People v. Colone

2024 IL App (1st) 230520

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 6, 2024
• Docket: 1-23-0520
• Status: Published

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 230520

FIRST DISTRICT SECOND DIVISION November 6, 2024

No. 1-23-0520

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 18CR17744 ) KAHLIL COLONE, ) Honorable ) Ursula Walowski, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a jury trial, defendant Kahlil Colone was convicted of two counts of first

degree murder and was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 50 years in prison.

On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce a rap

video created by defendant approximately two months after the homicides, (2) trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the unauthenticated and inaccurate transcription added by the

State to the rap video, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce multiple photos

of the deceased victims, and (4) defendant’s de facto life sentence should be vacated because the

State presented his disciplinary records from the juvenile temporary detention center (JTDC)

without a live witness and the trial court relied on improper evidence as aggravating factors.

¶2 Defendant and his codefendant Leslie Ward were charged by indictment with multiple

counts of first degree murder stemming from the August 17, 2018, shooting deaths of Darnell No. 1-23-0520

Flowers and Raysuan Turner. Upon his convictions, the trial court subsequently sentenced

defendant to consecutive terms of 25 years for each homicide, for a total term of 50 years in

prison. Defendant and Ward were tried in simultaneous but severed jury trials.

¶3 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to bar the State’s use of a rap video

created by defendant, arguing that the video lacked probative value and was prejudicial to

defendant. According to defendant, nothing in the video or its lyrics related directly to the

commission of a murder nor implied or related to the case at issue. Also, the video did not

indicate on what date it had been created, including whether it was created after the murders in

this case. After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied the motion.

¶4 The following evidence was presented at defendant’s November 2022 jury trial.

¶5 Melanie Reneau testified that she was the mother of Flowers. Flowers was 17 years old in

August 2018 and was a student at Fenger Academy. On August 17, 2018, Reneau saw Flowers at

home that morning. The last time she saw him, he told her he was going to his girlfriend’s house.

When Flowers had not returned home by 9 p.m., Reneau called the police station to report him

missing. The following morning, she went to the police station and filed a missing person report.

She was able to track Flowers’s cell phone to a location near East 130th Street and South

Eberhart Avenue in Chicago. She identified Flowers when he was alive in a photograph. The

parties then stipulated to a photograph of Flowers taken after he was deceased.

¶6 Rayniecia Morris testified that she was the mother of Turner. He was 16 years old in

August 2018 and would have been a junior at Fenger Academy. Morris last saw Turner around 1

p.m. on August 17, 2018. He told her he was going to his father’s house. Later that night she

texted Turner to make sure he was home and did not get a response. When she arrived home

around 11 p.m., Turner was not home. She called his father and was told that Turner was not

2 No. 1-23-0520

with his father. Morris then called the police station to see if any teenagers were in custody but

was told there were not.

¶7 The next day, August 18, 2018, Morris went to work and then at 1 p.m., she left work to

go to the police station. There, she filed a missing person’s report. She also went door to door

around the neighborhood passing out missing person fliers. Morris “stopped everybody” she saw

on the street in the area around Golden Gate Park in Chicago. One of the people she stopped was

defendant. She identified him in court as the young man with a blue shirt and dreadlocks. Morris

spoke with defendant near East 132nd Street and South Forestville Avenue. Defendant was

shown a picture of Turner, and he initially responded that he did not know Turner, but when

pressed by Morris, defendant told her that he had not seen Turner that day. Defendant told her

that he had seen Turner at the park the previous day, August 17, 2018. She also spoke with an

individual with the nickname “Squeezy,” near East 133rd Street and South Eberhart Avenue, and

identified him in court as codefendant Ward. Morris had not known either of the defendants

before that day.

¶8 While Morris was at the police station around 10 a.m. on August 19, 2018, she received

an anonymous phone call. After that call, she went to Golden Gate Park near a bus stop to look

for her son, but she did not locate him. As she was on the way to the police station, Morris

received another phone call that caused her to return to the park. Morris later received another

phone call from a detective informing her that the bodies of Turner and Flowers had been found

in a wooded area behind a store called Rosebud Farms. The following day, August 20, 2018,

Morris went to the Cook County Medical Examiner’s Office, identified her son’s body, and

retrieved some personal items, including Turner’s cell phone. She gave the personal items to

Sergeant John Foster.

3 No. 1-23-0520

¶9 In October 2018, some students from Fenger Academy called Morris to tell her that there

was a Facebook Live video on “BG Shooter’s” Facebook page. Morris knew that “BG Shooter”

was the name of defendant’s Facebook page. She explained that a Facebook Live video was a

livestream that could be played on a person’s Facebook page for up to 24 hours. Morris watched

the video, recorded it from her screen, and sent it to Sergeant Foster.

¶ 10 Detective Matthew Micetich testified that in August 2018 he served in the special victims

unit and was assigned to investigate two missing people with his partner Detective Henry

Thomas. He assisted in generating the missing persons’ fliers for two male juveniles. Family

members of the missing persons assisted the police by notifying them that a cell phone was

“pinging” near East 130th Street and South Ellis Avenue, which was also close to Golden Gate

Park. Detective Micetich described a wooded area near the park as a “very dense” area behind

some houses. He went to this location with Detective Thomas and Detective Livingstone close to

midnight on August 19, 2018. The detectives used flashlights to aid their vision. When they

entered the wooded area, the detectives discovered two bodies. Detective Micetich discovered

one body approximately 20 to 25 feet to his left as he entered an opening into the wooded area.

He “thought” this person was wearing “camouflage pants and maybe a black hoodie.” Detective

Thomas found the second body approximately 15 feet away. That person was wearing light blue

or gray jeans and a black hoodie. Both individuals were deceased, and some decomposition had

begun. The detectives notified the violent crimes team. Detective Micetich had no additional

involvement in the case.

¶ 11 Victoria Hutchens, who was in custody at the Cook County jail because she failed to

appear to testify earlier as a witness pursuant to subpoena, also testified at trial. She was 16 years

4 No. 1-23-0520

old and lived near East 131st Street and South Forestville Avenue in August 2018. Golden Gate

Park was a couple of blocks away from her home.

¶ 12 On August 17, 2018, Hutchens was with her friend Heaven Johnson, who lived across the

street from the park, and another young girl, Hutchens’s cousin. The three girls went to the park

and saw defendant, “Squeezy,” and two other boys. She identified defendant in court as wearing

a blue shirt and tie with long dreadlocks and identified “Squeezy” in court as Ward. She did not

know the other two boys. Hutchens had known Ward for three years and defendant for a couple

of months. She met defendant through Johnson. According to Hutchens, defendant was around

the neighborhood and with Ward a lot. She saw the boys near the benches by the playground area

in the park.

¶ 13 The group then left the park to go towards Smiley’s, a convenience store. While they

were walking to the store, defendant said to Hutchens and Johnson, “someone was gonna die

today.” She and Johnson then went into the store while the four boys “took off into the woods.”

Hutchens saw all four boys go into the woods. She did not see the two boys who entered the

woods with defendant and Ward exit the woods. She admitted that she could not see if anyone

left the woods while she was in the store. After Hutchens left the store, she went near the

basketball court at the park. Defendant came out of the woods alone and approached her and

Johnson. He asked her to hold his and Ward’s cell phones. Defendant then returned to the woods.

Hutchens then heard four gunshots. The three girls then ran to Johnson’s house. She and Johnson

went inside while Hutchens’s cousin stayed outside.

¶ 14 They stayed inside watching television for a while and then went into Johnson’s

backyard. At some point, Ward came to the backyard and collected the cell phones. He told them

he wanted to talk to them but did not want to talk in front of Hutchens’s cousin. The next day,

5 No. 1-23-0520

August 18, 2018, defendant contacted Hutchens through Facebook and asked her and Johnson to

come talk to him at Ward’s house. When the girls arrived at Ward’s house, defendant was

outside of the house and Ward was inside. Ward “stuck his head out” of the window to talk.

Defendant and Ward asked the girls if they were okay. Defendant and Ward then told the girls

that they were not outside that day, did not see them, and did not hear anything. Hutchens

understood defendant to mean that on the day of the shooting, she did not see them going into the

woods.

¶ 15 On August 20, 2018, Lieutenant Patrick Kinney and Sergeant Foster came to Hutchens’s

house, and she recounted what she had seen and heard on August 17, 2018, involving defendant,

Ward, and the two boys. Hutchens admitted that she did not tell the officers that defendant told

her that someone was going to die. Later in September 2018, Hutchens met with detectives and

viewed two photo arrays. In the first photo array, Hutchens identified Ward from a group of six

pictures, and in the second, she identified defendant from the group of six pictures. She then met

with an assistant state’s attorney (ASA) and testified before the grand jury about the events

surrounding the shooting. Hutchens admitted that she did not see defendant with a gun, she never

called police, and she was scared to be involved in the case.

¶ 16 Paul Presnell, a forensic investigator for the Chicago Police Department, testified that he

was assigned to process the scene the night of August 19, 2018. He entered the wooded area and

observed two deceased males. He photographed the bodies and the surrounding area. The crime

scene photographs were admitted without objection. Presnell described the photographs showing

the victims in a state of decomposition including the presence of maggots. He estimated the

bodies were between 15 to 20 feet apart.

6 No. 1-23-0520

¶ 17 Presnell also looked for shell casings or other items of evidentiary value for

approximately 4½ hours. He first used a metal detector, then a hard rake, and then a soft rake to

locate any firearms evidence, such as fired bullets or cartridge cases. No shell casings were

found. Presnell explained that a semiautomatic firearm will eject casings off the side of the

barrel, but the casings remain in a revolver and have to be unloaded once fired.

¶ 18 The parties stipulated that in August 2018, Facebook received search warrants for four

accounts. The information provided from Facebook disclosed the following: an account with the

username BG Shoota belonged to defendant, an account with the username BG Choppa belonged

to Ward, an account with the username BG Herbo belonged to Turner, and an account with the

username BG Bibby belonged to Flowers.

¶ 19 Lieutenant Kinney testified that in August 2018, he was working as a homicide detective

in Area 2 for the Chicago Police Department. He and his partner, Detective James Looney, were

assigned to investigate the shooting deaths of Turner and Flowers shortly after midnight on

August 20, 2018. They went to the area near East 130th Street and South Rhodes Avenue in

Chicago. He observed several police cars, police officers, and crime scene tape cordoning off an

area. The area was residential with a lot of trees and overgrown bushes between 130th Street and

131st Street. Lieutenant Kinney was directed to the center of the wooded area and while using

his flashlight, he discovered the two deceased victims. Both victims were facedown and

“extremely decomposed.” Lieutenant Kinney was the lead investigator and had several other

detectives assisting him, including some officers doing a canvass of the neighborhood to locate

anyone that had seen or heard anything.

¶ 20 Lieutenant Kinney learned the possible identities of the victims as Flowers and Turner

from Detective Micetich and his partner. Based on information obtained from an assisting

7 No. 1-23-0520

detective, Lieutenant Kinney was informed of a potential witness and the physical description

and names or nicknames of the offenders. After a search was conducted of the police database,

officers were looking for defendant and codefendant Ward. Lieutenant Kinney identified

defendant in court as wearing a blue shirt and Ward was identified as wearing a brown shirt.

¶ 21 In his investigation, Lieutenant Kinney listened to 911 calls from residents that reported

hearing multiple gunshots coming from the wooded area near East 130th Street and South

Rhodes Avenue around 5:54 p.m. on August 17, 2018.

¶ 22 Lieutenant Kinney, along with Sergeant Foster, conducted an interview with Hutchens

around 12:20 p.m. on August 20, 2018. She told him that she had seen four people go into the

woods, but only two individuals came out. She provided him with the names for defendant and

Ward, but she did not know the other two people. Defendant and Ward were arrested on August

20, 2018, but not charged at that time.

¶ 23 During his investigation, Lieutenant Kinney learned some information about the

Facebook accounts for both defendants. While in custody on August 20, 2018, defendant told the

lieutenant that he had a Facebook account under the name “BG Shoota.” Ward also admitted to

having an account under the name “BG Choppa.”

¶ 24 Lieutenant Kinney recovered Flowers’s cell phone before his body was taken to the

morgue. When he turned on the cell phone, he discovered several conversations on Flowers’s

Facebook Messenger application from August 17, 2018, the day the officers determined he was

murdered. These conversations were with both defendants. Flowers’s Facebook account was

under the name “BG Bibby.” Lieutenant Kinney was able to determine that Turner’s Facebook

account was under the name “BG Herbo.” He prepared and served search warrants for those

accounts on Facebook. He then reviewed the account information received from Facebook. He

8 No. 1-23-0520

initially sent a preservation request to Facebook through a portal for law enforcement that would

“freeze” the account to prevent information from being deleted. He requested information from

August 10, 2018, through August 21, 2018. He detailed different conversations between the

defendants and the victims. The State presented the conversations in PowerPoint slides through

Lieutenant Kinney’s testimony.

¶ 25 The PowerPoint slides showed the following messages. In an August 11, 2018 message,

Flowers asked defendant, “Wssp w/ the pipes?” and defendant responded, “Everything still

everything bro it’s just mfers done started this dumb ass war so everybody in the field except u

nd herbo.” Lieutenant Kinney testified that based on his training and experience, he understood

“pipes” to be a term that described firearms or guns. Another message asking about “the pipes”

was sent from Flowers to Ward on August 11, 2018, and Ward responded, “Its war rn but i told u

yucky all shoota[.]”

¶ 26 Later, on August 11, 2018, defendant sent a message to Flowers, “It’s w.e y’all just can’t

get bumped every pole is needed” and Flowers responded, “Im already knowin.” Lieutenant

Kinney explained that, based on his experience and training, he understood “pole” also as a

reference to a firearm or a gun.

¶ 27 At approximately 12:14 p.m. on August 17, 2018, Flowers sent a message to defendant

and asked, “Wtw we fenna slide out there today.” Defendant answered, “Idm I’m finna slide out

thea rn I’m finna call my p.o.s. and put these shoes on,” Flowers responded, “Bet im waitin on

herbo[.]” Herbo refers to Turner. Flowers then asked, “Where yall fenna be at[?]” Around 2:30

p.m., Flowers sent a message to defendant, “We at the park[.]” Flowers also sent a message to

Ward around 12:50 p.m. on August 17, 2018, “Me & herbo fenna slide out there” and later

around 1:40 p.m., he asked Ward where they were going to be.

9 No. 1-23-0520

¶ 28 Lieutenant Kinney found these conversations to be significant because Flowers was

asking both of the defendants individually where they were going to be and informing them that

he and Turner would be coming. Lieutenant Kinney also pointed to the record of a 22-second

phone conversation, and while there was no content to that call, it showed Flowers

communicating with Ward prior to the murders. At approximately 5:38 p.m., Ward sent a

message, “Hml wen u get to the slot.” Lieutenant Kinney found this relevant because the

murders occurred between 5:30 p.m. and 6 p.m.

¶ 29 Later that night, at approximately 8:17 p.m., defendant sent a message to Flowers, “Bro

my bad I been sick asf all day i stayed in one spot nd laided it down[.]” Lieutenant Kinney

testified that this message was sent after he had determined that the murders had occurred and

the message was not included in defendant’s account, which indicated that defendant had deleted

this message. Flowers was already dead at that time, so he could not have deleted it.

¶ 30 The following day, on August 18, 2018, both defendants sent messages to Flowers’s

account. Defendant sent his first at approximately 4:23 p.m., “Were tf u at bro u still wit raysuan

everybody looking for yall[.]” The other three messages were sent at approximately 7:25 p.m.,

“Wya bro”, “Yo ppls looking for you y’all ass tweaking were tf y’all at”, and “Bro stop playing

you trippin wea tf y’all at[.]” Defendant also sent three messages to Turner at approximately 7:25

p.m. August 18, 2018, asking where he was, “Bro wya”, “You still with bibby y’all ass off y’all

s*** y’all got mfers worried were tf you at”, and “Bro call me soon as u see this[.]”

¶ 31 Ward sent messages to Flowers at approximately 5:51 p.m. on August 18, 2018, “Aye bro

wya yo ppls looking fa u” and later at 7:18 p.m., “Wyaa[.]” He also sent messages to Turner at

the same times, “Wya yo ppls lookin fa u” and “Ayee bro wea you at[.]” Lieutenant Kinney

found the space of approximately 24 hours relevant because the families had begun

10 No. 1-23-0520

“extensively” looking for Flowers and Turner. He also explained that “wya” means “where you

at.” Defendant continued to send messages to Turner on August 19, 2018, asking where he was.

¶ 32 The Facebook messages recovered from defendant’s account included messages between

defendant and Ward. At around 10 a.m. on August 17, 2018, Ward asked defendant, “Wya” and

defendant answered, “I changed my clothes broski i got sum bread.” Lieutenant Kinney

understood “bread” to mean money. Ward then said, “Huryy up get out hea” and defendant

responded, “lte check I’m omw Imma tell u.” Lieutenant Kinney understood “omw” to mean “on

my way.” He also noted that defendant’s message indicating that he was on his way was counter

to defendant’s message to Flowers that he was too sick to leave the house.

¶ 33 Lieutenant Kinney also discussed messages sent between Ward and someone from the

account named “Migooboy Jordan” from August 17, 2018, in which Jordan said he had a “357”

and Ward responded, “Yea I a trade. A 9 fa dat nd 250.” Lieutenant Kinney testified that this was

referencing firearms, a .357-caliber firearm and a 9-millimeter. He understood that Ward offered

to trade the 9-millimeter and $250 for the .357-caliber firearm. Lieutenant Kinney testified that

the weapon used in the shooting of Flowers and Turner “was a .357 caliber firearm.” In his

experiences, typically a .357-caliber firearm is a revolver and it does not leave shell casings.

¶ 34 Lieutenant Kinney also testified about a video defendant made of himself on Facebook

Live. He explained that a Facebook Live video is streamed live but “[u]sually it’s gone after 24

hours unless the accountholder decides to permanently post it on their Facebook page.”

Defendant’s video was provided by the mother of one of the victims to Sergeant Foster. At the

time that Lieutenant Kinney viewed this video, the investigation was still ongoing. He

characterized the video as defendant performing a rap song. He identified a DVD of the video as

well as second DVD of the video prepared by the State. He indicated that the only difference

11 No. 1-23-0520

between the two versions was that the State’s version had a transcription of what defendant was

saying. The State then asked to admit its version with the transcription, which the court allowed

over defendant’s previous objection. The video is just over a minute in length, which we discuss

more fully below. Lieutenant Kinney testified on cross-examination that he believed that

defendant was talking about a crime in the video. He admitted that defendant did not say that he

shot or harmed anyone or committed a crime in the rap video.

¶ 35 Lieutenant Kinney also admitted that during his August 2018 interview with Hutchens,

she did not tell him several things that she recounted in her trial testimony. According to the

detective, Hutchens never told him that defendant said to her that someone was going to die that

day, that she spoke with defendant and Ward the next day, that defendant told her not to say he

had been outside that day, and that the two cell phones defendant asked her to hold belonged to

defendant and Ward.

¶ 36 Dr. Ponni Arunkumar, the chief medical examiner for the Cook County Medical

Examiner’s Office, testified as an expert in forensic pathology. The autopsies for both Turner

and Flowers had been performed by Dr. Myra Khan on August 20, 2018. He reviewed the

autopsy reports for both victims. Photographs from both autopsies were admitted without

objection.

¶ 37 The autopsy for Turner indicated that he was clothed in a black hoodie and blue and

white jeans. There was evidence of decomposition, including “maggot activity, skin slippage,

discoloration of the skin.” The evidence of injury included two gunshot wounds. The first

gunshot wound was to the back and was lodged in his left chest. The bullet was recovered. The

path of the bullet went through the spinal cord, the left atrium of the heart, and the upper lobe of

the left lung. The second gunshot wound was also in the back and injured the left abdomen,

12 No. 1-23-0520

including the spleen and the diaphragm, and then exited from the front of the abdomen. Neither

gunshot wound showed evidence of close-range firing. The cause of death was multiple gunshot

wounds, and the manner of death was homicide.

¶ 38 The autopsy for Flowers detailed that he was wearing a red hoodie and camouflage pants.

His body also showed evidence of decomposition, including maggots, bloating in the abdomen

and head, and skin slippage. The body had two gunshot wounds. The first gunshot wound was

the back of the head and the bullet lodged in the right facial area. The bullet was recovered. The

gunshot went through the brain, but it was difficult to state which structures of the brain were

injured due to decomposition. The second gunshot wound was to the left shoulder and injured the

vertebra in the neck. The bullet exited from the right side of the face. The exit wound was large

due to maggot activity. There was no evidence of close-range firing. The cause of death was

multiple gunshot wounds, and the manner of death was homicide.

¶ 39 The parties stipulated that a proper chain of custody for the fired bullets was maintained.

The parties also stipulated that Tracy Konior, an employee of the Illinois State Police crime lab

and an expert in firearms identification, received the recovered bullets and would testify that the

bullets were both “of .357/.38 class caliber,” and were fired from the same firearm. Konior

would also testify that in her experience “.357 revolvers are less commonly used than 9mm or

.40 caliber semiautomatic firearms.”

¶ 40 The State then rested. Defendant moved for a directed finding, which the trial court

denied.

¶ 41 Defendant then entered a stipulation that ASA Chris Costello presented Hutchens to the

grand jury on September 13, 2018. Hutchens testified that she and Johnson went to Ward’s

house, where defendant was outside and Ward was inside. She further testified that Ward “talked

13 No. 1-23-0520

to her through a window and they told her, you didn’t see us outside, you don’t know nothing

and that’s about it.” ASA Costello further stated in the stipulation that Hutchens did not testify

before the grand jury that while walking to the store, defendant “whispered to her that someone

is going to die today.”

¶ 42 Defendant also presented a stipulation that Walter Collier III would testify that he was the

forensic services manager of Shot Spotter, Inc. (Shot Spotter). He would further testify that at

17:39:29 local time on August 17, 2018, Shot Spotter sensors detected a series of acoustic pulses

classified as three rounds of gunfire at the street address of 501 East 130th Street in Chicago,

Illinois. At 17:15:56 local time on August 17, 2018, Shot Spotter sensors detected an acoustic

pulse classified as one round of gunfire at the street address of 13037 South Rhodes Avenue,

Chicago, Illinois.

¶ 43 Defendant then rested. The State did not present any evidence in rebuttal.

¶ 44 Following closing arguments, the jury began deliberating. During deliberations, the jury

sent out a note asking, “Could we please receive further definition of or examples of legal

responsibility and an example or definition of aid in the context of legal responsibility?” The

court told the jury that they had all of the instructions and to continue to deliberate. The jury

subsequently found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder. The jury found that the

allegation that defendant was armed with a firearm during the commission of the murders was

not proven.

¶ 45 Defendant filed a motion for new trial in December 2022 and raised several issues,

including a claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to bar the State’s

introduction of the rap video because it was irrelevant and its admission substantially prejudiced

defendant. The trial court subsequently denied defendant’s motion.

14 No. 1-23-0520

¶ 46 While the parties discussed setting the date for defendant’s sentencing hearing, defendant

repeatedly interrupted the proceedings and asserted that he did not agree to setting his sentencing

hearing in March. He interjected, “March nothing. You already know what you want to give me

anyway.” When the court responded that it did not know, defendant said, “We can do this right

now.” The court explained to defendant that it did not know what sentence it would impose

because the court had not heard the sentencing evidence. Defendant responded, “This obviously

against us anyway. So I’m ready right now.” The parties, including defense counsel, agreed to a

date for sentencing and the court asked for defendant to be taken back. Defendant then

interjected, “She already know what she want to do. They did this wrong. They know what they

doing, man. How we both charged on accountability? Who the f*** did it then?”

¶ 47 At defendant’s March 2023 sentencing hearing, defense counsel presented defendant’s

pro se motion for a new trial alleging multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of

counsel. The trial court discussed the motion and noted that many of defendant’s allegations

were addressed either at trial or in defense counsel’s motion for a new trial. Regarding the

allegations of ineffective assistance, the court conducted a hearing pursuant to People v. Krankel,

102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and denied the motion.

¶ 48 In aggravation, the State presented a certified copy of defendant’s adjudication of

delinquency for unlawful use of a weapon. According to defendant’s presentence investigation

report (PSI), defendant was sentenced to a year of probation in September 2017, then

resentenced to a year of probation in March 2018, and probation terminated unsatisfactorily in

January 2019. The PSI listed defendant’s date of birth as March 29, 2002. The State also

presented disciplinary reports from the JTDC.

¶ 49 The State further presented the grand jury transcript of Lakia Fisher, dated November 19,

15 No. 1-23-0520

2018. Fisher testified that in August 2018, she lived on the 400 block of East 133rd Street in

Chicago and attended Fenger High School. At that time, Fisher had been dating Ward for three

years. Ward lived across the street from Fisher. She also knew defendant as a friend of Ward.

Fisher also knew both Turner and Flowers and considered them to be her friends.

¶ 50 On August 17, 2018, Fisher saw Ward at around 2 p.m. at Ward’s house. Defendant

arrived around 3 p.m. At one point, Ward and defendant were outside on the side of Ward’s

house to talk alone, but Fisher was able to hear their conversation from inside the house. She

heard Ward and defendant discuss their plan to kill Turner and Flowers. She said Ward was

panicking, but defendant told him not to worry. Fisher testified that they wanted to kill Turner

and Flowers because Ward said there “was money on their heads.” After defendant received a

message from Flowers, he and Ward left to meet Turner and Flowers at the bus stop in front of

the wooded area. Fisher later saw all four boys together in front of Ward’s house. The boys

walked to the woods, and Fisher heard gunshots approximately 40 minutes later. She saw Ward

approximately an hour after she heard the gunshots and then defendant about 20 to 30 minutes

later.

¶ 51 The next day, August 18, 2018, Fisher saw Morris, Turner’s mother, looking for Turner

around noon. Fisher saw Ward around 7 p.m. or 8 p.m. that night. Ward gave her a bag, and

when she looked inside, it contained a gun. She described the gun as having a brown handle and

with a cylinder that can spin and pop out and then back in. Ward told her not to give the gun to

anyone or tell anyone that she had the gun. She hid the gun for two days. A few days later, Fisher

spoke with Ward, and he told her that defendant killed “those boys,” referring to Turner and

Flowers. Ward then took the gun, and Fisher never saw it again.

¶ 52 The State then presented victim impact statements from Morris, Turner’s mother, and

16 No. 1-23-0520

Reneau, Flowers’s mother. Following arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court

sentenced defendant to 25 years for each first degree murder conviction, to be served

consecutively, for an aggregate term of 50 years. Defendant moved to reconsider the sentence,

which the trial court denied.

¶ 53 This appeal followed.

¶ 54 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to bar the admission

of the Facebook Live rap video. According to defendant, this rap video was not relevant to the

case and was highly prejudicial to him because it discussed gang life, shooting, drug use, and

drug sales. The State responds that the rap video was not prejudicial and “the admission of the

video was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion because a reasonable jury could have

found that defendant’s statements referred to his involvement in the murders of Flowers and

Turner.” Specifically, the State asserted that defendant’s rap video was relevant to the issue of

identify because the lyrics were an admission by defendant that “he was the shooter in the

victims’ murder.”

¶ 55 Relevance is a threshold requirement that must be satisfied by each piece of

evidence. People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 289 (2010). Rule 402 of the Illinois Rules of

Evidence provides: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.

Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Ill. R. Evid. 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). “Evidence

is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.’ ” People v. Tatum, 2019 IL App (1st) 162403, ¶ 111 (quoting Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff.

Jan.. 1, 2011)). “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ***.” Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1.

17 No. 1-23-0520

2011).

¶ 56 The admission of evidence falls within the sound discretion of a trial court, and a

reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s evidentiary ruling absent a showing of an abuse

of discretion. People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010). An abuse of discretion occurs where

the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person

would agree with the position adopted by the trial court. Id.

¶ 57 The following transcription appears on the video presented to the jury. The video opens

with the following typed in white on a black screen, “Youngboy~ion mean to break yo heart but

baby thats what herpes do [followed by three emojis].” Then the video shows defendant and the

transcription of defendant’s rap is as follows.

“Yo, gang shit (inaudible). The fuck ya’ll (inaudible) like they let they

Taco loose, don’t come around no BGN and we don’t fuck with you. Choppa and

the cover that send me man he don’t need a group and he ain’t gonna stop

blowing until them people discover you. If you with your homie I’m blowing

leaving them cover too, while they all flexing claiming shit that they don’t ever

do, why they FaceTiming all these guns that they don’t never use, hollow over his

chest can’t catch bro like he forgot the chew, catch ‘em up impression they fake

clutching like they always do they call me Shoota Shots because I’m quick to up

and blow the two three hundred round drops straight from the Army with the

soldiers use so if you see this Choppa bitches know that I belong a coup, grab the

posse ya’ll supposed to means I’m finna act a fool, pissed off mean to drip you

but I hope that I don’t shoot you grab body better get back when Shoota start

approaching you, fuck Lil Nuk if he want smoke then he can have it too, all these

18 No. 1-23-0520

n*** buttons I’m pushing I’m trying to work and mew, get up in the woods

smoke a wood then bring that product through, thick bitch riding with thirty and

yes he got the jewels pulled to your face leave you froze and have your momma

blue.”

¶ 58 The rap video was streamed on Facebook Live and brought to the attention of the police

by Morris, Turner’s mother. The video is just over one minute long and shows defendant

smoking something before beginning his rap. Defendant sought to bar the introduction of this

video in a motion in limine before trial. He argued that there was “nothing in the video and [its]

lyrics that directly relate[d] to committing a murder” and nothing that implied or related to the

murder that formed the basis of the charges against defendant. He asserted that any probative

value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect to defendant.

¶ 59 During a hearing on the motion, the State argued that the lyrics were similar to the

circumstances of the murder and noted that defendant made references to “blowing leaving them

covered” and the victims “were found in the woods with leaves and all that type of thing

covering them.” The State further pointed to lyrics in which defendant said, “they call me shoot

shots because I’m quick to up and blow the two, three hundred round drops” and the victims

were shot. The State noted that defendant referred to people “FaceTiming all these guns that they

don’t ever use” and there were Facebook messages in which defendant stated that every person

was needed and implied that the victims were “not doing their share.” Defendant also referred to

“a coup,” and the State asserted the victims were executed as part of a coup within their group.

The State also observed that defendant referred to “get up in the woods. Smoke a wood, which is

what they did.” The State explained that the murder happened in a wooded area of Golden Gate

Park and the four young men “were all smoking weed together before that happened.” Finally,

19 No. 1-23-0520

the State noted that the video ended with defendant saying, “got the jewels pulled to your face.

Leave you froze and have your mama blue” and the victims were left in the woods and

“[o]bviously they were dead, frozen dead, and their mamas were sad or blue.” The State

concluded by asserting that it was relevant but “[o]bviously it’s open to interpretation.”

¶ 60 In response, defendant argued that there was no date on the video, and they did not know

when it took place, “before, after, years before, months before.” He contended that it was not

relevant because the date of the recording was unknown and was prejudicial because they did not

know anything about it “other than these interpretations that the State is going to try to make.”

¶ 61 The trial court then denied defendant’s motion and made the following findings.

“I find that the State has made an argument as to its relevance. I don’t

think the prejudicial effect of this will outweigh—you could make your

arguments that you just made as to what weight the jury should give this video,

but I find that based on the State’s argument it’s—there is relevance to this video

based on the comparisons with the case—the murder charges that your client

faces. So for those reasons I’m going to deny your motion in limine.”

¶ 62 In his posttrial motion, defendant again argued that admission of the rap video was error

because the video was irrelevant, immaterial, and “its admission resulted in substantial

prejudice” to defendant. Defendant further contended that the admission of the rap video “was

clearly used to imply the guilt of the defendant due to his creating the rap without anything to tie

it to the crime charged.” At a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion and made the

following finding regarding the admission of the rap video.

“As to [defendant], a major issue that you raised, [defense counsel], which

was presented against your client was a rap video of your client. I did have a

20 No. 1-23-0520

hearing on that prior to allowing that in. I did allow that in.

I find that the State made a sufficient proffer at the time of my ruling and

then it bore out during the trial where they did lay a proper foundation for that

video. The video had your client rapping. There were words in that rap video that

were used that the State argued can be interpreted in a way that the State argued

should be interpreted by the jury.

You argued as far as a different interpretation. However, the jury chose to

interpret it the way they wanted to. I found that it was admissible because it was

relevant.

But nobody told the jury as far as the detective what he thought it meant.

They were able to decide for themselves how they interpret that jury [sic]. Both

sides were able to argue their sides.

I did find that that evidence was relevant. I did allow it in. I’m going to

stand by that ruling. I don’t find that it was an improper ruling.”

¶ 63 Before this court, defendant maintains that the video does not relate to the murders at

issue in this case. He points out that the neither the caption nor the video refer to the victims’

nicknames of “Bibby” and “Herbo,” but refer to “Youngboy,” “Taco,” and “Lil Nuk,” and there

was no evidence of anyone with those nicknames involved in the shooting.

¶ 64 Defendant relies on several nonbinding cases from other states for support. See State v.

Skinner, 95 A.3d 236, 251-52 (N.J. 2014) (the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a “strong

nexus between specific details of the artistic composition and the circumstances of the offense”

is necessary in order to admit a defendant’s artistic writings as probative evidence); People v.

Venable, 88 Cal. App. 5th 445, 455 (Ct. App. 2023) (the Fourth District Court of Appeal was

21 No. 1-23-0520

considering the application of a new California state statute that “requires a trial judge to

consider in addition that the probative value of such evidence is minimal absent certain markers

of truth and that undue prejudice includes the possibility the evidence will inject racial bias and

be used to improperly indicate the defendant’s propensity for violence” (Cal. Evid. Code

§ 352.2(a) (West 2023))).

¶ 65 To begin, we note that decisions from foreign jurisdictions are not binding in Illinois.

People v. Wright, 2013 IL App (1st) 103232, ¶ 66. “Although comparable decisions from other

jurisdictions may be considered for their persuasive value, ‘[w]hen there is Illinois case law

directly on point, we need not look to case law from other states for guidance’ ***.” In re A.C.,

2016 IL App (1st) 153047, ¶ 47 (quoting Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory,

P.C., 357 Ill. App. 3d 381, 395 (2005)).

¶ 66 Recently, our supreme court addressed the admissibility of rap lyrics in a criminal trial.

People v. Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 61. In that case, the defendant was convicted of felony

murder and the unlawful use of a weapon by felon after escalating events led to the shooting

death of one victim and injury to a second person. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. Prior to trial, the defense sought to

admit the rap lyrics from one of the State’s witnesses as a prior inconsistent statement and was

barred by the trial court. Id. ¶ 55.

¶ 67 The evidence at trial disclosed that a dispute arose between two families after a man sold

his mother’s expensive belt to the son of the other family, but the original owner wanted her belt

back. Id. ¶¶ 3, 12. Over the course of the day, the dispute intensified, including the police being

called after a physical altercation. Id. ¶ 12. Eventually, groups from both sides converged in front

of the house of the buyer’s mother. Both sides “yelled back and forth” and “painted the other

side as the aggressors.” Id. ¶ 16. The group opposing the defendant claimed they were not armed,

22 No. 1-23-0520

but multiple witnesses testified that the group was armed with “knives, bats, and cans in socks.”

Id. The defendant displayed his gun and testified that one of the victims responded they had guns

as well. After a struggle over a broom between the defendant’s cousin and the victims, the

defendant fired his gun because he was “scared.” Id. ¶ 17. One victim was shot in the torso and

died from his injuries while the second victim was shot in the arm and hospitalized. Id. ¶ 20.

¶ 68 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine

to admit the statement of a witness made in a rap video as a prior inconsistent statement. “The

appellate court summarily rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in

not admitting the video, stating that ‘the rap video was made solely for entertainment purposes

and was not akin to a prior statement by the witness.’ ” Id. ¶ 27 (quoting People v. Bush, 2022 IL

App (3d) 190283, ¶ 112).

¶ 69 Before the supreme court, the defendant again contended that the trial court erred in

denying his request to present the rap video as impeachment evidence and asked the supreme

court to reject the appellate court’s “work-of-art exception.” Id. ¶ 55. The Bush court first

reviewed the admissibility of the rap lyrics within the framework for prior inconsistent

statements and found that the defendant had established each of the statutory requirements for

admission. Id. ¶ 63. Noting the satisfaction of the statutory prerequisites for admission, the

supreme court found the trial court’s decision to deny the admission to be “arbitrary because it

was based on the purported platform of the statements, a rap video, as opposed to the substance

of the statements.” Id. ¶ 61. The court further observed that there was “no work-of-art exception”

under the statute for use of prior inconsistent statements. Id. “The proper approach is to treat

prior statements the same way a trial court treats the admissibility of any piece of evidence.” Id.

¶ 62. Thus, the court concluded that “the proper focus is the relevance of the prior statement.” Id.

23 No. 1-23-0520

¶¶ 63-64.

¶ 70 The Bush court then focused its analysis on “what factors should be considered in

determining the admissibility of song lyrics.” Id. ¶ 64. The court reviewed how a few foreign

jurisdictions approached this issue.

“Some courts have held that a prior statement made in the context of a music

video is admissible where the statement bears a ‘strong nexus’ to the

‘circumstances of the underlying offense for which a person is charged.’ [Skinner,

95 A.3d at 239]. Other courts have separated statements made in music videos

into categories of ‘admissible statements of historical fact’ and ‘inadmissible

works of fiction.’ Hannah v. State, 23 A.3d 192, 197 (Md. 2011). Both

approaches help to determine whether statements made in a music video are

relevant to a particular case.” Id.

¶ 71 The Bush court then found that the rap lyrics at issue should have been allowed because

the “statements in the video bear a ‘strong nexus’ to the events” in the case. Id. ¶ 65. The court

observed that in the video, the witness started by “stating that what he is about to say is a ‘true

story’ and ‘true facts,’ ” and then referred to the date of the shooting and mentioned the

nickname of the victim killed in the shooting. Id. He “describe[d] how he came to be at [the

scene] at the time of the shooting, stating that he was picked up by his brother [the second

victim] and was ready to go.” Id. The supreme court thus concluded that the witness’s

“statements were statements of historical fact. The statements were relevant because they were

directly related to the events at issue in this case. The exclusion of the statements was an abuse

of discretion.” Id.

¶ 72 Nevertheless, the supreme court held that this error was harmless because the statements

24 No. 1-23-0520

in the rap video were cumulative to other evidence presented at trial. Id. ¶ 67. The court found

that “each relevant statement from the music video would have been cumulative to evidence that

was presented at trial” and the defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial. Id.

¶ 73 We acknowledge that the supreme court in Bush considered the admission of the rap

lyrics for a different purpose than at issue here, i.e., the impeachment of a witness by the use of

his prior inconsistent statements. Nonetheless, the court’s guidance in considering the relevance

of the rap lyrics is applicable in this case. Here, the State sought to admit the rap lyrics as

substantive evidence against defendant, and we conclude the analysis still turns on whether those

lyrics bore a “strong nexus” to the circumstances of the shooting.

¶ 74 Prior to the supreme court’s holding in Bush, the Third District reached a similar

conclusion when considering the relevancy of a rap video presented at trial. In People v.

Hastings, 2022 IL App (5th) 190446-U, 1 the defendant was charged with armed robbery and

aggravated battery with a firearm during which the victim was shot in the abdomen. The State

filed a motion in limine for the admission of a video of defendant rapping at the trial. The video

had been uploaded to YouTube, and the victim watched the video and recognized the rapper as

the assailant in the armed robbery. The victim had not been able to identify the perpetrator prior

to watching the video. Id. ¶ 5. The defendant opposed the State’s motion and argued that the

prejudicial effect of the video outweighed any probative value. Id. ¶ 6. The trial court allowed

the admission of the video for the purpose of establishing identity of the perpetrator. During the

trial, the victim testified that he was watching music videos while recuperating after the shooting

and saw the defendant’s video. He recognized the defendant as the person who shot him during

the armed robbery. When the video was played for the jury, the victim identified the defendant.

1 Nonprecedential orders entered under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(b), (e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023). 25 No. 1-23-0520

Id. ¶ 15. The victim explained that he did not identify the defendant in a photo lineup after the

shooting because the victim could not see the individual’s facial features in the photo. However,

he was able to identify the defendant in the video based on his eye shape and long dreadlocks. Id.

¶¶ 15-16.

¶ 75 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the

video to be played at trial because the video was overly prejudicial. He asserted that the State

could have presented the victim’s identification through a still photo from the video. Id. ¶¶ 49-

50. The State responded that the video was relevant for many reasons, including identity, motive,

intent, absence of mistake, and the investigatory steps taken by the police. Id. ¶ 51. The State

maintained that any claim of prejudice was speculative, and even if it was error, the error was

harmless in light of the overwhelming trial evidence, which included the testimony from a

codefendant. Id.

¶ 76 The reviewing court held that a reasonable trial judge could have found that it was

appropriate to allow the jury to view the video to determine for themselves if the victim’s failure

to identify the defendant in the lineup photo was reasonable. Id. ¶ 53. The court concluded that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of the video. Id.

¶ 77 While Hastings did not consider the substance of the defendant’s lyrics in the video, the

analysis is still persuasive for our discussion. As Bush and Hastings show, the admission of rap

videos is an evidentiary issue within the trial court’s discretion. See Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 57

(evidentiary motions are directed to the trial court’s discretion, and reviewing courts will not

disturb a trial court’s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion). Thus, the crucial question

in determining the admissibility of a statement within a music video is whether the statement

bears a “strong nexus” to the circumstances of the offense for which the defendant is on trial. Id.

26 No. 1-23-0520

¶ 64.

¶ 78 Turning to the facts in this case, defendant contends that the “lyrics bore no ‘strong

nexus’ to the shooting for which [he] was on trial.” He asserts the video appears to show him

“engaging in braggadocio about gang conflicts generally.” According to defendant, the video

was not relevant to the shooting and “injected propensity evidence and implicit racial bias into

his trial.” We disagree.

¶ 79 The shooting occurred on August 17, 2018, when defendant and Ward went into a

wooded area of Golden Gate Park with Turner and Flowers. Multiple gunshots were heard and

only defendant and Ward were seen leaving the wooded area. The following day, Morris and

Reneau reported their sons missing. Morris went around the neighborhood with fliers and asked

people if they had seen her son. The bodies of Turner and Flowers were discovered by police in

the wooded area near midnight on August 20, 2018. The rap video was streamed by defendant on

his Facebook account approximately two months later. “[S]ome of the kids” from Fenger

Academy called Morris and alerted her to the video’s presence on Facebook Live, and she

recorded the video. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that these students from Fenger

Academy understood the lyrics to be referencing the murders and, in turn, notified Morris, the

mother of one of the victims.

¶ 80 In accordance with the Bush court’s holding, we find that the rap lyrics bear a strong

nexus to the circumstances of the shooting for the reasons that follow. We point out that the

video was brief, lasting just over a minute in length. The lyrics referenced Ward’s nickname

“Choppa” multiple times as well as defendant’s own nickname “Shoota.” The repeated use of

Ward’s nickname as well as his own nickname suggests that defendant and Ward had engaged in

the actions described by the lyrics.

27 No. 1-23-0520

¶ 81 Specifically, the lyrics, “while they all flexing claiming shit that they don’t ever do, why

they FaceTiming all these guns that they don’t never use,” explicitly connect to the facts of this

case. Multiple Facebook messages between defendant and Flowers were introduced at trial in

which Flowers asked defendant about “the pipes” and defendant responded that there was a

“war” and that “everybody in the field except you and Herbo,” referring to Flowers and Turner.

Defendant then said, “every pole is needed.” Detective Kinney explained, both pipe and pole

refer to a gun. Defendant’s rap further stated, “catch ‘em up impression they fake clutching like

they always do,” which again referred to individuals failing to use their guns. These lyrics

demonstrate the motive for the murders after Flowers and Turner failed to participate in the gang

war.

¶ 82 The lyrics, “If you with your homie I’m blowing leaving them cover too,” implies the

shooting of more than one person, even if defendant did not have an issue with both people. This

lyric aligns with the shooting of two victims and again connects to the Facebook messages

discussing Flowers’s and Turner’s lack of participation in the gang war. Defendant also bragged

about his speed in firing gunshots, “quick to up and blow the two three hundred round drops

straight from the Army with the soldiers use.” While defendant’s exaggeration about the number

of gunshots was “braggadocio,” this line has a kernel of truth when both victims were shot twice

in the back. The evidence further established that both victims were shot with the same gun.

¶ 83 Additionally, the lyrics referred to “get[ting] up in the woods” and “smok[ing] a wood,”

and Hutchens testified at trial that kids would sometimes smoke marijuana in the woods. The

State’s theory of the case was that defendant and Ward took the victims into the woods with the

intent to smoke marijuana. Instead, defendant and Ward shot both victims in the back.

Defendant’s lyrics mentioned to “grab the posse,” which again appears to allude to the gang war

28 No. 1-23-0520

discussed in the Facebook messages. These premeditated murders could also have been

considered the “coup,” when defendant and Ward lured the victims to the woods and then shot

them. Defendant warns victims in the lyric, “I hope that I don’t shoot you grab body better get

back when Shoota start approaching you.” Again, the Facebook messages clearly depict the plan

between defendant and Ward to lure Flowers and Turner to the woods where they carried out this

murder.

¶ 84 The Facebook messages show Flowers contacted both defendant and Ward to discuss

their plan to meet the day of the murders. Flowers told both defendants that he was with Turner

at the park. Ward specifically sent a message to Flowers to contact him around the time of the

murders. Meanwhile defendant and Ward discussed their plan to meet and defendant had some

money. Ward also contacted another individual to obtain a .357 revolver. In contrast, defendant

messaged Flowers that night, after the murders, that he was sick and had not left the house. Both

defendants sent messages after the murders to both victims asking where they were as the

victims’ mothers searched for them. These messages described both defendants’ plan to meet

with Flowers and Turner and then their attempts to avoid suspicion after the fact as part of their

“coup.”

¶ 85 Further, the lyrics ended with “leave you froze and have your momma blue,” which is

strikingly similar to the bodies of Turner and Flowers left in the woods while their mothers

looked for them. While the victims’ mothers were searching, Turner’s mother Morris specifically

talked to defendant. When she showed Turner’s picture to defendant, he denied knowing Turner,

but then told her that he had seen Turner near the park the day he went missing. These lyrics

unambiguously reference the mothers’ fruitless searching and defendant’s actions in leaving the

victims “froze[n]” in death.

29 No. 1-23-0520

¶ 86 As previously observed, evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence. Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). And “[a]ll relevant evidence is

admissible.” Ill. R. Evid 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Defendant’s rap lyrics were relevant and

properly admissible for multiple reasons. The lyrics explicitly refer to details of the murders that

only a participant would know. Moreover, the lyrics are supported by and correspond with the

evidence presented at trial, including both defendants’ Facebook messages and Hutchens’s

testimony. We also find that the rap lyrics were relevant to defendant’s identity in the

involvement of the murders because a reasonable jury could find his statements established that

he was bragging about his participation in the murders of Flowers and Turner. The lyrics from

defendant’s rap were relevant to demonstrate motive and identity and were strengthened by the

overwhelming evidence presented at trial. After reviewing defendant’s rap in the context of the

evidence at trial, we find that a strong nexus has been established in both the similarity to the

facts as well as a temporal proximity because the video was streamed only two months after the

murders.

¶ 87 Defendant contends that the admission of his rap lyrics raised a concern about racial bias

in the public’s perception of rap music. In support, defendant relies extensively on the New

Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner, but we find the circumstances in Skinner easily

distinguishable from the facts in this case. Skinner, 95 A.3d at 253. The lyrics at issue in Skinner

were found in three notebooks with the “profane and violent” rap lyrics written by the defendant

in the first person. Id. at 239-40. Significantly, the State conceded that “many of the lyrics”

obtained by the State and “read to the jury were composed long before the circumstances

underlying the instant offense took place.” Id. at 240. The Skinner court reviewed the admission

30 No. 1-23-0520

of the lyrics as evidence of prior bad acts and concluded that the prejudicial effect of the violent

rap lyrics outweighed any probative value. Id. at 247, 251. The court concluded that a “strong

nexus between specific details of the artistic composition and the circumstances of the offense”

was necessary to admit a defendant’s artistic writings as probative evidence. Id. at 251-52. We

further observe that the Skinner court did not discuss racial bias in its analysis. Id. at 247-53.

¶ 88 In contrast, defendant’s rap lyrics have demonstrated a strong nexus to the circumstances

of the murders and were not admitted as evidence of prior bad acts. Defendant asserts that the

lyrics at issue here refer to drugs and drug sales unrelated to the facts of the case. However, as

defendant acknowledges, Hutchens testified that young people went into the woods to smoke

marijuana. This testimony ties directly to the State’s theory of the case, i.e., defendant and Ward

lured Flowers and Turner to the woods under the belief that they would smoke marijuana. Thus,

the references to drug use relate to the facts of the case and support our finding of a strong nexus.

The State did not discuss any other ambiguous drug references and focused only on the lyrics

that connected to details of the crime. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention that the rap

lyrics added an implicit racial bias into the trial because the lyrics explicitly related to the

circumstances of the murders.

¶ 89 We further find defendant’s suggestion that it was not established when defendant wrote

this rap lacks merit. As discussed above, the video was livestreamed on Facebook in October

2018 and viewed by Fenger Academy students who recognized the details in the lyrics and

alerted Morris to the video. Morris explained how a Facebook livestream worked because she

has used it. She described it as “a video where you can live stream what you are doing and what

you are saying in that moment.” Morris further stated that the video “can be played on your

Facebook page for up to 24 hours.” She then recorded the video and gave it to the police.

31 No. 1-23-0520

Lieutenant Kinney also testified that a Facebook Live video is streamed live but “[u]sually it’s

gone after 24 hours unless the accountholder decides to permanently post it on their Facebook

page.” Defendant has not offered any evidence to dispute this evidence that the video was posted

as a livestream. Since it was streamed approximately two months after the murders occurred, the

temporal proximity to the murders was very brief and supports the trial court’s admission.

¶ 90 We also disagree with defendant’s claims that the State “relied heavily on the rap.” The

State did not discuss the video in either its opening statement or initial closing argument and only

discussed the video in rebuttal closing argument after defense counsel had argued that the video

was irrelevant.

¶ 91 Additionally, we find the reasoning in some out-of-state cases to be instructive. Initially

relied on by defendant, we find the Maryland Supreme Court’s decision in Montague v. State,

243 A.3d 546 (Md. 2020), supports the State’s position as well as the conclusion reached by our

supreme court in Bush. In that case, the defendant contended that the lyrics from a rap recording

were irrelevant, their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect, and there was a

minimal nexus between the lyrics and the details of the homicide. Id. at 556. The rap lyrics

originated in a phone call the defendant made shortly before his trial while in custody. He spoke

with an unknown man and made multiple statements “in the form of an amateur rap that he

composed while incarcerated and awaiting trial,” and the defendant asked the unknown man to

record his rap lyrics. Id. at 553-54. The recorded rap “included lyrics that matched the details of

[the victim’s] murder” and “also made references to shooting ‘snitches’ and the recording was

subsequently uploaded on Instagram.” Id. at 551.

¶ 92 The Montague court first considered the rap lyrics relevancy and observed that evidence

is relevant if it has “ ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

32 No. 1-23-0520

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.’ ” Id. at 556 (quoting Md. R. 5-401 (eff. July 1, 1994)). The court noted this is “a very

low bar to meet.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 93 The reviewing court observed that the danger of unfair prejudice is of special interest

when the rap lyrics at issue are “ ‘insufficiently tethered’ to the details of the alleged crime.” Id.

at 563 (quoting Skinner, 95 A.3d at 253). The Montague court discussed the consideration of the

nexus between the lyrics and the circumstances of the crime and reasoned that “[w]hen such a

nexus exists, and a jury can ‘reasonably view the lyrics as factual, not fictional,’ the risk of

improperly admitting the lyrics as propensity evidence of the defendant’s bad character

significantly decreases.” Id. at 564 (quoting Holmes v. State, 306 P.3d 415, 418 (Nev. 2013)).

“When a defendant’s rap lyrics are composed after the alleged crime occurs, the lyrics have a

closer temporal nexus to that crime and are therefore more probative of the defendant’s

involvement.” Id.

¶ 94 If the defendant-authored rap lyrics bear a close nexus to the details of an alleged crime

such that the lyrics constitute direct proof of the defendant’s involvement, they meet the low

threshold for relevancy under Maryland rules of evidence and are admissible. Id. at 566. The

relevance inquiry then shifts to a balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice. “[W]hen

such a nexus exists, the probative value of defendant-authored rap lyrics is not substantially

outweighed by unfair prejudice because the usefulness of the lyrics to the jury is not substantially

overcome by their inflammatory character as propensity evidence.” Id. at 566 (citing Holmes,

306 P.3d at 420).

¶ 95 When it considered these principles alongside the defendant’s rap lyrics, the reviewing

court concluded that while the defendant’s rap lyrics include “some thematic elements native to

33 No. 1-23-0520

rap as a genre, and do not recount every detail of [the victim’s] murder, the lyrics are relevant

because they bear a close factual and temporal nexus to the details of [the victim’s] murder.” Id.

¶ 96 Both our supreme court and the Montague court relied on the Nevada Supreme Court’s

decision in Holmes, for support in their respective decisions. In that case, the defendant

challenged the trial court’s admission of rap lyrics of a song he wrote in jail while awaiting

extradition to Nevada. Holmes, 306 P.3d at 418. The rap lyrics at issue paralleled the details of a

robbery and murder where the assailants wore ski masks, turned out the victim’s pockets, and

tore a necklace from the victim’s throat. Id. at 419-20. While the trial court “acknowledged that

admitting gangsta rap carries the risk of it being misunderstood or misused as criminal

propensity or ‘bad act’ evidence,” the court found that the probative value was not “substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 418.

¶ 97 The Nevada Supreme Court recognized that “defendant-authored rap lyrics may employ

metaphor, exaggeration, and other artistic devices, [citation], and can involve abstract

representations of events or ubiquitous storylines. [Citation.] But these features do not exempt

such writings from jury consideration where, as here, the lyrics describe details that mirror the

crime charged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 419. It is one thing to exclude

defendant-authored fictional accounts, whether rap lyrics or some other form of artistic

expression, when offered to show a propensity for violence. Id. But “[i]t is quite another when

the defendant-authored writing incorporates details of the crime charged.” Id. The supreme court

further rejected the defendant’s assertion that the lyrics featured “cliched” references to

robberies, finding that the “lyrics’ lack of originality may reduce but does not eliminate their

probative value. The extent of the lyrics’ probative value was a matter for cross-examination,

argument, or even, perhaps, expert testimony.” Id. at 420.

34 No. 1-23-0520

¶ 98 The Holmes court also acknowledged that the rap lyrics carried a risk of prejudice but

observed that the “real question is whether the lyrics’ probative value was substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. The reviewing court

pointed out that the trial court provided an appropriate limiting instruction, including that the

jury could consider the defendant’s statements, including the lyrics, as “ ‘confessions,

admissions or neither’ and that they could not use the lyrics as evidence of bad character or

criminal propensity.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. The supreme court concluded that even though

the lyrics were prejudicial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion “in determining that the risk

they carried of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh their probative value.” Id.; see

Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (The reviewing court found the

defendant’s rap lyrics relevant when the lyrics referred to finding a body in the trunk of his car

and the victim’s body was recovered from the trunk of her vehicle that the defendant had driven

for several days and said belonged to him.); Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 86-87

(Ky. 2006) (The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim that a video of him

rapping about killing his wife was prejudicial character evidence because the defendant referred

to his emotions and actions for the current offense, showed the murder of his wife was

premediated, and impacted his defense of extreme emotional disturbance by showing his mental

state prior to the commission of the murder.).

¶ 99 Following our review of these cases, the common thread throughout, including by our

own supreme court in Bush, is the necessity of a strong nexus between the lyrics or artistic work

and the circumstances of the crime at issue. Absent such a nexus, the risk of unfair prejudice

surpasses any probative value in their admission. The rap lyrics at issue in this case establish this

strong nexus and demonstrate that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. As the

35 No. 1-23-0520

Montague court observed, “When a defendant’s rap lyrics are composed after the alleged crime

occurs, the lyrics have a closer temporal nexus to that crime and are therefore more probative of

the defendant’s involvement.” Montague, 243 A.3d at 564. The temporal nexus was also

satisfied because the video was streamed a short time, approximately two months, after the

commission of the murders. “Although there is no definitive line that demarcates the amount or

content of lyrics that may be used appropriately, reasonableness should govern. The distinction

between whether rap lyrics are more probative than prejudicial is a determination for the trial

judge in the first instance.” Hannah v. State, 23 A.3d 192, 205 (Md. 2011) (Harrell, J.,

concurring).

¶ 100 When the rap lyrics are considered along with the circumstances of the murders, it is

clear that a strong nexus exists with the lyrics to the events and the trial court properly allowed

the video into evidence. The probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we

find no abuse of discretion occurred.

¶ 101 However, even if the admission of the video was error, we find that any error was

harmless. An error can be harmless (1) where the error did not contribute to defendant’s

conviction, (2) where the other evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant’s conviction, or

(3) where the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted

evidence. In re Brandon P., 2014 IL 116653, ¶ 50. In a harmless error review, the State bears the

burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 495. (2009).

¶ 102 Contrary to defendant’s assertion that the video “easily could have tipped the scales for

the jury in a case hinging on circumstantial evidence,” the other evidence of his guilt was

overwhelming. First, the State presented the separate Facebook Messenger conversations

between defendant and Turner, Flowers, and Ward. The parties stipulated that the information

36 No. 1-23-0520

received from Facebook established that an account with the username BG Shoota belonged to

defendant, an account with the username BG Choppa belonged to Ward, an account with the

username BG Herbo belonged to Turner, and an account with the username BG Bibby belonged

to Flowers.

¶ 103 As detailed above, defendant told Flowers in a message that everyone was “in the field”

of their turf war except Flowers and Turner. This set forth a motive for the killings, namely

Flowers and Turner were not carrying their weight in the “war.” There were multiple messages

referring to the presence of guns, including Flowers asking both defendants about the “pipes”

and defendant telling Flowers that “every pole [was] needed.” Lieutenant Kinney testified that in

his experience “pipes” and “pole” both referred to guns.

¶ 104 Significantly, these messages revealed the discussion defendant and Ward each had with

the victims to arrange a place to meet the afternoon of the shooting, including references to the

park. Messages between defendant and Ward indicated a plan for defendant to meet up with

Ward. Ward also spoke with Flowers and Turner to coordinate meeting near the park.

¶ 105 Further, messages from Ward’s account disclosed he discussed the trade of a 9-millimeter

handgun plus $250 for a .357-caliber gun with another person. The parties stipulated that a

firearms expert from the Illinois State Police crime lab would testify that the bullets recovered

from the bodies of Flowers and Turner were both “of .357/.38 class caliber.” Presnell thoroughly

searched the wooded area for shell casings for over four hours using a metal detector, a hard

rake, and a soft rake, but no casings were recovered from the crime scene. Lieutenant Kinney

and Presnell testified that .357-caliber revolvers typically do not expel shell casings when fired;

the casings remain in the firearm.

¶ 106 The testimony from Hutchens provided substantial details leading up to the shooting and

37 No. 1-23-0520

the day afterwards. Hutchens saw defendant and Ward with two boys she did not know in

Golden Gate Park the afternoon of the shooting. She knew both defendants before that day. She

walked with them to a store and on the way, defendant told her someone was “gonna die today.”

He also gave his and Ward’s cell phones to Hutchens to hold onto. Hutchens then saw defendant

and Ward enter the woods with the two boys. She later heard four gunshots and fled to her

friend’s house across from the park. Later that day, Ward came to retrieve his and defendant’s

cell phones from Hutchens. The following day, Hutchens and her friend met with defendant and

Ward. Defendant and Ward told Hutchens and her friend that the girls were not outside that day,

did not see defendant and Ward, and did not hear anything. Hutchens understood defendant to

mean the day the shooting happened and that she did not see them going into the woods.

Hutchens also identified both defendant and Ward to the police in separate photo arrays.

¶ 107 After the murders occurred, defendant created a false alibi and sent it to Flowers that he

was too sick to leave his house that day. That false alibi was contradicted by his own messages

as well as Hutchens’s testimony and his admission to Morris that he saw Turner in the park the

day of the shooting. He then deleted the alibi message from his account, but the message

remained on Flowers’s account since Flowers was already deceased and unable to delete it.

¶ 108 Additionally, both Reneau and Morris, the victims’ mothers, reported the boys missing

the next day. Reneau told the police that she was able to track Flowers’s cell phone to a location

near East 130th Street and South Eberhart Avenue in Chicago. Morris distributed missing person

fliers of Turner and later received anonymous calls telling her to look near Golden Gate Park.

Defendant spoke with Morris and initially denied knowing her son, but later said he had seen

Turner at the park the day Turner went missing. This statement to Morris further contradicted

defendant’s message to Flowers that he had never left the house the day the murders occurred.

38 No. 1-23-0520

The police found the bodies of Flowers and Turner in the wooded area of Golden Gate Park.

Flowers’s cell phone was recovered from his pants. The victims were both shot twice in the back

with no evidence of close-range firing. Further, there was evidence that Shot Spotter sensors

detected a series of acoustic pulses classified as three rounds of gunfire at the street address of

501 East 130th Street in Chicago at 5:39 p.m. on August 17, 2018. Lieutenant Kinney had

testified that the shooting occurred between 5:30 p.m. and 6 p.m. based on two 911 calls

indicating multiple gunshots as well as the audio in the area detected possible gunshots. Given

this overwhelming evidence of guilt, we find any error in the admission of the video was

harmless.

¶ 109 Further, we find that the statements made in the rap video were cumulative to other

properly admitted evidence presented at trial, which included the testimony from Hutchens,

Morris, and multiple police officers, as well as the Facebook messages between the defendants

and the victims. Therefore, each relevant statement from defendant’s video was cumulative to

properly admitted evidence that was presented at trial. See Brandon P., 2014 IL 116653, ¶ 50

(harmless error can occur where the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or

duplicates properly admitted evidence).

¶ 110 Defendant also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

“unauthenticated and inaccurate” transcription of his rap video lyrics. At trial, the State included

a captioned transcription in the recording of defendant’s rap video that was played at trial.

Defendant asserts that the transcription “appears to be inaccurate in places” and prevented the

jurors “from interpreting the rap for themselves.”

¶ 111 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are resolved under the standard set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court

39 No. 1-23-0520

delineated a two-part test to use when evaluating whether a defendant was denied the effective

assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. Under Strickland, a defendant must

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficient performance

substantially prejudiced defendant. Id. at 687. To demonstrate performance deficiency, a

defendant must establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142, 162 (2001). In evaluating sufficient

prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If a case may be disposed of on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, that course should be taken, and the court need not ever consider the quality of the

attorney’s performance. Id. at 697. “Strickland requires actual prejudice be shown, not mere

speculation as to prejudice.” People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 135 (2008).

¶ 112 Defendant argues that the State failed to lay the appropriate foundation for the admission

of the transcription and his attorney’s failure to make an objection constituted deficient

performance. However, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, which we do not find,

defendant cannot establish the requisite prejudice.

¶ 113 First, to establish prejudice a defendant must show that the outcome would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If counsel had objected to the foundation at trial, the State

could have cured any error by laying a proper foundation for the admission of the video with

transcription. See People v. Diaz, 377 Ill. App. 3d 339, 350 (2007) (finding that the defendant

could not show “a reasonable probability of a different outcome because, even if defense counsel

had opposed the admission of the [scientific] test, it is likely that the State would have

40 No. 1-23-0520

immediately cured the foundation deficiency by asking more questions concerning” the witness’s

experience and knowledge with the test); People v. Rodriguez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 877, 888 (2000)

(observing that the State could have presented an alternative foundation for the admission of a

tape, including a witness’s prior testimony of its accuracy). Thus, defendant cannot show a

reasonable probability that an objection would have prevented the admission of the transcription.

¶ 114 Second, the only inaccuracies alleged by defendant were minor and inconsequential to

the meaning and references in the video. According to defendant, the captions do not appear “to

be entirely accurate.” He asserts that State’s captions in the line, “The fuck ya’ll see calling like

they let Taco loose,” is inaccurate. He contends that “what the State translated as ‘see’ sounds

more like ‘stay’ or ‘steady,’ and ‘Taco’ sounds incorrect as well, and makes little sense.”

However, we point out that the captions do not include the words “see calling,” but is noted as

inaudible, “The fuck ya’ll (inaudible) like they let Taco loose.” The only other line contended as

inaccurate is, “I’m trying to work and mew,” because defendant asserts that “ ‘mew’ cannot be

correct” and refers to possible meanings in Urban Dictionary and the Merriam-Webster

Dictionary, but none would make sense in the context of the video. None of these alleged

inaccurate captions altered the meaning of the video such that there was a reasonable probability

that he was prejudiced by its admission.

¶ 115 Third, and most significantly, even if the version of the rap video with the transcription

was not admitted, the State had a copy of the original version of the video without captions. And

as we concluded above, the admission of the rap video was proper. Since the rap video itself

would have been introduced at trial either with a transcription or not, he cannot establish the

requisite prejudice.

¶ 116 Further, any error in the transcription was cured in the jury instructions. The trial court

41 No. 1-23-0520

instructed the jury in accordance with IPI Criminal No. 3.20:

“Finally, an electronic recording has been admitted into evidence. In

addition to the electronic recording you’re being given a transcript of the

electronic recording. The transcript only represents what the transcriber believes

was said on the electronic recording and merely serves as an aid when you listen

to the electronic recording. The electronic recording, and not the transcript, is the

evidence. If you perceive a conflict between the electronic recording and the

transcript, the electronic recording controls.” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,

Criminal, No. 3.20 (approved Oct. 17, 2014).

Defendant fails to acknowledge that the jury was instructed on how to review the video and the

transcript. As previously observed, “[a]bsent some indication to the contrary, we must presume

that jurors follow the law as set forth in the instructions given them.” Wilmington, 2013 IL

112938, ¶ 49. Therefore, any potential error in the transcription was cured by the court’s

instruction.

¶ 117 Since defendant cannot establish the requisite prejudice under Strickland, his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

¶ 118 Defendant next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion for allowing the admission

of over a dozen photographs of the bodies of Turner and Flowers. Specifically, defendant argues

that these images were not relevant to any issue before the court and only served to inflame the

passions of the jury, depriving him of a fair trial.

¶ 119 Defendant admits that he failed to object to the photographs of the victims or include this

claim in his posttrial motion. To preserve an issue for review, defendant must object both at trial

and in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Failure to do so

42 No. 1-23-0520

operates as a forfeiture as to that issue on appeal. People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 293 (1992).

Defendant asks this court to review this alleged error under the plain error doctrine, as well as for

his attorney’s ineffectiveness for failing to properly preserve this issue.

¶ 120 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) states that “[a]ny error, defect,

irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors

or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the

attention of the trial court.” The plain error rule

“allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or

obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone

threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the

seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is

so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the

integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.”

People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (citing People v. Herron, 215

Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)).

However, the plain error rule “is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all errors

affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial

court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)). Rather,

“Illinois’s plain error rule is a narrow exception to forfeiture principles.” People v. Jackson, 2022

IL 127256, ¶ 18.

¶ 121 Defendant carries the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error rule.

People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). Defendant asserts that this alleged error falls under

both prongs of the plain error test. However, “[t]he initial analytical step under either prong of

43 No. 1-23-0520

the plain error doctrine is determining whether there was a clear or obvious error at trial.” People

v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49.

¶ 122 As previously stated, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under

Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such

deficient performance substantially prejudiced defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. However,

we conclude that we need not decide whether trial counsel was ineffective or whether plain error

review would apply because defendant’s claim regarding the crime scene and autopsy

photographs fails on the merits.

¶ 123 In general,

“[p]hotographs of a decedent may be admitted to prove the nature and extent of

injuries and the force needed to inflict them, the position, condition and location

of the body, the manner and cause of death, to corroborate a defendant’s

confession, and to aid in understanding the testimony of a pathologist or other

witness.” People v. Richardson, 401 Ill. App. 3d 45, 52 (2010).

“If photographs are relevant to prove facts at issue, they are admissible and may be shown to the

jury unless the prejudicial nature of the photographs outweighs their probative value.” People v.

Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 219 (2000). “When a defendant in a murder trial pleads not guilty, the

prosecution is allowed to prove every element of the crime charged and every relevant fact.” Id.

at 219-20. “Even gruesome or disgusting photographs may be properly admitted into evidence if

they are relevant to establish any fact at issue in the case.” People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130,

147 (1998). “If photographs could aid the jury in understanding testimony, they may be admitted

even if cumulative of that testimony.” Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 220. “The decision of whether a

jury should be allowed to see photographs of a decedent is a decision that rests within the sound

44 No. 1-23-0520

discretion of the trial judge.” Id. at 219.

¶ 124 Defendant contends that the “gruesome photos of Turner and Flowers’s maggot-infested

bodies were irrelevant to the only question before [defendant’s] jury: whether [defendant] was

responsible for their deaths.” The photos “served only to horrify” and “prejudice” the jurors.

¶ 125 The State maintains that the pictures were properly admitted and no error occurred

because the complained-of photographs showing the decay of the victims’ bodies was “an

inherent part of this crime, and analogous to any other unpleasant but probative effort” by the

perpetrators to dispose of the victims’ bodies. Specifically, the State argues that the damage

suffered by the bodies before their discovery, as shown in the photographs, “directly related to

‘the nature and extent of the injuries, the position, condition, and location of the body, and the

manner and cause of death,’ and also aided in understanding the testimony of the forensic

investigator and medical examiner.”

¶ 126 Defendant challenges the admission of 13 photographs: 6 of Flowers and 7 of Turner. Of

these photographs, four were taken by Presnell, the forensic investigator, and nine by Dr. Khan,

the medical examiner who performed both autopsies. In his testimony, Presnell used the

photographs to explain where and how he discovered the bodies in the wooded area. He first

discussed Flowers’s body, which was found face down and photographed by Presnell in that

position. He then rolled Flowers’s body over to take photographs of his face, clothing, and to

search his pockets. The photographs showed the state of decomposition, including the presence

of maggots. Similarly, Turner was discovered face down and photographed by Presnell in that

position, as well as when he was turned over to photograph his face and search his pockets.

¶ 127 The first two complained-of photographs taken by the medical examiner were presented

during the testimony of Reneau and Morris and stipulated by the parties as how Flowers and

45 No. 1-23-0520

Turner looked in death. “A person cannot invite the trial court to take an action and then

complain about that same action in a reviewing court.” People v. Trice, 2017 IL App (1st)

152090, ¶ 59; see People v. Kane, 2013 IL App (2d) 110594, ¶ 19 (“A party who agrees to the

admission of evidence through a stipulation is estopped from later complaining about that

evidence being stipulated into the record.”). Since defendant stipulated to the admission of these

two photographs of the victims, he cannot now complain that their admission was in error.

¶ 128 The remaining complained-of photographs from the autopsies showed the injuries to the

bodies as they arrived at the morgue, before the bulk of the maggots were removed during the

autopsy process. These photographs were relevant to show both the condition of the victims’

bodies, as well as understanding the medical examiner’s testimony. See Richardson, 401 Ill.

App. 3d at 52. The photographs were especially relevant since Dr. Arunkumar did not perform

the autopsies but was able to discuss the injuries and condition of the bodies from Dr. Khan’s

report. For example, in reviewing a photograph of Turner’s body, Dr. Arunkumar explained that

“because of the maggots in the area, it was hard to make out if this was the entrance wound or

the exit wound.”

¶ 129 We are not persuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. Garlick, 46 Ill. App. 3d 216

(1977), and People v. Coleman, 116 Ill. App. 3d 28 (1983), and find both cases distinguishable.

In Garlick, the defendant admitted to killing the victim and asserted insanity as an affirmative

defense. Despite this admission, a gruesome photograph of the decedent’s “massive head

wound” was admitted at trial. Garlick, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 224. The defendant appealed and argued

that the photograph of the decedent’s head should not have been admitted because it was

irrelevant and prejudicial given his admission that he committed the offense. The appellate court

agreed with the defendant and ruled that the admission of the photograph “could serve no

46 No. 1-23-0520

purpose other than to inflame and prejudice the jury in the grossest manner” because the

defendant had admitted his guilt and raised an insanity defense. Id. The reviewing court held that

trial court erred in allowing the photograph to go to the jury because the photograph was

“needlessly prejudicial.” Id.

¶ 130 In Coleman, the jury was shown a color slide depicting “the decedent’s decomposing,

maggot-infested, partially autopsied body,” which the appellate court found “ ‘absolutely

hideous.’ ” Coleman, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 35. The photograph showed “[s]everal teeth [were]

missing, and the brain [was] exposed and lying next to the head.” Id. Significantly, the medical

examiner testified that the slide was “of no use to him in establishing the identity of the

decedent.” Id. at 36. The Coleman court concluded that the photograph of “an autopsied,

decomposed body” carried “extremely little probative value” in establishing the decedent’s

identity. Id.

¶ 131 In contrast to Garlick, the question of whether defendant committed the murders was

very much at issue and as stated above, the State was entitled “to prove every element of the

crime charged and every relevant fact.” Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 219-20. Moreover, “the

appellate court’s comments [in Garlick] about the photograph were mere dicta, since the

appellate court had already decided that a new trial was warranted on other grounds.” People v.

Maldonado, 402 Ill. App. 3d 411, 420 (2010). While the photographs showed the presence of

maggots and the damage caused by them, and unlike in Coleman, the images were relevant to

establish the effects of the maggots on the gunshot wounds as necessary for the medical

examiner to determine the path of the bullets and injuries sustained by Flowers and Turner. Thus,

the complained-of photographs were probative of the nature and extent of the victims’ injuries.

¶ 132 To sustain defendant’s first degree murder conviction, the State was required to prove,

47 No. 1-23-0520

among other things, that he performed an act that caused the deaths of Flowers and Turner.

See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2016). Accordingly, the State was permitted to present evidence

relating to whether defendant’s actions caused their death. See People v. Starks, 287 Ill. App. 3d

1035, 1042 (1997) (“Regardless of the fact that defendant did not dispute the cause of death or

the force used, the People may still prove every element and relevant fact of the offense charged,

and if autopsy photos are relevant to establish any such fact, they are admissible despite their

gruesome nature.”). The complained-of photographs did just that; they showed how the bodies

were discovered and their condition as well as the nature of the injuries and damage caused by

both the gunshots and the maggots while the bodies remained in the woods. Since these

photographs were probative to establish both relevant facts and the requisite elements of the

murder charge, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of these

photographs. If there is no error, there is no plain error and counsel cannot be ineffective for

failing to raise the issue. People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 139 (2005). Thus, this claim fails.

¶ 133 Next, defendant contends that this court should vacate his de facto life sentence because

the trial court’s findings in aggravation were contradicted by the evidence presented at

sentencing. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court erred by improperly relying on the JTDC

disciplinary reports without hearing from a live witness and the trial court erred by considering

facts in aggravation that should have been considered in mitigation.

¶ 134 “It is well established that a trial court has broad discretionary authority in sentencing a

criminal defendant.” People v. Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d 948, 967 (2007). “An appellate court

typically shows great deference to a trial court’s sentencing decision since the trial court is in a

better position to decide the appropriate sentence.” Id. Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing

decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “The reviewing court may not

48 No. 1-23-0520

reverse the sentencing court just because it could have weighed the factors differently.” People v.

McWilliams, 2015 IL App (1st) 130913, ¶ 28 (citing People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991)).

¶ 135 “In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial judge is further required to consider all

factors in aggravation and mitigation, which includes defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general

moral character, mentality, social environments, habits, and age, as well as the nature and

circumstances of the crime.” Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 967. “If the sentence imposed is within

the statutory range, it will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit

and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v.

Starnes, 374 Ill. App. 3d 132, 143 (2007) (citing People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1999)).

¶ 136 Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly considered defendant’s disciplinary

records from the JTDC without requiring the State to call a live witness. However, he failed to

object to the admission of the disciplinary records, nor did he argue this alleged error in motion

to reconsider his sentence. “In order to preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a

contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are

required.” People v. Harvey, 2018 IL 122325, ¶ 15. Although defendant filed a postsentencing

motion, he did not set forth this alleged error in his motion. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited

this claim on appeal.

¶ 137 Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court “mischaracterized the evidence presented at

sentencing.” Specifically, he argues that the court failed to comply with the consideration of

applicable juvenile sentencing factors under section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Unified Code of

Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020)) because the court improperly considered

some of the factors in aggravation, rather than mitigation. Defendant was 16 years old at the time

of the commission of the offense.

49 No. 1-23-0520

¶ 138 Section 5-4.5-105(a) provides:

“(a) On or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th

General Assembly, when a person commits an offense and the person is under 18

years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the court, at the

sentencing hearing conducted under Section 5-4-1, shall consider the following

additional factors in mitigation in determining the appropriate sentence:

(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time

of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of

behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or

both, if any;

(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including

peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences;

(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social

background, including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or

other childhood trauma;

(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of

rehabilitation, or both;

(5) the circumstances of the offense;

(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the

offense, including the level of planning by the defendant before the

offense;

(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his

or her defense;

50 No. 1-23-0520

(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and

(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable,

including an expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person,

on advice of counsel chooses not to make a statement, the court shall not

consider a lack of an expression of remorse as an aggravating factor.” Id.

¶ 139 Defendant does not argue that the trial court failed to consider his youth and attendant

circumstances as required under section 5-4.5-105(a), but rather, he contends that the court found

some of these facts weighed toward aggravation instead of mitigation. The State maintains that

the trial court properly considered the statutory factors and “merely found some factors less

mitigating than defendant claimed.” The State points out that defendant “is not claiming that the

trial court overlooked or misapprehended the applicable sentencing factors” but rather “the

evidence should have been weighed more heavily in favor of mitigation.” We review for an

abuse of discretion whether the court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors before

imposing the sentence. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000).

¶ 140 Here, the trial court made extensive and detailed findings regarding the juvenile

sentencing factors. The court stated that it had reviewed all documents before determining

defendant’s sentence. The court outlined the sentencing range of 20 to 60 years for first degree

murder and that defendant’s sentences would be consecutive since he was found guilty of killing

two victims.

¶ 141 Turning to the factors, the court acknowledged defendant’s trauma but observed that he

was “very intelligent.” The court recognized that defendant was 16, but while considering his

impetuosity and maturity, the evidence did not show a lack of maturity, but rather found “just the

opposite.” The court observed that defendant was “able to consider the risk and consequences of

51 No. 1-23-0520

[his] actions.”

¶ 142 The court then declined to find:

“that you have cognitive or developmental disability at all. As I [stated], I find it’s

just the opposite. I don’t find that you’re subjected to outside pressure. I don’t

find there’s any evidence of pressure on you as far as peer pressure or negative

influences. I find that there was trauma in your childhood.”

¶ 143 Regarding defendant’s family ties, the court “recognize[d]” that defendant had a “very

difficult complex relationship *** with both of [his] parents and [his] siblings” and that impacted

him growing up.

¶ 144 In considering defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the court acknowledged it was a

“difficult thing to be able to predict.” The court then noted defendant’s criminal history of a

delinquency finding for unlawful use of a weapon. The court pointed out that “the evidence is

clear, according to your prior criminal history as a juvenile, you didn’t abide by a lot of things

you were supposed to abide by. And as a matter of fact, and I want to make sure I have this clear,

but you were on probation at the time of this offense.” The court found that while defendant was

“very smart,” it did not “see” defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and not to commit another

criminal act.

¶ 145 Turning to the circumstances of the offense and defendant’s participation in the

commission, the court found defendant and Ward “preplanned” these killings, and noted it was

not akin to a drive by shooting. Defendant and Ward took Turner and Flowers, who were both

teenagers, “in the woods, shot in the back, and left for dead, and their bodies discovered a couple

of days later rotted in an awful state to be returned to their families.” The court further

acknowledged that both defendant and Ward were found guilty under a theory of accountability

52 No. 1-23-0520

and “in this case the evidence bears out that both you and Mr. Ward did this together with the

planning and the purpose of committing this murder.”

¶ 146 The court also found that defendant was able to meaningfully participate in his defense

and understood the legal process and the court noted defendant’s disagreement with his trial

counsel. The court further observed that defendant’s account of the events was not credible

because defendant admitted to spending the day with Turner and Flowers and then both boys

went home. Defendant’s timeline did not line up because the following day he “said that some of

the victims’ friends had contacted [him] to ask about them because they were found deceased”

but the victims had not been found at that time. Defendant also suggested some “enemies” from

a “turf war” killed them. Finally, the court acknowledged that defendant had a young daughter

and his diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder. The court then sentenced defendant to two

terms of 25 years, to be served consecutively.

¶ 147 After reviewing the trial court’s thorough and detailed consideration of the juvenile

sentencing factors under section 5-4.5-105(a), we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion. The trial court went through each of the factors and explained its reasoning based on

the facts and evidence presented. The court considered defendant’s history as well as the

circumstances of this offense to determine the appropriate sentence. While defendant disagrees

with the weight the court gave to each of the factors in mitigation, this court may not reverse the

sentencing court just because we might have weighed the factors differently. See McWilliams,

2015 IL App (1st) 130913, ¶ 28.

¶ 148 Additionally, we point out that under recent legislation, defendant will be afforded a

parole hearing after serving 20 years of his sentence. “A person under 21 years of age at the time

of the commission of first degree murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019 *** shall be

53 No. 1-23-0520

eligible for parole review by the Prisoner Review Board after serving 20 years or more of his or

her sentence or sentences ***.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020). Thus, defendant is not

subject to a de facto life sentence. See People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 54 (noting that

courts look to the earliest opportunity for release to assess whether a de facto life sentence has

been imposed); People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 54 (finding that “the legislature

*** created the new parole statute and modified the parole review factors for the purpose of

creating a meaningful opportunity for parole for juvenile offenders”); People v. Elliott, 2022 IL

App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56 (finding the defendant did not receive “a de facto life sentence since he is

eligible for parole”).

¶ 149 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.

¶ 150 Affirmed.

54 No. 1-23-0520

People v. Colone, 2024 IL App (1st) 230520

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-CR-17744; the Hon. Ursula Walowski, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Jennifer L. Bontrager, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, Erin K. Slattery, and Daniel Piwowarczyk, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.