Mountainside v. Jamieson Risk Service
This text of Mountainside v. Jamieson Risk Service (Mountainside v. Jamieson Risk Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Washington Unit Case No. 88-2-20 Wncv 65 State Street Montpelier VT 05602 802-828-2091 www.vermontjudiciary.org
Mountainside Condominium vs. Jamieson Risk Service
Opinion and Order on Jamieson’s Motion to Amend its Answer
Jamieson Risk Services Inc. seeks to amend its answer to add affirmative defenses
of issue and claim preclusion. See Vt. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (expressly including claim preclusion
in list of affirmative defenses); Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Issue preclusion is an affirmative defense.”).1 These defenses are not meaningfully
explicated in the proposed amendment, but Jamieson represents in briefing that they
relate to the arbitration proceeding between Receiver Thomas Lauzon and Vermont
Mutual Insurance Company. Plaintiffs oppose any such amendment. Both sides’
briefing is laconic.
I. Procedural Standard
Vt. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given
by the court “when justice so requires.” In Vermont, this provision has been liberally
construed in favor of allowing parties to amend their pleadings. Lillicrap v. Martin, 156
Vt. 165, 170 (1991). “The principal reasons underlying the liberal amendment policy are
1 For a brief summary of this case and related litigation, see Mountainside Condominium v. Jamieson Risk Service, No. 88-2-20 Wncv, 2024 WL 1508781 (Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2024).
aimin
Order Page 1 of 3 88-2-20 Wncv Mountainside Condominium vs. Jamieson Risk Service (1) to provide maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits rather
than on a procedural technicality, (2) to give notice of the nature of the claim or defense,
and (3) to enable a party to assert matters that were overlooked or unknown to him at an
earlier stage in the proceedings.” Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 1, 5
(quoting Bevins v. King, 143 Vt. 252, 255 (1983)).
Leave to amend is not always granted, however. It may be denied when the just
and expeditious disposition of the dispute between the parties will not be advanced via
the amendment. In making that determination, the Court analyzes whether the
proposed amendment: (1) would result in undue delay; (2) is brought in bad faith; (3)
would result in unfair prejudice to the opposing party; or (4) would be futile. Perkins v.
Windsor Hosp. Corp., 142 Vt. 305, 313 (1982).
II. Analysis
Plaintiffs assert that Jamieson has waited too long to amend; the amendment is
asserted in bad faith; it would result in unfair prejudice; and it would be futile.
It is true that Jamieson offers little in the way of explanation for having waited
until now to add preclusion defenses based on a long-resolved arbitration. More
importantly, however, Plaintiffs neither argue nor suggest that adding these legal
defenses to the case now will cause any delay, much less any undue delay, going forward.
Nor is there any palpable bad faith or unfair prejudice. Delay in amending alone
does not suggest bad faith in the circumstances of this case, and there is no apparent way
in which amendment might cause unfair surprise or other prejudice. Further, Plaintiffs
have not asserted any basis for a conclusion that amendment will unfairly prejudice
them in any manner.
Order Page 2 of 3 88-2-20 Wncv Mountainside Condominium vs. Jamieson Risk Service Finally, Plaintiffs argue in passing that the preclusion defenses are futile. The
entire defenses, as pleaded, are as follows: “MCA’s action is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata” and “MCA’s action is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Plaintiffs
assert that these defenses are futile because: “Defendant fails to explain how the
arbitration award in the [Vermont Mutual] claim dispute would somehow have
preclusive effect in this matter in a manner favorable to Defendant. In fact, it is
Plaintiffs who have claimed that the arbitrated determination there was a ‘code and
ordinance’ insurance shortfall in excess of $1 million that has preclusive effect in this
matter as a measure of compensable harm arising out of Defendant’s breaches of duty.”
Futility is judged on the same high standard by which a court evaluates a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Under that standard, the Court cannot conclude, on such
a sparse record, that the preclusion defenses cannot have any merit as a matter of law.
This is especially so where Plaintiffs themselves appear to be asserting that they, too,
may rely on the preclusive effect of the arbitration proceeding.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Jamieson’s motion to amend is granted.
Electronically Signed on May 30, 2025, per V.R.E.F. 9(d)
__________________________ Timothy B. Tomasi Superior Court Judge
Order Page 3 of 3 88-2-20 Wncv Mountainside Condominium vs. Jamieson Risk Service
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