People v. Harris

2026 IL App (1st) 242147-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 9, 2026
• Docket: 1-24-2147
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 242147-U No. 1-24-2147 Order filed January 9, 2026 Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 13 CR 02582 ) YECARY HARRIS, ) Honorable ) James Bryan Novy, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s sentence is affirmed where he failed to substantiate (1) that the resentencing court disregarded mitigating information, and (2) that the resentencing court relied on the transcript of the initial sentencing hearing or that consideration of the transcript constituted prejudicial error.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Yecary Harris was convicted of first degree murder and

sentenced to a 50-year prison term. (Defendant’s name also appears as Ye’Cary Harris in the

record.) Defendant appealed, and this court remanded for resentencing due to a procedural error No. 1-24-2147

but otherwise affirmed. People v. Harris, 2023 IL App (1st) 210754. On remand, defendant was

resentenced to a 50-year prison term. On appeal, defendant contends that the resentencing court

failed to consider mitigating factors, including his mental illness, and erroneously considered the

transcript from his initial sentencing hearing. We affirm.

¶3 This court detailed the trial evidence in our prior order on direct appeal. We only restate

the evidence relevant to the instant appeal.

¶4 Defendant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder and aggravated fleeing

or attempting to elude a peace officer arising from the shooting death of Christopher Thomas on

December 30, 2012. Rodney Harris, who is not related to defendant, was also charged and is not a

party to this appeal. Defendant proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable James B. Linn.

¶5 Albert Williams testified that on December 30, 2012, at approximately 5 p.m., he was

working at a Chicago liquor store with James Banks. Defendant asked Williams where defendant

could obtain cigarettes and marijuana. Williams directed defendant to Banks and witnessed

defendant talking with Banks and Thomas, who was also in the store. Defendant exited with

Thomas, explaining that he did not want to buy marijuana in view of the liquor store’s surveillance

cameras.

¶6 Shortly thereafter, Williams went outside and saw defendant and Thomas conversing

approximately 20 feet away. Thomas began to remove his coat. Defendant then shot Thomas, who

tried to grab the firearm from defendant. Defendant fired multiple shots even after Thomas had

collapsed. Williams fell to the ground because defendant was “shooting around.” Defendant then

jumped over Williams, ran to the corner, stuffed the firearm in his waistband, and entered the

passenger seat of a silver vehicle parked at a gas station across the street. The silver vehicle drove

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away when police arrived approximately a minute later. Williams later identified defendant in a

lineup.

¶7 Anthony Freeman testified that he was approaching the liquor store when he observed two

men talking down the street. One man shot the other multiple times, including once after the second

man had fallen to the ground.

¶8 Donald Braxton, who was also present, testified to hearing multiple gunshots and

witnessing defendant shoot Thomas before fleeing into a vehicle parked across the street. Braxton

saw the silver vehicle “zooming” away with defendant in the front passenger seat when the police

arrived. Braxton went to Thomas, who “took his last breath.” Braxton did not see any weapons on

the ground. Braxton also later identified defendant in a lineup.

¶9 Chicago police officer James Atkinson testified that he heard several gunshots and drove

to the scene. There, Braxton indicated that defendant was in the silver vehicle, which Atkinson

identified as a Chrysler. Atkinson then pulled into the gas station behind the silver Chrysler.

Chicago police officer Bobby Tong also tried to block the silver Chrysler, which drove away.

¶ 10 Atkinson and Tong pursued, and other officers joined the chase. Defendant ran stop signs

before entering the Dan Ryan Expressway. The officers continued their high-speed pursuit until

the 43rd Street exit. Atkinson witnessed the Chrysler crash into another vehicle, which flipped

several times before landing in front of his own. Atkinson confirmed that the occupant of the other

vehicle was “okay.”

¶ 11 Tong testified that following the crash, defendant left the Chrysler. Defendant ran, and

Tong arrested him 60 to 90 seconds later.

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¶ 12 Chicago police officer Kevin Kilroy testified that he found a 9-milimeter Luger on a

parkway on the route of the chase. Forensic investigator Jamal Judeh testified that he recovered

the firearm. He also recovered other evidence, including two fired bullets and one metal fragment

found under Thomas’ body; according to Judeh, that indicated someone had stood over Thomas

and fired into him.

¶ 13 Stipulated forensic testimony established, in relevant part, that the bullets and cartridge

cases recovered at the scene of the shooting came from the Luger. The parties additionally

stipulated that Dr. Stephen Cina, who performed Thomas’ autopsy, would testify that Thomas’

cause of death was homicide due to multiple gunshot wounds, including from seven shots to his

back and the back of his right arm.

¶ 14 The trial court found defendant guilty on all counts, merging them into one count for first

degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2012)).

¶ 15 Defendant’s initial sentencing hearing was held via Zoom on June 9, 2021. The State’s

evidence in aggravation included testimony from Cook County sheriff correctional officer

Lawrence O’Rourke regarding an incident for which defendant was convicted of felony resisting

a correctional officer. The court also heard victim impact statements from Thomas’ sister, Chrystal

Kyles, and mother, Valerie Kyles. (Because Chrystal Kyles and Valerie Kyles have the same last

name, we refer to them by their first names.) The State additionally proffered defendant’s criminal

history, including a 2002 aggravated kidnapping conviction.

¶ 16 Defendant did not present evidence in mitigation apart from his presentence investigation

report (PSI), portions of which were blank because he refused to answer the probation officer’s

questions. Defense counsel argued that defendant’s history of mental illness, lack of family

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support, and prior employment warranted the minimum sentence. Defendant spoke, expressing

sympathy for Thomas’ family but professing innocence.

¶ 17 The trial court imposed 50 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 18 Defendant appealed and argued, in relevant part, that the trial court failed to obtain his

waiver for an in-person hearing before proceeding with his sentencing hearing via Zoom and

without counsel in the same location. Harris, 2023 IL App (1st) 210754, ¶ 56. We remanded for a

new sentencing hearing and otherwise affirmed. Id. ¶ 115.

¶ 19 The Honorable James Bryan Novy presided over the resentencing hearing. Judge Novy

noted that he had reviewed a new PSI, which the parties amended in court, the trial and sentencing

transcripts, and this court’s order on direct appeal.

¶ 20 The new PSI, as amended, is included in the record on appeal. It indicates that defendant

was 42 years old at the time of resentencing. Defendant reported that he was close with his mother

but suffered emotional and physical abuse. He attended school until the ninth grade but earned his

GED and wanted to learn business management or architecture. Defendant said he had worked as

a housekeeper and hoped to work for the railroad upon his release. Defendant was married with

two minor children.

¶ 21 Defendant’s criminal history included juvenile adjudications for drug-related offenses. As

an adult, he was convicted for resisting a correctional officer, “fail[ing] to report annually,”

aggravated kidnapping, drug offenses, retail theft, criminal possession of a firearm, and a traffic

violation. Defendant reported former involvement with the Gangster Disciples.

¶ 22 The PSI details defendant’s history of chronic headaches, high blood pressure, breathing

problems, and nightmares. Defendant had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder,

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anxiety, bipolar disorder, and borderline schizophrenia, for which he took medication. He reported

excessive alcohol consumption starting as a teenager, although “it had been years since he last

drank alcohol.” He also noted daily use of Xanax, “Narco,” “MDAM,” and Ecstasy.

¶ 23 The State published two victim impact statements. In her statement, Chrystal recalled her

mother screaming that someone had “ ‘killed my baby,’ ” her only son. Chrystal described the

years of attending court proceedings as “unbearable.” In Valerie’s statement, she said that

defendant had hurt his own family and “destroyed” hers. The State did not recall O’Rourke to

testify about defendant’s felony conviction for resisting a correctional officer.

¶ 24 In mitigation, defense counsel published a letter from defendant’s father, who wrote that

defendant groomed and shaved seniors at no cost and transported people to the grocery store.

Defendant’s father emphasized that defendant was “good and polite to everyone,” tried to support

his children, and helped when his grandmother and great-grandmother were alive.

¶ 25 The State asked for a 50-year sentence, contending that no substantive issue existed with

the original sentence.

¶ 26 Defense counsel asked for the minimum sentence, which he characterized as “already

extremely high” based on defendant’s age, 44 at the time of sentencing. Counsel shared

defendant’s desire to use his GED, work, and live with his family upon his release. Counsel

discussed defendant’s childhood trauma and physical abuse, employment prior to incarceration,

renunciation of gang affiliation, and lack of criminal activity since 2016. Counsel emphasized

defendant’s high blood pressure, chronic headaches, nightmares, and breathing problems. Counsel

also highlighted defendant’s PTSD, anxiety, bipolar, and schizophrenia diagnoses.

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¶ 27 In allocution, defendant expressed remorse but insisted he was innocent. Defendant said

that he knew “what it feels like to lose somebody” because he “lost nearly [his] whole family being

incarcerated.” Defendant concluded by stating that he wished that Thomas’ family could “possibly

heal” someday.

¶ 28 The resentencing court stated it had considered the PSI, defendant’s allocution, the

arguments, and “all statutory and nonstatutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether

specifically mentioned or not” pertaining to defendant’s “history and character.” Further, the court

considered “the seriousness of the offense” and the objective of restoring defendant to useful

citizenship. In aggravation, the court found that defendant caused or threatened serious harm and

had a history of criminal activity, and that a sentence “is necessary to deter others from committing

the same crime.” The court stated, “I don’t feel there were any factors in mitigation that were

statutorily to be considered based on what I heard today.”

¶ 29 The resentencing court highlighted defendant’s other convictions and stated its belief that

the original sentence had been vacated “on a technicality” and was not otherwise inappropriate.

The resentencing court quoted the trial court’s description of the crime as a “cold-blooded

homicide” and “an execution on the street,” and imposed 50 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 30 Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the resentencing court denied.

¶ 31 On appeal, defendant first argues that the resentencing court failed to consider statutorily

mitigating information.

¶ 32 A trial court has broad discretion in imposing its sentence, and a reviewing court will give

it great deference. People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142877, ¶ 60. This is because the trial court

is better able to “weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral

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character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209

(2000). Unless a trial court disregards relevant mitigating information, or considers incompetent

evidence or improper aggravating factors, a trial court has “wide latitude” in imposing a sentence

within the applicable statutory range. People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 56. We will

presume that a sentence within the statutory limits is proper and will not disturb it absent an abuse

of discretion. People v. Webster, 2023 IL 128428, ¶ 21.

¶ 33 An abuse of discretion occurs where a sentence “varies greatly from the spirit and purpose

of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Jones, 2014 IL App (1st)

120927, ¶ 56. This court will “not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because

it would have weighed *** factors differently.” Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. The presence of

mitigating factors does not mandate a minimum sentence. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 55.

A reviewing court presumes the sentencing court considered any mitigation evidence. People v.

Burton, 2015 IL App (1st) 131600, ¶ 38. A defendant must make an affirmative showing to the

contrary to rebut this presumption. Id.

¶ 34 Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012). The

sentence for this crime ranges from 20 years’ to 60 years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20

(West 2024). A 25-year enhancement applies where, as here, the defendant personally discharged

a firearm that caused a death. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West Supp. 2023). Consequently, the

applicable sentencing range in this case was 45 years’ to 85 years’ imprisonment. Defendant was

sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment, within the statutory limits. We will presume this sentence

proper unless defendant affirmatively demonstrates otherwise. See Burton, 2015 IL App (1st)

131600, ¶ 38.

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¶ 35 Section 5-4-1(a)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) requires a court to “consider

evidence and information offered by the parties in aggravation and mitigation.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4-

1(a)(4) (West 2024). Section 5-5-3.1 of the Code outlines mitigating factors. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-

3.1(a)-(b) (West 2024). In relevant part, the statute provides that a mental illness can be a

mitigating factor if, at the time of the crime, it was insufficient to establish an insanity defense but

“substantially affected [an offender’s] ability to understand the nature of his or her acts or to

conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law.” Id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(16).

¶ 36 Defendant urges that, contrary to statute, the resentencing court failed to consider any

mitigating information presented. He notes the court’s comment that “I don’t feel there were any

factors in mitigation that were statutorily to be considered based on what I heard today,” and

characterizes this language as the court disregarding all mitigating information. In particular,

defendant faults the court’s supposed failure to consider evidence of (1) his mental illness; (2) his

childhood trauma; (3) his full-time employment before the crime; (4) his supportive family; (5) his

contributions to the community; (6) his renunciation of gang affiliations; (7) his empathy for

Thomas’ family; and (8) his lack of criminal activity since 2016, when he began taking his

medication regularly.

¶ 37 As noted, absent an indication to the contrary, a trial court is presumed to have considered

all mitigating information presented. People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19. This

court will not focus on a few words or statements made by the trial court in isolation but will

consider the record as a whole. Id. ¶ 13. Here, shortly before making the comment at issue, the

court stated that it had considered the PSI, defendant’s allocution, the arguments, and “all statutory

and nonstatutory factors in aggravation and mitigation.” In context, the court conveyed that it had

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considered all information presented and did not find that any evidence constituted mitigating

factors prescribed by statute. That is, defendant’s mental illness did not qualify as a mitigating

factor because it did not substantially affect his ability to understand the nature of his acts or

conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the crime. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-

3.1(a)(16) (West 2024). Defendant therefore has not affirmatively shown that the court failed to

consider the relevant mitigating information presented. See Burton, 2015 IL App (1st) 131600,

¶ 38.

¶ 38 Defendant has also failed to affirmatively demonstrate that the resentencing court failed to

consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence concerning his childhood trauma, prior employment,

supportive family, community contributions, former gang membership, empathy for Thomas’

family, and lack of criminal activity. The record shows the court reviewed and considered

defendant’s PSI and defense counsel’s arguments. Both discuss the mitigating information at issue.

¶ 39 Because the record does not indicate that the resentencing court failed to consider

mitigating information, and defendant has failed to affirmatively show otherwise, this court

presumes that the resentencing court properly considered defendant’s mental illness diagnoses and

other mitigating information. Therefore, we will not disturb the court’s sentence for abuse of

discretion based on a failure to consider the statutory mitigating factors.

¶ 40 Defendant also contends that the resentencing court erred in reviewing the initial

sentencing hearing transcript. He asserts that since those proceedings were constitutionally infirm,

the court could not consider them. Defendant particularly faults any consideration of O’Rourke’s

testimony, which was presented in aggravation at the initial sentencing but not at resentencing.

The State argues that the court could review the transcript and highlights that no party objected.

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¶ 41 We must first determine whether this issue has been preserved for appeal. People v. Smith,

228 Ill. 2d 95, 106 (2008). Generally, to preserve a sentencing issue, a defendant must make a

contemporaneous objection and raise the issue in a written postsentencing motion. People v.

Colone, 2024 IL App (1st) 230520, ¶ 136.

¶ 42 Here, defendant did not object to the resentencing court’s review of the transcript, and his

motion to reconsider did not address the issue. However, the State forfeited any forfeiture or waiver

argument by failing to raise the forfeiture issue in its response brief. People v. Gonazalez, 2019 IL

App (1st) 152760, ¶ 77. Because the State forfeited the forfeiture, we address defendant’s claim.

Id.

¶ 43 When a court mentions an improper fact in sentencing, remand is only warranted where a

defendant can “show that the court relied on the particular improper fact when imposing the

sentence.” People v. Valadovinos, 2014 IL App (1st) 130076, ¶ 47. Defendant has not identified,

nor has this court found authority for the proposition that a resentencing court’s consideration of a

transcript of a prior sentencing hearing is a per se error. Further, irrespective of whether the

resentencing court’s review of the initial sentencing hearing transcript was improper, defendant

has not demonstrated that the court relied on the transcript when rendering its sentence. To the

contrary, the court did not refer to O’Rourke’s testimony regarding defendant’s conviction for

resisting a correctional officer. Therefore, defendant has failed to show that the court weighed an

improper consideration such that remand is warranted.

¶ 44 For these reasons, we affirm the judgement of the circuit court.

¶ 45 Affirmed.

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