Barney, C.J.
This is a medical malpractice action. In the fall of 1976, plaintiff Dorothy Perkins underwent an elective cholecystectomy at Mt. Ascutney Hospital in Windsor, Vermont. Prior to her release the defendant physician issued plaintiff a prescription for the drug Flagyl.1 The drug was prescribed in an effort to discover the cause of atypical cells, disclosed in plaintiff’s routine pap smear test.
Plaintiff filled the prescription at the defendant pharmacy in Windsor, Vermont. Some time later, according to plaintiff’s testimony, she ingested the initial prescribed dosage of Flagyl and suffered severe adverse reactions. She was rushed to the hospital emergency room where she was treated for chest pains and shortness of breath. Following discharge, plaintiff continued to experience chest pains and related medical problems.
In September, 1978, plaintiff brought suit against the defendant physician alleging he was negligent in having prescribed Flagyl, and that he had failed to obtain plaintiff’s informed consent to the Flagyl treatment.2 The complaint also named the hospital as a party defendant, apparently on the basis of respondeat superior. Plaintiff filed an additional [308]*308complaint in August, 1979, alleging that the defendant pharmacy negligently prepared, dispensed and labelled the Flagyl prescription.
The defendant hospital’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim as to it was granted, and the case against the physician and pharmacy was tried before a jury. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendants and answers to written interrogatories finding neither defendant negligent. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment, raising numerous grounds for reversal.
I. Defendant Physician
A. Informed Consent
Plaintiff first claims in her brief that the trial court erred in refusing her request to charge 12 V.S.A. § 1909, Vermont’s informed consent statute. Count II of plaintiff’s original complaint alleged that the defendant physician failed to obtain plaintiff’s informed consent to the treatment in question. She also submitted proposed instructions, seeking to have the court give a charge on § 1909. Moreover, plaintiff complied with the requirement of V.R.C.P. 51(b) that the party “[state] distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.” The issue has therefore been preserved for appellate review. Sanville v. Williams, 138 Vt. 498, 501, 418 A.2d 860, 862 (1980) ; Palmisano v. Townsend, 136 Vt. 372, 374-75, 392 A.2d 393, 395 (1978).
The standards pertaining to informed consent established by this Court in Small v. Gifford Memorial Hospital, 133 Vt. 552, 557, 349 A.2d 703, 706-07 (1975), have, since that decision was rendered, been modified by legislation. 12 V.S.A. § 1909, entitled “Limitation of medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent,” became effective on April 7, 1976. 1975, No. 250 (Adj. Sess.), § 3. Section 1909 reads in pertinent part:
(a) For the purpose of this section “lack of informed consent” means:
(1) The failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable [309]*309risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation____
It is against this statutory language that the trial judge’s instructions must be measured.
It is clear from the transcript that plaintiff’s claim of lack of informed consent centered around (1) whether the defendant physician provided plaintiff with any warning concerning the dangers of taking Flagyl after ingesting alcoholic beverage; and (2) whether, assuming such a warning was given, it was adequate in light of plaintiff’s infirmities.3 Although the trial judge charged extensively on the elements of medical malpractice, see 12 Y.S.A. § 1908, he refused plaintiff’s request to charge the elements of informed consent as set forth in § 1909 stating: “There is no competent medical evidence in the record that would support that charge.” We disagree with this assessment of the state of the evidence below.
The cornerstone of plaintiff’s suit was the claim that she had not knowingly and intelligently consented to Flagyl treatment because she had not been made aware of the reasonably foreseeable risks, in particular the potential adverse reaction when combined with alcohol. In response to this allegation, the defendant physician testified that although he did not recall actually warning plaintiff of this risk, it nevertheless was his “custom” to give such an oral warning. Plaintiff’s expert testified that even if the physician had given his customary warning it would not have provided plaintiff with sufficient information concerning the dangers to permit plaintiff to make a knowledgeable evaluation to undergo the treatment.
This testimony in itself was enough to require that informed consent be fully charged. See 12 V.S.A. § 1909(e). Instead, while the charge as given did contain some of the elements of informed consent, they were sparse at best, and considered in context with the charge as a whole, did nothing by express reference to this issue or otherwise, to place the [310]*310question before the jury. Even assuming these references might have alerted a person trained in the law of the subject, we conclude they were not sufficient, either as a directive to a jury of laymen that the factual issue was theirs to determine, or as providing a clear understanding of the elements for their consideration. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff was effectively deprived of her right to have the jury determine the adequacy of the information furnished by the physician.
B. Medical Negligence
Count I of plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the physician’s decision to prescribe Flagyl to plaintiff constituted professional medical negligence. See 12 Y.S.A. § 1908. The jury disagreed, answering a written interrogatory with the finding of no negligence on his part.
Plaintiff asserts, however, that judgment in favor of the defendants as to the medical negligence claim must be reversed because the trial court erred in using assumption of risk language when instructing the jury on the defendants’ affirmative defense of comparative negligence. In Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt. 293, 304, 390 A.2d 398, 404 (1978), we stated that “use of assumption of risk language is irrelevant and confusing in a jury instruction on comparative negligence.” The parties were entitled to a jury free from irrelevancies and possible confusion. While mindful that, under V.R.C.P. 51(b), the procedures for preserving objections to jury instructions are limited by requiring an objection “before the jury retires to consider its verdict,” Collette v. Bousley, 141 Vt.
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Barney, C.J.
This is a medical malpractice action. In the fall of 1976, plaintiff Dorothy Perkins underwent an elective cholecystectomy at Mt. Ascutney Hospital in Windsor, Vermont. Prior to her release the defendant physician issued plaintiff a prescription for the drug Flagyl.1 The drug was prescribed in an effort to discover the cause of atypical cells, disclosed in plaintiff’s routine pap smear test.
Plaintiff filled the prescription at the defendant pharmacy in Windsor, Vermont. Some time later, according to plaintiff’s testimony, she ingested the initial prescribed dosage of Flagyl and suffered severe adverse reactions. She was rushed to the hospital emergency room where she was treated for chest pains and shortness of breath. Following discharge, plaintiff continued to experience chest pains and related medical problems.
In September, 1978, plaintiff brought suit against the defendant physician alleging he was negligent in having prescribed Flagyl, and that he had failed to obtain plaintiff’s informed consent to the Flagyl treatment.2 The complaint also named the hospital as a party defendant, apparently on the basis of respondeat superior. Plaintiff filed an additional [308]*308complaint in August, 1979, alleging that the defendant pharmacy negligently prepared, dispensed and labelled the Flagyl prescription.
The defendant hospital’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim as to it was granted, and the case against the physician and pharmacy was tried before a jury. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendants and answers to written interrogatories finding neither defendant negligent. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment, raising numerous grounds for reversal.
I. Defendant Physician
A. Informed Consent
Plaintiff first claims in her brief that the trial court erred in refusing her request to charge 12 V.S.A. § 1909, Vermont’s informed consent statute. Count II of plaintiff’s original complaint alleged that the defendant physician failed to obtain plaintiff’s informed consent to the treatment in question. She also submitted proposed instructions, seeking to have the court give a charge on § 1909. Moreover, plaintiff complied with the requirement of V.R.C.P. 51(b) that the party “[state] distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.” The issue has therefore been preserved for appellate review. Sanville v. Williams, 138 Vt. 498, 501, 418 A.2d 860, 862 (1980) ; Palmisano v. Townsend, 136 Vt. 372, 374-75, 392 A.2d 393, 395 (1978).
The standards pertaining to informed consent established by this Court in Small v. Gifford Memorial Hospital, 133 Vt. 552, 557, 349 A.2d 703, 706-07 (1975), have, since that decision was rendered, been modified by legislation. 12 V.S.A. § 1909, entitled “Limitation of medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent,” became effective on April 7, 1976. 1975, No. 250 (Adj. Sess.), § 3. Section 1909 reads in pertinent part:
(a) For the purpose of this section “lack of informed consent” means:
(1) The failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable [309]*309risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation____
It is against this statutory language that the trial judge’s instructions must be measured.
It is clear from the transcript that plaintiff’s claim of lack of informed consent centered around (1) whether the defendant physician provided plaintiff with any warning concerning the dangers of taking Flagyl after ingesting alcoholic beverage; and (2) whether, assuming such a warning was given, it was adequate in light of plaintiff’s infirmities.3 Although the trial judge charged extensively on the elements of medical malpractice, see 12 Y.S.A. § 1908, he refused plaintiff’s request to charge the elements of informed consent as set forth in § 1909 stating: “There is no competent medical evidence in the record that would support that charge.” We disagree with this assessment of the state of the evidence below.
The cornerstone of plaintiff’s suit was the claim that she had not knowingly and intelligently consented to Flagyl treatment because she had not been made aware of the reasonably foreseeable risks, in particular the potential adverse reaction when combined with alcohol. In response to this allegation, the defendant physician testified that although he did not recall actually warning plaintiff of this risk, it nevertheless was his “custom” to give such an oral warning. Plaintiff’s expert testified that even if the physician had given his customary warning it would not have provided plaintiff with sufficient information concerning the dangers to permit plaintiff to make a knowledgeable evaluation to undergo the treatment.
This testimony in itself was enough to require that informed consent be fully charged. See 12 V.S.A. § 1909(e). Instead, while the charge as given did contain some of the elements of informed consent, they were sparse at best, and considered in context with the charge as a whole, did nothing by express reference to this issue or otherwise, to place the [310]*310question before the jury. Even assuming these references might have alerted a person trained in the law of the subject, we conclude they were not sufficient, either as a directive to a jury of laymen that the factual issue was theirs to determine, or as providing a clear understanding of the elements for their consideration. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff was effectively deprived of her right to have the jury determine the adequacy of the information furnished by the physician.
B. Medical Negligence
Count I of plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the physician’s decision to prescribe Flagyl to plaintiff constituted professional medical negligence. See 12 Y.S.A. § 1908. The jury disagreed, answering a written interrogatory with the finding of no negligence on his part.
Plaintiff asserts, however, that judgment in favor of the defendants as to the medical negligence claim must be reversed because the trial court erred in using assumption of risk language when instructing the jury on the defendants’ affirmative defense of comparative negligence. In Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 136 Vt. 293, 304, 390 A.2d 398, 404 (1978), we stated that “use of assumption of risk language is irrelevant and confusing in a jury instruction on comparative negligence.” The parties were entitled to a jury free from irrelevancies and possible confusion. While mindful that, under V.R.C.P. 51(b), the procedures for preserving objections to jury instructions are limited by requiring an objection “before the jury retires to consider its verdict,” Collette v. Bousley, 141 Vt. 373, 374, 449 A.2d 936, 937 (1982), we nonetheless agree with plaintiff that the instruction given was erroneous. In charging the jury, the trial court blended the instructions, creating an overlap between the negligence of the doctor in prescribing Flagyl in the first place, the warnings, if any, to Mrs. Perkins of potential harmful side effects and her assumption of risk. The interrogatories given the jury further emphasized this meld by asking only if Dr. Gephart was negligent, and not separating the two causes of action. Thus, while ordinarily the mere inclusion of the assumption of risk language might not have been reversible error, and this is particularly true here since it was not formally objected to [311]*311as required by V.R.C.P. 51 (b), it becomes so from the unfortunate interweaving of those concepts.
In other words, the plaintiff correctly noted his objections to, among other things, the failure to give an informed consent instruction and the confusion of contributory negligence with the alleged warnings by the doctor or pharmacist. Formal objection was not made specifically to the words “assumed the risk” included in the negligence charge. Thus, under our long-established rule, review of the irrelevant assumption of risk language is not undertaken except to prevent a failure of justice. See McCrea v. State, 138 Vt. 517, 519-20, 419 A.2d 318, 319 (1980); 2B W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1106 (C. Wright ed. 1961). As we unanimously agree, the lack of an informed consent charge was error and was objected to. Unlike the minority opinion, however, we will not preclude ourselves from examining the totality of the charge merely because there was no formal objection to three irrelevant words.
A brief examination of the charge given highlights our concerns and supports our conclusion that the error requires reversal. The court told the jury to turn their attention “to the specific legal principles which [they] must apply in determining whether or not the defendant, Doctor Gephart, was or was not negligent.” The explanation of the legal principles, however, immediately became muddled:
The claim of negligence against Doctor Gephart relates to his act of prescribing the drug Flagyl. Your first task is to decide what standard of care is required of physicians in Doctor Gephart’s type of practice in this general area with respect to the need to warn when prescribing Flagyl for this purpose you may and should consider the testimony of all the physicians who testified.
The court then went on to outline very briefly the jury’s task of weighing the evidence before it against the standard of care applicable.
If you find that Doctor Gephart did not meet this standard of care, then you may find he was negligent and is responsible for any damages that were the proximate result of his negligence. If you also find, however, that Mrs. [312]*312Perkins had been warned of potential harmful effects, if any, of Flagyl, by any other individual, you must find that Mrs. Perkins assumed the risk of which she had been warned and that Doctor Gephart is not legally responsible for any damages.
It is clear that, what started as an instruction on negligent prescription, immediately became an instruction “with respect to a need to warn.” Compounding the error, the court charged that, if the jury should find the existence of a warning “by any other individual,” then Dr. Gephart would not be legally responsible for any damages. This incorrectly states the law. As we have already noted, 12 V.S.A. § 1909(a) requires that “the person providing the professional treatment disclose the risks. Not only is this instruction confusing and erroneous, it is also strongly tilted in favor of Dr. Gephart. Monti v. Town of Northfield, 135 Vt. 97, 99, 369 A.2d 1373, 1375 (1977). See also Gibson v. Mackin Construction Co., 123 Vt. 287, 292-93, 187 A.2d 337, 340-41 (1963) (Barney, J., dissenting).
II. Defendant Hospital
Plaintiff also presents a valid argument for reversal with respect to the dismissal of the complaint against Mt. Ascutney Hospital. Her original complaint sought to impute the alleged negligence of the defendant physician to the hospital on the basis of respondeat superior. The hospital moved, unsuccessfully, for summary judgment on the ground that the physician was an independent contractor. On the day of jury drawing, the hospital moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim as to which relief can be granted. V.R.C.P. 12(b) (6). The court granted this motion without giving reasons for its decision.
Plaintiff promptly moved for reconsideration of the dismissal and sought to amend the complaint against the defendant hospital. This motion was denied, the court stating: “The proposed amendments would cause prejudice to the defendants . . . because they state an entirely new cause of action and are out of time.” The amendments, if allowed, would have clarified the respondeat superior claim and alleged direct negligence on the part of the hospital.
[313]*313We find that the court erred in refusing to permit the requested amendments; reversal of judgment in favor of the defendant hospital is therefore required.
V.R.C.P. 15 (a) directs the trial courts that “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Moreover, the lower courts must be mindful of the “historical Vermont tradition of liberality in the allowance of amendments to the pleadings.” Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 Vt. 512, 513, 296 A.2d 269, 271 (1972). Nonetheless, we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion for leave to amend only if the ruling is an abuse of discretion. Gilwee v. Town of Barre, 138 Vt. 109, 111, 412 A.2d 300, 301 (1980). See also 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1484 (1971).
It appears that the court below denied plaintiff’s motion to amend in part because it stated a new cause of action — direct negligence on the part of the defendant hospital. This was error. V.R.C.P. 15 directs the trial court to consider not whether the amendment raises a new cause of action but “whether the just and expeditious disposition of the controversy between the parties will be advanced by permitting the amendment.” 1A W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 448, at 753 (C. Wright ed. 1960). The trial court should have considered the propriety of plaintiff’s motion to amend by examining several factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) futility of amendment; and (4) prejudice to the opposing party. See Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). None of these factors support the denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend.
The second reason advanced by the court in support of its denial of plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend was that the amendments were out of time. By this it appears that the trial court concluded that the amendments were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 12 V.S.A. § 521, since made more than three years after the occurrence of the alleged negligence. This, too, was error.
V.R.C.P. 15(c) governs the relation back of amendments, stating: “Whenever the claim . . . asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or [314]*314occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.” Here the proposed amendments were designed to accomplish two goals (1) clarify the claim under respondeat superior, and (2) allege direct negligence against the hospital. There is no question regarding the relation back of the amendments to the respondeat superior claim. Thus it was error to deny that amendment as “out of time.”
It was also error to refuse to allow the direct negligence amendment. The negligence claim arose out of the conduct or occurrence set forth in the original complaint. The defendant hospital had notice from the beginning of this action that plaintiff sought to hold it responsible for the harm she allegedly suffered as a result of the Flagyl treatment. We find the hospital’s assertion that it would be prejudiced if the amendment is permitted unpersuasive in light of the fact that the hospital was a party defendant up to the actual day of jury drawing. Any surprise engendered by allowance of the proposed amendment could have been eliminated by requesting a continuance of the trial.
III. The Pharmacy
The sole issue presented by plaintiff’s appeal from judgment in favor of the defendant pharmacy is whether the court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the practice of pharmacy, as defined by 26 V.S.A. § 2022(6). We answer this question in the negative.
Chapter 36 of Title 26 is designed to “promote, preserve and protect the public health, safety and welfare by and through the effective control and regulation of the practice of pharmacy.” 26 V.S.A. § 2021. It is a general regulatory chapter, not a statutory codification of the tort liability of pharmacists. In view of the court’s extensive instruction on the elements of pharmacist’s liability, it was not error to refuse to charge § 2022 (6).
Judgment in favor of defendant Dale Gephart, M.D., as to the informed consent and negligence counts reversed and remanded. Judgment in favor of Windsor Hospital Corp. d/b/a Mt. Ascutney Hospital and Health Center reversed and re
[315]*315
manded. Judgment in favor of Kelley’s Drugstore, Inc., affirmed.