People v. Krentkowski

2025 IL App (1st) 232390-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 24, 2025
• Docket: 1-23-2390
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 232390-U No. 1-23-2390 Order filed June 24, 2025 Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 17 CR 12926 ) CARL KRENTKOWSKI, ) Honorable ) Patrick K. Coughlin, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and Howse concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s convictions for first degree murder and attempted first- degree murder over his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and jury instructions regarding eyewitness identifications. We also affirm defendant’s sentence over his contention that it is excessive.

¶2 A jury found defendant Carl Krentkowski guilty of first-degree murder and attempted first

degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to 86 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends

that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because eyewitness No. 1-23-2390

identifications of him were unreliable, (2) the trial court erred in not modifying the Illinois Pattern

Jury Instruction regarding eyewitness identification testimony, and (3) his sentence is excessive.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The State proceeded to trial on two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)

(West 2016)) premised on defendant shooting and killing Alex Saldana and two counts of

attempted first degree murder (id. §§ 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1)) premised on defendant shooting at Galindo

Saldana and Alfredo Batrez.

¶5 A. Trial

¶6 The evidence established that Juana Saldana and her husband, who did not testify, lived on

the 14600 block of Division Street in Posen, Illinois, in August 2017. Their four sons lived with

them: Galindo Saldana, Jr., age 22, Jesus Saldana, age 20, Emmanuel Saldana, age 17, and Alex

Saldana, age 14. All living Saldana brothers are now adults. We will refer to the Saldanas by their

first names. For consistency, we will generally refer to other occurrence witnesses by their first

names as well.

¶7 1. The State’s Case

¶8 a. Emmanuel Saldana

¶9 Emmanuel Saldana testified that on August 2, 2017, he and a friend were walking near the

intersection of West 150th Street and Maplewood Avenue in Harvey when a white GMC pulled

up next to them. Nick DeMante (the parties and the record also refer to him as Nick Delmonte)

was driving and defendant was in the passenger seat. Emmanuel knew defendant, whom he

identified in court, “[f]rom around the area.” Emmanuel referred to defendant by the nickname

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“Car Car” and knew him to be a member of the Latin Kings gang. Nick said “they forgot to whoop

[Emmanuel’s] ass last time” and asked if he “was La Raza.” Emmanuel responded that he did not

“gang bang.” Defendant and Nick exited the vehicle, beat Emmanuel, and took his wallet.

Emmanuel returned home and told his family about the incident.

¶ 10 Two days later, on August 4, 2017, Emmanuel saw a video depicting the Saldanas’ house

that a Miguel Flores posted to Snapchat. Emmanuel found the video threatening and told his family

about it. Emmanuel, his brothers, their cousin Alfredo Batrez, and Raul Gonzalez went to Miguel’s

house to “try to calm him down.” Emmanuel, Jesus, and Raul went to the door and spoke to

Miguel’s sister. Emmanuel saw Miguel drive by in a gray pickup truck.

¶ 11 Emmanuel returned home and then went to the Posen police station with Jesus and their

parents to report the August 2, 2017, incident. The police station was “[r]ight around the corner”

from the Saldanas’ house. While he was at the police station, Emmanuel heard gunshots, ran to his

house, and saw Galindo holding Alex in the driveway. Alex left the scene in an ambulance.

¶ 12 At approximately 7:00 p.m. on August 5, 2017, Emmanuel identified defendant in a photo

array as the person who attacked him on August 2. The State moved the photo array and an

advisory form Emmanuel signed into evidence.

¶ 13 b. Alfredo Batrez

¶ 14 Alfredo Batrez testified that the Saldana brothers are his cousins. At approximately 1 p.m.

on August 4, 2017, Alfredo, Jesus, and Alex were walking near a beauty supply store when a white

Chevrolet Tahoe stopped near them. Nick was driving and defendant, whom Alfredo identified in

court, was in the front passenger seat. Alfredo knew defendant “from around town;” his nickname

was “Car Car.” Defendant made a hand sign indicating he was a member of the Latin Kings.

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Alfredo testified that neither he nor his cousins were gang members. When defendant displayed

the Latin Kings gang sing, Alfredo punched the Tahoe’s rear windshield and the Tahoe dove away.

¶ 15 Later that day, Raul Gonzalez showed Alfredo a Snapchat video depicting the Saldanas’

house, which Alfredo interpreted as a threat. Alfredo went to Miguel’s house with the four Saldana

brothers and Raul. Alfredo, Galindo, and Alex stayed in the vehicle while Jesus, Emmanuel, and

Raul went to the door. The group then returned to the Saldanas’ house. Alfredo saw a gold

Silverado pickup truck circle the Saldanas’ block approximately three times. Jesus and his parents

went to the police station to report the truck and Emmanuel followed shortly thereafter.

¶ 16 Alfredo, Galindo, Alex, and Raul remained outside the Saldanas’ house. At approximately

11 p.m., the Silverado approached from the north with its headlights on. Alex and Galindo were

standing in the driveway. Alfredo went into the street near a white car and tried to throw a rock at

the truck. When the truck neared Alfredo, it slowed down but did not stop. Alfredo saw Miguel

driving, Nick “in the back,” and defendant in the front passenger seat. Alfredo recognized

defendant from earlier that day. Alfredo saw a firearm protruding from the passenger side window,

which was three to four feet away. He saw “fire” and heard gunshots, so he “ran around” a Mustang

parked at the south end of the driveway and back toward the sidewalk. Alfredo heard 9 or 10

gunshots total, after which the truck drove off. Alex was on the ground and said he had been shot;

Galindo was holding him. Alex died on scene.

¶ 17 Alfredo identified photographs of the Saldanas’ house as it appeared on the night of the

shooting, which the State moved into evidence. The photographs depict two white cars parked in

front of the house on either side of its driveway, one to the north and one to the south. When the

pickup truck drove by, Alfredo was near the white Mustang parked just south of the Saldanas’

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driveway, on the side of the vehicle closer to the middle of the street. Alfredo also identified a

streetlight across from the Saldanas’ house. The light hangs over the center of the street,

illuminating the street in white light.

¶ 18 After the shooting, Alfredo went to the Posen police station and sat in a room with Galindo

and Raul for “a couple of hours.” Alfredo acknowledged that he told a detective that defendant

used a Smith & Wesson firearm but testified he could not tell which model it was. At

approximately 6:30 p.m. on August 5, 2017, Alfredo identified defendant in a photo array as the

man who shot Alex. In court, Alfredo identified the photo array and an advisory form he signed,

and the State moved them into evidence.

¶ 19 c. Galindo Saldana, Jr.

¶ 20 Galindo Saldana, Jr., testified that on the afternoon of August 4, 2017, he saw a threatening

Snapchat video that Miguel posted. Galindo drove his three brothers and Alfredo to Miguel’s

house. Galindo and Alex remained in the vehicle while the others tried to talk to Miguel’s parents.

Galindo saw a brown pickup truck drive past and recognized it as Miguel’s truck. The group

returned to the Saldanas’ house and saw the same brown pickup truck drive past twice. Jesus,

Emmanuel, and their parents went to the police station to make a report about the truck.

¶ 21 Galindo, Alex, Alfredo, and Raul remained outside the Saldanas’ house. Galindo stood in

the driveway with Alex behind him. Galindo identified a photograph of his family’s house as it

appeared on the night of the shooting, which the State moved into evidence. Galindo indicated that

he was standing where the driveway and the sidewalk intersected and Alex was behind him on the

driveway. Alfredo was standing at the end of the driveway where it intersected with the street.

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¶ 22 The brown truck drove down the street “pretty quick[ly]” and “slow[ed] down a little bit”

as it approached the Saldanas’ driveway. Galindo could not see the driver but “knew it was

Miguel.” Galindo saw Nick sitting in the rear seat. As the truck passed the Saldanas’ driveway,

Galindo saw that defendant, whom he identified in court, was in the front passenger seat. Galindo

recognized defendant by his face tattoos and knew him by the nickname “Car Car.” As the truck

reached the driveway, Galindo saw defendant extend his right arm and begin shooting. Galindo

looked at defendant for a second or two, then ducked down and heard “more than six” gunshots.

The truck drove away.

¶ 23 Alex said he had been shot and was gasping for air. Galindo moved Alex next to a car but

he “was gone already.” Galindo called police and paramedics, who arrived shortly thereafter.

Galindo went to the police station and learned that Alex had died. While at the station, Galindo sat

in a room with Alfredo and Raul for several hours before he spoke with police. Defendant moved

into evidence a photograph of the three men sitting together at the police station. On August 5,

2017, Galindo identified defendant as the shooter in a photo array. In court, Galindo identified the

photo array and an advisory form he signed, and the State moved them into evidence.

¶ 24 d. Jesus Saldana

¶ 25 Jesus Saldana testified that he was walking home from a store with Alex and Alfredo at

approximately 1 p.m. on August 4, 2017. A truck pulled up and Jesus saw that Nick was the driver

and defendant, whom he identified in court, was the passenger. Jesus knew that defendant lived in

Harvey and that his nickname was “Car Car.” Defendant made a gang sign representing the Latin

Kings. Jesus hit the truck’s window and the truck drove away.

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¶ 26 That evening, Raul showed Jesus a video that Jesus found concerning, so he told his mother

and brothers about it. Jesus went to Miguel’s house with his three brothers, Alfredo, and Raul.

Jesus went to Miguel’s door alone and briefly spoke with Miguel’s sister. While he was at Miguel’s

front door, Jesus “heard a loud vehicle pass a few times, so [he] kind of guessed that was Miguel.”

Jesus returned home and his mother said that a vehicle passed by the house a few times. When the

vehicle passed by again, Jesus and Emmanuel tried to chase it down. Jesus then went to the police

station with his parents. Jesus told an officer about the truck and the incident earlier that day. While

Jesus was speaking with the officer, he heard a radio call of shots fired at his home address, so he

ran back home and saw Alex on the ground. An ambulance transported Alex to the hospital. When

Jesus arrived at the hospital, he learned that Alex had died.

¶ 27 Jesus spoke to police at approximately 3:30 a.m. on August 5, 2017. He returned to the

police station that evening and identified defendant in a photo array. In court, Jesus identified the

photo array and an advisory form he signed, and the State moved them into evidence.

¶ 28 e. Juana Saldana

¶ 29 Juana Saldana testified that her son Jesus told her about an incident that happened when he

was going to the store on the afternoon of August 4, 2017. Later that evening, her sons left the

house. While Juana and her husband were sitting in the living room, a truck drove by the house

multiple times. Juana, her husband, and Jesus went to the police station to report the truck. At the

station, a police officer asked Juana to call Emmanuel to ask him to come to the station, which he

did. Shortly after Emmanuel arrived, the officer received a call on the radio, and everyone ran to

the Saldanas’ house. When Juana arrived, she saw Alex on the ground with police and paramedics

nearby. At the hospital, Juana learned that Alex had died.

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¶ 30 f. Police and Fire Witnesses

¶ 31 Posen police officer Christopher DeMato testified that he was dispatched to the 14600

block of Division Street for a call of a person shot at approximately 11:12 p.m. on August 4, 2017.

When DeMato arrived, Alex was lying on the grass near the driveway and was unresponsive.

DeMato stayed with Alex until paramedics arrived approximately two minutes later.

¶ 32 Posen police officer Dziekan testified that he met with Jesus, Emmanuel, and their parents

at the Posen police station at approximately 11 p.m. on August 4, 2017. While they were talking,

Dziekan received a call of shots fired on the 14600 block of Division Street and responded to it.

When Dziekan arrived at the scene, he saw Alex lying on the ground with a gunshot wound to the

chest and DeMato kneeling over him. Galindo told Dziekan that he knew who the shooter was and

gave the name of “who owned that vehicle.” Dziekan learned from police dispatch that a 1999

Chevrolet pickup truck belonged to Miguel.

¶ 33 Posen fire department lieutenant Mark Krizik testified that he responded to a call of a

person shot on the 14600 block of Division Street at approximately 11:13 p.m. on August 4, 2017.

He arrived approximately one minute later with paramedics and placed Alex into an ambulance.

Alex had no pulse or blood pressure and was not breathing. The ambulance transported Alex to

Christ Hospital’s emergency room.

¶ 34 Posen police sergeant Ryan Grab testified that he interviewed Alfredo and Galindo at the

police station on the morning of August 5, 2017. Alfredo and Galindo both stated that defendant

was the shooter, Miguel was the driver, and Nick was the rear passenger. Grab then prepared three

separate photo arrays for defendant, Nick, and Miguel. The photo array that included defendant

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also included individuals who, like defendant, had face tattoos and beards. Neither Alfredo nor

Galindo identified Miguel in the photo array that included his picture.

¶ 35 Grab was also present for a video recorded interview of Galindo by Assistant State’s

Attorney Eric Sauceda on August 6, 2017. During that interview, Galindo identified defendant as

the shooter and stated that defendant had long hair and a beard on the night of the shooting. The

picture of defendant in the photo array, which was taken less than two weeks before the shooting,

showed defendant with short hair and a beard.

¶ 36 Grab also learned that Nick lived at Outreach Academy in Dixmoor, less than a mile from

the Saldanas’ home in Posen. Additionally, Grab testified that Emmanuel was arrested for

possession of a firearm in 2019, unrelated to this case. Emmanuel “cooperate[d]” and was

sentenced to probation in that case.

¶ 37 Riverdale police detective Lugo testified that he was a member of the South Suburban

Major Crimes Task Force. On August 6, 2017, Lugo located a tan Chevrolet Silverado pickup

truck registered to Miguel in Chicago Heights. He identified photographs of the truck, which were

admitted into evidence.

¶ 38 Defendant, whom Lugo identified in court, was arrested on August 9, 2017, and detained

at the Riverdale police station. Lugo and another detective gave defendant Miranda warnings and

interviewed him at approximately 12:32 p.m. on August 9, 2017. In court, Lugo identified the

Miranda warning form that defendant signed and the State moved it into evidence. Lugo also

identified a partial video recording of defendant’s interview and the State moved it into evidence.

Defendant described himself as a “gang banger.” He also described an incident in which he beat

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two “Mexican kids” he did not know. Two days later, he saw the same “Mexican kids” at a phone

store in Dixmoor, where they hit his truck.

¶ 39 g. Forensic Evidence

¶ 40 Illinois State Police lieutenant Sean Grosvenor testified that he was assigned to process the

scene at approximately 12:45 a.m. on August 5, 2017. In court, Grosvenor identified photographs

of the scene that he took, and the State moved them into evidence. The photographs depict the

Saldanas’ house on the east side of Division Street, with the driveway on the south side of the

house and a streetlight directly across the street. The photographs also depict nine .40-caliber

Smith & Wesson cartridge casings Grosvenor found on the street. Grosvenor testified that a

semiautomatic weapon ejected these casings as it fired. The locations of the casings could not

definitively establish where the weapon was fired because people, vehicles, wind, or the slope of

the street could have moved the casings. Grosvenor recovered and inventoried the casings. He

identified them in court and the State moved them into evidence.

¶ 41 Grosvenor also identified a scene diagram and a chart he prepared documenting

measurements of the casings, which the State moved into evidence. These documents reflect that

the casing closest to the Saldanas’ house was 58.4 feet north of the house and the farthest was

227.1 feet north of the house, with the other seven casings in between.

¶ 42 The parties stipulated that Illinois State Police forensic scientist Jon Flaskamp was an

expert in firearms and firearms identification. Flaskamp examined nine casings that Grosvenor

recovered and concluded that all nine were discharged from the same weapon.

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¶ 43 Dr. Xin Zhang was qualified as an expert in forensic pathology. She reviewed Alex’s

autopsy, which Dr. Eimad Zakariya performed on August 5, 2017. Alex died from a gunshot

wound to the left side of his chest, and the manner of death was homicide.

¶ 44 The State rested.

¶ 45 2. Defendant’s Case

¶ 46 a. Outreach Academy Stipulations

¶ 47 Defendant introduced the following stipulations.

¶ 48 Sharon Latiker worked at a temporary residential facility called Outreach Academy in

Dixmoor, Illinois. A report documented that “Nicholas Delmonte” left Outreach Academy at 10:50

p.m. on August 4, 2017, and returned at 11:50 p.m. Another report documented that a Daniel

Turner left Outreach Academy at 10:58 p.m. on August 4, 2017, and returned at 11:50 p.m.

¶ 49 Fred Wilkes was an information technology specialist at Outreach Academy. Outreach

Academy’s surveillance cameras were working between 10:20 p.m. on August 4, 2017, and 12:30

a.m. on August 5, 2017, but the date and time stamps on the videos were incorrect.

¶ 50 If recalled, Sergeant Grab would testify that he interacted with “Nicholas Delmonte” prior

to Alex’s murder and would identify him in the surveillance videos from Outreach Academy.

Those videos showed “Nicholas Delmonte” leaving Outreach Academy at 10:58 p.m. and

returning at 11:50 p.m. on August 4, 2017.

¶ 51 Blue Island police detective Sean Donica interacted with Daniel Turner prior to Alex’s

murder and would identify Turner in the surveillance videos from Outreach Academy. The videos

showed Turner leaving Outreach Academy at 10:58 p.m. and returning at 11:50 p.m. on August 4,

2017.

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¶ 52 b. Dr. Geoffrey Loftus

¶ 53 Dr. Geoffrey Loftus was qualified as an expert in the field of human perception and

memory. Dr. Loftus expressed no opinion as to whether Alfredo or Galindo’s identifications of

defendant were reliable.

¶ 54 Dr. Loftus testified that memories consist of reliable sensory data combined with unreliable

pre- and post-event information, which influences and fills gaps in the sensory data. Pre-event

information includes a witness’s expectations about what will happen. Post-event information

includes a witness’s inferences, such as assuming that the offender must have been a person with

whom a witness had a prior confrontation. Post-event information also includes witnesses talking

with each other, which can cause them to converge on a certain version of events. Therefore,

witnesses’ memories can be “very real seeming; very detailed” but “false in important ways” due

to the influence of unreliable information. This can manifest as witnesses misidentifying the

perpetrator of a crime.

¶ 55 Five factors affect a witness’s ability to identify a person: expectations, lighting, stress,

attention, and duration. Expectations cause a witness to remember an event as the witness expected

it to happen. For example, a witness might misidentify a stranger as an acquaintance if the witness

expected to see the acquaintance. A witness to a drive-by shooting would expect that the shooter

was someone with whom the witness recently had a confrontation and could make a mistaken

identification based on that expectation. In addition, if a witness expects the offender to be a certain

person, then the witness has “no reason to pay further attention to the offender’s appearance at

all.” However, Dr. Loftus acknowledged that it is easier for a witness to identify an acquaintance

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than a stranger. In addition, an offender having “unique face tattoos” would allow the witness to

narrow their identification to people the witness knew who had such face tattoos.

¶ 56 Lighting conditions also affect perception. The poorer the lighting, the less a witness can

see. Viewing an event at night with only a streetlight “is severely suboptimal for being able to

accurately perceive what is out there” because streetlights are “relatively dim” and widely spaced.

¶ 57 An intermediate level of stress can cause a person to be more alert, but an extremely high

level of stress causes mental functioning to deteriorate. Although witnesses may have vivid and

detailed memories of stressful events, those memories are often based on inaccurate post-event

information.

¶ 58 Attention refers to focusing on sensory data that is relevant to the goal a person is trying to

accomplish and filtering out sensory data that is irrelevant to that goal. This filtering process is

“fairly unconscious and automatic” and focuses on danger. In a drive-by shooting, a witness would

likely focus on keeping themselves and the people around them safe, calling for help, and

potentially returning fire. Witnesses tend to focus their attention on weapons as opposed to who is

holding the weapon. However, just because a weapon was involved in an incident does not mean

that eyewitness identifications are unreliable.

¶ 59 Duration refers to the fact that the longer a witness pays attention to an event, the more

sensory data the witness will gather about that event. “[F]unctional duration” refers to the “total

portion *** of the whole crime that the witness is able to memorize what the offender looks like.”

Functional duration requires the offender to be in the witness’s field of view, enough light and

proximity to see the offender’s face, and a degree of stress that allows the witness to form

memories. Even if a drive-by shooting “takes a couple seconds, the functional duration available

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to the witness to memorize what the offender looks like could be arbitrarily short. It could be as

short as 0 [seconds].”

¶ 60 A witness identifying an offender whom the witness knew prior to the offense may not be

reliable, particularly if the witness’s opportunity to view the offender was poor. In that scenario, a

“much more reasonable hypothesis *** is that [the witness’s] identification was based on a match

between their prior knowledge of what the offender looked like.” Such an identification would be

unreliable even if the witness expressed confidence about it. The witness’s confidence would be

based not on sensory data, but on unreliable post-event information falsely “confirming” the

witness’s expectations of who the offender would be.

¶ 61 3. Jury Instructions and Verdict

¶ 62 During the jury instructions conference, the State proposed IPI Criminal No. 3.15, which

stated:

“When you weigh the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider all

the facts and circumstances in evidence, including, but not limited to, the following:

[1] The opportunity the witness had to view the offender at the time of the offense.

[2] The witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense.

[3] The witness’s earlier description of the offender.

[4] The level of certainty shown by the witness when confronting the defendant.

[5] The length of time between the offense and the identification confrontation.”

Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.15 (approved July 28, 2017) (hereinafter

IPI Criminal No. 3.15).

¶ 63 Defendant proposed a modified version of IPI Criminal No. 3.15, which stated:

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“When you weigh the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider all

the facts and circumstances in evidence, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. The opportunity the witness had to view the offender at the time of the offense,

including but not limited to:

a. the amount of time the witness had to observe the perpetrator;

b. the distance from which the witness observed the perpetrator; and

c. the lighting conditions at the time of the observation.

2. The witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense, including but not

limited to:

a. whether the presence of a weapon distracted the witness’s ability to view

the perpetrator; and

b. whether stress impacted the memory of the witness.

3. The witness’s earlier description of the offender.

4. The length of time between the offense and the identification confrontation.

5. Whether the witness was familiar with the person they identified from prior

contact.

[Defendant voluntary omitted factors 6 and 7]

8. Whether the witness was exposed to opinions, descriptions, or identifications

given by other witnesses, to photographs or newspaper accounts, or to any other

information or influence, that may have affected the independence of his/her identification.

In evaluating this identification or any prior out-of-court identification by the

witness, you should consider the observations and perceptions on which the identification

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was based, the witness’s ability to make those observations and perceive events, and the

circumstances under which the identification was made. Such identifications, even if made

in good faith, may be mistaken. Therefore, when analyzing such testimony, be advised that

a witness’s level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability

of the identification.”

Defendant argued that Dr. Loftus’s testimony supported the additional language in this instruction.

Defendant drew these additional factors from New Jersey’s jury instructions and State v.

Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (N.J. 2011). Defendant also cited People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, for

the proposition that expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification is

important because such identifications are “the cause of many wrongful convictions.”

¶ 64 The State objected to defendant’s proposed instruction. The State argued that IPI Criminal

No. 3.15 was modified in July 2017, after Lerma and Henderson, and did not include the additional

factors defendant proposed, which suggested that the instructions committee chose not to include

those factors. The State maintained that defendant could argue factors such as distance, lighting,

degree of attention, distraction, familiarity, and certainty, but those factors did not need to be added

to IPI Criminal No. 3.15.

¶ 65 The court gave IPI Criminal No. 3.15 without modifications. The court explained that

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 451(a) (eff. April 8, 2013), it was required to use IPI Criminal

No. 3.15 unless that IPI did not accurately state the law. The court reasoned that IPI Criminal No.

3.15 set forth the factors for evaluating eyewitness identifications outlined in Neil v. Biggers, 409

U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972), which our supreme court adopted as the applicable factors in People v.

Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 561, 567 (2007). The court also cited several appellate decisions holding

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that IPI Criminal No. 3.15 correctly stated the law, including People v. Polk, 407 Ill. App. 3d 80,

109 (2010). The court concluded that IPI Criminal No. 3.15 correctly stated the law and there was

no reason to modify it. Finally, the court found that defendant’s proposed instruction was repetitive

and improperly highlighted mistaken identifications.

¶ 66 The jury found defendant guilty on all counts.

¶ 67 B. Posttrial Motions

¶ 68 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial arguing in relevant part that the State failed to

prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court erred in giving IPI Criminal No.

3.15 without defendant’s proposed modifications. He also filed a supplemental posttrial motion

that argued (1) that “no physical or scientific evidence implicat[ed] defendant” and (2) Galindo’s

identification of defendant was unreliable because Galindo told police the shooter had long hair,

but defendant had short hair. The supplemental motion also argued that Dr. Loftus’s testimony

supported giving defendant’s proposed jury instruction on eyewitness identifications.

¶ 69 The trial court denied defendant’s posttrial motions. The court rejected defendant’s

sufficiency of the evidence argument. The court explained that Alfredo and Galindo both testified

that they saw defendant discharging a firearm toward the Saldanas’ house and the jury was free to

believe that testimony even considering Galindo’s impeachment regarding the length of

defendant’s hair and Dr. Loftus’s testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identifications. The

court also reiterated that it refused defendant’s proposed jury instruction on eyewitness

identifications because IPI Criminal No. 3.15 accurately stated the law.

¶ 70 C. Sentencing

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¶ 71 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it reviewed defendant’s two

presentence investigation reports (PSIs). The PSIs reflected that in 2011, defendant was convicted

of burglary and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in two separate cases and was sentenced to

a total of four years in prison. In 2014, defendant was convicted of attempted armed robbery with

a firearm and was sentenced to six years in prison. After his arrest in this case, in 2018, defendant

was charged with aggravated battery of a peace officer, burglary, and criminal damage to property

in two pending cases. In 2019, defendant was charged with possession of a weapon in a penal

institution, which was also pending. In 2021, defendant was charged with public indecency; that

case was pending as well. In 2023, defendant was charged with possessing a weapon in a penal

institution in two separate cases, both of which were pending.

¶ 72 The PSIs also stated that when defendant was five years old, he witnessed his uncle’s

murder, and when defendant was eight, his father was arrested and imprisoned on drug charges.

The Department of Children and Family Services removed defendant from his home at that time,

and he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder. Defendant began “running the streets” at approximately age 10 and dropped

out of school in the ninth grade. Defendant was affiliated with the Latin Kings from ages 11 to 27.

At approximately age 20, defendant was diagnosed with anxiety and depression. Defendant

worked for a brick laying company at the time of his arrest in this case. He was engaged and had

a nine-year-old daughter with his fiancée.

¶ 73 In aggravation, the State submitted letters from Alex’s parents, his sister-in-law, three of

his aunts, and his cousin. These letters described the devastating effects Alex’s death had on his

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family. The State also highlighted that defendant admitted to being a member of the Latin Kings

and was on parole when he committed this offense.

¶ 74 In mitigation, defendant submitted a letter from his fiancée, Luisa Avena, who claimed that

defendant was “100% innocent and ha[d] been wrongfully accused,” and that he “had been a law

abiding citizen prior to this unfortunate incident.” Avena gave examples of defendant helping

family, friends, and neighbors as evidence of his good character. She also explained that defendant

had a difficult upbringing but decided to leave “street life” and focus on his work and family.

¶ 75 In allocution, defendant insisted that he was asleep at home when Alex was murdered.

Defendant claimed that Galindo lied about knowing him and that “the State manipulated the case

against [him] and fabricated evidence.” Defendant maintained that he was innocent but expressed

condolences to Juana for the loss of her son.

¶ 76 The court stated that it considered all the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation.

As aggravating factors, the court highlighted defendant’s multiple prior felony convictions,

defendant being on parole at the time of Alex’s murder, and the need to deter others from

committing “senseless gang-motivated crime[s].” The court orally summarized the mitigating

evidence in defendant’s PSIs, including his uncle’s murder and father’s arrest, his mental health

issues, and his struggles with substance abuse. The court merged the two first degree murder counts

and sentenced defendant to 60 years in prison for first degree murder, plus 26 years on each of the

attempted first degree murder counts. The sentences for attempted murder ran concurrently with

each other but consecutively to the sentence for murder, for a total of 86 years in prison.

¶ 77 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentences, which the trial court denied.

¶ 78 Defendant timely appealed.

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¶ 79 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 80 On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions,

the trial court’s decision to give IPI Criminal No. 3.15 without modifications, and his sentences.

¶ 81 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 82 Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

because Alfredo and Galindo’s identifications of him were unreliable.

¶ 83 “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” People v. Harvey, 2024 IL 129357, ¶ 19. We review the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State and draw all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. Id.

¶ 84 As charged here, a defendant commits first degree murder when he “kills an individual

without lawful justification [and] in performing the acts which cause the death,” the defendant

“either intends to do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will

cause death to that individual or another.” See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2016). Both first degree

murder counts in this case also alleged that defendant personally discharged a firearm. A defendant

commits attempted first degree murder if he “does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward

the commission of” first degree murder. Id. § 8-4(a).

¶ 85 “A single, positive identification by someone who had ample opportunity to observe the

offender is sufficient to support a conviction.” People v. Conway, 2023 IL 127670, ¶ 18. Illinois

courts evaluate eyewitness identification testimony using the Biggers factors, which are (1) the

opportunity of the witness to view the offender at the time of the offense, (2) the witness’s degree

of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s description of the offender, (4) the witness’s degree

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of certainty in identifying the defendant, and (5) the length of time between the offense and the

identification. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 567. Courts also consider the totality of the circumstances

because eyewitnesses often make identifications based on overall impressions rather than specific

features. People v. Middleton, 2018 IL App (1st) 152040, ¶ 22.

¶ 86 1. Opportunity to View

¶ 87 A witness’s ability to view the offender is the most important factor in the reliability

analysis, but it is not dispositive. People v. Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220494, ¶ 32. Variables

such as distance, lighting, and length of time can affect the witness’s opportunity to view the

offender. Id. The question is “whether the witness was close enough to the accused for a sufficient

period of time under conditions adequate for observation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

People v. Tomei, 2013 IL App (1st) 112632, ¶ 40.

¶ 88 Alfredo and Galindo saw defendant in the truck’s front passenger seat as the truck

approached the Saldanas’ driveway and just as defendant began shooting. Alfredo saw defendant

from two to four feet away. Galindo saw defendant’s face for one to two seconds. It was nighttime

and dark outside, but photographic evidence established that a streetlight was directly over the area

where Alfredo and Galindo saw the truck and illuminated the entire street with bright white light.

¶ 89 Importantly, both eyewitnesses knew defendant prior to this incident. Alfredo recognized

defendant from seeing him earlier that day. Galindo knew defendant from school and recognized

his face tattoos. The photo arrays show that defendant had a tattoo of the state of Illinois between

his eyes and another tattoo under his left eye. Furthermore, both men knew defendant’s nickname,

“Car Car.” Therefore, Alfredo and Galindo viewed and identified an acquaintance with a

distinctive appearance, not a stranger. Dr. Loftus testified that witnesses can identify acquaintances

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more easily and more quickly than strangers. Alfredo and Galindo’s familiarity with defendant

supports a finding that their identifications of him were reliable. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 2015

IL App (1st) 131103, ¶ 74 (identification sufficient where eyewitness knew defendant’s nickname

and had met him “on multiple occasions” over the past two to three years); People v. Sullivan, 366

Ill. App. 3d 770, 783 (2006) (identification sufficient where eyewitness had seen the defendant

“plenty of times” and identified him by his nickname on the night of the crime).

¶ 90 Defendant argues that Alfredo and Galindo’s familiarity with defendant made their

identifications of him less reliable, not more. Dr. Loftus testified that if a witness expects to see a

certain person, the witness is more likely to believe they saw that person, even if they did not.

Defendant implies that because Alfredo and Galindo knew defendant and had seen him recently,

they incorrectly assumed he was the shooter. But that argument views the evidence in the light

most favorable to defendant. As explained above, Dr. Loftus also testified that familiarity with a

person makes it easier for a witness to identify that person quickly. Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the State, Alfredo and Galindo knowing defendant and interacting with him

recently made it more likely that they could recognize him in the span of a few seconds. The jury

could accept Dr. Loftus’s testimony and still find Alfredo and Galindo’s identifications reliable.

¶ 91 Defendant also contends that Alfredo and Galindo saw the shooter under poor lighting

conditions for only a few seconds. It is true that Alfredo and Galindo’s opportunity to see defendant

was brief, but “[t]he brevity of a witness’s opportunity to view, by itself, will not discredit an

identification.” See People v. Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 45. The amount of time

eyewitnesses saw the offender is just one factor that a factfinder can consider in weighing

testimony. Id. We have found identifications sufficient when the eyewitnesses saw the defendant

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for five seconds or fewer. Id. Counting seconds as “one one thousand, two one thousand” illustrates

how a seemingly brief period can in fact be enough time to recognize someone’s face. People v.

Macklin, 2019 IL App (1st) 161165, ¶ 30.

¶ 92 Defendant suggests that a backlighting effect from the streetlight would have obscured

defendant’s face in shadow. But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as

we must, the streetlight would have been shining down on top of the truck as it passed the Saldanas’

house, illuminating defendant’s head and face from the top, not the back. Accordingly, a rational

jury could conclude that this Biggers factor weighed in favor of reliability.

¶ 93 2. Degree of Attention

¶ 94 The second Biggers factor concerns the degree of attention the eyewitnesses paid to the

offender. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 567.

¶ 95 On the night of the shooting, Alfredo and Galindo were wary of a truck circling the

Saldanas’ block. They had just seen that truck near Miguel’s house when they tried to confront

him about a threatening video he posted to Snapchat. Moreover, Alfredo had been involved in a

confrontation with defendant that morning. These incidents were alarming enough that four

Saldana family members went to the police station just before the shooting. This evidence

supported an inference that Alfredo and Galindo’s awareness was heightened when the truck

approached the Saldanas’ house. As Dr. Loftus explained, an intermediate degree of stress or

nervousness can improve a witness’s memory.

¶ 96 We acknowledge that defendant’s use of a firearm and the stress of this event may have

diminished the attention Alfredo and Galindo paid to defendant’s face during the shooting.

“[R]esearch on eyewitness identification shows that the presence of a weapon commands an

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eyewitness’s attention and diminishes the ability of the eyewitness to describe or recognize the

offender, a phenomenon known as the weapon-focus effect.” Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220494,

¶ 33 (citing Jonathan M. Fawcett, Kristine A. Peace, & Andrea Greve, Looking Down the Barrel

of a Gun: What Do We Know About the Weapon Focus Effect?, 5 J. of Applied Res. in Memory

and Cognition, 257, 261 (2016)). It is reasonable to think that Alfredo and Galindo were not

looking at defendant’s face the entire time he was discharging a firearm toward them. In fact, both

men testified that they ducked for cover after defendant opened fire. Nevertheless, a reasonable

jury could find that Alfredo and Galindo paid attention to defendant’s face in the moments leading

up to when he opened fire, then ducked and lost sight of him. That scenario would permit reliable

identifications of defendant.

¶ 97 3. Accuracy of Description

¶ 98 Evidence of the third Biggers factor was sparse. The video recording of Galindo’s police

interview reflects that he accurately described defendant’s beard and forehead tattoo of Illinois.

However, Galindo also claimed that defendant had long hair, which he did not. Nevertheless, the

partial inaccuracy of one eyewitness’s statement does not warrant reversing the jury’s verdict

because “[w]here the witness makes a positive identification, precise accuracy in the preliminary

description is not necessary.” See Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 131103, ¶ 75.

¶ 99 4. Degree of Certainty

¶ 100 Recent cases have questioned the validity of this factor, but it remains part of the Biggers

analysis. Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 220494, ¶ 53. At trial, Galindo expressed certainty that

defendant was the shooter. Therefore, what little evidence exists on this factor weighs in favor of

reliability.

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¶ 101 5. Length of Time

¶ 102 The final Biggers factor examines the time between the offense and the identification. Id.

¶ 58. Alfredo and Galindo identified defendant in police interviews on the night of the shooting

and in photo arrays the following evening, less than 24 hours after the shooting. This factor weighs

in favor of reliability.

¶ 103 Defendant argues that the hours between the shooting and defendant’s identification in the

photo arrays gave Alfredo and Galindo “the opportunity to confer with each other.” Defendant

implies that Alfredo and Galindo encouraged each other to identify defendant as the shooter even

though that identification was mistaken or false. But there is no evidence that Alfredo and Galindo

had such discussions. This theory is defendant’s speculation about what might have happened

when Alfredo and Galindo were together at the police station. At most, it is an inference drawn

from the timeline of Alfredo and Galindo’s interactions with police. But we cannot draw inferences

in defendant’s favor on appeal. See Harvey, 2024 IL 129357, ¶ 19.

¶ 104 Finally, defendant makes a somewhat underdeveloped argument that the photo arrays

suggested that Alfredo and Galindo should pick the man they recognized, defendant, over

strangers. Alfredo and Galindo identified defendant as the shooter before police prepared the photo

arrays, so police could not exclude defendant from the photo arrays just because Alfredo and

Galindo knew him. The point of the photo arrays was to determine whether Alfredo and Galindo

could identify defendant’s face. They could and did.

¶ 105 We acknowledge that Alfredo and Galindo’s testimony featured several inconsistencies

and contradictions. For example, Alfredo testified that the truck approached the Saldanas’ house

from the north, traveling southbound. The Saldanas’ house was on the east side of Division Street,

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so if Alfredo was correct, then the truck’s front passenger—the shooter—would have been on the

far side of the truck. We do not understand how Alfredo and Galindo, who were on the east side

of the street in front of the Saldanas’ house, could have seen defendant brandishing a firearm from

the truck’s passenger-side window, which faced west. Also, Alfredo and Galindo testified that

defendant began shooting when the truck was directly in front of the Saldanas’ driveway, three to

four feet from Alfredo. However, police recovered cartridge cases between 58 and 227 feet north

of the Saldanas’ driveway and none in front of the driveway. Alfredo and Galindo’s accounts

arguably do not match the physical evidence. Moreover, Alfredo and Galindo claimed they saw

Nick in the truck’s rear passenger seat, but the truck police recovered did not have a rear passenger

seat. However, the jury was responsible for resolving conflicts in the evidence. People v. Epstein,

2022 IL 127824, ¶ 21. We cannot usurp the jury’s role. People v. Weeks, 2011 IL App (1st) 100395,

¶ 27. The jury was free to accept Alfredo and Galindo’s identification of defendant even though

their accounts may not have been entirely accurate or consistent. See Middleton, 2018 IL App (1st)

152040, ¶ 26.

¶ 106 The evidence in this case was not overwhelming, but when we view it in the light most

favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational jury could find that defendant was the shooter.

See id. ¶ 23. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions over his challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence.

¶ 107 B. IPI Criminal No. 3.15

¶ 108 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by giving IPI Criminal No. 3.15 without his

proposed modifications.

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¶ 109 Jury instructions convey the law that applies to the evidence before the jury. People v.

Ortiz, 2017 IL App (1st) 142559, ¶ 50. If an applicable IPI exists, the trial court must use it unless

the court finds that the IPI does not accurately state the law. Id. (citing People v. Pollock, 202 Ill.

2d 189, 211-12 (2009)); Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013). If appropriate, a non-IPI instruction

must be accurate, simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument. Ortiz, 2017 IL App (1st)

142559, ¶ 50. The instructions as a whole must not be misleading or confusing. Id. We review a

trial court’s decision on which jury instructions to give for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse

of discretion in the refusal of a non-IPI occurs only where there is no IPI instruction applicable to

the subject on which the jury should have been instructed and the jury was, therefore, left to

deliberate without proper instructions.” Id. (citing People v. Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d 409, 432-34

(1995)).

¶ 110 A trial court should give IPI Criminal No. 3.15 “when identification is an issue,” as it was

in this case. See IPI Criminal No. 3.15. Illinois courts have consistently held that the five Biggers

factors listed in IPI Criminal No. 3.15 “are an accurate statement of the law ‘for assessing the

reliability of identification testimony.’ ” Polk, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 109 (quoting Piatkowski, 225 Ill.

2d at 567); see also Middleton, 2018 IL App (1st) 152040, ¶ 22. Because IPI Criminal No. 3.15

accurately stated the law, the trial court was required to use it. See People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d

52, 81 (2008); Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013). The trial court’s decision to give IPI Criminal

No. 3.15 without modifications was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 111 Ortiz guides our reasoning. In Ortiz, the defendant proposed the following non-pattern

instruction:

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“Although nothing may appear more convincing than a witness’s categorical identification

of a perpetrator, you must critically analyze such testimony. Such identifications, even if

made in good faith, may be mistaken. Therefore, when analyzing such testimony, be

advised that a witness’s level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of

the reliability of the identification.” Ortiz, 2017 IL App (1st) 142559, ¶ 47.

The last two sentences are identical to the instruction defendant proposed in this case. And like in

Ortiz, defendant argued that IPI Criminal No. 3.15 was outdated and contrary to the scientific

evidence concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony. See id. The Ortiz court rejected that

argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision not to give the defendant’s non-IPI language. Id.

¶ 51. We reach the same conclusion.

¶ 112 Defendant cites Lerma for the proposition that IPI Criminal No. 3.15 does not accurately

state the current law or science of eyewitness identifications. In Lerma, our supreme court held

that the trial court should have allowed the defendant to call an expert witness, Dr. Loftus, to testify

regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 25. The court

explained that defendants should be able to challenge eyewitness identifications using scientific

evidence because recent research showed that eyewitness identifications are often unreliable. Id. ¶

24. The court “recognize[d] that such research is well settled, well supported, and in appropriate

cases a perfectly proper subject for expert testimony.” Id. We agree, and that is why it was

appropriate for defendant to call Dr. Loftus in this case.

¶ 113 However, Lerma did not hold that IPI Criminal No. 3.15 misstates the law, nor did it replace

Biggers as the standard of eyewitness identification reliability in Illinois. In fact, Lerma did not

discuss jury instructions at all. Furthermore, IPI Criminal No. 3.15 was amended in July 2017,

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approximately a year and half after the supreme court decided Lerma, and the committee did not

change the five Biggers factors listed in the instruction. On the contrary, the committee notes state

that IPI Criminal No. 3.15 “lists factors well-established by case law.” IPI Criminal No. 3.15.

¶ 114 Defendant also argues that Dr. Loftus’s testimony supported modifying IPI Criminal No.

3.15. We disagree. The jury heard Dr. Loftus’s testimony regarding the factors that influence

eyewitnesses’ memory and identifications. Defendant was free to argue how those factors applied

to this case and the jury was free to consider those arguments. There was no need to give Dr.

Loftus’s opinion testimony the force of law by incorporating it into a jury instruction.

¶ 115 Defendant claims that Dr. Loftus “analy[zed] the strength of [Alfredo and Galindo’s]

identifications” and found them to be unreliable. That is inaccurate. On direct examination,

defendant asked Dr. Loftus to analyze a “hypothetical” drive-by shooting with facts similar to this

case as a roundabout way of suggesting that Alfredo and Galindo’s identifications were unreliable.

But on cross-examination, Dr. Loftus confirmed that he “ha[d] no opinion as to whether the eye

witness identification[s] in this case [were] accurate or inaccurate.”

¶ 116 Also inaccurate is defendant’s claim that his “proposed amendments to the IPI instruction

follow well established Illinois case law.” None of the cases defendant cites in support of this claim

approved such modifications to IPI Criminal No. 3.15. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 376 Ill. App. 3d

511, 516-27 (2007); People v. Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d 465, 468 (2003). Accordingly, we affirm

the trial court’s use of IPI Criminal No. 3.15.

¶ 117 C. Sentence

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¶ 118 Finally, defendant contends that his de facto life sentence is excessive because the trial

court did not consider his rehabilitative potential or mitigating factors such as his difficult

childhood.

¶ 119 A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing a defendant and we will not overturn its

sentencing decision unless the trial court abuses its discretion. People v. Colone, 2024 IL App (1st)

230520, ¶ 134. The trial court must consider all applicable factors in aggravation and mitigation,

but we will not reverse its decision just because we would have weighed those factors differently.

Id. ¶¶ 134-135.

¶ 120 In this case, the sentencing range for first degree murder was 20 to 60 years (see 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2016)) plus a 25-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm (see

id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii)). Therefore, defendant’s sentencing range for first degree murder was 45

to 85 years. Defendant’s 60-year sentence is in the middle of this range. The sentencing range for

attempted first degree murder was 6 to 30 years as a Class X felony (see id. § 5-4.5-25(a); 720

ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West 2016)) plus a 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm

(see 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C) (West 2016)). Therefore, defendant’s sentencing range for attempted

first degree murder was 26 to 50 years. Defendant received the minimum sentence, 26 years, on

both counts of attempted first degree murder. Because all of defendant’s sentences are within the

statutory ranges, they are not excessive unless they greatly vary from the spirit and purpose of the

law or are manifestly disproportionate to the offenses. Colone, 2024 IL App (1st) 230520, ¶ 135.

¶ 121 The most important factor in sentencing is the seriousness of the offense. People v.

Hussain, 2024 IL App (1st) 230471, ¶ 44. In this case, the seriousness of the offense cannot be

overstated. Defendant shot and killed an unarmed 14-year-old boy for no apparent reason while he

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was standing in his own driveway. Alex’s murder alone would support a sentence of up to 85

years. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a), 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2016).

¶ 122 Although defendant did not kill Galindo or Alfredo, the attempted murder offenses were

serious as well. The truck in which defendant was a passenger circled the Saldanas’ block before

the shooting, suggesting that defendant was targeting the Saldanas and waiting for an opportunity

to open fire. In addition, defendant fired multiple times toward a group of people. That is an

inherently dangerous act that suggests callous indifference to who is injured or killed. Defendant’s

sentences do not vary from the spirit and purpose of the law or disproportionate to the offenses.

See Colone, 2024 IL App (1st) 230520, ¶ 135.

¶ 123 Defendant suggests that his troubled childhood lessens his culpability for this offense.

Specifically, defendant contends that he became involved in gang violence not “because he was

evil or irreparably depraved” but “because this was what he had been exposed to at a young age.”

The trial court was aware of the family tragedies defendant experienced at a young age, such as

his uncle’s murder and his father’s incarceration. The court discussed those factors in its ruling.

The record establishes that the trial court considered the mitigating factors defendant presented.

We will not reweigh those factors. See id. ¶¶ 134-135.

¶ 124 Defendant also contends that “the record does reflect his rehabilitative potential,” pointing

to “his efforts to remove himself from the Latin Kings.” We disagree. The record indicates that

defendant is more likely to reoffend than rehabilitate. Defendant was convicted of four violent

felonies between 2011 and 2014. His four-year prison sentence in the 2011 cases did not deter him

from committing further violent crimes in 2014, and his six-year prison sentence in that case did

not deter him from murdering Alex in 2017, when defendant was still on parole. Defendant was,

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by his own admission, a gang member at the time of Alex Saldana’s murder. Even after his arrest

in this case, defendant allegedly committed offenses while in jail in 2018, 2019, 2021, and 2023.

The record shows that defendant commits violent offenses regardless of whether he has been to

prison before, is on parole, or is currently in custody. None of defendant’s sentences to this point

have deterred him from engaging in violent behavior as soon as he was out of custody, so we are

unpersuaded that defendant should receive yet another chance at release and rehabilitation.

¶ 125 Finally, defendant complains that the trial court did not acknowledge it was imposing a de

facto life sentence. Defendant cites no authority holding that a trial court failing to acknowledge

that it is imposing a de facto life sentence warrants resentencing. Accordingly, we affirm

defendant’s sentences.

¶ 126 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 127 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.

¶ 128 Affirmed.

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