COCHRAN, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court in which
KELLER, P.J., and
MEYERS, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY and ALCALA, JJ„ joined.
A Tarrant County jury convicted appellant of the murder of his wife. The trial [71]*71judge denied appellant’s motion to suppress his statements to police during custodial questioning at a hospital after a magistrate had given him his Article 15.17 rights.1 The trial judge rejected appellant’s claim that he had invoked both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel when he asked the magistrate for an appointed attorney but also said that he wanted to talk to the police who were standing outside the hospital room. On remand from this Court, the court of appeals, over a dissent, held that appellant had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel during the magistration process.2
We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to clarify the distinction after Montejo between the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel.3 Under Montejo, the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel is triggered by the Miranda warnings that police must give before beginning any custodial questioning. The Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel is triggered by judicial arraignment or Article 15.17 mag-istration. Both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel apply- to post-magistration custodial interrogation, but each is invoked and waived in exactly the same manner — under the Fifth Amendment prophylactic Miranda rules. We hold that, because appellant never invoked his right to interrogation counsel after the police gave him Miranda warnings, the trial judge did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
I.
A. Factual Background. .
Arlington paramedics responded to a 911 call and found appellant and his wife, Michelle, in their apartment, both bleeding from stab wounds. Michelle, who had been stabbed fifty-five times, died before the paramedics arrived. Appellant was taken to the hospital. A serrated kitchen knife with a seven-inch blade was found on the bathroom floor. Based on their initial investigation, detectives believed that appellant had killed Michelle and then stabbed himself. After several days, they obtained an arrest warrant. Then Detectives Nutt and Frias took Judge Maddock, a local magistrate, to appellant’s hospital room.
Judge Maddock testified at the suppression hearing that she normally performs magistration hearings at the Arlington City Jail, but she went to the hospital for appellant’s hearing, as she had done in some other cases, “due to the policy of the sheriffs office [that it will not] transfer ... a Defendant until he has been fully magis-trated.” The two detectives drove Judge Maddock to the hospital and entered appellant’s room with her. They all introduced themselves. Judge Maddock, who [72]*72was fluent in Spanish, told appellant, while pointing to the detectives, “They are here. They would like to speak to you.” Appellant either said yes or nodded.
The detectives then left the room and stood outside while Judge Maddock arraigned appellant. She read appellant a Spanish version of the Article 15.17 “Adult Warning Form,” although she had only an English version for him to sign.4 After reading appellant his rights, Judge Mad-dock asked if he “wantfed] a court appointed attorney. And he stated he did.” She then asked appellant, “Do you still want to talk to [the detectives]?” He said that he did. Appellant signed the Article 15.17 form acknowledging that he understood his rights.
Judge Maddock stated that, in her opinion, appellant’s decision to speak with the detectives was free and voluntary and there was “absolutely no coercion.” She believed that, when appellant asked for counsel, he was asking for trial counsel. She said that appellant never indicated that he wanted a lawyer to be present when detectives questioned him. Judge Maddock then went into the hall and told the detectives that appellant “had initially asked for a lawyer, but [that] she had been told by Mr. Pecina that he wanted to talk to them.” She gave the signed Article 15.17 form to the detectives, and she waited in the hallway.
Detectives Frias and Nutt then came back into appellant’s room. Det. Frias spoke Spanish and explained to appellant who they were and that they wanted to question him about his wife’s murder. Appellant said that he wanted to talk with them, so Det. Frias wrote, in Spanish, on the 15.17 form, “I asked for a lawyer, but also I wanted to speak with the Arlington police.” The officers told appellant that they would record the interview, and as they prepared their equipment, Det. Frias gave appellant the Miranda5 warnings orally in Spanish. The audio equipment malfunctioned at first, so Det. Frias orally warned Pecina again once the tape started. Appellant also signed a card that listed his Miranda rights in Spanish. At every point, appellant waived his Miranda rights. While taping the oral statement, Det. Frias wrote out a written version for appellant, and he signed it.6
[73]*73The detectives said that appellant never asked to stop the interview and never asked to speak with counsel. They denied making any promises, and they stated that they believed appellant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. After their interview, the detectives took Judge Mad-dock back to her office, and she began the process to appoint appellant’s trial counsel.
Appellant testified that, if an attorney had advised him not to speak with police, he would not have talked with them. The rest of his testimony dealt with whether he was advised that he could contact the Mexican Consulate.
The trial judge denied the motion to suppress. He found that appellant was fully informed of his rights and “indicated that although he did want a lawyer, that he wished to also talk with detectives from Arlington, meaning that he basically was waiving his rights at that time.”
B. Appellate History.
On original submission, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s murder conviction, finding that, when appellant agreed to speak with police in response to the magistrate’s question, he initiated contact with police.7 Appellant’s action waived both the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel, regardless of which he may have invoked.8 On discretionary review, we reversed, holding that, under Michigan v. Jackson, 9 appellant “had invoked his [Sixth Amendment] rights to counsel when arraigned by the magistrate at the hospital,” and appellant’s “yes” reply when the magistrate asked if he still wanted to talk with the police was insufficient to reinitiate contact and waive his previously invoked Sixth Amendment right.10 We remanded the case for the court of appeals to conduct a harm analysis.
While this case was pending in the court of appeals on remand, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson
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COCHRAN, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court in which
KELLER, P.J., and
MEYERS, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY and ALCALA, JJ„ joined.
A Tarrant County jury convicted appellant of the murder of his wife. The trial [71]*71judge denied appellant’s motion to suppress his statements to police during custodial questioning at a hospital after a magistrate had given him his Article 15.17 rights.1 The trial judge rejected appellant’s claim that he had invoked both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel when he asked the magistrate for an appointed attorney but also said that he wanted to talk to the police who were standing outside the hospital room. On remand from this Court, the court of appeals, over a dissent, held that appellant had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel during the magistration process.2
We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to clarify the distinction after Montejo between the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel.3 Under Montejo, the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel is triggered by the Miranda warnings that police must give before beginning any custodial questioning. The Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel is triggered by judicial arraignment or Article 15.17 mag-istration. Both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel apply- to post-magistration custodial interrogation, but each is invoked and waived in exactly the same manner — under the Fifth Amendment prophylactic Miranda rules. We hold that, because appellant never invoked his right to interrogation counsel after the police gave him Miranda warnings, the trial judge did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
I.
A. Factual Background. .
Arlington paramedics responded to a 911 call and found appellant and his wife, Michelle, in their apartment, both bleeding from stab wounds. Michelle, who had been stabbed fifty-five times, died before the paramedics arrived. Appellant was taken to the hospital. A serrated kitchen knife with a seven-inch blade was found on the bathroom floor. Based on their initial investigation, detectives believed that appellant had killed Michelle and then stabbed himself. After several days, they obtained an arrest warrant. Then Detectives Nutt and Frias took Judge Maddock, a local magistrate, to appellant’s hospital room.
Judge Maddock testified at the suppression hearing that she normally performs magistration hearings at the Arlington City Jail, but she went to the hospital for appellant’s hearing, as she had done in some other cases, “due to the policy of the sheriffs office [that it will not] transfer ... a Defendant until he has been fully magis-trated.” The two detectives drove Judge Maddock to the hospital and entered appellant’s room with her. They all introduced themselves. Judge Maddock, who [72]*72was fluent in Spanish, told appellant, while pointing to the detectives, “They are here. They would like to speak to you.” Appellant either said yes or nodded.
The detectives then left the room and stood outside while Judge Maddock arraigned appellant. She read appellant a Spanish version of the Article 15.17 “Adult Warning Form,” although she had only an English version for him to sign.4 After reading appellant his rights, Judge Mad-dock asked if he “wantfed] a court appointed attorney. And he stated he did.” She then asked appellant, “Do you still want to talk to [the detectives]?” He said that he did. Appellant signed the Article 15.17 form acknowledging that he understood his rights.
Judge Maddock stated that, in her opinion, appellant’s decision to speak with the detectives was free and voluntary and there was “absolutely no coercion.” She believed that, when appellant asked for counsel, he was asking for trial counsel. She said that appellant never indicated that he wanted a lawyer to be present when detectives questioned him. Judge Maddock then went into the hall and told the detectives that appellant “had initially asked for a lawyer, but [that] she had been told by Mr. Pecina that he wanted to talk to them.” She gave the signed Article 15.17 form to the detectives, and she waited in the hallway.
Detectives Frias and Nutt then came back into appellant’s room. Det. Frias spoke Spanish and explained to appellant who they were and that they wanted to question him about his wife’s murder. Appellant said that he wanted to talk with them, so Det. Frias wrote, in Spanish, on the 15.17 form, “I asked for a lawyer, but also I wanted to speak with the Arlington police.” The officers told appellant that they would record the interview, and as they prepared their equipment, Det. Frias gave appellant the Miranda5 warnings orally in Spanish. The audio equipment malfunctioned at first, so Det. Frias orally warned Pecina again once the tape started. Appellant also signed a card that listed his Miranda rights in Spanish. At every point, appellant waived his Miranda rights. While taping the oral statement, Det. Frias wrote out a written version for appellant, and he signed it.6
[73]*73The detectives said that appellant never asked to stop the interview and never asked to speak with counsel. They denied making any promises, and they stated that they believed appellant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. After their interview, the detectives took Judge Mad-dock back to her office, and she began the process to appoint appellant’s trial counsel.
Appellant testified that, if an attorney had advised him not to speak with police, he would not have talked with them. The rest of his testimony dealt with whether he was advised that he could contact the Mexican Consulate.
The trial judge denied the motion to suppress. He found that appellant was fully informed of his rights and “indicated that although he did want a lawyer, that he wished to also talk with detectives from Arlington, meaning that he basically was waiving his rights at that time.”
B. Appellate History.
On original submission, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s murder conviction, finding that, when appellant agreed to speak with police in response to the magistrate’s question, he initiated contact with police.7 Appellant’s action waived both the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel, regardless of which he may have invoked.8 On discretionary review, we reversed, holding that, under Michigan v. Jackson, 9 appellant “had invoked his [Sixth Amendment] rights to counsel when arraigned by the magistrate at the hospital,” and appellant’s “yes” reply when the magistrate asked if he still wanted to talk with the police was insufficient to reinitiate contact and waive his previously invoked Sixth Amendment right.10 We remanded the case for the court of appeals to conduct a harm analysis.
While this case was pending in the court of appeals on remand, the United States Supreme Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson — the very case that we relied on in holding that appellant’s invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the magistration hearing rendered his subsequent waiver of the right to counsel for the police-initiated interview invalid — in Montego v. Louisiana.11 However, the court of appeals held that, even after Montego, appellant’s statements should have been suppressed because he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to an interrogation attorney by asking the magistrate for an appointed lawyer.12 We granted review to discuss the distinct Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel after Monte-jo and to apply those differences to custodial interrogation.
[74]*74II.
Over the past four decades, the jurisprudence concerning the Fifth Amendment right to counsel during police interrogation and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all “critical” stages of criminal proceedings had become intertwined in complex and confusing ways. It was increasingly difficult for courts to determine which right can be invoked when and whether invocation of the right to counsel under one amendment invoked the right to counsel under the other amendment. Finally, in Montejo, the United States Supreme Court disentangled the two right-to-counsel constitutional provisions and clarified their separate purposes and applications by overruling Michigan v. Jackson and reaffirming the bright-line rule of Miranda and Edwards.13 As Justice Scalia noted in his Montejo conclusion,
This case is an exemplar of Justice Jackson’s oft quoted warning that this Court “is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added. We today remove Michigan v. Jackson’s fourth story of prophylaxis.14 ”
We examine how the lessons of Montejo apply in this case, one that is factually very similar to Montejo.15
A. The Fifth Amendment Right to Interrogation Counsel.16
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from compelling a criminal [75]*75suspect to bear witness against himself.17 In Miranda v. Arizona,18 the Supreme Court crafted safeguards to protect this “privilege against self-incrimination” in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations.19 Before questioning a suspect who is in custody, police must give that person Miranda warnings. Only if the person voluntarily and intelligently waives his Miranda rights, including the right to have an attorney present during questioning, may his statement be introduced into evidence against him at trial.20
Under Edwards v. Arizona,21 once a person invokes his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by merely showing that the suspect responded to police-initiated interrogation after being advised of his rights again.22 The purpose of the Edwards rule is to “prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”23 That prophylactic rule protects the suspect — who has made the decision not to speak to law-enforcement officers without his lawyer and clearly communicated that decision to the police — from further police badgering.24 In Montejo, the Supreme Court again praised the “clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement profession” that Edwards provides.25
It is the police officer or other law-enforcement agent who administers Miranda warnings, and he does so immediately before custodial interrogation.26 Thus, the police must give the Fifth Amendment Miranda warnings during the process of custodial interrogation but be[76]*76fore questioning actually begins.27 But, as the Supreme Court noted in McNeil v. Wisconsin,28 it has never accepted the notion of an “anticipatory” invocation of Miranda rights (1) given by someone other than law-enforcement officers or other state agents; or (2) outside the context of custodial interrogation.
We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipa-torily, in a context other than “custodial interrogation” — which a preliminary hearing will not always, or even usually, involve.... Most rights must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with similar future effect.29
Thus, in Montejo, the Supreme Court stated that, under its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, “a defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings.”30 And if he does invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, “not only must the immediate contact [by police] end, but ‘badgering’ by later requests is prohibited.”31
Once formal adversary proceedings begin, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in exactly the same way as the Fifth Amendment right applies [77]*77to custodial interrogation.32 Thus, Miranda warnings serve the arrestee’s interests in both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel during custodial interrogations conducted after a person has been formally charged. Because the “doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver,”33 both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to interrogation counsel are fully encompassed by the Fifth Amendment Miranda doctrine.
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial Counsel.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches once the “adversary judicial process has been initiated,” and it guarantees “a defendant the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.”34 We refer to this Sixth Amendment right with the shorthand term “trial counsel.” Generally, an Article 15.17 initial appearance and magis-tration marks the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings in Texas and “plainly signals” the attachment of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.35
In Michigan v. Jackson, the Supreme Court had held that “if police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.”36 That is the rule that the Supreme Court explicitly overruled in Montejo because it was deemed “unworkable,” “superfluous,” and a “policy driven” doctrine whose “policy is being adequately served through other means.”37
Furthermore, the Jackson rule simply did not take account of the practical realities and goals of the arraignment event and its relationship to the separate event of custodial interrogation. When a person is brought before a magistrate, told that [78]*78he is formally accused of committing a crime, and asked if he wants a lawyer to represent him in those criminal proceedings, that is an entirely different question from whether he wants a lawyer to be with him during any police questioning. A defendant’s response, “Yes, I want a lawyer,” is fatally ambiguous because it may mean “I want a lawyer for these judicial proceedings,” or “I want a lawyer before I talk to the police,” or “I want a lawyer for all purposes and I do not want to say anything more to anyone — you or the police — until I have one.”38
As Montejo concluded, this ambiguity is easy to resolve: a Sixth Amendment request for an attorney at an arraignment, initial appearance, or Article 15.17 hearing is a request for the guiding hand of counsel for all judicial criminal proceedings. If the defendant also wishes to invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the “critical stage” of post-arraignment custodial interrogation,39 he may certainly do so. But he does so by invoking that right to counsel, pursuant to Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick when law enforcement or other state agents embark upon custodial interrogation.40
Thus, both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel during custodial interrogation depend upon the same thing: “What matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during the interrogation — not what happened at any preliminary hearing.”41
Distilled to its essence, Montejo means that a defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel at his Article 15.17 hearing says nothing about his possible invocation of his right to counsel during later police-initiated custodial interrogation. The magistration hearing is not an interrogation event. An uncharged suspect may invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel (and a defendant who has been arraigned may invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel) for purposes of custodial interrogation when the police or other law-enforcement agents approach him and give him his Miranda warnings. That is the time and place to either invoke or waive the right to counsel for purposes of police questioning.
C. Standard of Review
In reviewing claims concerning Miranda violations and the admission of statements made as the result of custodial interrogation, we conduct the bifurcated [79]*79review articulated in Guzman v. State.42 We afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and on application of law to fact questions that turn upon credibility and demeanor while we review de novo the trial court’s rulings on application of law to fact questions that do not turn upon credibility and demeanor.43
However, the Supreme Court has held that, in deciding whether an accused “actually invoked his right to counsel,” reviewing courts must use an objective standard “[t]o avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations^]”44 The accused “must unambiguously request counsel” during a custodial interrogation; thus, “he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”45 We view the totality of circumstances from the viewpoint of the objectively reasonable police officer conducting custodial interrogation.
With that general background, we turn to the present case.
III.
In this case, there were two separate events: magistration followed by a custodial interrogation.46 Judge Maddock conducted the magistration and gave appellant his Article 15.17 warnings in Spanish. Appellant told her, “I want a lawyer, but I also want to speak with the Arlington Police.” In her opinion, appellant asked for the appointment of a trial attorney, but he wanted to talk to the police who were standing right outside the hospital door. She did not believe that appellant invoked his right to counsel for purposes of custodial interrogation.47 As a neutral magistrate, acting in her judicial capacity, she concluded that appellant was willing to talk to the police officers without counsel.48 [80]*80The detectives then entered and gave appellant his Miranda warnings in Spanish three separate times. At no time did he hesitate, invoke his right to an attorney at that interview, or ask the officers to stop their questioning. The officers concluded that appellant freely, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel during their questioning. There is nothing in the record that would contradict them conclusion.
Under the totality of these circumstances, we agree with the trial judge that an objective and reasonable police officer, conducting a custodial interrogation, would conclude that appellant had voluntarily waived both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel for purposes of the custodial questioning by Detectives Frias and Nutt. Because appellant was in custody at the time the police questioned him, he had a Fifth Amendment right to counsel if he wished to invoke it. Because formal adversary proceedings had begun against appellant and were triggered by Judge Maddock’s raagistration, he had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel if he wished to invoke it. He could invoke either or both in precisely the same manner — by telling the officers, after they gave him the Miranda warnings, that he wished to have an attorney before speaking to them. He did not do so. He, therefore, waived both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel during custodial interrogation.49
A majority of the court of appeals, in its opinion, acknowledged the Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo, and stated that “Miranda and Edwards are still the law for suspects in custody subjected to police interrogation.... To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the police may not initiate custodial interrogation of a suspect who has previously requested assistance of counsel.” Not exactly. Under Montejo, and following Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick, the correct statement is, “To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the police may not continue or re-initiate custodial interrogation of a suspect who has previously requested assistance of counsel after the police informed him of his right to counsel at the beginning of a custodial interrogation.” 50 Judge Maddock’s magistration did not trigger any Fifth Amendment right concerning custodial interrogation; that was done by the detectives at the beginning of their interrogation.
Justice Holman, in his dissenting opinion in the court below, correctly noted that “the ‘Miranda-Edwards regime’ does not apply to ‘non interrogative types of [81]*81interaction between the defendant and the State.’ ”51 He stated that both the Supreme Court decision in Montejo and our post-Montejo decision in Hugheri52 make it clear that “whatever occurred at [appellant’s] preliminary hearing did not even implicate Edwards because Pecina had not yet been approached for interrogation nor had he ever unambiguously expressed his desire to deal with the police only through his attorney.”53 Further, Justice Holman correctly noted, “now that the Montejo court has overruled Jackson, neither a defendant’s request for counsel at arraignment or similar proceeding nor appointment of counsel by a court gives rise to a presumption that any subsequent waiver by a defendant to police-initiated interrogation is invalid.”54 We agree with this analysis.
Because, under Montejo, appellant never invoked his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel during custodial interrogation, we conclude that the trial judge properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress his statements made as a result of that police questioning. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
ALCALA, J., filed a concurring opinion in which JOHNSON, J., joined.
PRICE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.