Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller

124 F.2d 160, 140 A.L.R. 811, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4742
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedDecember 12, 1941
Docket9807
StatusPublished
Cited by50 cases

This text of 124 F.2d 160 (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160, 140 A.L.R. 811, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4742 (5th Cir. 1941).

Opinions

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

This is a suit to collect unpaid freight charges arising from shipments of onions consigned over appellant’s railways. The question for decision is the right of the consignor, more than two years and one day after his loss claims had been denied by the carrier, to assert by way of recoupment damage to the shipments caused by the negligence of the carrier. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the carrier in the amount of the unpaid freight charges, and found for the shipper in an equal amount as damages. This appeal is from the judgment entered on the verdict.

These were the established facts: Three cars of onions were delivered by the appellee to appellant’s originating carriers for shipment, and bills of lading were issued and accepted thereon for the original shipment and for each diversion thereof. The original, connecting, and delivering carriers participating in the transportation had on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission tariffs promulgating freight rates, and the charges here involved were in accordance with those tariffs. The onions were damaged and in an unsalable condition when delivery was attempted, and the consignee refused to accept them. They were sold by the delivering carrier at a greatly reduced price, and the proceeds were applied to the payment of the freight charges. The balance remaining due on the freight charges is the subject matter of this suit. Appellee filed written claims for loss occurring by reason of the damage to the consignments, all" of which were disallowed by the carrier prior to May 21, 1936. This suit was filed June 10, 1938.

Appellant contends that the recovery of damages by recoupment should not have been allowed, because the provisions of the bills of lading covering the shipments destroyed the carrier’s liability for such damages after two years and one day from the denial of the loss claims, and for the further reason that the claim for damages was barred by the two-year-and-one-day limitation provision of the bills of lading. The portion of the bills of lading relied upon required suits on such claims to be instituted against the carrier within two years and one day after notice in writing of the disallowance of the claim was given, and “where suits are not instituted thereon in accordance with” these provisions, “no carrier hereunder shall be liable, and such claims shall not be paid.”

The crux of this case lies in the distinction between an affirmative action for relief and a defense interposed in reduction or extinguishment of plaintiff’s cause of action. The cited portion of the bill of lading is a limitation upon the time within which suits to enforce the recovery of claims may be instituted, and limits the period of existence of an action for recovery against the carrier, but is not a limitation upon a defense by way of recoupment. Appellee’s answer set up the loss suffered by reason of the negligence of the carrier, but he sought no damages therefor; rather, he challenged the right [162]*162of the carrier in equity and good conscience to recover from him on the cause of action alleged.

The doctrine of recoupment was derived from the civil law, and was adopted as a part of the common law.1 Under it a defendant is entitled to claim, by way of deduction, all just allowances or demands accruing to him in respect of the same transaction that forms the ground of the action. This is not a set-off or counterclaim in the strict sense, because it is not in the nature of a cross demand, but rather it lessens or defeats any recovery by the plaintiff.2 It goes to the existence of plaintiff’s claim, and is limited to the amount thereof.3 Being a part of the common law of England in 1840, it was expressly adopted by the State of Texas where this contract was made, and has existed since in unimpaired form in that state.4

Recoupment goes to the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim; it is available as a defense, although as an affirmative cause of action it may be barred by limitation.5 The defense of recoupment, which arises out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, survives as long as the cause of action upon the claim exists.6 It is a doctrine of an intrinsically defensive nature founded upon an equitable reason, inhering in the same transaction, why the plaintiff’s claim in equity and good conscience should be reduced.7 Though appellee’s cause of action to recover affirmatively for the damages he sustained was cut off by the limitation in the bill of lading at the time this action was brought against him, his right to claim damages by way of recoupment remained. The defense was properly asserted and properly sustained. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
124 F.2d 160, 140 A.L.R. 811, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 4742, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pennsylvania-r-co-v-miller-ca5-1941.