People v. Erimas

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: July 3, 2012
• Docket: CF0690-11
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 4

5 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CASE NO CF0690-11 ) 6 v. ) DECISION AND ORDER ON 7 ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ELIAS SENTURO ERlMAS, ) SUPPRESS 8 ) 9 ) Defendant. ) 10 ------------------------------) INTRODUCTION II

12 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III, on March 13 7, 2012, on Defendant Erimas' Motion to Suppress. Attorney Terence E. Timblin 14 represented Defendant, Elias Senturo Erimas. Assistant Attorney General Brian 15 Gallagher represented the People of Guam. Following the hearing the Court took 16 the matter under advisement. Upon weighing the credibility of the witnesses and 17 evidence offered at the hearing and after consideration of the parties' arguments, 18 this Court now issues its Findings and Facts and Conclusions of Law. 19 FACTUAL HISTORY 20 During a December 2012 investigation of a mIssmg persons complaint 21 involving a fourteen-year-old minor girl, L.M.C. ("victim"), Guam police officers 22 learned that Defendant, then a 28 year old male, may have engaged in sexual 23 penetration with the victim. Defendant, a native of Chuuk, had only resided on 24 Guam for seven months and did not speak English. Officers placed Defendant in 25 custody and a Chuukese-speaking police officer served as a translator for 26 Defendant. The officer read aloud, in Chuukese, each paragraph of the police 27 department's standard Custodial Interrogation Form (CIF). The CIF describes an 28 individual's so-called Miranda rights and allows space for the confined suspect to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Motion to Suppress Case No. CF690-11 both acknowledge his understanding of those rights and consent to waIve those 2 rights prior to speaking with officers. 3 Mter the officer read Defendant his rights, Defendant initialed by each 4 paragraph of the CIF indicating that he understood each of his rights. Defendant 5 also signed at the bottom of the form, acknowledging his desire to waive those 6 rights. Officers then questioned Defendant about his relationship with the minor 7 victim. In response to the questions, Defendant stated that he had had sexual 8 intercourse with the victim and that he knew she was fourteen years old. Defendant 9 now seeks to suppress his inculpatory statement by claiming that he did not 10 understand the CIF and that his waiver of his constitutional rights was not II knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 12 FINDINGS OF FACT 13 Based on the testimony provided at the hearing, this Court finds the 14 following facts were supported by a preponderance of the evidence: 15 1. Defendant is a native of Chuuk and does not speak the English language. 16 2. While Defendant was in custody, a Guam police officer fluent in Chuukese 17 translated all English communication into Chuukese for Defendant's 18 benefit and Defendant was able to understand the communications. 19 3. Officers translated, verbatim, each paragraph of the CIF. With respect to 20 the paragraph relating to the Defendant's right to an attorney, officers 21 explained that an attorney could help Defendant. 22 4. Defendant initialed next to each paragraph to indicate his understanding 23 of his rights and Defendant signed the form indicating his waiver of those 24 rights. 25 5. Defendant appeared to understand the substance of the form. At no point 26 did defendant ask questions or indicate that he did not understand what 27 was being read to him. 28

-2- Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Motion to Suppress Case No. CF690-11 6. Although Defendant testified that officers suggested to him that the 2 process would be better for Defendant if he signed the form as opposed to 3 leaving the form blank, this Court believes Defendant's testimony to be 4 incredible and finds insufficient support to conclude that officers engaged 5 in any oppressive behavior, offered any promises, or utilized any other 6 coercive techniques to induce Defendant to sign the CIF and give a 7 statement. 8 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 9 1. In determining whether Defendant's inculpatory statements should be 10 suppressed, this Court must determine whether Defendant's Miranda 11 waiver was valid and whether Defendant's statements were voluntarily 12 gIven. 13

14 Waiver of Miranda

15 2. A statement given during a custodial interrogation is admissible only if

16 the police warned the suspect of his constitutional rights as set forth by

17 the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 284 U.S. 436,

18 479 (1996), and only if, prior to offering the statement, the defendant

19 provided a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights. See

20 Guam v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1 ~16; United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709,

21 727 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534, 536

22 (9th Cir.1998». The following tests are employed to determine whether a

23 waiver is knowing and voluntary:

24 First, the relinquishment of the right must have been 25 voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and 26 deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 27 deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and 28 the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation'

-3- Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Motion to Suppress Case No. CF690-11 reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 2 comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. 3

4 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 5 410 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 6 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979»; see also United States v. Doe, 155 F.3d 7 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.1998) ("A waiver is voluntary if, under the totality of 8 the circumstances, the confession is the product of a free and deliberate 9 choice rather than coercion or improper inducement."); People v. Hualde, 10 1999 Guam 3 ~ 30. II

12 3. Where the person waiving his or her rights is a foreign national, courts must subject their analysis to heightened scrutiny: 13

14 In the case of a foreign national, the voluntariness inquiry also includes assessment of the following factors: (1) whether the 15 defendant signed a written waiver; (2) whether he was read his 16 rights in his native language; (3) whether he appeared to understand those rights; (4) whether he had the assistance of a 17 translator; (5) whether his rights were explained painstakingly; and, (6) whether he had experience with the American criminal 18 justice system. 19 United States v. Gamez, 301 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 United States v. Amano, 229 F.3d 801, 804-05 (9th Cir. 2000). 21 4. The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and 22 understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth 23 Amendment privilege." Colorado V. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574, 107 S.Ct. 24 851, 857 (1987). 25 5. The government bears the burden of showing a valid waiver by a 26 preponderance of the evidence. See Colorado V. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 27 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522,93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 28

-4- Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Motion to Suppress Case No. CF690-11 6. In this case the evidence showed that Defendant's waIver was valid. 2 Defendant had a translator who read him his constitutional rights in his 3 native language. Officers went beyond the mere written words of the ClF 4 by generally explaining the purpose of a lawyer. Moreover, the 5 circumstances indicate that Defendant knew his rights: Officers testified 6 that Defendant appeared to understand the translation of the CIF; 7 Defendant initialed next to each paragraph on that form indicating that 8 he understood his rights; and Defendant, by his own admission, did not 9 ask any questions about the CIF. Having heard an oral translation of the 10 CIF and having indicated that he understood his rights, Defendant then II signed the written waiver without question. Defendant appears to be of 12 normal intelligence and there is no claim that Defendant lacked 13 competency to waive his rights. Finally, this Court found above that 14 officers did not employ coercive tactics that would raise questions as to the 15 voluntariness of the waiver. 16 7. The only factor weighing in Defendant's favor is that he had not had prior 17 experience with the American criminal justice system. However, given the 18 totality of the circumstances, this Court is not convinced that that 19 Defendant's lack of familiarity with the justice system is sufficient to 20 allow a finding that the waiver was not voluntary. Based on the evidence, 21 this Court concludes that Defendant's waiver was voluntary, knowing, 22 and intelligent. This conclusion is in accordance with precedent in other 23 jurisdictions addressing similar issues of waiver by non-English speaking 24 defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d 1360 (9th 25 Cir. 1993) (Waiver by Mexican suspect who possessed sixth grade 26 education and no experience with American criminal justice system held 27 valid where Miranda rights were read to him in Spanish and suspect signed 28 a written waiver); United States V. Guerrero, 296 Fed. Appx. 764 (11th

-5- Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Motion to Suppress Case No. CF690-11 Cir. 2008) (evidence that defendant received oral recitation of Miranda 2 waiver form in defendant's native language and that defendant initialed 3 each paragraph indicating his understanding of his rights was sufficient 4 to show defendant's waiver of those rights was knowing, voluntary, and 5 intelligent); State v. Ortez, 178 N.C. App. 236, 631 S.E.2d 188 (2006) 6 (Spanish-speaking defendant classified as mildly mentally retarded held 7 to have provided a valid waiver of Miranda rights that were orally read to 8 him where defendant did not indicate that he was confused); Com. v. 9 Alves, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 935, 625 N.E.2d 559 (1993) (Portuguese speaking 10 defendant having no experience with criminal justice system found to 11 have validly waived Miranda rights that had been read to defendant in 12 Portuguese). 13

14 Voluntariness of Defendant's Statement 15 8. In addition to considering the propriety of Defendant's Miranda waiver, 16 the Court must also determine whether the statement itself was 17 voluntarily given. In United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, the 18 Ninth Circuit held that "[b]efore a criminal defendant's statement can be 19 used against him, the government must prove its voluntariness by a 20 preponderance of the evidence." Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d at 1365 21 (citations omitted); cf. People v. Farata 2007 Guam 8, 56-63 (holding that 22 a statement given post-Miranda must be knowing and voluntary). 23 9. An inculpatory statement is voluntary only when it is the product of a 24 rational intellect and a free will. United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 25 589 (9th Cir. 2004). "In evaluating voluntariness, the test is whether, 26 considering the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the 27 statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper 28 inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne." United States v.

-6- Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Motion to Suppress Case No. CF690-11 Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1022 (9th Cir.2002) (citation and internal 2 quotation marks omitted). 3 10. A statement is involuntary if it is "extracted by any sort of threats or 4 violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, 5 [or] by the exertion of any improper influence." Bram v. United 6 States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). 7 Where a promise is made by law enforcement, that promise "must be 8 sufficiently compelling to overbear the suspect's will in light of all 9 attendant circumstances." United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 10 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 11 11. In the present case, there was very little testimony at the hearing 12 addressing the specific circumstances surrounding the confession. 13 However, the brief testimony relating to Defendant's confession indicated 14 that following the Miranda waiver, Defendant freely gave his statement in 15 response to questioning by the officers. There is no indication that officers 16 employed inappropriate tactics to induce a statement by Defendant. This 17 court finds that given the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's 18 statement was voluntary. 19 CONCLUSION 20 Based on the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby DENIED. A trial 21 setting is scheduled for July 5, 2012 at 3:00 p.m. 22

23 rd 24 It is SO ORDERED this 3 day of July, 2012.

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