AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed May 7, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00488-CR No. 05-23-00491-CR
JACQUES DSHAWN SMITH, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 196th District Court Hunt County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 34630CR; 36631CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Garcia, Breedlove, and Kennedy Opinion by Justice Breedlove
We withdraw the opinion of April 30, 2024. The following is now the
opinion of this Court.
Jacques Dshawn Smith appeals his convictions for murder. Appellant pleaded
guilty pursuant to a plea bargain and was sentenced to life imprisonment in Cause
No. 34630CR and thirty-five years’ imprisonment in Cause No. 34631CR.
Appellant brings one issue on appeal contending the trial court erred by denying
appellant’s motion to suppress statements elicited in a custodial interrogation by law enforcement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A) (in plea-bargain case, a defendant
may appeal “those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on
before trial”). Appellant asserts on appeal that he was prevented from making a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights due to an intellectual disability.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.22. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 13, 2022, appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress statements
made to law enforcement during a custodial interrogation on the basis that
appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated because appellant did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights because of an intellectual
disability.
On January 6, 2023, and January 20, 2023, the trial court conducted hearings
on the suppression motion. Haley Blackwood, Ph.D. testified for appellant. Dr.
Blackwood testified as an expert on individuals with disabilities and their ability to
understand Miranda warnings. Dr. Blackwood tested appellant to determine, based
upon appellant’s specific intellectual disabilities, whether he would be capable of
understanding oral and written Miranda warnings. Although Dr. Blackwood had
testified before as an expert witness in other courts, she had not previously testified
regarding a defendant’s ability to comprehend Miranda warnings because the issue
does not come up often. Dr. Blackwood further testified that to understand the oral
–2– and written Miranda warnings administered to appellant in this case, one would need
to have the ability to understand approximately an eighth grade level.
Dr. Blackwood testified that she had reviewed numerous records of appellant,
including educational records and previous testing done on appellant. Dr.
Blackwood affirmed that appellant has a longstanding history of an intellectual
disability. She testified that the testing administered by her is the “gold standard” in
determining a person’s ability to understand Miranda warnings. Dr. Blackwood
stated the purpose of the test was to evaluate appellant’s “understanding of the nature
of the right and the consequences being abandoned.” After testing, Dr. Blackwood
determined that appellant’s reading and listening comprehension were
approximately the level of a second grade child. Dr. Blackwood opined that given
appellant’s well-documented history of mental impairment, the manner the oral
warnings were administered to appellant, the fact that the warnings require someone
to have at least an eighth grade level of verbal and oral comprehension to fully
understand them, that appellant did not possess the ability to knowingly and
intelligently waive his rights.
During cross-examination by the State, Dr. Blackwood conceded that this
testing protocol was fairly new, and she was not aware of any court having accepted
this test. She also conceded that this was her first time to testify as an expert about
this subject. Dr. Blackwood testified that appellant did have prior involvement with
law enforcement, but that research suggested that prior experience with law
–3– enforcement did not improve an individual’s ability to comprehend Miranda
warnings.
Dr. Blackwood reviewed the videos of the interrogation of appellant and
admitted that during the questioning, appellant responded appropriately to the topic
of discussion. At the conclusion of her testimony, Dr. Blackwood agreed to provide
to the trial court and the State citations to the peer review studies that accept as valid
the tests she administered to appellant.
The trial court continued the suppression hearing on January 20, 2023. The
only witness to testify for the State was Ranger Chad Matlock. Matlock was the lead
investigator on the murders for which appellant is accused. Matlock interviewed
appellant on two separate occasions. Matlock testified that in both interviews,
appellant responded appropriately to the questions asked and that Matlock never
doubted that appellant understood what he was communicating and that appellant’s
responses to the questions were appropriate and logical. Matlock stated he has
interviewed “a significant amount of people” during his career, has encountered
defendants who did not appropriately respond to questions due to intoxication or
mental defect, and that he never felt during questioning that appellant fell into one
of those two categories. Matlock further testified that after he questioned appellant,
detectives from Mississippi attempted to interview appellant and that appellant
refused to speak with them.
–4– On cross examination, Matlock admitted that during his interviews with
appellant, he said more than once that he did not think appellant was understanding
what he was saying. He admitted he has not had any training in identifying people
with developmental disabilities. He also admitted that during his interview with
appellant, appellant stated approximately thirteen times that he did not wish to speak
with Matlock.
The trial court denied the suppression motion and issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law on April 4, 2023. The trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law signed April 3, 2023 included the following:
The Defendant stated “I don't want to talk about that” when asked questions about an aggravated robbery.
The Defendant was then asked questions regarding the instant offense.
The Defendant answered preliminary questions regarding the instant offense without asserting his Miranda rights.
The Defendant said several times during the February 5, 2020 interview that he did not want to talk about the instant offense, but continued to answer questions on other topics.
The Defendant was again interviewed on February 7, 2020 by Ranger Matlock.
The Defendant was again read his MirC1ndC1 rights by Ranger Matlock.
The Defendant stated that he understood his Miranda rights.
The Defendant then answered background questions without invoking his Miranda rights. –5– On May 18, 2023, appellant entered a plea of guilty in each case pursuant to
a plea bargain. The trial court accepted the plea bargains and sentence appellant in
accordance with the plea bargains. The trial court certified that appellant had the
right to appeal from the denial of the suppression motion. On May 23, 2023, the trial
court submitted additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on the suppression
motion.
In one issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in denying the motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement due
to his documented intellectual disability and inability to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. In response, the State argues that the law,
both state and federal, does not support the position that just because someone has
low IQ, they cannot make knowing and intelligent waivers of their Miranda rights.
The State also argues that it presented ample evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings and conclusions that appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of
his Miranda rights.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. E.g., Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 78–79 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). We
afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on questions of fact and
questions involving the application of law to fact that turn upon a witness’s
–6– credibility and demeanor. Id. at 79. We review de novo the trial court’s rulings on
pure questions of law and questions involving the application of law to facts that do
not turn upon a witness’s credibility and demeanor. Id. “As the sole trier of fact
during a suppression hearing, a trial court may believe or disbelieve all or any part
of a witness’s testimony.” See State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013); Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An
appellate court examines the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. See id. A trial court will abuse its discretion only if it refuses to suppress
evidence that is obtained in violation of the law and that is inadmissible under Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23. See id.
When, as here, the trial court has made express findings of fact, an appellate
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to those findings and determines
whether the evidence supports the fact findings. See State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d
1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). “We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if that ruling is ‘reasonably
supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.’”
Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447–48.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
The United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment provides suspects in
custody a privilege against self-incrimination and a right to interrogation counsel.
Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 74–75. Miranda and article 38.22 require that a defendant be
–7– given specific warnings in order for statements resulting from custodial interrogation
to be admissible. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.22. The purpose of Miranda warnings is to “guard against abridgement of the
suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.” McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 506
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Article 38.22 section 3 provides that an oral statement is
admissible against a defendant in a criminal proceeding if, among other things,
(1) the statement was electronically recorded; (2) the defendant was given the
warnings set out in article 38.22 section 2(a) prior to the statement but during the
recording; and (3) the defendant “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waived
the rights set out in the warnings. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3(a).
“The warnings provided in Section 2(a) are virtually identical to the Miranda
warnings, with one exception—the warning that an accused ‘has the right to
terminate the interview at any time’ as set out in Section 2(a)(5) is not required by
Miranda.” Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citations
omitted); see also Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 527 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005) (observing that article 38.22 “requires a slightly more elaborate set of
warnings than Miranda and adds the requirements of either a written, signed
statement or an audio or video recording of custodial interrogations by law
enforcement”).
The State bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights under
–8– Miranda and article 38.22. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349, 351 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011); Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In determining
whether a valid waiver occurred, we consider whether (1) the relinquishment of the
right was voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception; and (2) the waiver was made with
full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon it. Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 25. Only if the “totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and
the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that a defendant
waived his rights. Id. The “totality-of-the-circumstances approach” requires the
consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including the
defendant’s experience, background, and conduct. Id.
While not alone determinative, evidence of mental impairment is a factor to be
considered by the factfinder in evaluating voluntariness. Oursbourn v. State, 259
S.W.3d 159, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Umana v. State, 447 S.W.3d 346, 350
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). A confession is involuntary if
the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the confessor did not make the
decision to confess of his own free will. Id. at 351.
IV. DISCUSSION
Appellant asserts that his waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing and
voluntary because he was limited by his intellectual disability. Although appellant’s
–9– motion to suppress alleged that the officers engaged in “forms of behavior akin to
bribery,” appellant does not argue on appeal that his waiver was involuntary due to
coercive police conduct. Thus, appellant’s contention that his Miranda and/or Due
Process rights were violated is foreclosed. A confession is involuntary “only when
there is police overreaching.” Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 169; Umana, 447 S.W.3d
at 350. “Absent police misconduct causally related to the confession, there is no
deprivation of due process of law by a state actor and therefore no violation of the
Due Process Clause.” Cevantes-Guervara v. State, 532 S.W.3d 827, 833 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 170;
Umana, 447 S.W.3d at 350). Likewise, Miranda protects against government
coercion to surrender Fifth Amendment rights. Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 170;
Umana, 447 S.W.3d at 350. However, even if appellant had argued the issue of
coercion on appeal, the record before us is devoid of any evidence of police coercion.
Unlike a claim of involuntariness under Miranda, appellant’s claim that his
waiver of rights under article 38.22 was involuntary need not be predicated on
evidence of police overreaching. See Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 352. Under the totality of
the circumstances test, many factors, including intellectual disability, may be
relevant in determining whether a defendant’s waiver of rights under Article 38.22
was voluntary—the product of his free and deliberate choice. See Oursbourn, 259
S.W.3d at 172–73; Williams v. State, 502 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). “[T]he waiver must be made with a full awareness both
–10– of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it.” Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349 (internal citations omitted).
The question is whether the accused’s mental impairment is so severe that he
is incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession. See Casias
v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). A defendant’s mental
condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, will never require
a conclusion of involuntariness. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164
(1986). Thus, while not alone determinative, mental impairment or intellectual
disability is a factor in ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession. See Penry v.
State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
It is undisputed that Matlock advised appellant of his Miranda and statutory
rights. Appellant expressly waives his rights on the video recording. It also is
undisputed that during the recording, appellant makes incriminating statements
regarding his role in various crimes.
At the suppression hearing, Dr. Blackwood testified as to appellant’s mental
impairment. She discussed the results of her testing of appellant and opined that
appellant’s reading and listening comprehension were approximately the level of a
second grade child.1
1 In his brief, appellant argues this Court should hold the trial court erred in refusing to accept Dr. Blackwood’s assessment based on her testing because the State offered no competing evidence, regardless of the fact that no other courts have yet accepted the methodology used by Dr. Blackwood to determine appellant’s comprehension skills. However, because the trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole judge of
–11– Appellant’s evidence does not establish a mental impairment so severe that he
was incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession. The court
of criminal appeals has routinely upheld the voluntariness of confessions given by
defendants with mental deficiencies more severe than those of appellant. See Penry,
903 S.W.2d at 746 (admitting confession of mentally retarded defendant who could
not read or write and had IQ ranging from forties to seventies); Casias, 452 S.W.2d
at 488 (admitting confession of mentally retarded defendant who could not read or
write and had IQ of 68 and mental age of eight to ten years). Here, there was evidence
from Matlock that appellant appeared to understand and respond appropriately,
evidence that appellant actually exercised his right to remain silent in at least one
other case, and the trial court’s own ability to observe the demeanor and responses
of appellant. Further, appellant never testified that he had any issues understanding
his rights. Aside from the testimony of Dr. Blackwood that suggested that appellant’s
comprehension level was below that of the level required to understand the Miranda
warnings, appellant provides no evidence that he did not understand the meaning of
the warnings and the effect of his confession.
Appellant’s counsel presents the argument that because Dr. Blackwood
opined that appellant has the oral and reading comprehension skills of a child whose
age would preclude criminal prosecution under the laws of this state that he should
the witnesses’ credibility, we need not determine whether the trial court erred in failing to accept Dr. Blackwood’s methodology. See Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273; Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458. –12– be found incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights. This
argument is problematic for several reasons. Even if the court were to accept as true
Dr. Blackwood’s opinion, a person’s reading and listening comprehension skill level
is no indication of one’s actual maturity or knowledge, especially when considering
a person’s prior encounters with law enforcement, a fact that the trial court was
permitted to consider. Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 25. Appellant has provided no case
law, and this Court has found none, that would require courts to treat adult offenders
with comprehension deficits as if they were juveniles.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
motion to suppress as there is support in the record for the trial court’s
determinations of voluntariness. We must give deference to the trial court’s factual
finding that appellant’s waiver of his rights during the recorded statement was the
“free will” or “free choice” of appellant. The evidence does not reflect any
overreaching or misconduct on the part of the police, and appellant does not argue
that any occurred. See Umana, 447 S.W.3d at 356. The evidence shows that Matlock
advised appellant of his Miranda rights and article 38.22 statutory rights; appellant
had the basic reasoning skills to understand them, and voluntarily waived them;
appellant did not give any indication that his educational background or mental
capabilities prevented him from understanding Matlock’s questions.
Accordingly, we conclude the totality of the circumstances here support the
trial court’s determination that any alleged mental impairment of appellant did not
–13– render him incapable of understanding the meaning and effect of his waiver and
confession and, thus, that both were voluntarily made. See Umana, 447 S.W.3d at
351. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s
motion to suppress and admitting appellant’s recorded statement.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/Maricela Breedlove/ MARICELA BREEDLOVE JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
230488F.U05
–14– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JACQUES DSHAWN SMITH, On Appeal from the 196th District Appellant Court, Hunt County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 34630CR. No. 05-23-00488-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Breedlove. Justices Garcia and THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Kennedy participating.
We VACATE the judgment of April 30, 2024. The following is now the judgment of the Court. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered May 7, 2024
–15– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JACQUES DSHAWN SMITH, On Appeal from the 196th District Appellant Court, Hunt County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 34631CR. No. 05-23-00491-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Breedlove. Justices Garcia and THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Kennedy participating.
We VACATE the judgment of April 30, 2024. The following is now the judgment of the Court. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
–16–