2025 IL App (1st) 230521-U No. 1-23-0521 Order filed February 4, 2025 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) 18CR17744 ) LESLIE WARD, ) Honorable ) Ursula Walowski, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s convictions for first degree murder over his contentions that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to introduce photographs of the victims’ bodies and imposed an aggregate sentence of 50 years in prison.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Leslie Ward was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder and sentenced to a total of 50 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion when it (1) allowed the State to introduce multiple photographs of the No. 1-23-0521
victims’ “decomposing remains” when the photographs were irrelevant to any disputed issue and
(2) imposed a de facto life sentence for offenses that occurred when defendant was 17 years old
without adequately considering his traumatic childhood. We affirm.
¶3 Defendant and his codefendant Kahlil Colone were charged by indictment with multiple
counts of first degree murder arising from the August 17, 2018, shooting deaths of Darnell Flowers
and Raysuan Turner. Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the offenses. Defendant and Colone
were tried in simultaneous but severed jury trials. We detailed the facts of this case in our
disposition of Colone’s appeal. See People v. Colone, 2024 IL App (1st) 230520. We relate only
those facts necessary to the disposition of this appeal.
¶4 At trial, Melanie Reneau, Flowers’s mother, testified that she last saw him on the morning
of August 17, 2018. On August 19, 2018, Reneau was notified Flowers was found in the “woods,”
and she later identified his body at the medical examiner’s office. The parties stipulated to a
photograph of Flowers in death.
¶5 Rayniecia Morris, Turner’s mother, testified that she last saw Turner on the afternoon of
August 17, 2018. The following day, Morris filed a missing person’s report and went to the area
around Golden Gate Park in Chicago to look for him. There, she spoke to Colone. Morris also
spoke to defendant, who stated that the prior day he, Turner, Flowers, Colone, and others smoked
“weed” in the park. Defendant further stated that he did not see Turner leave. On August 19, 2018,
police informed Morris that Turner’s body was found. She later gave his cell phone to a detective.
The parties stipulated to a photograph of Turner in death.
¶6 Victoria Hutchens testified that on August 17, 2018, she and her friend Heaven Johnson
were at Golden Gate Park. There, she saw defendant, Colone, and two other boys. Hutchens and
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Johnson went into a store and the boys entered the woods. Later, after Hutchens returned to the
park, Colone exited the woods, asked her to hold his and defendant’s phones, and reentered the
woods. Hutchens then heard four gunshots and ran away. Later, when Hutchens and Johnson were
in Johnson’s backyard, defendant arrived and asked for the phones. The following day, Colone
contacted Hutchens to ask that she and Johnson come to defendant’s home. There, defendant stated
that the girls did not see anything. Hutchens understood that Colone was telling her that she was
not outside on the day of the shooting. She understood that defendant was telling her that she did
not see Colone, defendant and the two boys going into the woods.
¶7 On August 18, 2018, Hutchens told the investigators what she had seen and heard regarding
Colone, defendant, and the two boys who went with them into the woods.
¶8 Paul Presnell, a forensic investigator for the Chicago Police Department, testified that on
the night of August 19, 2018, he photographed two deceased males and the surrounding area.
These photographs were admitted and published without objection. Presnell described the
photographs as showing the victims in a state of decomposition including the presence of maggots.
¶9 Chicago Police Department lieutenant Patrick Kinney testified that, after midnight on
August 20, 2018, he was directed to the center of a wooded area where he observed the victims,
facedown and “extremely decomposed.” After speaking with fellow detectives, Lieutenant Kinney
learned the possible identities of the victims as Flowers and Turner, and was informed of a possible
witness and the physical description and names or nicknames of the offenders. Following a search
of a police database, officers were looking for Colone and defendant. Later that day, Lieutenant
Kinney spoke to Hutchens, who stated that she had seen four people enter the woods, but only two
exit. Colone and defendant were arrested that day, but later released. While in custody, defendant
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stated that he had a Facebook account under the name “BG Choppa,” and Colone stated that he
had a Facebook account under the name “BG Shoota.”
¶ 10 Lieutenant Kinney further testified that he reviewed Flowers’s Facebook Messenger
activity on August 17, 2018, which included conversations with both defendants. Flowers’s
Facebook account was under the name “BG Bibby.” Turner’s Facebook account was under the
name “BG Herbo.” Lieutenant Kinney served search warrants for these accounts on Facebook and
reviewed the information received.
¶ 11 Lieutenant Kinney detailed different Facebook conversations between defendant, Colone,
and the victims. He explained that messages on the afternoon of August 17, 2018, showed that
Flowers asked each defendant individually where he was going to be and informed them that
Flowers and Turner would be coming. The day after the murders, both defendant and Colone sent
messages to Flowers’s account, stating that people were looking for Flowers and asking for his
location. Defendant also messaged Turner, asking for Turner’s location. Lieutenant Kinney also
detailed messages between defendant and the Facebook account “Migooboy Jordan” on August
17, 2018, which Lieutenant Kinney understood as defendant offering to trade a 9-millimeter
firearm and $250 for a .357-caliber firearm, the kind of firearm used in this shooting.
¶ 12 Cook County chief medical examiner Dr. Ponni Arunkumar testified that autopsies were
performed on Turner and Flowers on August 20, 2018. Photographs from both autopsies were
admitted and published without objection. 1 Each victim suffered two gunshot wounds, the cause
of death was multiple gunshot wounds, and the manner of death was homicide.
1 Included among these photographs were the photographs stipulated-to during the victims’ mothers’ testimony.
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¶ 13 After the State rested, defendant moved for a directed finding, which the trial court denied.
Following argument, the jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Flowers and
Turner. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI). Defendant moved for a new trial,
which the court denied after argument.
¶ 14 The PSI report stated that defendant declined an interview. The report listed three juvenile
adjudications for aggravated assault of a teacher or school employee. Defendant was also
adjudicated guilty of robbery, armed robbery, burglary, assault, aggravated assault “USE
DEADLY WEAPON REPLICA FIREARMS/PELLET GUNS,” and the receipt, possession, or
“SEE” of a stolen vehicle. 2
¶ 15 Defendant filed a mitigation report, which stated that he moved to Chicago at the age of
two following his parents’ divorce. He lived in the Golden Gate Park neighborhood, and was an
“outgoing kid” who played sports and video games with friends. Defendant had an “ ‘off and on’ ”
relationship with his father, who lived in Atlanta, was close to his mother, siblings, and aunt, and
had a six-year-old daughter. At the time of his arrest, defendant attended high school. Although
defendant was not “formally” diagnosed with a learning disability, his mother believed an
evaluation was needed.
¶ 16 The mitigation report further stated that when defendant was 11 years old, his cousin,
Davis, was shot and killed. Although defendant did not see the shooting, defendant watched as
Davis was treated and taken to a hospital. Defendant’s mother believed that this was a “defining
moment” in his life. The report further stated that defendant’s neighborhood was known as a
“ ‘Toxic Doughnut’ ” due to the presence of lead paint and industrial waste.
2 Defendant was also adjudicated delinquent of “Replica Firearm/Pellet Guns.”
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¶ 17 In a letter in support, defendant’s aunt stated that defendant helped with his younger
siblings and matured when he became a father. In a second letter, defendant’s cousin stated that
defendant was happy and generous, and that his daughter needed him in her life. In a third letter,
another cousin stated that defendant was good with children and deserved a second chance because
he was “so young.” Also attached to the mitigation report were articles about the Davis shooting
and defendant’s neighborhood, and a “White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence.”
¶ 18 At sentencing, the State presented the grand jury transcript of Lakia Fisher, dated
November 19, 2018. Fisher testified that in August 2018, she lived on the 400 block of East 133rd
Street in Chicago and attended Fenger High School. At that time, Fisher had been dating defendant
for three years. Defendant lived across the street from Fisher. She also knew Colone as a friend of
defendant. Fisher also knew both Turner and Flowers and considered them to be her friends.
¶ 19 On August 17, 2018, Fisher saw defendant at around 2 p.m. at defendant’s house. Colone
arrived around 3 p.m. At one point, Colone and defendant were outside on the side of defendant’s
house to talk alone, but Fisher was able to hear their conversation from inside the house. She heard
Colone and defendant discuss their plan to kill Turner and Flowers. She said defendant was
panicking, but Colone told him not to worry. Fisher testified that they wanted to kill Turner and
Flowers because defendant said there “was money on their heads.” After Colone received a
message from Flowers, he and defendant left to meet Turner and Flowers at the bus stop in front
of the wooded area. Fisher later saw all four boys together in front of defendant’s house. The boys
walked to the woods, and Fisher heard gunshots approximately 40 minutes later. She saw
defendant approximately an hour after she heard the gunshots and then Colone about 20 to 30
minutes later.
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¶ 20 The next day, August 18, 2018, Fisher saw Morris, Turner’s mother, looking for Turner
around noon. Fisher saw defendant around 7 p.m. or 8 p.m. that night. Defendant gave her a bag,
and when she looked inside, it contained a gun. She described the gun as having a brown handle
and with a cylinder that can spin and pop out and then back in. Defendant told her not to give the
gun to anyone or tell anyone that she had the gun. She hid the gun for two days. A few days later,
Fisher spoke with defendant, and he told her that Colone killed “those boys,” referring to Turner
and Flowers. Defendant then took the gun, and Fisher never saw it again.
¶ 21 The State further asserted that no statutory sentencing factor in mitigation applied. As to
the Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), factors applicable to the sentencing of juveniles, the
State argued that defendant was “mature enough” to plan the murders. The State also presented
victim impact statements from Turner’s and Flowers’s families.
¶ 22 In allocution, defendant stated that the victims were “[n]ot bad people.” He and Colone,
who was like his “little brother,” would not “do nothing like that to no people that we hang with.”
¶ 23 Following argument, the trial court made detailed findings pursuant to section 5-4.5-105(a)
of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020)). The court noted, in
pertinent part, that it did not observe any evidence of defendant’s immaturity; rather, it was “the
opposite.” The court further stated that although Colone was more “outspoken” and intelligent, the
court did not see evidence that Colone pressured defendant; instead, they acted together. The court
noted that “peers in adolescence tend to do things together” that one would not otherwise do alone,
which was what happened in this case. Here, two peers worked together for a “certain end,” that
is, the murder of two young men. The court stated that this was a “horrible murder” for “no good
reason.”
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¶ 24 As to Fisher, the court noted that Fisher testified before the grand jury that she overheard
defendant “planning this or talking about this” and then received a firearm from defendant. The
court also noted that Hutchens testified that Colone gave her Colone’s and defendant’s phones,
which was evidence of planning rather than “some sort of impulsive act.” Moreover, the Facebook
messages showed the “formulation” of a plan to murder Turner and Flowers. That is, defendant
and Colone planned, and then led Turner and Colone into the woods. The court concluded that,
based upon the circumstances of the offenses and defendant’s actions afterward, this was “not a
situation where somebody driving down the street maybe saw somebody [he] didn’t like, words
were exchanged, and bullets started flying.” Rather, this was a “much more serious planned event.”
¶ 25 The court therefore sentenced defendant to 25 years for each first degree murder
conviction, to be served consecutively. Defendant moved to reconsider the sentence, which the
trial court denied.
¶ 26 On appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed
the State to introduce multiple “gruesome” photographs of the victims’ “maggot-infested
decomposing remains.” Defendant asserts that the photographs were irrelevant to the question
before the jury, i.e., whether he was responsible for the victims’ deaths, and served only to
prejudice the jury against him.
¶ 27 The State responds that the photographs were properly presented to the jury as the
“infestation and decay” of the victims’ bodies was an inherent part of the offenses. The State argues
that the photographs related to the nature and extent of the victims’ injuries, the location and
condition of their bodies, and the cause of their deaths. Moreover, the photographs aided the jury
in understanding the testimony of the forensic investigator and the medical examiner.
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¶ 28 Defendant acknowledges that he failed to object to the photographs or include this claim
in his posttrial motion. To preserve an issue for review, a defendant must object both at trial and
in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Failure to do so results
in forfeiture of that issue on appeal. People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 293 (1992). Defendant asks
us to review this alleged error under the plain error doctrine, as well as for trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness for failing to properly preserve the issue.
¶ 29 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), “[a]ny error, defect,
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors
or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the trial court.” The plain error rule
“allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error
occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the
scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a
clear or obvious error occurs and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the
closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (citing People
v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)).
¶ 30 However, the plain error rule “is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all
errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial
court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)). Rather,
“Illinois’s plain error rule is a narrow exception to forfeiture principles.” People v. Jackson, 2022
IL 127256, ¶ 18.
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¶ 31 A defendant carries the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error rule.
People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). The first step of plain error analysis is to determine
“whether there was a clear or obvious error at trial.” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49.
¶ 32 Additionally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are resolved under the standard
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Pursuant to Strickland, a defendant
must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficient performance
substantially prejudiced him. Id. at 687. To demonstrate deficient performance, a defendant must
establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. People v.
Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142, 162 (2001). To establish prejudice, a defendant “must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If a case may be disposed of on the ground
of lack of sufficient prejudice, the court need not ever consider the quality of the attorney’s
performance. Id. at 697. “Strickland requires actual prejudice be shown, not mere speculation as
to prejudice.” People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 135 (2008).
¶ 33 In the case at bar, we need not decide whether trial counsel was ineffective or whether plain
error review would apply because defendant’s claim regarding the crime scene and autopsy
photographs fails on the merits.
¶ 34 Generally,
“[p]hotographs of a decedent may be admitted to prove the nature and extent of injuries
and the force needed to inflict them, the position, condition and location of the body, the
manner and cause of death, to corroborate a defendant’s confession, and to aid in
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understanding the testimony of a pathologist or other witness.” People v. Richardson, 401
Ill. App. 3d 45, 52 (2010).
¶ 35 “If photographs are relevant to prove facts at issue, they are admissible and may be shown
to the jury unless the prejudicial nature of the photographs outweighs their probative value.”
People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 219 (2000). “When a defendant in a murder trial pleads not
guilty, the prosecution is allowed to prove every element of the crime charged and every relevant
fact.” Id. at 219-20. “Even gruesome or disgusting photographs may be properly admitted into
evidence if they are relevant to establish any fact at issue in the case.” People v. Armstrong, 183
Ill. 2d 130, 147 (1998). “If photographs could aid the jury in understanding testimony, they may
be admitted even if cumulative of that testimony.” Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 220. “The decision of
whether a jury should be allowed to see photographs of a decedent is a decision that rests within
the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Id. at 219.
¶ 36 Defendant challenges the admission of photographs taken of the victims at the crime scene
and during each victim’s autopsy. During his testimony, forensic investigator Presnell used the
photographs to detail how he discovered the bodies in the wooded area. He first discussed
Flowers’s body, which was found facedown and photographed in that position. Investigator
Presnell then rolled Flowers’s body over to take photographs of his face and clothing, and to search
his pockets. The photographs showed the state of decomposition, including the presence of
maggots. Similarly, Turner was discovered facedown and photographed in that position, as well
as when he was turned over to photograph his face and search his pockets.
¶ 37 Initially, we note that two complained-of photographs taken by the medical examiner were
presented during the testimony of Reneau and Morris and stipulated by the parties as how Flowers
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and Turner looked in death. “A person cannot invite the trial court to take an action and then
complain about that same action in a reviewing court.” People v. Trice, 2017 IL App (1st) 152090,
¶ 59; see also People v. Kane, 2013 IL App (2d) 110594, ¶ 19 (“A party who agrees to the
admission of evidence through a stipulation is estopped from later complaining about that evidence
being stipulated into the record.”). Because defendant stipulated to the admission of these two
photographs of the victims, he cannot now complain that their admission was in error.
¶ 38 The remainder of the complained-of photographs from the victim’s autopsies depicted the
injuries to their bodies when they arrived at the morgue. These photographs were relevant to show
the condition of the victims’ bodies, as well as to understand Dr. Arunkumar’s testimony. See
Richardson, 401 Ill. App. 3d at 52. Moreover, the autopsy photographs were relevant because Dr.
Arunkumar did not perform the autopsies but was able to discuss the injuries and condition of the
bodies based upon the autopsy reports. For example, when discussing a photograph of Turner’s
body, Dr. Arunkumar explained that “because of the maggots in the area, it was hard to make out
if this was the entrance wound or the exit wound.”
¶ 39 We are unpersuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. Garlick, 46 Ill. App. 3d 216
(1977), and People v. Coleman, 116 Ill. App. 3d 28 (1983).
¶ 40 In Garlick, although the defendant admitted to killing the victim and asserted insanity as
an affirmative defense, a photograph of the victim’s “massive head wound” was admitted at trial.
Garlick, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 224. On appeal, the defendant argued that the photograph should not
have been admitted because it was irrelevant and prejudicial given his admission that he committed
the offense. The appellate court agreed, finding that the admission of the photograph “could serve
no purpose other than to inflame and prejudice the jury in the grossest manner” when the defendant
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had admitted his guilt and raised an insanity defense. Id. The court determined that the trial court
erred in allowing the photograph to go to the jury when it was “needlessly prejudicial.” Id.
¶ 41 In Coleman, the jury was shown a color slide depicting the victim’s “decomposing,
maggot-infested, partially autopsied body,” which the appellate court found “ ‘absolutely
hideous.’ ” Coleman, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 35. The photograph showed “[s]everal teeth [were]
missing, and the brain [was] exposed and lying next to the head.” Id. Additionally, the medical
examiner testified that the slide was “of no use to him in establishing the identity of the decedent.”
Id. at 36. The Coleman court concluded that the photograph of “an autopsied, decomposed body”
carried “extremely little probative value” in establishing the victim’s identity. Id.
¶ 42 Unlike in Garlick, the question of whether defendant committed the murders was at issue
here and the State was entitled “to prove every element of the crime charged and every relevant
fact.” Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 219-20. Moreover, “the appellate court’s comments [in Garlick]
about the photograph were mere dicta, since the appellate court had already decided that a new
trial was warranted on other grounds.” People v. Maldonado, 402 Ill. App. 3d 411, 420 (2010).
¶ 43 Although the photographs in the present case depicted maggots and the damage caused by
them, unlike in Coleman, these images were relevant to establish the effects of the maggots on the
gunshot wounds and related to the medical examiner’s determination of the path of the bullets and
injuries sustained by Flowers and Turner. Accordingly, these photographs were probative of the
nature and extent of the victims’ injuries.
¶ 44 To sustain defendant’s first degree murder convictions, the State was required to prove,
inter alia, that he performed an act that caused the deaths of Flowers and Turner. See 720 ILCS
5/9-1(a) (West 2016). Accordingly, the State was permitted to present evidence relating to whether
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defendant’s actions caused their death. See People v. Starks, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1042 (1997)
(“Regardless of the fact that defendant did not dispute the cause of death or the force used, the
People may still prove every element and relevant fact of the offense charged, and if autopsy
photos are relevant to establish any such fact, they are admissible despite their gruesome nature.”).
¶ 45 Here, the complained-of photographs depicted how the bodies were discovered and their
condition as well as the nature of the injuries and damage caused by both the gunshots and the
maggots while the bodies were in the woods. Because the photographs were probative to establish
both relevant facts and the requisite elements of the murder charges, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing their admission. When there is no error, there is no plain error and counsel
cannot be ineffective for failing to raise the issue. See People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 139
(2005). Thus, this claim fails.
¶ 46 Defendant next contends that this court should vacate his de facto life sentence or remand
for resentencing when the trial court abused its discretion by failing to “adequately” consider his
traumatic childhood. He argues that the trial court mischaracterized, dismissed, and “altogether
ignored” mitigation evidence.
¶ 47 “It is well established that a trial court has broad discretionary authority in sentencing a
criminal defendant.” People v. Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d 948, 967 (2007). “An appellate court
typically shows great deference to a trial court’s sentencing decision since the trial court is in a
better position to decide the appropriate sentence.” Id. Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing
decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “The reviewing court may not
reverse the sentencing court just because it could have weighed the factors differently.” People v.
McWilliams, 2015 IL App (1st) 130913, ¶ 28 (citing People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991)).
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¶ 48 “In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial judge is further required to consider all
factors in aggravation and mitigation, which includes defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general
moral character, mentality, social environments, habits, and age, as well as the nature and
circumstances of the crime.” Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 967. “If the sentence imposed is within the
statutory range, it will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and
purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Starnes,
374 Ill. App. 3d 132, 143 (2007) (citing People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54 (1999)).
¶ 49 Here, defendant contends that the trial court “dismissed” and downplayed the impact of his
cousin’s death and the “toxic” conditions in his neighborhood. He further argues that the court
considered some mitigation evidence in aggravation.
¶ 50 Because defendant was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, the trial court was required
to consider the following additional factors in mitigation when imposing sentence:
“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including
the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive
or developmental disability, or both, if any;
(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure, familial
pressure, or negative influences;
(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background, including
any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma;
(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both;
(5) the circumstances of the offense;
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(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including the level
of planning by the defendant before the offense;
(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense;
(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and
(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an expression of
remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel chooses not to make
a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression of remorse as an
aggravating factor.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020).
¶ 51 In sentencing defendant, the trial court stated that it reviewed defendant’s “mitigation
packet,” the PSI report, and the applicable statutes. The court then detailed the applicable
sentencing range of 20 to 60 years in prison, and that because there were two victims the sentences
would be consecutive. Next, the court made detailed findings pursuant to section 5-4.5-105(a).
¶ 52 The court recognized the trauma Davis’s shooting caused defendant, although defendant
was not present when Davis was shot. The court further recognized that trauma affected “many of
us.” The court considered that “the Gates” was referred to as the “Toxic Donut,” and acknowledged
the article referencing the toxicity in certain “deprived neighborhoods” and how that “may affect
someone.” The court stated that, although there was violence in the community, good people lived
there. The court considered the letters in support of defendant and the article about the development
of early, middle, and late adolescence. As to the PSI report, the court noted that defendant’s
juvenile adjudications began when he was about 14 years old, and led to a “consistent interaction”
with the juvenile justice system.
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¶ 53 Turning to the section 5-4.5-105(a) factors, the court stated that, based upon the written
materials and observation of defendant, defendant had good relationships with his parents, family,
and child, and was involved with friends. He attended school, and the court had no evidence of a
learning disability, grades, or school records. Considering that defendant was 17 years old at the
time of the offenses, the court was “not sure [it had] any evidence of *** level of maturity at the
time of the offense, *** as far as trying to make an assessment as to your level of maturity.” The
court noted that defendant was “offered opportunities” through the juvenile justice system.
However, the court did not see any evidence of defendant’s immaturity; rather, “it’s just the
opposite.” Further, the court did not see any evidence that defendant was unable to consider the
risks and consequences of his behavior. Nor did it see “a lot” of evidence to support the existence
of a cognitive or developmental disability.
¶ 54 While Colone was “obviously” outgoing and intelligent, the court saw no evidence that
defendant was pressured by Colone; rather, they were peers who acted together. The court noted
that the study contained in the mitigation packet discussed how adolescents commit acts together
that they would not perform apart, and opined that was what happened in this case. Here, two peers
worked together for a “certain end.” The court reiterated that it recognized the childhood trauma
caused by Davis’s shooting, but that there was “nothing else”; to the contrary, defendant had a
supportive family and friends.
¶ 55 The court found it “difficult” to determine, based on a “limited amount of evidence,”
whether defendant could be rehabilitated. Defendant’s prior offenses, which were not “minor,”
began in 2014 and were addressed through the juvenile justice system. However, the juvenile
system had not “done anything” because defendant was now before the trial court. The court
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therefore made a “general statement” that hopefully defendant would have “rehabilitation ***
because [he] will mature.”
¶ 56 Considering the circumstances of this case, the court found that two people were murdered
“for no good reason.” Additionally, this was a “planned murder.” The court noted that Fisher
overheard defendant and Colone planning the murders, that Hutchens testified that Colone gave
her defendant’s and Colone’s phones before the shooting, and that the Facebook messages showed
the “formulation” of a plan to murder Turner and Flowers. Based upon the circumstances of the
offenses and defendant’s actions following the shooting, the court concluded that this was “not a
situation where somebody driving down the street maybe saw somebody [he] didn’t like, words
were exchanged, and bullets started flying.” Rather, this was a “much more serious planned event.”
¶ 57 The court had not seen any evidence that defendant was unable to participate in his defense.
Moreover, defendant had a significant juvenile history. The court therefore sentenced defendant
to two consecutive 25-year prison terms.
¶ 58 Based upon our review of the trial court’s detailed consideration of the juvenile sentencing
factors under section 5-4.5-105(a), we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing consecutive 25-year sentences. The trial court discussed each factor and its reasoning
based on the facts and evidence presented. The court considered defendant’s history as well as the
circumstances of the offenses and defendant’s role in planning the offenses to determine the
appropriate sentence. While defendant disagrees with the weight the court gave to each mitigation
factor, this court may not reverse the sentencing court just because we might have weighed the
factors differently. See McWilliams, 2015 IL App (1st) 130913, ¶ 28.
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¶ 59 Moreover, pursuant to recent legislation, defendant will be afforded a parole hearing after
serving 20 years of his sentence. “A person under 21 years of age at the time of the commission
of first degree murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019 *** shall be eligible for parole
review by the Prisoner Review Board after serving 20 years or more of his or her sentence or
sentences ***.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020). Thus, defendant is not subject to a de facto
life sentence. See People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 54 (courts look to the earliest opportunity
for release to assess whether a de facto life sentence was imposed); People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL
App (2d) 220066, ¶ 54 (“the legislature *** created the new parole statute and modified the parole
review factors for the purpose of creating a meaningful opportunity for parole for juvenile
offenders”); People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56 (defendant did not receive “a de
facto life sentence since he is eligible for parole”).
¶ 60 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.
¶ 61 Affirmed.
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