The State of Texas v. Christian Hernandez Rodriguez

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 14, 2025
• Docket: 13-24-00411-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00411-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,

v.

CHRISTIAN HERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 103RD DISTRICT COURT OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting appellee Christian

Hernandez Rodriguez’s motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2020, Hernandez was indicted for continuous sexual abuse of a young child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). On September

14, 2023, Hernandez filed a motion to suppress, asserting any statements he made to

law enforcement “were involuntary and were coerced and enticed” and that he was

deprived of his “right to counsel” because he “did not make an intelligent and knowing

waiver of that right.” He further argued that he signed a Miranda waiver “because he

believed the promise that it would be better for him to agree with the officer.” On August

14, 2024, the trial court held a pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress.

At the hearing, Investigator Eli Cano testified that while he was a criminal

investigator for the Cameron County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO), he interviewed Hernandez.

According to Cano, while he transported Hernandez to the sheriff’s office, he did not make

any promises or threats, did not pressure Hernandez, and did not coerce Hernandez into

making a statement at any time. Cano stated that he provided Hernandez with his Miranda

warnings prior to the interrogation by reading off a “Miranda Warning and Waiver” form,

that Cano understood the warnings, and that Cano waived his rights by signing the waiver.

A copy of the waiver was admitted into evidence.

A video recording of the interrogation was admitted into evidence, and the following

is depicted. Cano began by asking if Hernandez was named Christian, and Hernandez

nodded yes. Cano then introduced himself and stated that he was going to read

Hernandez his Miranda warnings and waiver first. He asked whether Christian was

Hernandez’s first name, and Hernandez responded, “Yeah.” Cano asked if he had a

middle name or what last name he went by, and Hernandez responded, “Hernandez.”

The following transpired:

Cano: You mentioned earlier Rodriguez, something?

2 Hernandez: Yeah, Rodriguez is also my middle name.

Cano: So you go by Christian Rodriguez Hernandez?

Hernandez: No, Hernandez is first.

Cano: Christian Hernandez.

Hernandez: Yes.

Cano: And then Rodriguez, or just like that?

Hernandez: Yeah, and then Rodriguez, but they usually just call me Christian Hernandez.

Cano: Your date of birth Christian?

Hernandez: Um. August five two thousand two.

Cano: So you’re eighteen, right?

Hernandez: Yeah.

Cano: Before I ask you any questions, I’m going to make sure you understand your rights.

Cano advised Hernandez of his Miranda rights by reading from the form verbatim

and pointing out each warning with his index finger as he read. After Cano finished the

last warning, he then told Hernandez, “You can say, you know what Investigator I don’t

want to talk [any]more. You can. You don’t have to. I can’t force you to. If you understand

those, initial one through five please.” Hernandez asked if he should initial “C.H.,” and

Cano said, “Yeah, just however you initial, just initial one through five.” Again, Hernandez

asked if he should initial “C.H. or C.H.R.” Cano responded, “However you do it.”

Hernandez initialed the Miranda warnings. Then Cano stated, “This is what you

call a waiver,” proceeded to read the waiver portion verbatim, and asked “Clear?”

Hernandez nodded his head up and down in affirmance. Thereafter, Hernandez

3 answered nearly all of Cano’s questions in English in an almost hour-long interview.1

At the hearing, Hernandez testified that he moved to the United States when he

was in sixth grade and knew zero English; he did not begin learning English until he was

in eighth grade. It was not until high school that he began to practice English. According

to Hernandez, although he made Cs and Ds in school, all his teachers helped him earn

promotion to the next grade level though he acknowledged that he made an 82 in English

II, 85 in English III, 87 in World History, and 85 in U.S. History. Hernandez testified that

he failed out of college in his first semester because he fell behind in online classes during

COVID in high school.

Regarding the Miranda warnings that Cano read him, Hernandez testified that he

did not know the meaning of some of the terms and instead confused them with common

meanings. He testified that he confused “right” in “the right to remain silent” with

answering questions correctly; “statement,” which he confused with writing an essay;

“court of law,” which he confused with an actual room; “present”, which he confused with

a gift; “terminate,” which he confused with the Terminator movie; and “subject,” which he

confused with school subjects. He testified that he did not know the meaning of the words

“remain silent,” “may be used against you,” “trial,” “against,” “consult” “attorney,” “to advise

you prior,” “employ,” “appointed,” “waiver,” “consult,” “coercion,” and “threat.”

Although Hernandez signed the waiver, he claimed he did not know what he was

signing. According to Hernandez, on the way to sheriff’s office, Cano told him that if

Hernandez signed the waiver, Hernandez would be able to go back home. Hernandez

claimed that Cano told him if Hernandez “played the deny cards, [Cano] wouldn’t be able

1 Hernandez did answer a couple of questions in Spanish.

4 to help [Hernandez] out.” Hernandez trusted Cano and did not think that Cano would

harm him. Hernandez said he “just wanted to go back home,” so he signed the waiver.

The trial court granted Hernandez’s motion to suppress, and the State requested

findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court made the following findings: (1) on

route to the sheriff’s office, Cano promised Hernandez that the court “would help

[Hernandez] if he made a statement” and “would be able to go home,” but without making

a statement, the court “would not help him”; (2) during the interrogation Cano “stood up

and hovered physically over [Hernandez] to read him his Miranda rights”; (3) Cano took

twenty seconds to read the Miranda rights; (4) Cano did not understand any of the legal

terminology at the time he signed the waiver; (5) the Miranda warning and waiver were

signed within two minutes; (6) although the waiver had a “witness signature requirement”

a witness was absent, resulting in an unverified document; (7) Hernandez believed

signing the waiver would help him and did not understand the legal consequences; and

(8) Hernandez did not sign it freely and voluntarily without promises, threats, or coercion.

The State appealed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (granting the State

the right to an interlocutory appeal of a granted motion to suppress).

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The State argues that the trial court erred in granting Hernandez’s motion to

suppress because he “spoke and clearly understood English throughout the video-

recorded interview,” and the investigator “did not have reason to believe that [Hernandez]

did not understand English at the time of interview as he now claims.” The parties dispute

whether this interrogation was the product of a custodial interrogation, so we assume for

purposes of this analysis that Hernandez was subject to a custodial interrogation, such

5 that Cano needed to comply with Miranda requirements.

A. Article 38.22

Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure establishes procedural

safeguards for securing the privilege against self-incrimination. See id. art. 38.22. It

provides that no oral statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation

shall be admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless (1) the statement

was recorded and (2) prior to the statement but during the recording, the accused was

warned of his rights and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. Id.

art. 38.22, § 3. The warning must inform a defendant of the following rights:

(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial;

(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court;

(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during any questioning;

(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and

(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time.

Id. art. 38.22, § 2; see also United States v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The

statute contains two distinct elements pertaining to a statement’s admissibility: the

defendant’s receipt of the prescribed warning and his waiver of the rights set out in the

warning. Appellant does not assert that he was not warned of his rights. Instead, he states

that he did not clearly understand the rights when he waived them and that he was

coerced into making a confession.

The State has the burden of showing that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and must prove waiver by a preponderance of the

6 evidence. Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[A] waiver need

not assume a particular form and, in some cases, a ‘waiver can be clearly inferred from

the actions and words of the person interrogated.’” Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler,

441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). To evaluate whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we turn to the standard outlined in Joseph. See id.

at 25. The waiver “must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free

and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and “must have

been made with full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the

consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,

21 (1986)). “Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals

both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly

conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This

approach requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding interrogation as

well as consideration of the defendant’s experience, background, and conduct. Id.

B. Standard of Review

In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress statements made as a

result of custodial interrogation, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Pecina v. State,

361 S.W.3d 68, 78–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85,

89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). We review the ruling considering the totality of the

circumstances, giving almost total deference to the trial court on questions of historical

fact, as well as its application of law to fact questions that turn on credibility and

demeanor. Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 79; Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011). But we review de novo the trial court’s rulings on questions of law and mixed

7 questions of law and fact that do not depend on credibility determinations. Pecina, 361

S.W.3d at 79; Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349. We view the record in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s ruling and reverse the judgment only if it lies outside the zone of

reasonable disagreement. Hereford v. State, 339 S.W.3d 111, 118 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011).

C. Discussion

In this case, the warnings read to Hernandez made him fully aware of the rights

set forth in Miranda and Article 38.22, as well as the consequences of abandoning those

rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2.

Although the trial court found that Hernandez had “a limited understanding of the English

language,” at the time of the interview, the record does not support this finding. See

Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (declining to give “almost

total deference” to the trial court’s findings where the videotape did not pivot “on an

evaluation of credibility and demeanor”). Hernandez testified that he graduated from high

school with “Bs” and was admitted to college (although he failed his course). Furthermore,

the video unequivocally demonstrates that Hernandez comprehended all of Cano’s

interrogation questions and answered them in English coherently and appropriately. At

no time did he ask for an interpreter or that the interview be stopped. See Joseph, 309

S.W.3d at 26. Aside from the form Miranda warnings, Cano explained to Hernandez: “You

can say, you know what Investigator I don’t want to talk [any]more . . . You don’t have to.

I can’t force you to.” When Cano asked Hernandez if the waiver portion was clear to him,

Hernandez nodded his head affirmatively and proceeded to waive his rights. Immediately

after being warned by Cano that he did not have to make a statement, Hernandez willingly

8 participated in an almost hour-long interview in English. Thus, there is nothing in the video

indicating that Hernandez’s educational background or mental capabilities prevented him

from understanding Cano. See Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 27; see also Linton v. State, 275

S.W.3d 493, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“[I]n keeping with the notion that the question

on appeal is whether the defendant received due process rather than a perfect

translation,” “100% comprehension” is “not the constitutional requirement.”). In fact,

Hernandez elaborated several responses—curtailing the trial court’s finding that he

lacked an understanding of the language. Furthermore, Hernandez signed the

acknowledgment form indicating that he understood them. See Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at

26; see also Rojas v. State, No. 12-03-00016-CR, 2004 WL 626178, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Tyler Mar. 30, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding the trial

court did not err in denying the motion to suppress where law enforcement testified that

appellant understood the English language and that he had no trouble communicating in

English).

Additionally, the trial court’s finding that Hernandez’s confession was not “without

promises, threats, or coercion” is not supported by the record. See id. Here, there is

indisputable video evidence that there was no intimidation, coercion, physical or

psychological pressure from Cano to elicit statements during the interview. See Miller v.

State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“[W]hen evidence is conclusive, such

as . . . ‘indisputable visual evidence,’ then any trial court findings inconsistent with that

conclusive evidence may be disregarded as unsupported by the record, even when that

record is viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling”); Leza, 351 S.W.3d at

349 (“Before it may be said that a waiver of a Miranda right is involuntary, however, there

9 must be some element of official intimidation, coercion, or deception.”); Carmouche, 10

S.W.3d at 332 (declining to defer to the trial court’s finding because “the videotape

presents indisputable visual evidence contradicting essential portions of [the subject]

testimony”); Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“Appellant

did not raise any disputed factual issue under Article 38.23 concerning the legality of

obtaining his statement because there was no evidence of the type of police coercion or

overreaching envisioned by the Supreme Court.”). Additionally, Hernandez seemed calm

during the interview and did not show any signs of duress. Cf.Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at

170‒71 (collecting cases involving police overreaching). Therefore, the evidence does

not support the trial court’s finding that Hernandez’s confession was the product of

threats, intimidation, or coercion. See Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 26.

In sum, we conclude the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that

Hernandez “lacked a legal understanding of the individual words and combination of the

words in the Miranda Warning and waiver” or that he did not sign it without promises,

threats, or coercion. See id.; see also Alvarado-Gutierrez v. State, No. 01-16-00756-CR,

2017 WL 4413948, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 5, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, we conclude that the totality of the

circumstances here does not support the trial court’s determination.2 We sustain the

State’s issue.

2 At the motion to suppress, Hernandez had direct communication exchanges in English with the

State, his counsel, and the trial court, which reflects Hernandez’s ability to communicate effectively. See Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding appellant not denied due process when direct exchanges with trial judge during hearing on motion to suppress reflected appellant's ability to communicate effectively).

10 III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment, and we remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion.

JAIME TIJERINA Chief Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 14th day of August, 2025.