the consequences where the claimant does not notify the employer of the injury. The difficulty in this case, by contrast, is that although the employer had notice, the claimant failed to file a claim with the Industrial Commission. The policy reason behind I.C. § 72-704 is to notify the employer of potential claims but at the same time preserve claims despite lack of notice where the employer had actual knowledge or is not prejudiced by lack of notice. That policy is inapplicable to the requirement at issue in this case, that a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within a certain time after the accident.
The one year statute of limitations in I.C. § 72-701 would not bar Petry’s delayed claim for benefits under the terms of I.C. § 72-604 if the employer had knowledge of the injury and willfully failed to file a report as required by I.C. § 72-602(1). Idaho Code § .72-601(1) in turn, requires the employer to file a report to the Industrial Commission of any injury which requires treatment by a physician or which results in absence from work of one day or more. Petry argues that since the employer failed to file such a report in this case, the one year statute of limitations should be excused, and Petry’s claim for benefits should be allowed. We disagree.
The requirement that the employer file a report under I.C. § 72-602(1) is triggered by an injury requiring treatment by a physician or the employee’s absence from work for one day or more. In the present case, Petry did not miss any work as a result of the accident, and did not consult a physician until more than a year had passed. We cannot say that the statute intended to require an employer to file a report whenever a work-related injury requires medical attention, no matter how far removed in time the medical attention is from the date of the accident. Thus, we hold that in this case the employer was not required to file a report with the Industrial Commission, as Petry did not seek medical attention and did not miss any time off of work due to his injury.
Moreover, even if a report was required to be filed by the employer in this case, the omission must have been willful in order to excuse Petry’s delay in filing a claim. The Industrial Commission specifically addressed this issue, and found that the employer’s failure to file a report was the result of misinformation or ignorance, and was not willful. Conclusion of Law III.
Petry also contends that he is entitled to relief under the theory of constructive fraud. He argues that the employer’s failure to inform him that he needed to file a claim to preserve his rights to Worker’s Compensation benefits amounted to a false and material representation. The Industrial Commission did not address this issue.
We hold that Spaulding made no representation to Petry which could provide a basis for constructive fraud. Although it is the rule that silence may be construed as a representation where the other party might be led to harmful conclu[385]*385sions, Brooks v. Jensen, 75 Idaho 201, 270 P.2d 425 (1954), that is not the case here. Mr. Spaulding repeatedly suggested that Mr. Petry see a doctor about the pain in his shoulder, but Petry dismissed those suggestions under the mistaken belief that the injury was not serious. Had he followed Mr. Spaulding’s advice, Spaulding would have been required to report the injury to the Industrial Commission, and Petry would have presumably discovered that his injury was serious. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Petry was misled by Spaulding’s actions to his detriment.
Accordingly, we affirm the Industrial Commission’s holding that Mr. Petry’s claim for Worker’s Compensation benefits was not timely filed. We also decline to hold that Petry is entitled to recover from Spaulding Drywall under the theory of constructive fraud.
Costs to respondent.
BAKES, C.J., and JOHNSON and BOYLE, JJ., concur.